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Abstention-Under the Pullman Doctrine a Federal
District Court May Not Abstain from Determining the
Constitutionality of a State Statute Unless Sufficiently
"Persuasive"' Reasons Are Articulated for Deferring
to State Adjudication.
Lister v. Lucey
I. Introduction
The abstention doctrine grants a federal court the discretion to postpone
adjudication of a matter properly within its jurisdiction in order to effect a
balance between the rights of an individual litigant and the interests of the state
judiciary. When the objectives of federalism underlying abstention allow this
deference for state proceedings to work inequitably, a critical review of the
abstention is necessary. Lister v. Lucey presented the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit with such a situation. Although the Seventh Circuit discussed at
length the reasons supporting a firm limitation of abstention, the court hesitated
to promulgate specific guidelines thus minimizing the precedential value of its
opinion.
II. Statement of Facts
In October, 1971, four state university students brought a class action in
the Federal District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin contesting the
constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute' which classified students as residents or
* 575 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1978).
1 Wis. STAT. ANN §§ 36.16, 36.16(l) (a), (ab), (ae)v'(3) (West 1966) provides in pertinent part:
36.16 Nonresident tuition at university: [exceptions] (1) (a) Any adult student who
has been a bona fide resident of the state for one year next preceding the beginning
of any semester for which such student registers at the university, or any minor
student whose parents have been bona fide residents of the state for one year next
preceding the beginning of any semester for which such student registers at the
university, or any minor student whose natural parents are divorced or legally
separated who has resided substantially in this state during his years of minority and
at least one year next preceding the beginning of any semester for which such student
registers at the university; or whose mother or father has been a bona fide resident
for one year next preceding the beginning of any semester for which such student
registers at the university, or any minor student who is an orphan and who has
resided substantially in this state during his years of minority and at least one year
next preceding the beginning of any semester for which such student registers at the
university or whose legal guardian has been a bona fide resident for one year next
preceding the beginning of any semester for which such student registers at the university, or any minor student under guardianship in this state pursuant to ch. 48 or
319 who has resided substantially in this state during his years of minority and at
least one year next preceding the beginning of any semester for which such student
registers at the university or whose legal guardian if a person has been a bona fide
resident of the state for one year next preceding the beginning of any semester for
which such student registers at the university, shall while he continues a resident of
the state be entitled to exemption from nonresident tuition, but not from incidental
or other fees and tuition in the university.
(ab) Nonresident members of the armed forces who are stationed in this state and
their wives and children shall be entitled to the exemptions provided in par. (a)
during the period that such member of the armed forces is stationed in this state.
(ae) Any female who marries a bona fide resident shall be entitled to the exemptions
341
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nonresidents for the purpose of determining tuition. The original complaint
alleged that the statute deprived the plaintiffs of their civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.2 Subsequently, in December, 1972, the plaintiffs amended their
complaint3 to contest the constitutionality of the statute on two additional
grounds: vagueness, 4 and arbitrary and irrational administration.' Over a year
later the district court determined that proper adjudication of the plaintiffs'
constitutional claim required a state court clarification of the statutory language
in question. The district court, therefore, abstained on the authority of Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.6 and retained jurisdiction awaiting the state
court interpretation.
The plaintiffs chose not to appeal the abstention order7 and immediately
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Dane County, Wisconsin. In May,
1974, the plaintiffs' state claim was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The state circuit court reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust the
legislative claims procedure which was an established prerequisite to the commencement of a suit in the Wisconsin courts.8 The plaintiffs appealed this
decision and simultaneously returned to the federal forum with a motion to
vacate the district court's stay order since no speedy means for clarification remained in the state system.'
provided in par. (a) effective the semester following her marriage and while continuing to reside in this state.
(3) In determining bona fide residence, filing of state income tax returns in Wisconsin, eligibility for voting in the state of Wisconsin, motor vehicle registration in
Wisconsin, and employment in Wisconsin shall be considered. Notwithstanding the
provisions of par. (1) (a), a student from another state who is in this state principally to obtain an education will not be considered to have established a residence
in Wisconsin by virtue of attendance at educational institutions.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3 The plaintiffs filed two amended complaints. The first added several defendants, including those then serving as Governor of Wisconsin, Regents of the University of Wisconsin,
the President of the University of Wisconsin and the Chancellor, Registrar, Residency Examiner, and members of the Committee on Appeals from Non-Resident Tuition of the University of Wisconsin, Madison. campus. All the defendants were sued in both their individual
and official capacities and the Regents were also sued as a collective body. 575 F.2d at 1328.
4 The concept of "vagueness" or indefiniteness of a statute rests on the constitutional
principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication.
Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
5 An "arbitrary act" or decision is one that is arrived at through the exercise of will or
by caprice, one supported by mere option or discretion and not by a fair or substantial reason.
Bedford Inv. Co. v. Folb, 79 Cal. App. 2d 363 180 P. 2d 361, 362, (1947).
6 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
7 An abstention order has been determined to be sufficiently final for the purpose of
appeal. Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 F. 2d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1974).
8 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 285.01 (West 1958) provides:
Actions against state, bond. Upon the refusal of the legislature to allow a claim
against the state, the claimant may commence an action against the state by service
as provided in § 262.06(3) and by filing with the clerk of court a bond, not exceeding $1,000, with two or more sureties, to be approved by the attorney-general, to
the effect that he will indemnify the state against all costs that may accrue in such
action and pay to the clerk of court all costs, in case he shall fail to obtain judgment
against the state.
9 The plaintiffs also argued that a recent and very similar case offered sufficient clarification of the statute in question. In that case, Hancock v. Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin, 61 Wis.
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The federal court motion was still pending two years later, when the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court ruling. The plaintiffs again
moved to vacate the abstention order because no feasible means for clarification
remained. The district court, nevertheless, refused to hear the case stating that
"the reasons for abstention were undiminished"'" and that the plaintiffs must
bear the burden of their improper pursuit of state remedies.
Upon dismissal by the district court, Lister v. Lucey came before the Seventh

Circuit. On appeal, the court considered two main issues rooted in the application of the federal abstention doctrine: (1) the appropriateness of the district

court's initial abstention and (2) the district court's de facto requirement that
the plaintiffs exhaust state non-judicial remedies before seeking relief in the

federal courts. Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case
for a determination on the merits.
III. The Propriety of the Initial Abstention
In Lister, the plaintiffs exercised their right under § 28 U.S.C. 134311 to

contest the validity of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute in the federal
forum. The federal judiciary has an inherent obligation to adjudicate such controversies.'

An exception to this obligation arises, however, when an accurate

interpretation of a state legal question may substantially facilitate the disposition
of a case.'" If a claim presents a significant question of state law, the judicial
doctrine of "abstention" empowers a federal court to retain jurisdiction yet postpone adjudication pending state clarification of that issue.' 4
This exception to the exercise of federal jurisdiction gained prominence in
the landmark decision of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. 5 The
plaintiff in that case contested a state railroad commission order as a violation of
both Texas law and the federal Constitution. The Federal District Court of Texas
enjoined the order. Subsequently, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
Justice Frankfurter, a major proponent of the abstention doctrine and the author
of the Pullman opinion, described the district court's action as an improper
interference in a matter which in the best interest of federalism and equitable ad2d 484, 213 N.W.2d 45 (1973), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held, however, the claim not
justiciable without discussing whether the plaintiff had made a claim to the legislature pursuant
to § 285.01.
10 575 F.2d at 1332.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1948) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person: . . . (3) to redress the deprivation, under
color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act
of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
See note 2 supra.
12 The federal courts have been held to have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction given them. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976). See also England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964); Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264- (1821).
13 280 F. Supp. 938.
14 See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW oF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (3rd ed. 1976).
15 312 U.S. 496. See also Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
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judication demanded the perspective of a state tribunal. The Supreme Court,
therefore, instructed the federal court to "stay its hand '""e in deference to the independent state process. The Court characterized such restraint as imperative to
the harmonious interaction of the federal and state judiciaries.
The Wisconsin district court perhaps sought to exhibit such restraint by
abstaining in Lister. The Pullman doctrine, however, purports to be a very
narrow exception to the federal judiciary's jurisdictional obligation and demands
very specific circumstances in order that its operation will not thwart its equitable
purpose." The original Pullman decision, for instance, insisted that the abstention doctrine should be invoked only where "easy and ample means" for clarification were readily available in the state courts.' The importance of this prerequisite has been repeatedly emphasized by decisions illustrating the adverse
effects accompanying abstention. Cases involving Pullman indicate that the doctrine has been consistently plagued by concomitant problems of delay, expense
and piecemeal adjudication. 9 A federal court should only invoke abstention,
therefore, when proper adjudication obviously necessitates, and the state system
clearly affords, clarification.
The statute challenged in Lister, however, did not present a situation appropriate for Pullman abstention as the availability of clarification was not
evident. 20 Rather, the Lister case fell into a category of circumstances described
in Pullman and subsequent holdings, as particularly inappropriate for abstention.2 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit found "relatively unpersuasive" the
district court's conclusion that certain ambiguities in the Wisconsin statute
required state clarification. 21 Even if such vagueness existed, however, a substantial body of case law has established that abstention is inappropriate in cases,
such as Lister, in which the statute is challenged as vague in the abstract. 2
Finally, the Seventh Circuit criticized the alternative statutory construction
proffered by the district court as implausible.2 4 Although the court's construction
would, indeed, provide a basis for abstention by suggesting ambiguity within the
broad statutory language, such an interpretation appears wholly unfounded.
The Seventh Circuit's outline of the faulty logic underlying the district
court's abstention amply buttressed its decision to reverse. Lister, then, is
actually a narrowly drawn opinion which hinges solely upon the abstention issue
16 312 U.S. at 501.
17 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Allegheny County v. Mashuda Co., 360 U.S.
185 (1959).
18 312 U.S. at 501.
19 E.g., 375 U.S. 411 (delay and expense); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (piecemeal adjudication); Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)
(seven
years' delay).
20 575 F.2d at 1332.
21 See 280 F. Supp. 938.
22 575 F.2d at 1332.
23 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
24 The district court suggested that the broad language of § 36.16 (3) might be
construed to require that males who marry bona fide female residents are entitled to residency
status as are females who marry bona fide male residents. The Seventh Circuit found that
such a broad construction is unsupported by the language of the statute and would render
unnecessary § 36.16 (1) (ae) thereby violating fundamental principles of statutory construction. 575 F.2d at 1333. See also Johnson v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 672, 251 N.W.2d 834
(1977).
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for disposition. As such, the case basically represents a remonstration of a federal
court's abuse of discretion.
IV. The Potential for Limitation of Pullman
The Seventh Circuit did not limit its discussion in Lister to the dispositive
abstention issue, but extended it to encompass a more specific procedural
question. Essentially, the district court's dismissal in Lister created a requirement
that, upon abstention, the federal litigant exhaust state non-judicial remedies,
such as the legislative claims procedure, if the state courts refuse to clarify the law
until those non-judicial remedies are pursued. This provocative ruling allowed
mere procedural prerequisites to eclipse the rights of a federal litigant. Thus, the
district court's ruling in Lister clearly raised a question concerning the proper prerequisites for regaining the federal forum after the abstention doctrine has been
invoked. Specifically, Lister squarely presented the issue whether this unprecedented extension of Pullman abstention could, under any circumstances,
further the doctrine's original goals of judicial economy and equitable adjudication.
The Seventh Circuit's analysis focused on the consequences which would
result from an imposition of the exhaustion requirement, such as delay and piecemeal adjudication. The exhaustion requirement, in essence, forces a plaintiff to
pursue all available "legislative" or "administrative" remedies before presenting
a claim in the courts. This principle operates expediently when nonjudicial
proceedings dispose of a particular claim completely and competently." Exhaustion of such remedies, however, may not provide the judicial clarification
sought by abstention. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged, therefore, that a
concurrent imposition of the exhaustion requirement and federal abstention
would result in unwarranted delay and resort to a process which could not grant
the requested'relief. As further support, the court noted that the inequity worked
by such delay has even been held to outweigh the need for clarification in appropriate circumstances.26 The Seventh Circuit's reasoning, then, logically leads
to the conclusion that a procedural prerequisite perpetuating delay without the
possibility of affording clarification should never be required.
In addition to these problems of adjudication, the court examined the current trend toward the abolition of exhaustion in § 1983 cases." The Supreme
Court affirmed this trend by specifically holding that a requirement of exhaustion
in § 1983 cases would circumvent the expedient equitable solution sought by the
statute.2" The litigant's right to contest a deprivation of his civil rights in the
federal forum, then, is imperative to the determination of a § 1983 action. In
25 See generally J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 153 (1938); Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 537
(1974).
26 575 F.2d at 1333. See Mayor v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1973);
375 U.S. 411. But see Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
27 Devlin v. Sosbe, 465 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
28 McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). See generally CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., Ist Sess. 390 (1871). See also 365 U.S. 167, 172-87 (discussion of the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act).
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the Lister case, this right had already been postponed by the district court's
abstention. Although the abstention doctrine cannot be wholly excised as a
procedural alternative in § 1983 cases,29 there is no ascertainable reason for
further dissipation of the litigant's right to federal jurisdiction. The requirement
of exhaustion would have that precise effect, and therefore contradicts contemporary judicial policy in § 1983 actions.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit recognized the absence of substantial comity
concerns which normally reinforce an abstention order.3" The state trial court in
Lister evinced total disinterest in the opportunity to determine the statutory question posed by the case. The Seventh Circuit noted that if the state judiciary had
a significant interest in the resolution of the Lister question, the state supreme
court could have exercised its inherent authority to hear the case absent the procedural prerequisites. Furthermore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reacted indifferently to the district court's explicit request for a construction of the statute.
The factors outlined in the Seventh Circuit opinion stress the need for a
precise limitation of the expansion of Pullman doctrine created by the Wisconsin
district court. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit failed to provide new direction
in the area. The court specifically acknowledged the "powerful case" that these
reasons presented for promulgating a general rule against prolonging abstention
when a state court requires exhaustion;31 however, it stopped short of establishing any concrete procedural reform. Rather, the court stated that it "need not go
so far here,"3 thereby relegating its pointed discussion to mere dicta.
Undeniably, the Lister court could not have used unfettered discretion in
establishing new limits on abstention. In view of recent Supreme Court rulings,
for example, the Seventh Circuit could not have abrogated the application of
abstention in § 1983 cases altogether.3 It could, however, have conformed with
current judicial policy declaring the exhaustion requirement wholly inappropriate
in § 1983 cases such as Lister. 4 Despite the Seventh Circuit's refusal to rule on
this ground alone, the court clearly evinced an interest in limiting the district
court's discretion to deny a litigant his right to the federal forum. Yet by not
providing a decisive resolution to this conflict, the Lister court lost an opportunity
to effect a valuable limitation. The unrealized potential of Lister suggests that
the Seventh Circuit did not fulfill its judicial obligation to provide fundamental
guidelines in such an unrefined area of the law as abstention.
V. The Right to Abstain and the Obligation to Adjudicate:
A Proposed Balance
The narrow holding rendered in Lister u. Lucey reveals strong strains of
judicial conservatism. The opinion was effective to the extent that it focused on
the impropriety of the district court's initial abstention. Lister, however, involved
29
30
31
32
33
34

Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
575 F.2d at 1332.
Id.
Id.
See text accompanying note 29 supra.
See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
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an extraordinary example of federal judicial procrastination which the courts of
appeal, upon review, cannot continue to ignore. An establishment of reasonable
guidelines designed to preclude future recurrences of the Lister problem is
essential. Such reform could easily have been accomplished by the Seventh
Circuit since several alternatives are suggested by a reexamination of the origin
and development of the abstention doctrine.
Theoretically, the Pullman doctrine seeks clarification in order to effect
equitable adjudication and judicial economy as well as the furtherance of federalism."5 To realize these goals in a situation such as Lister, therefore, the
Seventh Circuit should require district courts to make a specific finding of fact
that the clarification sought through abstention could be easily and amply
provided by the state courts. A party opposing the abstention should have the
right to appeal such an assertion. Since an abstention order has already been
held to be a sufficiently final determination for the purposes of an appeal,3" this
avenue would simply be extended to encompass an additional basis of nonexpedient clarification. If the federal court can confidently ascertain, in this
initial stage, not only that the appropriate grounds for abstention exist but that
the state court can completely and fairly dispose of the issue, the federal court
should dismiss the action and direct the plaintiff to the state court without an
anticipation of returning to the federal forum. As a procedural safeguard, the
dismissal should be without prejudice so that the litigant's right to a judicial
forum is not irretrievably canceled."
Although such guidelines may shock the ardent advocates of the right to a
federal forum, they offer an honest, practical alternative to the inequitable federal forum-shuffling evinced in Lister v. Lucey. The promulgation of such guidelines would emphasize the substantial obligation of a federal district court to
direct a jurisdictionally questionable controversy to the proper forum initially in
order to insure the most expedient and equitable resolution.
VI. Conclusion
Although the judiciary must exercise caution in establishing general rules of
law, it has an obligation to prevent unnecessary recurrences of injustice. Lister v.
Lucey presented the Seventh Circuit with an opportunity to limit a clearly inequitable operation of the federal abstention doctrine. The court, by limiting its
holding, failed to establish such a specific limitation on the discretionary invocation of abstention. Although this action may be defended as an exercise in
judicial restraint, Lister illustrates the blatant inequity of juggling a federal
litigant through a myriad of judicial and non-judicial channels for more than
six years. Such an illustration challenges the proposition that Lister was an appropriate case for restraint; indeed, it suggests an affirmative obligation on the
part of the judiciary to curtail such abuse. Both equitable adjudication and
35 312 U.S. at 500-01.
36 Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 F.2d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1974).
37 Northrup v. Jay, 262 Mich. 463 247 N.W. 717, (1933). See also Marshall v. Sawyer,
301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962).
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judicial economy, the original objectives of the abstention doctrine, demand more
precise and fully articulated guidelines than those suggested in Lister. With
dockets overflowing, federal district courts may tend to seize any opportunity to
shift their burden to another forum." As the abstention doctrine, in effect,
endorses such action, the potential for judicial abuse is great. In order to curb
this abuse, the Seventh Circuit should have defined and limited not only the
circumstances appropriate for abstention but also the reasonable duration of its
operation.
Maureen E. Reidy

38 In Thermatron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), the Supreme
Court held that a district court had exceeded its authority by remanding the case before it on
the sole ground that its docket was overcrowded.

Commerce Clause-Congress Has the Power Under
the Commerce Clause to Extend the Equal Pay Act to
State and Local Governmental Employees.
Marshall v. City of Sheboygan*

I. Introduction
Relying on its Commerce Clause power,' Congress enacted the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 19382 (FLSA) in an attempt to eliminate the exploitation of
labor.' Through its regulations, Congress intended to "correct labor conditions
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers.... ." To achieve this goal, the Act
provided minimum wage5 and maximum hour' regulations.
In National League of Cities v. Usery,7 the Supreme Court held that the
FLSA minimum wage and hour provisions were inapplicable to certain state
employees. The Court proclaimed that the promulgation of such regulations was
an improper exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The
tenth amendment' was interpreted by the Court to limit Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause to interfere with traditional state governmental
functions.9
In 1963, Congress amended the Equal Pay Act"0 (EPA) to the FLSA. The
purpose of the equal pay amendment was to correct the discriminatory practice of
sex-based wage differentials. Again, the Commerce Clause was relied upon by
Congress as the constitutional authority for enacting the amendment."
*

577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978).

1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 2, 52 stat. 1060

(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1970)).
2 Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 201 (1970)). [Hereinafter cited as FLSA or the Act.]
3 83 CONG. REc. 9256 (1938).
4 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970).
5 Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1062 (1938) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 206 (1970)).
6 Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 7, 52 Stat. 1063 (1938) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 207 (1970)).
7 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
8 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
9 426 U.S. at 845.
10 The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1970)) [hereinafter cited as EPA] provides as follows:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within an. establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions except where such payment is made pursuant to
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings
by quantity of quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other
factor other than sex: Provided, that an employer who is paying a wage rate
differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with
the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
11 The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 83-38, § 2, 77 Stat. 56.
349
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In Marshall v. City of Sheboygan,' the Seventh Circuit sought to determine
whether Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to extend the
Equal Pay Act to state and local governmental employees. Following a discussion of the National League of Cities decision, the court held that the Supreme
Court's ruling did not preclude an Equal Pay Act suit against the states or their
political subdivisions.
This comment will demonstrate how the Seventh Circuit has overgeneralized with respect to its holding that Congress has the power to extend the EPA to
state and local governments, despite the tenth amendment limitation on Commerce Clause regulation announced in NationalLeague of Cities. Such a demonstration will be accomplished through an analysis of the vague guidelines set out
in NationalLeague of Cities," and an explanation of the potentially undesirable
effects of applying the equal pay law to the states. 4 This comment will also suggest that cases such as the City of Sheboygan should, rather, be decided under
section five of the fourteenth amendment, 5 for such an approach would allow
courts to avoid the confusion inherent in applying the vague guidelines announced
6
in National League of Cities."
II. Statement of the Facts
On March 26, 1976, the Secretary of Labor commenced an action to enjoin
the City of Sheboygan, Wisconsin, from violating the equal pay provision of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. 7 The Secretary alleged that a violation had occurred
when the City discriminated against women employed as custodians in its public
schools by paying them lower wages than were paid men doing "equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and
which are performed under similar working conditions."'" The City promptly
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings maintaining that pursuant to National League of Cities, Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority by
regulating the compensation paid by state and local governments to its employees.1 " The district court denied the motion and the City appealed to the
Seventh Circuit.
The court of appeals held that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to extend the Equal Pay Act to state and local governmental employees.2" In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit distinguished National
League of Cities and held that the tenth amendment did not bar an action by
the Secretary to enforce the Equal Pay Act against state and local governments.

12
13

577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978).
See text accompanying notes 24-64 infra.
14 See text accompanying notes 71-76 infra.
15 "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
16 See text accompanying notes 94-109 infra.
17 577 F.2d at 2.
18 Id. quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
19 577 F.2d at 2.
20 Id. at 1.
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III. Scope of the FLSA
When the Fair Labor Standards Act was first enacted, § 3 (d) specifically excluded states and their political subdivisions from coverage.2' With the 1966
amendments to the FLSA, however, expansive changes in coverage and exemptions were effectuated. For the first time, state and local governmental employees
associated with hospitals, institutions, and schools fell within the purview of the
Act.22 After an additional four-year effort to further expand coverage under the
FLSA, amendments were passed in 1974 which extended the scope of the Act to
include state and local governments and their political subdivisions.23 Under the
1974 amendments, public employers are subject to wage and hour requirements
that are equivalent to those which private employers had been subject previously.
IV. National League of Cities
In National League of Cities, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments. Adhering to its policy of
restricting federal power while expanding the "sovereign" powers of the states,
the Court held the extension of the scope of the FLSA to the states unconstitutional under the facts of National League of Cities. Accordingly, in Sheboygan
the City filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings contending that under
NationalLeague of Cities, Congress does not have the constitutional authority to
regulate the compensation paid by a state or local government to its employees.24
The Seventh Circuit also used National League of Cities to conclude that the
EPA was constitutionally applicable to the states. In an effort to evaluate the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Sheboygan, an analysis of National League of Cities
is required.
A. The Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has been granted the power to regulate interstate commerce. This grant of "plenary authority"25 has been declared
"an affirmative power commensurate with the nation's needs." 26 Limits exist,
however, upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty. In Fry v.
United States," the Court recognized an express declaration of these limitations
in the tenth amendment. In a footnote to the main opinion the Court proclaimed:
21 Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
203(d) (1970)) reads: " 'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States or
political subdivisions of a state."
22 Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat. 831 (1966) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)

(1966)).
(5), (6), 88 Stat. 58 (1974)

23

Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a) (I),

24
25
26
27

577 F.2d at 2.
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 197 (1824).
North America Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946).
421 U.S. 542 (1975).

§ 203(d), (s) (5), (x) (West Supp. 1978).

(codified at 29 U.S.C.A.
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While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism,"
stating merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), it is not without significance.
The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress
may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs28the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system.
After the passage of the 1974 amendments to the FLSA, the National League of
Cities, the National Governors Conference, and several state and local governments challenged the constitutionality of the amendments when applied to the
states.29
The challenge in National League of Cities was not directed toward the
scope of authority granted Congress under the commerce power, but rather
towards the validity of the 1974 amendments to the extent they transgress the
affirmative limitations contained in the Constitution." Specifically, the League
contended that the 1974 amendments to the FLSA were inapplicable to them
due to a tenth amendment limitation on the commerce power of Congress."
B. The Lower Court's Ruling
Plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the amendments' application to them. A three-judge court granted the Secretary of Labor's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
because it felt compelled to follow precedent laid down in Maryland v. Wirtz."
In Wirtz, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the 1966 amendments and held that the amendments did not infringe upon areas of state sovereignty protected by the tenth amendment.
C. The Supreme Court Ruling
The appellants' position was adopted by the Supreme Court and, as a result,
'he tenth amendment was applied as a limitation upon federal commerce power
regulation of state activities. The Court stated that "insofar as the challenged
amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the
authority granted Congress by Article I, § 8, cl. 3."" The Supreme Court
limited its opinion, however, by stating that the minimum wage and overtime
provisions were not held to be inapplicable to the states in all situations, but only
28 Id. at 547 n.7.
29 National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F.Supp. 826, (D.D.C. 1974). The state and
local governments which were parties to the action are as follows: the states of Arizona, Indiana,
Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington,
Wyoming, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., and the
cities of Cape Girardeau, Mo., Lompac, Cal., and Salt Lake City, Utah.
30 426 U.S. at 841.
31 Id. (Appellants noting instances when the Commerce Clause had been found invalid
because it offended a constitutional right.) See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)
(sixth amendment) and Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (fifth amendment).
32 392 U.S. 183 (1965).
33 426 U.S. at 852.
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"insofar" as they interfere with the sovereignty of the states in areas of "traditional" governmental functions. 4
The Court acknowledged the limitations of its decision by refusing to overrule United States v. California," in which the Safety Appliance Act was held
applicable to the State of California because it had engaged in interstate commerce by rail." In that opinion, the Court stated:
We look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged
as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power.
But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state can no more deny the power
if its exercise has been
37
authorized by Congress than can an individual.
In reference to the above statement, the Court in National League of Cities
asserted the following: "We think the dicta from United States v. California
simply wrong. Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon
the states its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
governmental functions are to be made." 3 In addition, however, the National
League of Cities Court declared: "The holding of United States v. California,as
opposed to the language quoted in the text, is quite consistent with our holding
today. There California's activity, to which the congressional command was
directed was not in an area that the states have regarded as integral parts of their
governmental activities. '3 The Court, therefore, held that regulations were unconstitutional as applied to the states only in areas of "traditional operations" or
"integral governmental functions.""0 Congressional interferences with state
activities of a routine proprietary sort were expressly excluded from the scope of
state autonomy.4 '
Unfortunately, the Court did not define those activities which fall within the
concept of "traditional operations." 42 As a result, lower courts must decide in
each case whether the target of regulation is, as the Supreme Court described, an
activity which is "typical of those performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public laws and furnishing
public services." 43
In addition to requiring that the regulation be aimed at integral governmental functions before the tenth amendment limitation on Commerce Clause
regulations is operative, the Court insisted that the regulation must deal with an
attribute of state sovereignty." Without explanation, the Court stated: "One
34 Id.
35 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
36 Id. at 185.
37 Id.
38 426 U.S. at 854-55.
39 Id. n.18.
40 Id. at 852.
41 For an argument taking the position that such a holding is inconsistent, see Tribe.
UnravelingNational League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential
Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1977).
42 For a discussion of what constitutes a "traditional governmental function," see Note,
Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local Governments: The Effect of National League
of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PENN. L. REV. 665 (1977).
43 426 U.S. at 851.
44 Id. at 845.
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undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the states' power to determine
wages.... ."" The Court proceeded to state that determinations which are attributes of state sovereignty must also be "functions essential to a separate and
independent existence"4 of the state. To establish guidelines for rendering such
decisions, the Court stated that the determinations (in this case wages and hours)
must be ones upon which the government's performance of the traditional
governmental functions rests."7
National League of Cities is further limited by the Court's discussion of what
constitutes a displacement of the states' freedom to structure integral operations.
After a brief examination of the financial impact of the imposition of a minimum
wage,"5 the Court noted that it was not preoccupied with actual impact. The
Court did not dwell on actual financial impact because even if the appellee's
assessments concerning the impact of the amendments were accepted, the application of the provisions would "nonetheless significantly alter or displace the states'
abilities to structure employer-employee relationships. . . ."" As discussed previously, the degree of financial impact needed to qualify as significantly altering
or displacing the states' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
In National League of Cities, due to the financial impact of the wage law,
the state would be left with the choice of "either attemptTng] to increase their
revenue to meet the additional financial burden imposed upon them by paying
congressionally prescribed wages to their existing complement of employees, or
reduc[ing] that complement to a number which can be paid the federal minimum
wage without increasing revenue."5 As a result of the dilemma presented by the
minimum wage restriction, the Court believed such a regulation would constitute
an impermissible interference with state sovereignty."' This conclusion was
reached on the basis that such a dilemma would lead to the "forced relinquishment" of important governmental activities and services which their citizens
require. 2 Thus, the Court had determined that under the facts of National
League of Cities,"' the states' power to determine the wages which shall be paid
to their employees in order to carry out their governmental functions is a determination which is a function "essential to [a] separate and independent existence,
so that ' Congress may not abrogate the states' otherwise plenary authority to make
them."
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 851. After a discussion of the characteristics of a traditional governmental
function, the court states: "If Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make
those fundamental employment decisions (such as wages) upon which their systems for performance of their functions must rest, we think there would be little left to the States' separate
and independent existence." Id.
48 Id. at 846.
49 Id. at 851.
50 Id. at 848.
51 Id. at 851.
52 Id. at 847.
53 The Court made specific reference to instances in which the regulations would force
relinquishment of important governmental activities by pointing to the allegations contained in
appellants' complaints. Id. at 847.
54 Id. at 845-46 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 22 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) which in turn
quoted Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869)).
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In addition to the guidelines set forth above, the Court attached another

limitation upon the use of a state sovereignty defense. The degree of interference
with a state's sovereignty must be weighed against the magnitude of the problem
compelling the federal enactment. As discussed by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion, the Cqurt adopted a balancing approach such that when "the
federal interest is demohstrably greater and where state facility compliance with
imposed federal standards would be essential," 5 5 the regulation is upheld.
A potential application of the balancing test was made apparent by the
National League of Cities Court by comparing the minimum wage and hour
regulations of the FLSA with the Economic Stabilization Act upheld in Fry v.
United States.5" In Fry, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970, which temporarily froze the wages of state and local
governmental employees in order to combat a severe inflation that threatened
our national economy." In reference to Fry, the Court made clear that Commerce Clause regulations would be allowed even though a state's sovereignty was
affected when the regulation was occasioned by an extremely serious problem
which "endangered the well-being of all the component parts of our federal
system.""8
In effect, National League of Cities gave the States an affirmative defense59
to actions by the Secretary of Labor to enforce the minimum wage and hour
provisions of the FLSA against state employers. When the provisions operate to
directly displace the states' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions, the tenth amendment prohibits their application to the states."5 To determine whether the tenth amendment limitation is
available, the facts must be applied to the test implicit in the National League of
Cities decision.
D. National League of Cities' Test for Constitutionality of Commerce
Clause Regulations
A test by which the constitutionality of Commerce Clause regulations of state
and local governmental activity may be determined is implicit in the Court's
decision in National League of Cities. The test may be constructed from the
limitations described in the plurality opinion and Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion. First, it must be determined whether the congressional command inherent in the regulation is directed toward an activity which is "typical of those
performed by state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of
55 426 U.S. at 856.
56 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
57 Id. at 548.
58 426 U.S. at 856. Other than a mention by Justice Blackmun of environmental protection,
the Court left no other guidelines for the lower courts to determine what constitutes a
"demonstrably greater" federal interest. Thus, from the opinion it appears the Court intended
such an interest to exist only when "the well-being of all the component parts of our federal
system" is threatened. Id. at 856.
59 See Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. 544 F.2d 148, 155 n.11 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977). Here, the Third Circuit concluded that rather than striking
down the 1974 amendments for all purposes, National League of Cities is limited and merely
gives the states an affirmative defense against actions by the Secretary of Labor to enforce the
minimum wage and hour provisions of the FLSA.
60 426 U.S. at 849.
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administering the public law and furnishing public services."'" Second, whether
the regulation interferes with "functions essential to [a] separate and independent
existence"' "2 of the state must be determined. Third, the inquiry must inquire
whether the regulation "displaces state policies regarding the manner in which
[the state] will structure delivery of those governmental services which their
citizens riquire." 3
If the burdens imposed by the regulation lead to affirmative responses to the
above inquiries, then the court must attempt to balance the federal interest with
the degree of interference. If the interference with state sovereignty can be
justified by a sufficiently strong federal interest, as defined by the Court, then the
regulation causing such interference is permissible.
Although National League of Cities arose in the context of the minimum
wage and overtime provisions, the reasoning employed in the decision is applicable in any case involving a regulation directed toward the state under the
commerce power. Thus, a court must determine whether the particular regulation, under the particular facts presented, passes the test provided in National
League of Cities. After such an analysis, if it is found that the regulation does
not "displace the state's freedom to structure integral operations," 64 then the
tenth amendment limitation on the enactment is ineffectual.
Since the Equal Pay Act was passed under the authority of the Commerce
Clause, when a lower court is faced with a situation in which the Act is being
sought to be applied against the state, the court must follow the guidelines
provided in National League of Cities to determine the constitutionality of its
applicability as a Commerce Clause regulation. The manner in which the Seventh
Circuit has followed those guidelines will be the basis upon which this comment
will evaluate the Sheboygan decision.
V. The Seventh Circuit Decision in Sheboygan
In Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, the issue adressed by the Seventh Circuit
was "whether Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to extend the
Equal Pay Act to state and local governmental employees." 5 Holding in the
affirmative, the court sought to support its decision with an analysis of National
League of Cities as well as with a statement concerning its beliefs regarding the
effects of the Equal Pay Act.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that National League of Cities did not
vitiate entirely the applicability of the minimum wage and overtime provisions to
the states."' States and their subdivisions still possess an affirmative defense when
"integral parts of [their] governmental activities"6 7 are challenged. The Seventh
Circuit, however, failed to examine properly the Sheboygan facts and did not
follow the guidelines established by National League of Cities. Rather, reliance
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 851.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 852.
577 F.2d at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4 (quoting 426 U.S. at 854 n.18).
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was placed on a generalized interpretation of the effects of the Equal Pay Act.
The court summarized the basis for its decision as follows:
Unlike the minimum wage and overtime provisions addressed in
National League of Cities, the prerogative to pay women unequal wages for
equal work is not a "fundamental employment decision." The ability to
discriminate solely on the basis of sex cannot be considered an attribute of
sovereignty necessary to a separate and independent existence. The equal
pay provision does not interfere with a state's ability to "structure employeremployee relationships." States are free to set all substantive terms of employment. The Equal Pay Act requires only that the substantive terms of
employment not be determined arbitrarily or in a discriminatory fashion.
Equally important, the Equal Pay Act does not displace any State policies
regarding the manner in which a State may structure delivery of its services.' 8
The court proceeded to conclude that the 1974 extension of the Equal Pay Act to
the states is a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 9
Yet, such a broad contention is unjustified, for as will be demonstrated, the equalpay law could have the effect of infringing upon the states' freedom to a degree
which would force the state to restructure its sovereign affairs in the same manner
as could the minimum wage and overtime provisions. The Seventh Circuit's
refusal to acknowledge this possibility accounts for its failure to apply the guidelines outlined in NationalLeague of Cities.
VI. The EPA Viewed as a Wage Regulation
The Equal Pay Act was not instituted only as an anti-discrimination measure. Like the Minimum Wage Law, the EPA sought to correct adverse living
conditions by correcting the discriminatory practice of sex-based wage differentials."0
To achieve this goal, the Equal Pay Act stipulates that "an employer who
is paying a wage differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to
iomply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee."'" With the inclusion of this provision, the Equal Pay Act prescribes
essentially the same requirement as that of the Minimum Wage Law-wages of
certain workers must be increased.
If discrimination by the states is found to be widespread, the requirement of
raising wages in the face of discrimination could lead to significantly increased
costs in the dispensing of state services and could place the States in the same
dilemma as that posed by the minimum wage provisions in National League of
68 Id. at 6.
69 Id.
70 The FLSA provided minimum wage and maximum hour regulations to "correct labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living for health, efficiency, and the general well-being of workers ..
" 29 U.S.C. § 202 (a) (1970). The Equal
Pay Act also served to correct adverse conditions resulting from wage differentials based on
sex such as depressed wages and living conditions, ineffective utilization of the available resources, labor disputes, the disrupted flow of goods in commerce, and the use of an unfair
method of competition. See Act of June 10, 1963, Pub. L. 88-38, § 2, 77 Stat. 56 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970)).
71 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) "(1970).
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Cities.7 2 That is, the imposition of the Equal Pay Act's sanctions could leave the
states with two choices, namely "either to attempt to increase their revenue to
meet the additional financial burden imposed upon them by paying congressionally prescribed wages to their existing complement of employees, or to reduce
that complement" " to a number which could be paid the wages received by
the nondiscriminated worker.7 ' This dilemma is precisely the reason the Supreme
Court held in National League of Cities that the power to determine wages is an
attribute of state sovereignty with which federal regulation may not substantially
interfere. As a result, the Equal Pay Act is also constitutionally inapplicable to
the states "insofar as it operates to directly displace the states' freedom to structure integral operations .... ,,7'Thus, to judge the constitutionality of the EPA
as applied to the states, the lower courts must employ the guidelines prescribed
by the Supreme Court in National League of Cities.
VII. Application of the National League of Cities' Guidelines to Sheboygan
A. "Traditional Operation"
Applying the National League of Cities' test to the facts in Sheboygan, the
first inquiry must be whether the Equal Pay Act is directed toward an activity
which is "typical of those performed by state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public
services." 6 The regulation at issue in Sheboygan was directed toward a public
school. Thus, the first part of the test is satisfied, for it is indisputable that education is a service which governments are created to provide and which states have
traditionally afforded their citizens.
72 See Note, note 42 supra. The author therein recognizes the fact that the Equal Pay
Act contains the same constitutional infirmities as the wage and hour provisions. That effect
is overstated, however, by declaring the EPA an unconstitutional exercise on Congress' commerce
power when applied to the states.
It is argued in the present comment that since the EPA has these similar infirmities,
it must be subjected to the same tests as the minimum wage provisions. The minimum wage
laws were not declared inapplicable in all situations by the decision in National League of Cities
and the same should hold true for the EPA.
The financial impact of the EPA has been found to be quite significant. With the increase in violations found by the Wage and Hour Division beginning in 1971, this has been
particularly true. For statistics on EPA judgments, see Handbook of Labor Statistics, U.S.
For a general discussion of the significance
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BULLETIN 1905 (1976).
of the EPA, see Greenberger & Gutman, Legal Remedies Beyond Title VII to Combat Sex
Discrimination in Employment, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTr'EE REPORT (1977).
73 426 U.S. at 848. When the Court used the phrase "congressionally prescribed wages,"
it was referring to the minimum wage. With the Equal Pay Act as it stands, however, any
wages of women which were -raised in order to comply with the law should likewise be considered "congressionally prescribed wages."
74 With the minimum wage law, the states may have had to reduce their number of
employees in order to comply with the minimum wage law. In the case of the Equal Pay
Act, however, it is possible that any reduction in employees would be disallowed, especially
if the employees released were the ones against whom the original discrimination was directed.
Therefore, it may be that the only recourse left to the states would be to cut back on governmental services or somehow increase revenues.
75 426 U.S. 852.
76 Id. at 851.
77 Id. Although education was not specifically listed in the NLC opinion as in the area
of traditional operations, Justice Rehnquist did point out the following in a footnote to the
opinion: "These examples are obviously not an exhaustive catalogue of the numerous line and
support activities which are well within the area of traditional operations of state and local
operations." Id.
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B. "Functions Essential to Separate and Independent Existence"
Second, whether the EPA interferes with an activity which is essential to the
states' separate and independent existence must be determined.7 8 In National
League of Cities, the Supreme Court decided that the power to determine wages
is undoubtedly an attribute of state sovereignty 79 and is a fundamental employment decision which is essential to the states' separate and independent existence.8 0 Since the Equal Pay Act is a wage regulation which prescribes wages,"'
as does the Minimum Wage Law, when a violation of the act has been found an
interference with a fundamental employment decision essential to the states'
separate and independent existence has also occurred.
Although the Seventh Circuit was correct in maintaining that the prerogative to pay women employees unequal wages for equal work is neither a "fundamental employment decision," nor an attribute of sovereignty necessary to a
separate and independent existence, "2 the court failed to recognize that the
provision requiring an increase in the wages of discriminated workers is in effect
a wage regulation in the same sense as the minimum wage law.
If the Equal Pay Act allowed the states to equalize the wages of men and
women by lowering the wages of men and raising the wages of women in order
to avoid budgetary pressures, then the argument that the EPA prescribes wages
would be lost. If such flexibility were allowed, there would be no interference
with a state's decision on the amount of funds it allocates to employee wages.
In such cases, the Act's only effect would be to eliminate discrimination. It would
not produce a budgetary squeeze upon the states which would lead to the
dilemma prohibited by the Court in National League of Cities.

C. Displacement of State Policies
Third, in an effort to evaluate the applicability of the EPA in Sheboygan,
it must be determined whether the regulation displaces the City's policies regarding the manner in which it will provide education to its citizens.
In a footnote, the Sheboygan court states:
While the City must suffer increased costs as a result of complying with
the EPA it may not lower wages paid to men to comply with the Act, 29
USC § 206 (d) (1), the effect of that impact is minimal when compared
to the potential costs in the minimum wage and overtime provisions. Furthermore, we cannot ignore the fact that the City has not alleged that it will have
to raise taxes, or, alternatively, release employees to comply with the EPA. 3
By stating that the impact would be minimal when compared with the minimum
wage and overtime provisions, the Seventh Circuit oversimplified the financial
impact of the EPA.
78

Id. at 845.

79

Id.

80

Id. at 851.

81
82
83

See note 74 supra.
577 F.2d at 6.
Id. n.18.
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The Supreme Court in National League of Cities did not specify what degree
of impact would constitute a significant alteration or displacement of the states'
ability to structure employer-employee relationships.8 4 Nor did the Court confine
its decision to require a degree of impact similar in magnitude to that of the
minimum wage and overtime provisions. Rather, the Court intended future
cases to be decided on an ad hoc basis, with the lower courts assessing the financial
impact under a particular fact setting and then judging whether it "appears
likely"8 that the impact will "significantly alter or displace the states' abilities to
structure employer-employee relationships"8 in areas of traditional operations."'
Without such a finding by the trial court, the issue of whether the tenth amendment limitation on the Commerce Clause power applies to the EPA under the
facts of this case could not be determined by the Seventh Circuit.
D. Balancing Test
Had the facts indicated that the EPA appeared likely8" to substantially
affect the City of Sheboygan's integral operations, the analysis would then have
been directed toward the qualifier to the principle test-the balancing test.
The Court in National League of Cities did not doubt the "salutary" results
of the minimum wage and hour provisions.8 9 The Court refused, however, to accept the exploitation of labor as a sufficient federal interest to allow any interference with state sovereignty." Since the EPA sought to achieve relatively the
same goals as the Minimum Wage Law,91 arguably, the purpose of the EPA
also will not qualify as a "demonstrably greater" federal interest.9 2 Thus, due to
the special status the states enjoy pursuant to the tenth amendment when regulation is enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause powers, it may have been desirable
for the Seventh Circuit to decide the question of the EPA's applicability to the
states on a more certain and better-defined ground.
VIII. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
The plurality opinion in National League of Cities avoided the question of
whether Congress might affect the integral operations of state governments by
exercising other constitutional powers. In a footnote, the plurality took the
following stance concerning other constitutional predicates for enforcing regula84 426 U.S. at 851.
85 Id. at 850. Although this phrase was used in reference to the hour provisions, it was a
criterion the Court was using to explain its opinion as to when interference with state sovereignty
is substantial.
86 Id. at 851.
87 See note 72 supra concerning the significance of the financial impact of the EPA.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 849.
90 This was the purpose behind minimum wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. See note 71 supra.
91 See note 71 supra.
92 Even when viewed as an anti-discrimination measure, the National League of Cities
requirement as to what constitutes a "demonstrably greater" federal interest is not satisfied. That
is, discrimination in pay scales cannot be said to threaten "the well-being of all the component.
parts of our federal system." 426 U.S. at 851.

[Vol. 54:349]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

tion against the states and their political subdivisions: "We express no view as
to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment."" s
The fourteenth amendment seeks to assure equal protection of the laws and
to prevent deprivation of life, liberty, and property.94 Section five of the fourteenth amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." The fourteenth amendment's substantive provisions embody significant limitations on state authority.
As the Supreme Court noted in Ex Parte Virginia,"s "the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a degree
restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce ....
Such enforcement is not invasion of State Sovereignty.""
Since Ex Parte Virginia, the Court has sanctioned intrusions by Congress
into spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the states." The trend recently
culminated in a decision rendered four days after National League of Cities. In
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer," the Court upheld the constitutionality of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination as applied to state and local governments. The
decision granted Congress the authority to abrogate a state's sovereignty, despite
the shield of the eleventh amendment, which prohibits federal court suits against
states by citizens of other states.
Unlike the minimum wage and hour provisions of the FLSA, the EPA is
also an anti-discrimination measure. Since the EPA serves the same fundamental
purpose as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," 9 it has been held that the
EPA should not be given a narrower reading. 0
Although the Court in Fitzpatrick specifically dealt with only the interrelationship of the fourteenth and eleventh amendments, its rationale has been found
to apply equally to the interaction of the fourteenth and tenth amendments."°
Several courts have cited Fitzpatrick in holding that the Equal Pay Act should
be excluded from any limitation on congressional power imposed by National
League of Cities."2
93 Id. at 852 n.17.
94 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law;...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
96 Id. at 346.
97 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). For a discussion of the Congressional powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, see Nichol, An Examination of Congressional Powers Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 175 (1976).

98

427 U.S. 445 (1976).

99 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703 (h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
100 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
905 (1970).
101 Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544- F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert denied-, 430
U.S. 946 (1977).
102 See Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 946 (1977); Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112 (1977); Usery v.
Bd. of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (1976); Usery v. Bettendorf School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637
(1976).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1979]

In Usery u. Allegheny County Institution District,0 3 the Third Circuit held:
Expressly referring to National League of Cities, at 453, 96 S. Ct. at 2670
n.9, the Court made it perfectly clear (1) that Congress has § 5 Fourteenth
Amendment power to prohibit sex discrimination in employment, and (2)
that such power, despite the Tenth Amendment, extends to the state as an
employer.
Thus there is a clear constitutional justification for the Equal Pay
04
Act.1

The fact that the EPA was not passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment does not bar the use of that amendment as justification for the application
of the EPA to the states. As the Third Circuit stated in Allegheny County: "In
exercising the power of judicial review, as distinguished from the duty of statutory
interpretation, we are concerned with the actual power of the national government."'0 5 Adopting this rationale, courts have persistently found no merit in the
argument that the constitutional basis for a federal law is limited to the powers
enumerated in the "basis and purpose" section of the statute.'
Fitzpatrick has provided adequate authority for holding the Equal Pay Act
applicable to the states. In Sheboygan, the Seventh Circuit felt that it was unnecessary to consider the validity of predicating the EPA's application to the
City on fourteenth amendment grounds since it found that the Act was constitutionally applicable under the Commerce Clause. 0 Had the court realized that
the EPA suffered from the same constitutional infirmities as the Minimum Wage
Law, and that it must grapple with the vague guidelines provided in National
League of Cities, it might have decided Sheboygan on more definitive fourteenth
amendment grounds. 8
IX. Conclusion
The Equal Pay Act, as applied to the states, is a constitutional exercise of
congressional power under section five of the fourteenth amendment. No such
assertion can be made, however, regarding the constitutionality of the EPA as an
exercise of Congress' commerce power.
In Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, the Seventh Circuit erroneously stated
that the Equal Pay Act, as applied to the states, was not prohibited by the tenth
amendment restriction on the Commerce Clause. The Seventh Circuit's failure
to recognize that the EPA could suffer from the same constitutional infirmities as
103 544 F.2d 148.
104 Id. at 155.
105 Id.
106 See Nilsen v. Metropolitan Fair & Exposition Auth., 435 F. Supp. 1159 (1977); Usery
v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (1977); Usery v. Dallas Independent School
Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111 (1976).
107 577 F.2d at 6 n.19.
108 This is precisely the manner in which the Sixth Circuit disposed of a case involving
the same issue in its recent decision in Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess Iospital, 581 F.2d
116 (1978). In that case the Sixth Circuit expressly agreed with the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (1977), and the Third Circuit's
decision in Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (1976), but disagreed with
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Sheboygan. The Sixth Circuit, however, endorsed the Third
and Fourth Circuits' reasoning with respect to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
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the Minimum Wage Law led to the court's failure to apply the test implicit in
National League of Cities v. Usery. Had the court applied the standards of
National League of Cities, it would have realized that the findings in the trial
court below were insufficient to reach a conclusion on the constitutionality of the
application of the EPA to the states as a Commerce Clause regulation.
The test provided by the Supreme Court in National League of Cities should
be applied on a case-by-case basis in an effort to determine the constitutionality
of ahy Commerce Clause regulation when such a regulation is to be applied to
the states or their political subdivisions. A court, therefore, faced with a case
involving a Commerce Clause regulation which is being applied to the states,
must limit the holding to the particular facts in the case. Any broad holding,
such as that handed down by the Seventh Circuit in Marshallv. City of Sheboyan.,
is clearly unwarranted.
Given the vague guidelines provided in National League of Cities, courts
should decide issues involving the application of the Equal Pay Act to the states
on the basis of section five of the fourteenth amendment. Such an approach
would enable the courts to avoid both the time and confusion involved with the
application of the standards in National League of Cities. Interpretation of the
principles of National League of Cities should be left to cases within its purview.
Marshallv. City of Sheboyan was not one of these cases.
Frederick H. Kopko, Jr.

Due Process-A Prisoner Who Has Successfully
Appealed a First Conviction May Not Be Given a
Harsher Sentence Upon Reconviction Without Valid
Justification.
United States v. Tucker*
I. Introduction
In United States v. Tucker,1 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
was presented with a significant question concerning the maximum penalty that
can be levied against a criminal defendant who has successfully appealed a
previous conviction for the same offense. The defendant asserted that his constitutional rights had been violated because his second sentence was actually more
severe than the first. In response, the court concluded that Tucker's second
sentence did not comply with minimal requirements of due process.
In North Carolinav. Pearce,' the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court
may not impose a penalty which is more severe than one given before a successful
appeal unless the reasons for the added punishment affirmatively appear on the
record. These reasons, moreover, are to "be based upon objective information
concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the
time of the original sentencing proceeding."' The Seventh Circuit claimed that
the justifications given for the added punishment in the instant case failed the
Pearce test.
Although the Tucker result properly reflects current legal precedent, the
case does raise three intriguing issues: ( 1 ) the definition of "sentence" in cases of
this nature; (2) the "quality" of the penalty imposed; and (3) the possibility
that harsher resentencing following a successful appeal should be proscribed
altogether.
II. Statement of the Case
On February 19, 1976, Howard Tucker was convicted at a bench trial of a
narcotics offense and received a sentence of probation for five years. The Seventh
Circuit reversed the conviction, however, on the grounds that the district court
had committed error by refusing to compel the government to disclose the
identity of a confidential informant who had given information against the defendant.' The action was remanded for retrial and Tucker was again convicted
after a jury trial presided over by a different judge. The second sentence consisted of a five-year probation period, a special condition that Tucker spend
ninety days at a correctional institution on a work release program, and a three-

581 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1978).

1 581 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1978).
2 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
3
4

Id. at 726.
United States v. Tucker, 552 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1977).
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year mandatory parole term to follow probation.
The second sentencing court gave the following reasons for the imposition of
the more severe sentence: (1) the evidence at the second trial was more convincing than that at the first; (2) the second conviction was rendered by a jury,
whereas the first trial had been before the court; (3) the Seventh Circuit
questioned the sufficiency of the evidence when considering Tucker's first appeal; (4) Tucker had obtained a divorce since his first sentencing; and (5) the
defendant had been unemployed for five months after his initial sentence proceeding.'
Tucker's appeal from this second conviction set forth a single constitutionally
premised argument which questioned the second trial court's authority to impose
a more severe sentence upon reconviction.' Tucker contended that the reasons
offered as justification for the more severe second sentence were insufficient to
satisfy the due process requirement of the fifth amendment. Normally due process
is satisfied in these circumstances only if such a resentence is based on defendant
misconduct which occurs after the original sentencing.7 The Tucker court held
that the reasons articulated by the second judge constituted no more than a subjective assessment of Tucker's behavior and did not indicate reprehensible conduct sufficient to support the harsher sentence.'
III. Application of the Pearce Standard
The Supreme Court addressed the propriety of imposing harsher sentences
upon retrial in North Carolinav. Pearce, which consolidated two cases, both of
which involved convicted defendants sentenced to prison. In each situation, the
original conviction had been set aside and, after reconviction, each defendant had
been given a sentence which exceeded the one originally imposed. No justification
was given for the imposition of the longer sentence in either case.
In addressing these circumstances, the Pearce court explained that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that vindictiveness against a
defendant who has successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in
the sentence imposed after retrial. Pearce evinced a conviction that a defendant
must not be deterred from exercising his right to appeal by apprehension of
potential retaliation in the form of an increased sentence from the second trial
judge. Accordingly, to prevent such judicial abuse, Pearce required that the
reasons for the added punishment be based upon the conduct of the defendant
occurring after the initial sentencing. Furthermore, the Court held that "factual
data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record,
so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal." 9
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the justifications articulated by the
second sentencing court in Tucker did not adequately support the harsher
5
6
7
8
9

581 F.2d at 604.
Brief for Appellant at 1, United States v. Tucker, 581 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1978).
395 U.S. at 726.
581 F.2d at 607.
395 U.S. at 726.
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sentence. The first three reasons amounted to nothing more than subjective
assessments by the court and thus failed to meet the requirement of Pearce that
such reasons be based upon "objective information." The fourth and fifth reasons
-Tucker's divorce and period of unemployment-were determined insufficient
to indicate such "reprehensible conduct on the part of the defendant
that [would
10
call] for imposition of a harsher sentence in light of Pearce."'
IV. Definition of "Sentence"
Tucker was convicted at both trials of willful and knowing distribution of
heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970)." Paragraph (b) of §
841,12 which provides for sentencing in such cases, states that a special parole
term of at least three years must accompany any term of imprisonment imposed
by the court. 3
A subtle yet significant distinction existed between the two penalties imposed upon Tucker by the two courts. In the first trial the court never "sentenced" Tucker to a term of imprisonment. Thus, the § 841 (b) requirement that
a three-year term of probation follow such a penalty did not apply since no
"sentence" of imprisonment was imposed.14 In the second situation, however,
the court imposed a five-year prison term and then suspended its execution. 5
Imposing a definite period of imprisonment and then suspending execution of the
sentence is a "sentence" for the purpose of invoking a statutorily prescribed parole
period.' Under these circumstances, the mandatory parole period was deemed to
apply even though the defendant was not required to spend time incarcerated.
The Pearce principle, as applied in Tucker, proscribed a harsher sentence
upon reconviction. Significantly, the second trial court imposed the invalid
penalty because it considered itself under a statutory mandate to reach such a
result under its method of sentencing, namely, suspending execution of a prison
sentence. Pearce, however, can proscribe not only the more severe penalty itself
but also the manner in which it is imposed. A method of sentencing, although
normally acceptable, is invalid to the extent that it results in an unconstitutionally
severe punishment. Thus, sentencing options which are normally available to a
trial judge might be removed if a more severe sentence results under conditions
10 581 F.2d at 607.
11 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Controlled Substances Act) § 704, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Controlled Substances Act] reads in relevant part: "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance. .. "
12 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1970).
13 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1970) provides in pertinent
part: "Any sentence imposing a term of imprisonment under this paragraph shall, in the
absence of such a prior conviction, impose a special parole term of at least 3 years in addition
to such term of imprisonment ......
14 The first sentencing judge suspended imposition of Tucker's sentence in favor of
imposing a five-year term of probation, 552 F.2d at 204 n.1. According to Zaroogian v.
United States, 367 F.2d 959, 963 (Ist Cir. 1966), suspending imposition of a sentence and
placing the defendant on probation renders the sentence void.
15 Brief for Appellant at 21, United States v. Tucker, 581 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1978).
16 Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 268 (1943).
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which violate the Pearcestandard.'
Cases considering the propriety of imposing a more severe sentence upon
reconviction have always involved increased periods of incarceration.18 The
sentences involved in Tucker, however, are unique because they bring into consideration the nature, purpose, and physical conditions of incarceration-the
quality of the sentence-as well as the length or quantity of the sentence. The
potential effects which the quality of a sentence might have upon a determination of severity merits further analysis.
V. Quality Versus Quantity of Sentence' 9
In concluding that the second sentence imposed upon Tucker-five years
probation with execution of all but ninety days suspended and a three-year mandatory parole to follow-was more severe than the first-five years probation-the
court looked merely to the addition of the three-year parole term. This additional
term did make the second sentence more severe in terms of restricting the defendant, but the court might also have addressed the nature and purpose of the
sentence. For example, had the three-year parole term not been added to the
second sentence, the court could still have declared the second sentence more
severe because it required Tucker to spend ninety days of the five-year sentence
on a work release program at a correction center. By the terms of the first sentence,2" the comparable ninety-day period would be spent on probation. 1
Many alternate sentences are available to a sentencing authority. Among
the alternatives are imprisonment, assignment to a work release center, and probation. In evaluating the severity of a sentence, the quality of the penalty might
be as significant as the quantity. For example, important differences regarding
the treatment of convicts exist between prison and work release programs. Theoretically, rehabilitation is an important goal of incarceration. Nonetheless,
the treatment potential of inmates is widely considered to be minimal. In fact,
prisons have been described as "useless for any purpose other than locking away
22
persons who are too dangerous to be allowed at large in free society."
Work release programs, conversely, are rehabilitative tools designed to bridge
17 Significantly, an interesting argument for the prosecution exists if the second method of
sentencing is deemed valid. The government could have argued that the first sentence Tucker
received was illegal because it circumvented the § 841 mandatory parole term and there then
would have been no valid first penalty with which Tucker could have compared his second
sentence. If accepted by the Seventh Circuit, this rationale would have undermined the
defendant's case.
18 See generally Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Stroud v. United States,
251 U.S. 15 (1919); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); United States v.
White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1052 (1968); Patton v. North
Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968); United States
ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 880 (1967);
Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir. 1967).
19 See Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal and a
Basis for Decision, 25 MONT. L. REV. 3, 25-36 (1963).
20 See note 12 supra.
21 This assumes that Tucker would have successfully completed his term of probation and
not have had probation revoked.
22 L. CARNEY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 16-17 (1977)
(quoting TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS; NATIONAL ADVIsORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS 597 (1973)).
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the gap between the isolated prison environment and the real world. They assist
the convict in learning job skills, earning money, and preparing for life after
release.2" In weighing the severity of sentences, it would be serious error for the
court to compare imprisonment and work release on no basis other than duration because the quality of confinement in prison renders it more severe than confinement in a work release unit, due to the nature and purpose of the incarceration. Similarly, a work release sentence may be considered more severe than a
sentence to probation of the same length because no confinement is required of a
person on probation.
Presently, no defendant has challenged the severity of a resentence solely
upon quality, although such a claim may be forthcoming Pearce rests upon the
assumption that fear of an increased sentence must not be allowed to deter a
convict from the right to appeal. The quality of a sentence, however, may
increase its severity without lengthening its duration. The courts, therefore,
should be prepared to determine the effect of such an argument upon the Pearce
principle.
VI. The Question of Harsher Resentencing
Prior to North Carolinav. Pearce, a controversy existed as to the constitutionality of harsher resentencing after a successful appeal. In Patton v. North
Carolina,4 for example, the Fourth Circuit held that the practice was unconditionally invalid. By the time Tucker was litigated, however, Pearce had settled
the issue by permitting a heavier penalty when the reasons for the added punishment affirmatively appear on the record.2 5 Pearce explicitly required that the
factual basis for the higher sentence "be made part of the record."2 The holding
in Pearce,however, did not order the second sentencing judge to state his reasons
on the record for imposing a higher sentence.
The Tucker court, relying on
subsequent judicial interpretation of the Pearce rule,2" required that the second
sentencing judge must himself articulate the reasons for his conclusion that a
harsher sentence is necessary. In this manner, Tucker extended the minimum
protection afforded a defendant.
Tucker cannot be analyzed properly unless the Pearce standard is also reexamined. There are two important reasons for such an inquiry. First, the
wisdom of Pearce must be reconsidered in its delineation of the minimal constitutional requirements for resentencing. Second, Tucker should have required
added protection for defendants by prohibiting harsher resentencing entirely.2"
23

Pepper, Prisons in Turmoil, 36 FED. PROBATION 3 (1972).
24 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967).
25 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
26 395 U.S. at 726.
27 581 F.2d at 605.
28 See, e.g., Jackson v. Justices of Super. Ct. of Mass., 549 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1977);
United States v. McDuffie, 542 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1976); Jones v. United States, 538 F.2d
1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
29

See text accompanying notes 39-53 infra for a discussion regarding the constitutional

grounds. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) and McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), which applied standards stricter than those mandated by the Constitution. There, as a matter of judicial policy, confessions were held inadmissible in federal
courts if obtained while a suspect is being held in violation of the "speedy arraignment"
provisions of FED. R. CRI.

P. 5 (a).
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A. Reconsideration of Pearce
The propriety of harsher resentencing has usually been defended on three
grounds.3 First, it is asserted that a successful collateral attack upon the prior
conviction "voids" both the previous sentence and conviction. 3 Thus, no penalty
exists with which the second sentence can be compared. This proposition has
also been stated in terms of "waiver," a defendant who seeks a new trial waives
any benefit he may have had from the prior sentence and conviction.3
Although this principle may have some merit in avoiding a plea of double
jeopardy by a defendant who has successfully attacked a prior conviction and
wishes not to be retried, it does not justify the imposition of harsher resentencing.
Characterizing the entire trial proceeding as void unfairly benefits the prosecution even though the latter's error necessitated the new trial. A defendant who
attacks his or her conviction does so on specific grounds, and the theory that such
an appellant consciously chooses to waive any effect that the previous sentence
may have had in setting a maximum limit on his penalty is pure fiction. If more
severe resentences are to be permitted, the rationale should rest on a more realistic
basis.
The second justification offered is that the possibility of a harsher second
sentence is a deterrent to frivolous appeals." Prisoners might flood the courts
with petitions for retrial if they are not restrained by the possibility of receiving
more severe sentences.
Proponents of this position assume that the possibility of a harsher sentence
will discourage only petitioners lacking meritorious claims from appealing and
that innocent convicts will not be deterred. Yet the bulk of harsher resentences
are likely given to petitioners with meritorious claims because those with frivolous
appeals are subject to summary dismissal and thus are usually not retried. A policy
allowing harsher resentencing, therefore, results in punishment for precisely that
group which it does not wish to deter. 4 Accordingly, the assumption that only
30 See, e.g., Agata, supra note 19; Ashman, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Harsher Punishment Upon Retrial, 55 A.B.A.J. 928 (1969); Honigsberg, Limitations Upon Increasing a Defendant's Sentence Following a Successful Appeal and Reconviction, 4- CRIu. L. BULL. 329
(1968); Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" CriminalAppellant, 74 YALE L. J. 606 (1965); Note, Constitutional Law: Increased Sentence and Denial
of Credit on Retrial Sustained Under Traditional Waiver Theory, 1965 DUKE L. J. 395;
Comment, 80 HARv. L. REv. 891 (1967); Comment, Criminal Law-Increased Punishment
After Appeal, 40 U. CoLo. L. R-v. 628 '(1968).
31 See generally Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection
of the Laws, 35 MINN. L. Rav. 239, 240-43 (1951) (history of the "void" doctrine).
32 See, e.g., Trono v. United States, 395 U.S. at 726.
33 See note 30 supra.
34 An example of such a fear is expressed in the following letter addressed to a federal
district judge in the Fourth Circuit prior to the Patton v. North Carolina decision:
Dear Sir:
I am in the Mecklenburg County jail. Mr. chose to re-try me as I knew
he would.
Sir the other defendant in this case was set free after serving 15 months of his
sentence, I have served 34 months and now I am to be tried again and with all
probility [sic] I will receive a heavier sentence then [sic] before as you know sir my
sentence at the first trile [sic] was 20 to 30 years. I know it is usuelly [sic] the courts
prosedure [sic] to give a larger sentence when a new trile [sic] is granted I guess this
is to discourage Petitioners.
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frivolous appeals are deterred hardly seems justified. Thus, the Pearce holding,
emphasizing the fact that the fourteenth amendment forbids the deterrence of
valid appeals by fear of higher penalties, 5 eradicates this justification.
The third rationale concerns the freedom of a sentencing court to consider
the defendant's conduct subsequent to the first conviction in designing a punishment that suits the individualized needs of the offender. A ceiling on the sentencing authority, it is said, would interfere with the modern concept that a sentence
should fit the offender and not merely the crime."
The validity of this argument is questionable, even if the underlying
assumption is accurate, because the government already has adequate alternatives
available to increase a defendant's punishment due to behavior occurring after the
original sentencing.37 If the conduct is criminal, the convict can be retried for
the new offense. If not, other penalties exist such as loss of good behavior time,
adverse consideration of parole possibilities, or revocation of probation. Thus, the
Pearce rule, which sanctions the imposition of more severe sentences in appropriate circumstances, gives the court far more discretion than is needed simply to
fashion penalties appropriate to the defendant's conduct subsequent to the
original sentencing.
An analysis of the grounds commonly offered as justification for harsher
resentencing indicates that none of these societal interests justify the intimidating
effect harsher resentencing might have upon a convict's right to appeal.3 The
"waiver" concept is merely a legal fiction used to justify increased penalties and
its demise would not compromise any public policy. The interest to society in
deterring frivolous appeals may be attained by summarily disposing of such
appeals. This procedure is less likely to intimidate valid claims for postconviction
relief. Finally, the availability of numerous options for dealing with a defendant's
behavior occurring after the original sentencing render the Pearce option unnecessary. Furthermore, although the Pearce rule, which, as adopted by the
Seventh Circuit, places the burden on the sentencing judge to prove lack of
vindictiveness by stating affirmatively his reasons for increasing a sentence, the
opportunity for unfairness still exists.
Thus, no need for the Pearceoption exists in dealing with retried defendants,
and, in addition, a defendant might be treated unfairly because of the rule. As a
result, the Seventh Circuit would stand on solid ground if, for policy or constitutional reasons, it decided to prohibit harsher resentencing within its jurisdiction.
Tucker did not provide an appropriate opportunity for such a radical step, since
Your Honor, I don't want a new trile [sic] I am afraid of more time***.
Your Honor, I know you have tried to help me and God knows I apreceate
[sic] this but please sir don't let the state re-try me if there is any way you can
prevent it.
Very truly yours
381 F.2d at 639 n.7.

35

395 U.S. at 725.

36 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). Accord, 395 U.S. at 723.
37 Pearce and Tucker only allow for harsher resentencing based upon conduct occurring
after the time of the original sentencing. For this reason, possible abuses that might arise if
harsher resentencing was allowed based upon behavior occurring before the original sentencing
will not be discussed in this comment.
38 FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
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the case was readily decided within current precedent. Yet, when the proper case

arises, the Seventh Circuit should be prepared for an assault on Pearce.
B. A New Argument to Displace Pearce
In Patton v. North Carolina,9 the Fourth Circuit held that an increase of
a defendant's punishment after the reversal of his initial conviction constituted a
violation of the fourteenth amendment "in that it exacted an unconstitutional
condition to the exercise of his rights to a fair trial, arbitrarily denied him the
equal protection of the law, and placed him twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense." 40 The Supreme Court's holding in North Carolina v. Pearce,
however, modified Patton to the extent that such increased sentences were held
to be valid under the equal protection or double jeopardy provisions of the Constitution and, in some instances, the due process clause.41
Pearce, however, did not consider a fourth constitutional theory which, if
accepted, would have led to a contrary result. The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions states that the receipt of governmental benefits cannot be conditioned
upon the surrender or limitation of constitutional rights absent some recognized
public interest. 2 Under this concept, the individual may not be required to
waive a constitutional right in exchange for the retention of some unconstitutional
privilege.4
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was first expounded44 in Frost
& Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission,4" which involved a state statute
requiring private carriers to obtain a certificate of public necessity and convenience before operating on the state highways between fixed termini. The
purpose of this provision was to subject private carriers to the stricter regulations
appropriate to common carriers.4" In order to prevent the potential erosion of
fundamental liberties, the Supreme Court held that the state of California could
not constitutionally condition the privilege to use its highways upon the surrender
of the constitutional right to due process of law by affixing to the privilege an
unconstitutional condition precedent that the carrier assume the burdens and
duties of a common carrier against his will.
47
and Griffin v.
This doctrine was further developed in Speiser v. Randall
California."' The Supreme Court in Speiser held that the receipt of a tax exemption for veterans could not be conditioned upon the surrender of the right to
refrain from unconstitutional oaths pursuant to the first amendment.4" In
39 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967).
40 Id. at 646.

41 Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F.Supp. 1272, 1274 (W.D. Va. 1972). See text accompanying
note 3 supra regarding due process requirements.
42 The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" was first explained in Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1595 (1960). This note was cited regarding the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by the Fourth Circuit in Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d
at 640 n. 11, and by Van Alstyne, supra note 30, at 614.
43 Van Alstyne, supra note 30, at 616.
44 Note, sunpra note 42, at 1596.
45 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
46 The private carriers in this case were automobiles for hire.
47 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
48 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
49 357 U.S. at 529.
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Griffin, the Court stated that the privilege not to have the prosecutor comment
upon a defendant's refusal to testify could not be based upon the waiver of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Before Patton, harsher resentencing of the type in Tucker had never been
explicitly held invalid under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.50 In an
analogous situation, however, the Supreme Court in Green v. United States5
declared that to make a defendant exchange his constitutional protection against
a second prosecution for an offense punishable by death as the price of a successful appeal from an erroneous conviction was a violation of double jeopardy.
The defendant in Green had originally been convicted of second degree murder.
On appeal, Green's conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new
trial. On remand, the defendant was tried for first degree murder under the
original indictment, convicted and sentenced to death. Relying in part on the
Supreme Court's reversal in Green, the Patton court challenged a more severe
second sentence in terms of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is applicable to the rights of
defendants convicted in violation of constitutional safeguards, in the following
way: (1) a defendant enjoys protection against a more severe resentence so long
as he passively accepts his situation; (2) the due process clause of the fifth amendment gives a defendant a constitutional right to a fair trial but to obtain this right,
the defendant has to appeal; (3) under Pearce a defendant forfeits his protection against a higher resentence the moment he appeals; (4) thus, to obtain the
unconstitutional privilege against a higher resentence, a defendant has to waive
his fifth amendment right to due process. The societal interests at issue clearly
do not justify placing a defendant in such a dilemma.5 2
In considering the validity of harsher resentencing, the Pearce court did not
consider the Patton conclusion concerning the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The fear of a greater sentence on retrial may prevent defendants from
seeking a constitutionally proper retrial through the appellate process.5" Therefore, in order to protect the right to a fair trial, the Seventh Circuit, using an
unconstitutional conditions justification, might have held that the original
sentence must operate as a ceiling for any sentence subsequently imposed following the successful appeal and retrial of the accused for the same offense. Such a
ruling would have set the stage for a decisive Supreme Court ruling on the
question of whether harsher resentencing should ever be allowed.
VII. Conclusion
The right to a fundamentally fair trial is at the very core of civil liberties.
In Tucker, the Seventh Circuit upheld this freedom within the parameters of
existing precedent. A review of the Pearce rule, however, reveals that harsher
resentencing cannot be justified under any circumstances. For this reason, the
50

Van Aistyne, supra note 30, at 617.

51

355 U.S. 184 (1957).

52 See text accompanying notes 30-38 supra, for a discussion of the societal interests involved.
53 See note 4 supra.
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Seventh Circuit should in the future transcend the narrow holding of Tucker
and,..when the appropriate case arises, proscribe harsher resentencing within its
jurisdiction. This action may be taken either on the basis of the court's right to
establish federal safeguards beyond minimal constitutional requirements or by
adopting the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine.
Furthermore, a close reading of Tucker reveals two other potential issues
which did not require adjudication in Tucker but are likely to generate litigation
in the future. First, since the Tucker opinion did not discuss the definition of
"sentence" pursuant to the Tucker facts, the Seventh Circuit did not fully clarify
the fact that Pearce forbids not only certain penalties, but also certain methods of
imposition of sentences. Even more significant, Tucker continues the judicial
trend of viewing the severity of penalties solely in terms of quantity. With the
increasing use of rehabilitative sentences such as work release programs, it is likely
that a defendant will eventually raise the issue of quality of the resentence. This,
however, must await future litigation.
In Tucker, the Seventh Circuit reached a result which properly reflects current legal precedent. To this extent, the decision is laudable. Yet the seeds of
future controversies are apparent in the instant case. Within the foreseeable
future, the Seventh Circuit may be directly confronted with the questions left unanswered by Tucker and the court should be prepared to respond in a manner
which would genuinely protect the interests of the retried defendant.
Deborah L. Thomas

Equal Protection-State Segregative Housing
Practices Can Be the Basis of a School
Desegregation Remedy.
United States v. Board of School Commissioners*
I. Introduction
United States v. Board of School Commissioners represents the culmination
of ten years of litigation involving school desegregation in Indianapolis, Indiana.'
Although eight years ago the district court held that the Board of School Commissioners had committed an equal protection violation which could be the basis
of an intradistrict school desegregation remedy,2 litigation continued in search of
an equal protection violation which could be the basis of an interdistrict school
desegregation remedy. In 1977 the Supreme Court extended this search by
remanding the case to the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of
the Supreme Court's recent holding that proof of discriminatory intent is required
to establish an equal protection violation.4
5
Litigation
II. The Indianapolis

In 1968 the United States Attorney General filed a complaint charging the
Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana, and others
with racial discrimination in the assignment of students to schools within the
Indianapolis Public School District (IPS).6
In 1969, while this litigation was pending in the district court, the Indiana
573 F.2d 400 (7th Gir. 1978).
1 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 920 (1973); 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, and
remanded, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975) ; 419 F. Supp. 180
(S.D. Ind. 1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, mem. sub nom.
Board of School Comm'rs v. Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977); United States v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 419 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ind. 1975), vacated and remanded, 573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3215 (1978); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, No. IP 68C-225 (S.D. Ind., filed July 11, 1978).
2 332 F. Supp. at 677-78.
3 429 U.S. 1068.
4 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
5 The five district court opinions issued in United States v. Board of School Comm'rs
between 1971 and 1978 are denoted Indianapolis I through V. The Seventh Circuit decision
which is the subject of this comment is denoted Board of School Commissioners.
6 This action was initiated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)-6(a), 6(b) (1970)
(amended 1972). 332 F. Supp. at 656.
The complaint also charged the defendants with racial discrimination in the assignment of
teachers. In 1968 the federal district court found racial discrimination in the assignment of
teachers and ordered corrective reassignment of teachers. United States v. Board of School
Comm'rs, No. IP 68-C-225 (S.D. Ind., filed Aug. 5, 1968). In 1969 three teachers instituted
a class action in the circuit court of Marion County, Ind., to enjoin the involuntary reassignment of teachers. The court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the
reassignment. The defendants removed the action to the federal district court which dissolved
the temporary restraining order. Burns v. Board of School Comm'rs, 302 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.
Ind. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 437 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1971).
374
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General Assembly repealed a provision of a 1961 Act' which had authorized the
automatic extension of the boundaries of IPS with an extension of the boundaries
of the City of Indianapolis. As a result of this repeal, the boundaries of IPS no
longer automatically coincided with the boundaries of the City of Indianapolis.
Sixteen days after this repeal, the General Assembly adopted the Consolidated First-Class Cities and Counties Acte (Uni-Gov Act) which consolidated
the governments of the "old" City of Indianapolis and surrounding Marion
County (with certain exceptions) into a metropolitan city government
which continues to be called the City of Indianapolis. The Uni-Gov Act expressly
provided that IPS would not be affected by the expansion of the City of
Indianapolis." As a result of the Uni-Gov Act and its companion legislation, IPS
was confined to the area of the "old" City of Indianapolis in which approximately
98.5% of the blacks in Marion County resided in 1969.1"
In 1971, in Indianapolis I,1 the district court found racial discrimination
evidenced by the gerrymandering of school attendance zones, the segregation of
faculty, the use of optional attendance zones among the schools, and the pattern
of school locations and construction. The court concluded that: (1) the Board
of School Commissioners had practiced de jure" segregation of IPS students on
May 17, 1954 (the date of Brown v. Board of Education s (Brown I)); and
(2) the Board of School Commissioners had not eliminated de jure segregation
of IPS students on or before May 31, 1968 (the date of the Attorney General's
complaint) . The court ultimately held that the Board of School Commissioners
had breached its affirmative duty to desegregate the schools within IPS, a duty
imposed by Brown v. Board of Education"s (Brown 1I), and thus had denied
black students in IPS the right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment.
In determining the scope of a remedy for this constitutional violation, the
district court considered the phenomenon of "white flight," the flight of white
students from a school which accelerates as the percentage of black students in
the school approaches a critical percentage known as the "tipping point."' 6
7 Acts 1961, Ch. 186, § 9 (current version at IND. CODE § 20-3-14-11 (1977)).
8 IND. CODE § 18-4-1-1 (1977).
9 IND. CODE § 18-4-3-14 (1977).
10 332 F. Supp. at 663.
11 332 F. Supp. 655.
12 De jure ("by law") segregation is racial separation caused by purposeful acts of gove rnmental authorities. De fact& ("by the facts") segregation is racial separation caused by
factors other than purposeful acts of governmental authorities. See generally Note, Reading
the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86
Yale L.J. 317 (1976).
13 In Brown I, the Supreme Court, rejecting the "separate but equal" doctrine, unanimously held that government-mandated (de jure) racial segregation in public schools violates
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
14 332 F. Supp. at 677-78.
15 In Brown II, the Supreme Court ordered the district courts involved in Brown I "to
take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees . . . as are necessary and proper to
admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the
parties to these cases." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
In Indianapolis1, the district court interpreted Brown II as imposing an affirmative duty
on all states, acting through their agents, to desegregate school districts which were practicing
de jure segregation on May 17, 1954 (the date of Brown 1). 332 F. Supp. at 658.
16 332 F. Supp. at 676-77.
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Experts testified that the tipping point was approximately 40%, and the court
noted that the percentage of black students in IPS was already approaching that
critical percentage."8 Statistically, a reassignment of students among the schools
within IPS to desegregate the predominantly white and black schools would
force each school to the tipping point and would accelerate "white flight" from
IPS into the surrounding City of Indianapolis.19 Thus, a desegregation remedy
encompassing only the schools within IPS (an intradistrict remedy) could not
"[promise] realistically to work now.""
The district court observed, however, that "white flight" would be minimal
if the boundaries of IPS coincided with the boundaries of the City of Indianapolis. IPS, which during the 1970-71 academic year had 100,145 enrolled students-of whom 36.5% were black,2 1 is surrounded by ten outside school corporations within Marion County, which during the 1969-70 academic year had
73,205 enrolled students-of whom 2.62% were black.22 Statistically, a transfer
of students between the schools within IPS and the ten outside school corporations
to desegregate the predominantly white and black schools within IPS would not
force any school to the tipping point. Thus, a desegregation remedy encompassing
the schools within IPS and the ten outside school corporations (an interdistrict
remedy) would "[promise] realistically to work now."23 Concluding that an interdistrict remedy raised questions which should not be answered without the addition of other parties, the court retained jurisdiction for further consideration of
an interdistrict remedy when other interested parties could be joined to the
action. 4
Later in 1971, the Buckley plaintiffs (two black students) intervened in their
own right and as representatives of a class consisting of all black students in IPS.25
The intervening plaintiffs joined as defendants additional state officials and
nineteen outside school corporations (including the ten outside school corporations within Marion County)." In an amended complaint, the intervening
plaintiffs claimed that: (1) the Uni-Gov Act and its companion legislation
(which excluded IPS from the "new" City of Indianapolis) were unconstitutional as racially discriminatory; and (2) the state and local school authorities
had practiced racial discrimination in the schools within IPS and the surrounding school districts. 7
Two weeks after the plaintiffs' intervention, the Board of School Commissioners joined as defendants the Metropolitan Development Commission of
17 Id. at 676. In Indianapolis II, the district court considered additional evidence on the
tipping point and concluded that the tipping point was approximately 25 to 30%. 368 F. Supp.
at 1197.
18 332 F. Supp. at 657.
19 "White flight," however, is an unacceptable reason for failing to desegregate schools.
United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
20 332 F. Supp. at 678 (quoting Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968)).
21 The total student enrollment and percentage of black student enrollment were calculated from figures in the court's opinion. 332 F. Supp. at 657.
22 Only these roughly comparative statistics were given in the court's opinion. Id. at 676.
23 See note 20 supra.
24 332 F. Supp. at 679.
25 368 F. Supp. at 1195.
26 Id. at 1195-96.
27 503 F.2d at 73.
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Marion County (Commission) and the Housing Authority of the City of
Indianapolis (HACI) . 8 In a cross-complaint, the Board of School Commissioners charged the Commission and HACI with contributing to school segregation in IPS by constructing public housing projects only within IPS territory.2 9
In 1973, while further consideration of an interdistrict remedy was pending
in the district court, the Board of School Commissioners appealed IndianapolisI,
contending that the segregation existing in the schools within IPS was de facto
and not deJure.'° The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court judgment, holding that the district court had properly inferred the discriminatory intent required
for a finding of de jure segregation from the pattern of practices of the Board of
School Commissioners.'
Later in 1973, in IndianapolisII," the district court concluded that: (1) a
desegregation remedy encompassing only the schools within IPS (an intradistict
remedy) was unworkable; (2) the practices of de jure segregation by the Board
of School Commissioners were acts of the state; (3) the added defendant state
officials had practiced de jure segregation within IPS by commission (racial discrimination in approving school locations) and by omission (breach of their
affirmative duty to desegregate the schools within IPS, a duty imposed by
Brown 11); and (4) none of the added defendant school corporations had
practiced de jure segregation within their respective districts.
The district court ultimately held that: (1) the state through its General
Assembly has the affirmative duty to desegregate the schools within IPS and thus
has the duty to devise a remedy encompassing the schools within IPS and the
outside school corporations (an interdistrict remedy); and (2) if the General
Assembly fails to fulfill its duty within a reasonable time, the district court has
the duty to devise a remedy encompassing the schools within IPS and the outside
school corporations (an interdistrict remedy)." In view of these holdings, the
court stated that consideration of the constitutionality of the Uni-Gov Act and its
companion legislation was unnecessary. 4 The charges brought by the Board
of School Commissioners against the Commission and HACI were not taken up
at this trial.
Subsequently, in 1973, in IndianapolisIII," the district court issued a supplemental opinion consisting primarily of guidelines to be followed by the General Assembly in implementing Indianapolis11.
In 1974, less than a year after the district court had ordered an interdistrict
remedy, the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley" (Milliken I) held that before
a federal court can order an interdistrict school desegregation remedy, "it must
28 419 F. Supp. at 182.
29 Id.
30 474 F.2d at 84.
31 Id. at 84, 89. In holding that discriminatory intent is required to establish de jure
segregation, the Seventh Circuit correctly anticipated Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver,
Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). See text accompanying note 54 infra.
32 368 F.Supp. 1191.
33 Id. at 1205.
34 Id. at 1208.
35 Id. at 1223.
36 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). For the facts in Milliken I, see text accompanying note 91 infra.
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first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within
one district
3 7
that produces a significant segregative effect in another district.3
Later in 1974, in the appeal of IndianapolisII, the Seventh Circuit reversed
the district court order pertaining to a remedy encompassing schools outside the
boundaries of the City of Indianapolis, vacated the order pertaining to a remedy
encompassing schools within the boundaries of the City of Indianapolis, and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Milliken .38
In 1975, in Indianapolis IV, 9 the district court announced that the earlier
findings that the state had practiced de jure segregation in IPS were now the
law of the case.40 Amplifying these earlier findings, the court found that: ( 1 ) the
Commission and HACI have had the authority to construct public housing
projects within and outside IPS territory; (2) suburban Marion County has
resisted the construction of public housing projects outside IPS territory; (3)
HACI with the Commission's approval has constructed every public housing
project within IPS territory; and (4) 98% of the public housing tenants were
4 1
black and their children attended schools within IPS.
The district court ultimately held that: (1) the General Assembly's passage
of the Uni-Gov Act and its companion legislation (which excluded IPS from
the "new" City of Indianapolis) breached the state's affirmative duty to eliminate
de jure segregation in the schools within IPS and thus established an equal protection violation which could be the basis of a remedy encompassing the schools
within IPS and the surrounding City of Indianapolis (an interdistrict remedy);
and (2) the Commission's approval and HACI's construction of all public housing projects within IPS territory produced segregative effects, namely, the effects
of increasing the racial disparity in residential and school populations between
IPS territory and the surrounding City of Indianapolis, and thus established an
equal protection violation warranting an injunction from locating additional
public housing projects within IPS territory."
In 1976, in the appeal of Indianapolis IV, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court order, emphasizing that the General Assembly's passage of the UniGov Act and its companion legislation produced segregative interdistrict effects
(the Milliken I prerequisite for an interdistrict remedy), namely, the effects of
inhibiting the power of the Board of School Commissioners to desegregate the
schools within IPS, and thus could be the basis of an interdistrict remedy."
In 1977 the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Seventh Circuit
and remanded44 the case to the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light
of Washington v. Davis45 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.4"
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 745.
503 F.2d at 86.
419 F. Supp. 180.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 183, 186.
541 F.2d at 1218-21, 1224.

44
45
46

429 U.S. 1068.
426 U.S. 229.
429 U.S. 252.
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III. Requiring Discriminatory Intent for Equal Protection ViolationsDavis and Arlington Heights
In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court announced that proof of discriminatory purpose is required to establish an equal protection violation.47 In
Davis, two black men, who had been denied positions as police officers in the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department because they had failed a
qualifying test, contended that the Department's use of the qualifying test violated
their rights under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.48 The rejected
applicants based their contention on the fact that a disproportionate number of
49
blacks failed the test.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, applying Title VII" standards
to resolve this constitutional issue, held that the racially disproportionate impact,
absent proof that the test adequately measured job performance, established an
equal protection violation."' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that proof
of discriminatory purpose is required to establish an equal protection violation
and declining to hold that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of
invidious racial discrimination is identical to the Title VII standards. 2
The Supreme Court emphasized "the basic equal protection principle that
the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." 53 The Court noted, for
example, that in school desegregation cases, de jure segregation is distinguished
from de facto segregation by "purpose or intent to segregate." 54 Thus, the disproportionate impact alone of predominately white or black schools does not
establish an equal protection violation without proof of discriminatory purpose.
Attempting to clarify the relationship between discriminatory purpose and
disproportionate impact, the Supreme Court made two observations. First, the
racially discriminatory purpose need not be express or appear on the face of a
statute."' A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, can invidiously discriminate
on the basis of race through its application." Second, the racially disproportionate impact of a law is not irrelevant."7 A racially discriminatory purpose can be
47 Prior to Davis, various circuits had held that proof of a racially disproportionate impact,
absent some justification, established an equal protection violation. 426 U.S. at 244-45.
48 Id. at 232-33. The Davis Court noted that the due process clause of the fifth amendment contains an equal protection component. Id. at 239.
49 Id. at 233.
50 42 U.S.C. § 2000e '(1970) (amended 1972). For a discussion of the standards of
proof in Title VII cases, see, e.g., Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 98 S. Ct. 2943 (1978).
justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, discussed the two methods of making out a prima
facie case under Title VII: (1) the "disparate impact" theory of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); and (2) the "disparate treatment" theory of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
In Furneo, a "disparate treatment" case, the Supreme Court concluded that the Seventh
Circuit had improperly equated a showing of a prima facie case with an establishment of a
Title VII violation and held that to rebut a prima facie case the employer need only articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an applicant's rejection. 98 S. Ct. 2943.
51 426 U.S. at 236-37.
52 Id. at 238-39.
53 Id. at 240.

54 Id. at 240 (quoting Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. at 208).
55 Id. at 241.
56
57

Id.
Id.
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inferred if the law bears more heavily on one race than another or if the discrimination is difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. 8
Less than a year after Davis, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.,59 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Davis holding
that proof of discriminatory purpose or intent is required to establish an equal
protection violation. In Arlington Heights, Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation (MHDC) had applied to the Village for a rezoning of land from
single-family to multiple-family classification in order to construct a racially
integrated, low- and moderate-income housing project." Upon denial of the application, MHDC and three black residents claimed that the Village's rezoning
denial was racially discriminatory and violated, among other things, the fourteenth amendment and the Fair Housing Act. 1
The district court, ruling in favor of the Village, concluded that the rezoning denial was motivated not by racial discrimination but by a desire to
protect property values and to maintain the Village's zoning plan.62 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed these conclusions, but reversed the judgment, holding
that the "ultimate effect" of the rezoning denial was racially discriminatory."3
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit judgment, holding that proof of
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to establish an equal protection
violation, and remanded the case for further consideration of the alleged Fair
Housing Act violation. 4
Attempting to clarify the Davis holding, the Supreme Court maintained that
the racially discriminatory purpose need not be the "dominant" or "primary"
purpose but only a "motivating factor" behind the governmental decision alleged
to constitute an equal protection violation. 5 The determination whether a discriminatory purpose was a "motivating factor" behind a governmental decision
requires an examination of a number of factors, including the impact of the
decision.
As mentioned in Davis, if the decision bears more heavily on one
race than another or if a clear pattern unexplainable on nonracial grounds
emerges from the impact of the decision, then discriminatory intent can be inferred from the impact." The Court asserted, however, that such cases are
a
rare.
In addition to impact, the Court identified five other, though not exclusive,
factors to examine:
[1] [t]he historical background of the decision .

.

. particularly if it reveals

a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes;
[2] [t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision;
58 Id. at 242.
59 429 U.S. 252.
60 Id. at 254.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 259.
63 Id. at 254, 259-60.
64 Id. at 270-71. For the Seventh Circuit decision on the remand of Arlington Heights,
see text accompanying note 110 infra.
65 429 U.S. at 265-66.
66 Id. at 266.
67 Id.
68 Id.

[Vol. 54:374]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

[3] [d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence;
[4] [s]ubstantive departures... particularly if the factors usually considered
important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to
the one reached;
[5] [t]he legislative or administrative history . . especially where there are
contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body,
minutes of its meetings, or reports.6 9
If an examination of these factors reveals proof that a governmental decision
was motivated in part by a discriminatory purpose, then the plaintiff has satisfied
the "threshold showing" for establishing an equal protection violation."0 The
burden then shifts to the defendant to prove "that the same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered."'" Thus, the
establishment of an equal protection violation requires two steps: (1) a "threshold showing" and (2) the "same decision test."
IV. Circumventing the Discriminatory Intent Requirement-The Intent
Standard in Board of School Commissioners
During 1976 and 1977 the Supreme Court remanded several school desegregation cases including Board of School Commissioners.for further consider2
ation in light of Davis and Arlington Heights."
On the remand of Board of
School Commissioners, the Seventh Circuit in dicta equated the discriminatory
intent requirement with a disproportionate impact requirement, a circumvention
of the discriminatory intent requirement announced in Davis and partially
clarified in Arlington Heights.
The Seventh Circuit maintained that Davis and Arlington Heights had not
explained the type of discriminatory intent that a plaintiff must prove to constitute a prima fade case of an equal protection violation and offered two suggestions for determining discriminatory intent.7"
First, discriminatory intent is to be gleaned from government institutions and
not from individual officials."4 This suggestion is inconsistent with the Arlington
Heights factors identified as probative of discriminatory intent, particularly
"[t]he legislative or administrative history . . . especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its
meetings, or reports." 5
Second, discriminatory intent is to be determined by the following standard:
A presumption of segregative purpose arises when plaintiffs establish that
the natural, probable, and foreseeable result of public officials' action or
inaction [is] an increase or perpetuation of public school segregation. The
presumption becomes proof unless defendants affirmatively [establish] that
69 Id. at 267-68.
70 Id. at 270 n.21.
71 Id.
72 Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977) (per curiam); School Dist. of Omaha v.
United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977) (per curiam); Board of School Comm'rs v. Buckley, 429
U.S. 1068 (1977) '(mem.); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990
(1976) (mem.).
73 573 F.2d at 412.
74 Id. at 413.
75 429 U.S. at 268.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1979]

their action or inaction [is] a consistent and resolute application of racially
neutral policies.7 6
This standard, however, is probative of disproportionate impact and not discriminatory intent. The inconsistency between the Board of School Commissioners standard and Arlington Heights is illustrated by the following hypothetical
fact pattern.
First, assume that a school board adopts a neighborhood school policy, a
policy of assigning students to the schools nearest their residence in a school
district in which the white and black residential areas are segregated. Second,
assume that after the school policy becomes effective, the schools in the white
residential areas become predominantly white and the schools in the black residential areas become predominantly black. Third, note that a neighborhood
school policy can have two plausible purposes: (1) nonracial purposes such as
safety and economy in reduced transportation costs, ease in student assignment
and administration, and better home-school communication; and (2) racial
purposes such as segregation of white students from black students.
The first step in applying the Board of School Commissioners standard to
this hypothetical is to determine whether the increase or perpetuation of school
segregation was a natural, probable, and foreseeable result of this school policy.
In effect, this inquiry is equivalent to asking whether the school policy produced
a racially disproportionate impact. Even if the segregative effects of the school
board action were not foreseeable when the school policy was adopted, the continuation of these segregative effects is a foreseeable result of school board inaction. Thus, a presumption of discriminatory intent will always arise if a racially
disproportionate impact exists.
The second step in applying the Board of School Commissioners standard
to this hypothetical is to determine whether the school board can affirmatively
establish that its action or inaction was a consistent and resolute application of
racially neutral policies. The response to this inquiry depends on whether the
school board must prove that its action or inaction was: (1) not taken for racial
purposes or (2) taken for nonracial purposes.
If the school board must prove that its action or inaction was not taken for
racial purposes, then the school board is forced to prove a negative. "Given the
extraordinary difficulty of establishing the absence of racial motivation, the
presumption of segregative design is, for practical purposes, the equivalent of a
conclusive presumption."" Thus, a presumption of discriminatory intent is
equivalent to proof of discriminatory intent.
Implicit in the first interpretation of the Board of School Commissioners
standard is the following reasoning: (1) a racially disproportionate impact is
equivalent to a presumption of discriminatory intent; (2) a presumption of discriminatory intent is equivalent to proof of discriminatory intent; (3) therefore,
a racially disproportionate impact is equivalent to proof of discriminatory intent.
76 573 F.2d at 413 (quoting NAACP v. Lansing Ed. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977), which quoted Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ.,
508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974)).
77 Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. ,L.
REv. 540, 579 n.167 (1977).
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Thus, this first interpretation of the Board of School Commissioners standard
disaffirms the Arlington Heights holding, which mandates inferring discriminatory intent from a racially disproportionate impact alone only in rare cases.""
If the school board must prove that its action or inaction was taken for nonracial purposes, then the second step in Arlington Heights for establishing an
equal protection violation, the "same decision test," becomes redundant. In
effect, proving that its action or inaction was taken for nonracial purposes is
equivalent to proving that the "same decision would have resulted even had the
impermissible purpose not been considered." 7 Thus, proof of discriminatory
intent is equivalent to proof of an equal protection violation.
Implicit in the second interpretation of the Board of School Commissioners
standard is the following reasoning: (1) a racially disproportionate impact is
equivalent to a presumption of discriminatory intent; (2) a presumption of discriminatory intent shifts the burden of the "same decision test" to the defendant;
(3) therefore, a racially disproportionate impact shifts the burden of the "same
decision test" to the defendant. Thus, this second interpretation of the Board of
School Commissioners standard disaffirms the Arlington Heights holding, which
mandates shifting the burden of the "same decision test" to the defendant only
after the plaintiff has proven discriminatory intent.
Under both interpretations of the Board of School Commissioners standard,
proof of a racially disproportionate impact shifts the burden of the "same decision
test" to the defendant.8" Arlington Heights, however, mandates that the burden
of the "same decision test" not shift to the defendant upon mere proof of a
racially disproportionate impact. Instead, the plaintiff must satisfy a higher
"threshold showing," proof of a racially discriminatory intent, which is to be
inferred from a racially disproportionate impact alone only in rare cases.
The Seventh Circuit, however, is not alone among the circuits in proposing a
standard for inferring discriminatory intent from a racially disproportionate impact alone.81 These circuits have observed that determining the "motivating
factors" behind a governmental decision is an impossible burden, "for in an age
when it is unfashionable for state officials to openly express racial hostility, direct
evidence of overt bigotry will be impossible to find." 82 To accept this statement,
however, is to argue for the collapse of the distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation and to invite a deluge of school desgregation litigation.
Whether the Supreme Court will allow the circuits to continue circumventing the discriminatory intent requirement in establishing equal protection viola78 429 U.S. at 266.
79 Id. at 270 n.21.
80 Under the first interpretation of the Board of School Comm'rs standard, the burden of
the "same decision test" shifts to the defendant upon application of the second step in
Arlington Heights. Under the second interpretation of the Board of School Comm'rs standard,
the burden of the "same decision test" shifts to the defendant upon application of the second
step in the Board of School Comm'rs standard, making application of the second step in
Arlington Heights redundant.
81 See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977), petition
for rehearing denied and petition for rehearing en bane denied, 579 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978);
Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1978); School Dist. of Omaha v. United States, 565
F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978); 559 F.2d 1042.
82 573 F.2d at 412.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1979]

tions in school desegregation cases remains an unsettled issue."3 The Court's
recent remand of several desegregation cases reflects a desire for further development of the discriminatory intent requirement in the lower courts before settling
the issue. 4
V. Circumventing the Discriminatory Intent Requirement-The Implicit
Holding in Board of School Commissioners
In Board of School Commissioners, the Seventh Circuit, prompted by the
Supreme Court's recent holding that proof of discriminatory intent is required to
establish an equal protection violation, devised a means to obtain a school desegregation remedy without proving that school authorities acted with discriminatory intent. Recognizing that residential patterns are reflected in the
racial composition of an area's schools, the Seventh Circuit held that if state
segregative housing practices have caused residential segregation and if the
residential segregation, in turn, has caused school segregation, then the state
segregative housing practices can be the basis of a school desegregation remedy. 5
This holding implies that a school desegregation remedy can be based not only on
equal protection violations by a housing authority, in which proof of discriminatory intent is required, but also on Fair Housing Act violations 6 by a housing
authority, in which proof of discriminatory intent is not required." In effect,
the implicit holding in Board of School Commissioners is a circumvention of the
discriminatory intent requirement announced in Davis and partially clarified in
Arlington Heights.
A. Recognizing the Relationship Between School Segregation and Residential
Segregation-Milliken I
Although the Supreme Court has never confronted the question whether
state segregative housing practices can be the basis of a school desegregation

83 In School Dist. of Omaha, a dissent argued that the Court of Appeals which had
adopted a standard for determining discriminatory intent similar to the first interpretation of
the Board of School Comm'rs standard had correctly anticipated Arlington Heights. 433 U.S. at
669-71 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., dissenting). On remand, the court of appeals reaffirmed
the adoption of its earlier standard. 565 F.2d at 128. Subsequently, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 434 U.S. 1064.
84 The Seventh Circuit remanded Board of School Comm'rs to the district court to
determine whether the General Assembly, the Commission, and HACI had acted with racially
discriminatory intent. 573 F.2d at 414. On remand, the district court found that the General
Assembly had acted with the racially discriminatory intent and purpose of confining black
students to IPS. This finding was based on an application of the factors enunciated in Arlington
Heiehts without use of the Board of School Comm'rs standard. The district court also found
that the Commission and HACI were racially motivated by the invidious purpose of keeping
blacks within IPS territory. This finding was based on an application of the Board of School
Comm'rs standard. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, No. IP 68-C-225 (S.D. Ind.,
filed July 11, 1978).
85 573 F.2d at 409.
86 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
87 See text accompanying note 110 infra.
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remedy,88 the Court has recognized the relationship between school segregation
and residential segregation in several school desegregation cases.89
In Milliken I,9" the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusions
that: (1) the Detroit Board of Education and the state of Michigan had
practiced de jure segregation in the schools within the Detroit Public School
System, and (2) an interdistrict school desegregation remedy encompassing the
schools within the City of Detroit and the surrounding metropolitan area was
necessary to lessen the racial identifiability of the schools within the City of
88 In Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), af'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975), the
Supreme Court, however, did summarily affirm a district court decision basing an interdistrict
school desegregation remedy on eight separate interdistrict constitutional violations including
four housing violations.
89 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court
recognized this relationship between school segregation and residential segregation. "People
gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of people.
The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of inner-city neighorhoods." 402 U.S.
at 20-21. The Court stated that a district court may consider residential patterns in fashioning
a school desegregation remedy. 402 U.S. at 21.
The Court, however, cautioned against using school desegregation cases to "embrace all
the problems of racial prejudice, even when those problems contribute to disproportionate
racial concentrations in some schools." 402 U.S. at 23. "One vehicle can carry only a limited
amount of baggage." 402 U.S. at 22.
(For a school desegregation case in which a circuit court heeded the warning in Swann,
see Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1975). In Hart, the school board impleaded city, state, and federal housing and urban
development bodies and officials, charging these third-party defendants with fostering residential
segregation which resulted in school segregation. After finding the school board liable, the
district court "mooted" the third-party complaint but retained jurisdiction over the third-party
defendants for purposes of ordering a comprehensive remedy. 383 F. Supp. at 754. The circuit
court, however, recommended to the district court that it withdraw its decision to "moot" the
third-party action and dismiss it. 512 F.2d at 56.)
In Keyes, the Court again observed that school policies "may have a profound reciprocal
effect on the racial composition of residential neighborhoods within a metropolitan area .
413 U.S. at 202.
[The familiar root cause of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas
of our country is essentially the same: one of segregated residential and migratory
patterns the impact of which on the racial composition of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of public school authorities.
413 U.S. at 222-23 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Austin Independent School Dist., the concurring opinion observed:
[t]he principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in urban public schools across
the country-North and South-is the imbalance in residential patterns. Such
residential patterns are typically beyond the control of school authorities. For example,
discrimination in housing-whether public or private-cannot be attributed to school
authorities. Economic pressures and voluntary preferences are the primary determinants of residential patterns.
429 U.S. at 994 (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., concurring).
This last sentence, however, contradicts the results of several studies. "Neither free choice
nor poverty is a sufficient explanation for the universally high degree of segregation in American
Powell
cities." Taeuber, Residential Segregation, 213 SCIENTiFic Am. 12, 19 (1965) (Justice
9
cited this article in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 223 n. .) "The
assertion that residential segregation by race is caused largely by economic factors remains unsubstantiated." Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives on Housing and School Segregation, 21
WAYNE L. REv. 833, 837 (1975). "Data from the Census of 1970 reveal that economic factors
account for little of the concentration of blacks within central cities, their absence from suburbia or the residential segregation of blacks from whites in either cities or suburbs." Hermalin
& Farley, The Potential for Residential Integration in Cities and Suburbs: Implications for
the Busing Controversy, 38 AM. Soc. Ray. 595 (1973). "[Elconomic factors explain only a small
proportion of the residential segregation found in American metropolises." Parley, Residential
Segregation and Its Implications for School Integration, 39 LAw & CONTEMPORARY PROB.
164, 177 (1975).
90 418 U.S. 717.
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Detroit. 1 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a federal
court cannot impose an interdistrict school desegregation remedy for single-district
de jure segregation violations absent significant segregative effects in the other
districts. 2 Specifically, an interdistrict school desegregation remedy is appropriate
"where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused
racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been
deliberately drawn on the basis of race."'"
Although the district court also found that federal, state, and local governmental actions and private actions had produced the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area, the Sixth Circuit did not rely
on housing violations in affirming the district court judgment. 4 Accordingly,
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, concluded that the case in its present
posture did not present any question concerning possible housing violations.9"
Justice Stewart concurred in the majority opinion but noted that if "state
officials had contributed to the separation of the races ...by purposeful, racially
discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws, then a decree calling for
transfer of pupils across district lines or for restructuring of district lines might
well be appropriate."9 Justice Stewart concluded, however, that the facts did
not show that the racial composition of the schools or that residential patterns
"were in any significant measure caused by governmental activity."'
Milliken I suggests that if the plaintiffs had shown that the state was "in
any significant measure" responsible for the residential segregation in the Detroit
metropolitan area, Justice Stewart would have voted to affirm an interdistrict
school desegregation remedy based on state segregative housing practices.98
B. Basing a School DesegregationRemedy on State Segregative Housing
Practices-Milliken I and Milliken II
The possibility of basing a school desegregation remedy on state segregative
housing practices which have caused segregation in the schools is supported by
the Supreme Court's interpretation in Milliken I" and Milliken v. Bradley0 0
(Milliken II) of the following remedial principle: "Once a right and a violation
have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."' 1
Milliken II enunciated three factors for federal courts to consider in ordering a school desegregation remedy. First, "the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution," must be
considered. 0' Second, the remedy must be related to " 'the condition alleged to
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 734-36.
Id. at 745, 753.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 724, 728 n.7.
Id. at 728 n.7.
Id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 756 n.2.
Sloane, Milliken v. Bradley in Perspective, 4
418 U.S. 717.
433 U.S. 267 (1977).
402 U.S. at 15.
433 U.S. at 280-81.

J. LAW-ED.

209 (1975).
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offend the Constitution .
,.
"10" Third, the remedy must be designed "'to
restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of such conduct.' ,,104
In ordering a school desegregation remedy based on state segregative housing practices, a federal court will encounter no theoretical difficulty with the first
and second factors, but will encounter practical difficulty with the third factor.
First, such an order will not impermissibly interfere with school districts in
managing their own affairs. The Milliken I holding that an interdistrict school
desegregation remedy is appropriate (a permissible interference) when the acts
of one school district (an instrumentality of the state) produce significant segregative effects in surrounding school districts (instrumentalities of the state) indicates that a school desegregation remedy might also be appropriate (a permissible interference) when the acts of a housing authority (an instrumentality
of the state) produce significant segregative effects in surrounding school districts
(instrumentalities of the state)."°' In each case the surrounding school districts
are ordered to participate in a remedy of the constitutional violations of either
another school district or a housing authority. The identity of the instrumentalities of the state that committed the constitutional violations will not alter the
permissible interference of the order on the school districts in managing their
own affairs.
Second, the order is related to a condition which offends the Constitution,
for school segregation caused by an instrumentality of the state (a school district
or a housing authority) is a condition which offends the Constitution." 6
Third, whether the order can be limited to remedying the incremental segregative effect of housing violations on the racial composition of the schools in the
presence of the violations, compared to the racial composition of the schools in the
absence of the violations, depends on the quality of the available evidence.'
The
court must not only determine the number of persons affected by the housing
violations but also estimate the number of students among those persons affected
by the housing violations. A court might find itself incapable or unwilling to
formulate such an estimate.
Thus, Milliken I and Milliken II suggest that a school desegregation remedy
based on state segregative housing practices is a theoretical possibility but not a
practical possibility.

103 Id. at 280 (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 738).
104 Id. at 280 (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746).
105 For clarification of a permissible interference, see Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976). In Hills, the Court distinguished Milliken I, affirming the Seventh Circuit's authorization of a metropolitan area remedy for racial discrimination in housing practices within the
City of Chicago without a showing of significant segregative effects in the suburbs. justice
Stewart, speaking for the Court, maintained that ordering the Department of Housing and
Urban Development to create housing alternatives in the suburbs would be commensurate
with the nature and extent of the constitutional violation and would not impermissibly interfere
with local governments and suburban housing authorities.
106 347 U.S. 483.
107 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
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C. Defining State Segregative Housing Practices-Boardof School Commissioners
In Board of School Commissioners, the Seventh Circuit held that state segregative housing practices can be the basis of a school desegregation remedy, but
the court did not explicitly define the violations established by "state segregative
housing practices." Implicit in this holding is the potential for obtaining a school
desegregation remedy without proving that either school or housing authorities
acted with discriminatory intent.
Clearly, "state segregative housing practices" can establish equal protection
violations, for that was the issue in Board of School Commissioners.
The Seventh Circuit, however, intended "state segregative housing practices"
to establish other housing violations:
It does not matter whether HACI itself had a discriminatoryintent in limiting public housing to IPS or whether the suburbs with discriminatory intent
refused to cooperate, thus preventing HACI from expanding public housing
projects beyond the IPS boundary. The result was the same and HACI, as
a public agency, should not be free from an injunctive order merely because
its conduct was forced from the outside." 8
The court is not referring to an equal protection violation, for proof of discriminatory intent is required to establish an equal protection violation. The court,
however, might be referring to a Fair Housing Act. 9 violation.
On the remand of Arlington Heights, the Seventh Circuit held that a Fair
Housing Act violation can be established by a showing of discriminatory effect
without a showing of discriminatory intent."' A Fair Housing Act violation can
produce significant segregative effects in a school district identical to those
resulting from an equal protection violation. The Fair Housing Act violation
can be the basis of a housing remedy, but can it also be the basis of a school
remedy? The answer depends on whether the constitutional and statutory
standards applicable in cases of racial discrimination can coexist, namely, whether
proof of discriminatory intent is required for constitutional adjudications but not
for statutory adjudications of racial discrimination.
VI. Conclusion
In Board of School Commissioners, the Seventh Circuit, searching for an
equal protection violation which could be the basis of an interdistrict school desegregation remedy, circumvented the Supreme Court's recent holding that proof
of discriminatory intent is required to establish an equal protection violation.
First, the Board of School Commissioners standard for determining discriminatory intent equated the discriminatory intent requirement with a disproportionate impact requirement.
108

573 F.2d at 414 n.34 (emphasis added).

109

42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).

110 Metropolitan v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). Accord, Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir.

1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
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Second, the Seventh Circuit held that state segregative housing practices
can be the basis of a school desegregation remedy. If the practices are intended
to establish equal protection violations, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory
intent on the part of housing authorities; however, if the practices are intended
to establish Fair Housing Act violations, the plaintiff need not prove discriminatory intent on the part of any instrumentality of the state.
Thus, this twofold circumvention of the discriminatory intent requirement
reflects the Seventh Circuit's determination to remedy the racially discriminatory
effects of governmental action or inaction-whether or not ultimately traced to a
racially discriminatory intent.
Diane L. Wolf

First Amendment-Freedom of Speech-Request for
Injunction to Prohibit Nazi March in Jewish
Community Denied.
Frank Collin and the National Socialist Party of America
v. Albert Smith and the Village of Skokie, Illinois*
I. Introduction
In Collin v. Smith the Seventh Circuit undertook to decide whether municipal ordinances adopted by the Village of Skokie, Illinois, were constitutionally
acceptable restrictions upon the right of the pro-Nazi National Socialist Party
of America to demonstrate upon the public sidewalk in Skokie. This determination required the court to consider the status of the right of free speech when it
clashes with other rights or values.
Protection of individual liberties was a founding principle in America's
constitutional system of government, and continues to be a highly respected
value.' The concept of individual liberty is itself rather intangible. Historically,
this concept reflects a desire to protect the rights of individual citizens to live
peacefully and worship freely without government encroachment. 2 In order to
preserve this freedom, the right to participate in certain activities is guaranteed to
the people in the first amendment of the Bill of Rights. These rights, among them
the right to speak freely, to assemble, and to petition the government for redress
of grievances, guarantee a voice to the people to protect their freedom and
liberty from oppressive government interference.
The climate in which the Seventh Circuit decided Collin merits special consideration. The nature of the Nazi/Jewish confrontation brought immediate
national attention to the planned demonstration and the efforts of the Jewish
community to prevent it. This publicity not only emphasized the emotional nature
of the conflict, but compounded the impact of the march upon the residents of
Skokie. In addition, the national attention which focused upon the eminent
decision of the Seventh Circuit escalated the natural pressures already inherent
in the resolution of the first amendment issue.
In the final analysis, the Seventh Circuit found the Village ordinances to
constitute an undue and thus unconstitutional burden upon protected speech.
Well-established principles of law, born of landmark cases in the area of free
speech, were cited to justify and buttress the court's conclusion. The impact of
this decision is a solid reaffirmation of traditional principles of free speech. These
principles proclaim that "freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are
means indistinguishable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that with578 F.2d 1197 '(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3264 (Oct. 16, 1978).
1 An initial understanding of the purpose of first amendment guarantees is essential before
analyzing the NSPA's status. If the purpose of protecting free speech is forgotten, the focus of
protection shifts to the action of speaking, and the principles that free speech is meant to preserve are abandoned. In short, it is not speech itself which is sacred, but the underlying
values which freedom of speech exists to protect.
2 See NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 712, 715 (1977).
*
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out free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine." 3 A close examination of Collin reveals, however, that dissemination of
such noxious doctrine may raise some additional constitutional problems that are
worthy of discussion. These questions focus upon the interrelationship of free
speech, the rights of those who are targets of that speech, and the rights of a
government to protect those rights on behalf of its citizens.
II. Development of the Issue: the Factual Setting
On March 20, 1977, the president of the National Socialist Party of America
(NSPA), Frank Collin, announced that the Nazi-based organization planned to
demonstrate on May 1 in front of the City Hall of Skokie, Illinois. Skokie is a
predominantly Jewish suburb of Chicago.4 The NSPA planned to wear full
military uniforms with swastika armbands and flags and to carry placards with
prowhite slogans. The demonstration was planned as a peaceful exercise of
30-50 demonstrators and no speeches were to be made.
The news that the Nazi group planned to march in downtown Skokie evoked
immediate response from Village residents. Many residents had themselves been
prisoners of war during the height of the Nazi regime or had lost personal family
members in the holocaust. Thus, the presence of proclaimed Nazis and display
of the swastika, the symbol of Nazi principles, were particularly offensive, if not
threatening to them. To add to the general furor, some Jewish members of the
community began to receive harassing or threatening phone calls,5 and handbills
announcing the proposed march began to circulate throughout the Village.
On April 28, 1977, the Village of Skokie filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court of Cook County asking that an injunction be issued to prevent the NSPA
from marching in Skokie on May 1. The injunction was initially granted, thus
delaying the demonstration, but was later removed in full.'
3

4

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
According to a 1974 estimate, approximately 60% of the 70,000 Village residents are

Jewish.
5 There was no evidence shown that members of the NSPA were responsible for the
threatening phone calls. The calls did, however, intensify the drama of the situation.
6 After a hearing, the injunction was granted and later amended to be effective indefinitely until further order of the court. The NSPA moved for vacation of the order or a stay
of the injunction, both of which were denied.
Appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court also resulted in denial of the stay. The NSPA
appealed directly to the Supreme Court Justice for the Seventh Circuit, Justice John Paul
Stevens. Justice Stevens treated the appeal as a petition for certiorari and recommended it to
the full Supreme Court for review.
On June 14, 1977, the Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court denial
of the stay and remanded the case to the Illinois state courts for granting of a stay or
immediate appellate review. National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S.
43 (1977). The Illinois Supreme Court ordered the Illinois Appellate Court to commence
expedited appellate review, or in the alternative, to grant a stay of the injunction. The Appellate Court set the case for immediate review, and on July 12 removed the injunction in part,
and affirmed that part of the injunction which prohibited the display of the swastika. Village
of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 51 Ill. App.3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977).
Mr. Justice Stevens denied a stay of this modified injunction. 434 U.S. 1327 (1977). The
affirmed portion of the decision of the Appellate Court was subsequently appealed to the
Illinois Supreme Court, which found the prohibition of the swastika to be unjustified. The
injunction was removed in full on January 27, 1978. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist
Party of America, 69 Ill.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
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While the NSPA was appealing the initial grant of the injunction, the
Village of Skokie enacted three ordinances designed to regulate public parades
and assemblies within the Village.' The first of these regulations, Ordinance No.
775-N-994 (994) required that a permit be obtained from Village officials for all
parades or public gatherings in which fifty or more people or vehicles would be
involved. Issuance of the permit was subject to several requirements, including
proof of insurance coverage8 and submission of the permit application at least
30 days prior to the planned activity.9 The permit could be denied if appropriate Village officials found that the assembly would "portray criminality,
depravity or lack of virtue in, or incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward
a group of persons by reason of reference to religious, racial, ethnic, national or
regional affiliation," 1 or if the activity promoted an unlawful purpose. 1 Failure
to obtain a permit before the assembly was punishable by a fine ranging from $5
to $500.
The other two ordinances were criminal in nature. Ordinance No. 775-N995 (995)12

prohibited dissemination of any printed materials which would

promote hatred against others based on race, religion or national origin.
Ordinance No. 775-N-996 (996) " made it illegal for members of political parties.
to wear military-style uniforms while demonstrating within Skokie. The maximum penalty for violation of either 995 or 996 was 6 months of imprisonment
and a $500 fine.
After the Village had enacted these ordinances the NSPA rescheduled their
demonstration for July 4, 1977, and applied for the requisite permit. The plans
submitted on the application form were essentially the same as those of the
,ormerly proposed May 1, 1977, march.
The Village officials refused to issue the permit. They considered that the
activity had an "unlawful purpose" under 994 because the NSPA intended to

7 The power of a state to regulate can be exercised by a lesser governmental body pursuant to state grant of authority. Under the "home rule" provision of the Illinois Constitution, Skokie has plenary legislative authority to enact ordinances for the protection of the
public welfare. ILL. CONST. ART. 7, § 6(a).
8 Skokie, Ill. Village Ordinance 994 27-54, provides:
No permit shall be issued to any applicant until such applicant procures Public
Liability Insurance in an amount of not less than Three Hundred Thousand Dollars
($300,000.00) and Property Damage Insurance of not less than Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50,000.00). Prior to the issuance of the permit, certificates of such insurance must be submitted to the Village Manager for verification that the company
issuing such insurance is authorized to do business and write policies of insurance in
the State of Illinois.
9 This requirement, contained in § 27-52 of 994, was not challenged in Collin.
10 § 27-56(c) of 994.
11 § 27-56(i) of 994.
12 The pertinent part of 995, § 28-43.1, provides: "The dissemination of any
materials within the Village of Skokie which promotes and incites hatred against persons by
reason of their race, national origin, or religion, and is intended to do so, is hereby prohibited."
"Dissemination of materials" is defined by § 28-43.2 to include: "publication or display
or distribution of posters, signs, handbills, or writings and public display of markings and clothing of symbolic significance."
13 Section 28-42.1 of Ordinance 996 provides that: "No person shall engage in any march.
walk or public demonstration as a member or on behalf of any political party while wearing
a military-style uniform." A political party is defined to include any organization existing
primarily to influence government or politics. § 28-42.2.
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wear military uniforms in violation of 996.
Upon denial of the permit the NSPA filed an action in the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, protesting that through the enforcement of the Skokie ordinances the members of the NSPA had been deprived of
their constitutional right of free speech. The district court found that the proposed
actions of the NSPA were entitled to first amendment protection and that the
three ordinances were unconstitutional restrictions on the exercise of free speech. 5
The Village of Skokie brought this appeal to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the
actions of the NSPA were not entitled to free speech protection and that the
regulations imposed upon the demonstrators were justified by the recognized
ability of a government to regulate under the police power.
III. The Collin Decision Under Existing Legal Standards
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.""6 The specific language of the first
amendment reflects the importance with which the enumerated rights, including
the right to free speech, are regarded. These first amendment guarantees are
generally recognized as fundamental rights which underlie the guarantee of liberty
under the Constitution.'
When faced with a situation such as Collin that involves both legal and
emotional issues, courts generally tend to strip away the emotional overtones and
reduce the legal question to traditional principles. This is, in effect, what the
Seventh Circuit did in Collin, breaking down the complex questions involved
into several components of traditional constitutional analysis:
a) Did the actions of the NSPA constitute speech under the first amendment?
b) If the actions constitute speech, was this speech within the protection of
the first amendment?
c) If the speech is within the protection of the first amendment, were the
restrictions placed on the actions of the NSPA unconstitutional obstacles
to exercise of this protected speech?
A. Did the actions constitute speech?
The determination by the Seventh Circuit that the activities of the NSPA
were within the constitutional scope of speech rested first upon the recognition
that action which has expressive value is a form of speech under the first amend14 The court noted that intent to violate 995 or 996 would constitute an "unlawful
purpose" under 994. Refusal of the permit here, however, was based only on the intended
violation of 996.
15 Frank Collin and the National Socialist Party of America v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676
(N.D. Ill., 1978).
16 U.S. CONST. amend I. Although this amendment is expressly applicable to Congress,
it has been held applicable to the states as well under the 14th amendment. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
17 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96-98 (1940).
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ment."8 Accepting this premise, the court scrutinized the specific actions of the
NSPA and found that such expressive value existed.
In support of its decision the court relied on several Supreme Court
cases in which essentially the same type of conduct as that in Collin was found to
constitute speech under the first amendment. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District9 the Supreme Court found that wearing a
black armband to protest the Vietnam War was closely akin to pure speech and
therefore worthy of first amendment protection. Similarly, cases which held
display of a party flag,"0 carrying of protest signs" and marching or demonstrating22 to constitute speech were cited by the Collin court to support its finding that
the proposed actions were indeed forms of symbolic speech.
B. Was this speech within the protection of the first amendment?
Historically, courts have not found all speech worthy of first amendment
protection. Thus, some types of speech are "no essential part of any exposition
of ideas and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."" Accordingly, speech has been divided into categories of protected and nonprotected, the general rule being that all speech is protected unless
it meets a specific exception. 4 These exceptions, established through case law,
include insulting or fighting words," words which incite riot,'0 words which
are offensive because of their erotic nature or obscene message, 7 and words which
constitute libel or slander of another person.' Refusal of protection to these four
types of speech is justified by the rationale that their use would tend to promote
breach of the peace, or that they are so objectionable to the general public that
their benefit is clearly outweighed by the social interests involved. 9
In order to reach its decision that the proposed actions of the NSPA did
qualify as protected speech, the Seventh Circuit systematically found each
of the four recognized exceptions inapplicable to the factual situation in Collin.
The first of these, and possibly the easiest to eliminate, was obscenity. Although
the court recognized that the presence of persons advocating Nazi principles and
the display of Nazi uniforms and swastikas may be very offensive to the general
populace of Skokie, it noted that obscenity was limited to material of an erotic
or sexual nature." Since the actions of the NSPA were not subject to this type of
connotation, no restriction could be allowed on this basis.
18 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
19 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
20 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
21 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
22 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
23 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
24 Id. at 571-72.
25 Id.
26 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
27 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
28 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). For discussion of the
current uncertainty as to the status of the libel exception, see note 35 infra.
29

R. CUSHMAN, CASES

30

Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).

IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

502 (4th ed. 1975).
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Both the "fighting words" exception and the "incitement to riot" exception
were eliminated by the Seventh Circuit because the Village of Skokie did not
express any fear of breach of the peace if the NSPA were allowed to march.3
Nonassertion of any likelihood of violence by the Village was accepted by the
court as a concession that there was no imminent danger of disturbance." Since
tendency to cause a breach of the peace is an element of both exceptions, this
concession prevented the court from finding either exception applicable to the
Collin situation.
The final exception eliminated by the Seventh Circuit in supporting
its finding of protected speech involved libel and slander. Libel or slander
of a group has not met uniform acceptance in U.S. law, but was recognized by the
Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois3 in essentially the same circumstances
as Collin. In Beauharnais, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under an
Illinois statute after the defendant distributed leaflets that called for the protection
of white neighborhoods from negro encroachment. 4
Although Beauharnaishas not been specifically overruled by the Supreme
Court, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Beauharnaisdoctrine has been modified extensively by subsequent court decisions and thus found it inapplicable
in this case. 5
C. Were the restrictionsplaced upon the actions of the NSPA unconstitutional
obstacles to exercise of protected speech?
First amendment rights are not absolute. They are limited by coexisting
rights that also deserve and demand protection. 6 One of these coexisting rights
is that of a government to regulate for the protection and welfare of its citizens.
This right, known as police power, is rooted in the reserve powers of a state under
the tenth amendment and empowers a government to preserve the public peace.3
The nature of this right is such that its exercise will often conflict with the
exercise of free speech because open discussion in the public forum will inevitably
cause some disruption of the public order. In reconciling these conflicting rights
the courts have balanced the interests involved, weighing the social value pro31 578 F.2d at 1203.
32 578 F.2d at 1204. In the dissenting opinion which accompanied the denial of
certiorari in Collin, Justice Blackmun analogizes the actions of the NSPA to be in the same
category as the "right" to cry "fire" in a crowded theater. 47 U.S.L.W. 3264 (Oct. 16, 1978).
This statement thus seems to question the finality of such a concession.
33 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
34 The statute involved in Beauharnais was very similar to that in Collin, prohibiting portrayal of "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race,
color, creed or religion . . . which exposes the citizens . . . to contempt, derision or obloquy or
which is productive of breach of the peace or riots . .
35 The Beauharnais decision recognized the right of a state to punish utterances directed
at defined groups under criminal libel laws. Since Beauharnais was decided, however, several
important libel cases have been decided which assess the constitutional status of libel. See Gertz
v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). As a result, the current validity of
Beauharnaismay be in doubt. See Toilet v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087 '(8th Cir. 1973). For
general discussion, see NowAK, supra note 1, at 781.
36 CUSHMAN, supra note 29, at 491.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also Tenneco v. Lafourche, 427 F.2d 1061, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 904 (1970), as to use of police power to restrict some private rights.
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tected by the government restriction against the seriousness of the threat to
protected speech.
After finding that the proposed actions of the NSPA did constitute protected
speech, the Collin court examined the Village ordinances one by one to see if
an undue burden had been placed upon exercise of that speech. The unconstitutionality of two of the ordinance provisions, the insurance requirement of §§
27-54 and 27-56(j) of 994 and the military uniform prohibition of 996 was
conceded by the Village of Skokie." The Seventh Circuit summarily affirmed
the unconstitutionality of 996, and likewise accepted the district court's finding of
unconstitutionality of the insurance requirement based on its discretionary waiver
provision.
The court noted that the insurance requirement itself seemed tied
to control of the content of the proposed speech, in that the nature of the activity
would affect the availability of the required insurance.4
Restrictions which control content of protected speech have met with heavy
judicial disfavor. The Supreme Court in Cohen v. California4 explicitly stated
that protected speech could not be regulated on the basis of its message, ideas
or content. This disfavor of content control is based on the realization that the
purpose of the right to free speech is to ensure open and uninhibited debate on
public issues and that control of the substance of discussion would effectively
defeat that purpose.42
Regulation of free speech has generally been allowed when limited to restrictions on "manner." 43 This has r6utinely included regulation of time, place
and duration of demonstrations or parades where the city has a significant government interest in rerouting traffic or providing additional police staff. Such
regulation can be accomplished by requiring that a permit be obtained prior to
the activity, stating the time, location and type of the proposed demonstration,
as well as number of people to be involved. The requirement of a permit fee
has been upheld as a reasonable restriction designed to cover administrative
expenses; however, courts are careful to ensure that the burden of acquiring the
permit is not an inhibiting obstacle to the activity."4 The Collin court thus
38 578 F.2d at 1207-08. See also 578 F.2d at 1208 n. 19. There was some disagreement
among the Collin judges as to whether the concession was an irrevocable waiver of defense
under its recent decision of Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc. 573 F.2d 429 (7th Cir.
1978) (alternate holding). Judge Sprecher in his dissent felt that the court should consider
these defenses, particularly because parties could otherwise use concession to prevent a court
from addressing an important constitutional question. The majority opinion, however, finds
Mitchell inapplicable and accepts the concessions.
39 Permit systems which allow exemption of certain organizations or discretionary application of the requirements of government officials are particularly vulnerable to first amendment
challenges. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) ; Hague v. C.I.O.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
40 The court relied both on common sense and expert testimony heard in the district court in
reaching its decision. 578 F.2d at 1208. The district court, in considering Collin, referred
to testimony by a licensed insurance broker in Collin v. O'Malley, 452 F. Supp. 577 (1978), in
which the NSPA was required to obtain $350,000 insurance coverage before a permit to march
in a Chicago city park would be issued. The witness testified that a four-month search for
such insurance was unsuccessful, and estimated that when and if the policy could be secured,
the premium would be as much as $1,000 for each event.
41 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
42 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
43
U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
44 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941).

[Vol. 54:390]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

allowed the permit requirement to stand once stripped of unconstitutional prerequisites.
Consistent with this general disapproval of burdens upon speech, the Seventh
Circuit found Ordinance 995, regulating dissemination of materials, unconstitutional due to overbreadth." The doctrine of overbreadth was succinctly
described by Justice Harlan, who stated that "a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities subject [to] regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."" Since the Collin court found the wording of 995 susceptible to an interpretation that would outlaw protected speech, it declared the ordinance unconstitutional. 4'
Once ordinances 995 and 996 were declared unconstitutional, the Village
could not assert intent to violate them as "portraying criminality" under § 2756(c) of 994 or as constituting an "unlawful purpose" under § 27-56 (i) of that
ordinance. Since the Village's refusal to issue a permit had been based upon intention to violate 996, this finding of unconstitutionality destroyed the justification for the permit denial. Absent this justification, the Seventh Circuit found
the permit denial to constitute an undue burden upon free speech. The court
therefore affirmed the district court decision enjoining the Village from either
enforcing the unconstitutional ordinances against the NSPA or denying a permit
based on violations thereof.
IV. Interrelationship of Coexisting Rights
Despite the court's insistence that the decision reached was necessary to
retain the meaning of civil rights, an air of something left unsaid seems to lurk
behind the strong words of the court's opinion. Although the court adamantly
upheld the right to express unpopular viewpoints or to advocate beliefs and goals
repugnant to the core of generally held values as being essential to realization of
the high purposes of the first amendment, an underlying thread of discontent
with the practical effect of its decision can be discerned. In Collin, the court
stated that it "regrets the use appellees plan to make of their rights."4 Certainly
this statement cannot be interpreted as a desire that that expression of unpopular
viewpoints should not have first amendment protection, for the court repeatedly
stressed the value of such free and open exchange of ideas as a fundamental prin49
ciple upon which our liberty is grounded.
The underlying discontent the court revealed focuses on the dilemma the
factual reality of this case presents and highlights the problem that courts face
in balancing first amendment rights against other conflicting concerns. An
examination of the facts of Collin reveals the facet of the case that seems to tug
on the court's conscience. Although the actions of the NSPA could appear to be
45 For further explanation of overbreadth, see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844.
46 NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
47 578 F.2d at 1207.
48 578 F.2d at 1210 (emphasis added).
49 See 578 F.2d at 1201, 1210.
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a legitimate expression of belief, the court seemed to feel that the underlying
purpose of the proposed activities was not to "communicate" in the sense of an
open exchange of ideas. Rather, the planned march seemed designed to disturb
the Jewish residents of Skokie and to use the Jewish character of the community
as an incendiary source of national attention for the NSPA.
Use of the cloak of first amendment protection to justify actions intended to
exploit the known weakness of an individual or group offends a natural sense of
justice. This justice dictates that while rights can and should be used, they should
not be abused, especially at the expense of other members of society. Some
difficulty arises, however, in trying to determine when use becomes abuse and
when abuse should result in limitation or restriction of an activity. It would
logically seem that such a determination would depend on such factors as the
exact nature of the activity and the extent of its effect on those who are exposed
to it.
Although the court did express dissatisfaction with the use the NSPA
planned to make of their right to free speech, in its final analysis the court did not
consider possible abuse of speech as a factor in its decision. Instead, after finding
the proposed activity to be within the aegis of protected speech, the court looked
simply at whether the Village ordinances were time, place and manner restrictions
and whether they were narrow enough to avoid overbreadth. It thus appears that
the Seventh Circuit, while following current standards of first amendment law,
was not required to consider whether speech which is intended to disturb the
mental and emotional peacefulness of a group deserves full first amendment protection.
The court's nonconsideration of this possible effect of the actions of the
NSPA has interesting implications. The potential for emotional distress of the
Jewish residents of Skokie was apparent upon the face of the situation. Yet the
court not only did not look at the reasonableness or extent of such disturbance,
but also did not find the question of its existence to be significant. The regret
the court expresses as to the effect of its decision suggests that the court did feel
there was an interest being compromised, but that the interest had to be sacrificed
in favor of the rights of free speech.
The Collin situation thus presents an excellent opportunity to examine
whether, under these circumstances, or in any circumstances in which one group
of citizens is victimized by the exercise of free speech by another, the right of free
speech can be limited to prevent this effect. A thorough exploration of this question requires that several issues be addressed:
a) Has a right to remain free of mental or emotional abuse from the words
or actions of another been judicially recognized?
b) What is the status of such a right when it comes into conflict with the
exercise of free speech?
c) How can such a right be protected without undue infringement upon
free speech?
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A. Past Recognition of the Right
The idea that there is a right of protection from the abusive exercise of
speech by another is not a concept which is new to our society. The fundamental
principles of freedom and liberty seem to inherently recognize the right of individuils to peaceful coexistence free from physical or mental harassment. Yet
it appears the Collin court did not give this right official recognition, or at least
consider it a relevant factor in deciding whether regulation of the NSPA activities
was warranted. This omission calls into question the legal existence or status
of such a right.
There has been some recognition of a right to remain free from abusive
speech. When the effect of such speech is physically abusive the law of nuisance
has been extended to regulate its exercise. This includes situations where the
form of the speech is abusive to the listener, as, for example, when a loudspeaker
system is used to communicate in a residential neighborhood for an extended
time disturbing the peacefulness and serenity of the residential area.5"
When the effect of speech is such that a physical response results, the law has
also allowed restriction of speech. Perhaps the most classic example of the
courts' willingness to regulate free speech which has physical consequences is
their denial of first amendment protection to speech which has the tendency to
incite violence."' This tendency is generally cited as justification for government
regulation of speech as necessary to preserve order, which ultimately seems to be
protection of citizens from the consequences of the exercise of free speech by
another.
The history of judicial recognition of a right to protection from speech which
causes mental or emotional anguish is less concrete than that dealing with physical
effect. Harassment of individuals, either through verbal threats or menacing
actions, has been subject to regulation, either through criminal prohibitions or injunction. 2 Although this might technically involve some danger of physical
violence, there appears to be-some inherent recognition of the right of an individual to remain free of mentally abusive words or actions.
The most definite recognition of the right of an individual to remain free
from abusive speech has been in the growth of the tort of intentional infliction of
mental or emotional distress. Although the law had been slow to grant "peace of
mind" independent legal protection, in recent years an increasing number of
states, including Illinois,"3 have recognized this right.5" This tort is necessarily
found to exist only after the disturbing speech or action has taken place.
Post facto determination does not have the chilling effect upon first amendment rights that the Collin prior restraint context does, and thus is more acceptable to the courts. " Most importantly, however, the fact that this tort is
50 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
51 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
52 Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
53 Public Finance v. Davis, 66 Ill.2d 85, 360 N.E.2d 765 (1976).
54 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 49 (4th ed. 1971).
55 Prior restraint upon speech has historically been viewed more critically by the courts
than has subsequent punishment. This is generally based on the belief that prior restraint has
a more serious effect as an infringemenit upon speech. See Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
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recognized stands as a statement by the courts that there is a protectable interest
in peace of mind and that those who intentionally invade the peace of another
may be subject to judicial censure.
B. The PracticalDifficulties Involved
As Collin illustrates, when a question involving validity of regulation or
restriction upon free speech arises, courts have been reluctant to consider the
possibility that the targeted listeners may have a right not to hear the speech. The
Collin situation demonstrates the practical difficulty that protecting such a right
would present. Considering the difficulty in judging the offensiveness of the
proposed activities, and the judicial preference for first amendment rights, it is
not surprising that some benefit of the doubt is extended in favor of speech.
It appears that the court in Collin felt that enforcement of fine-line distinctions between speech which was abusive and that which merely expressed
unpopular ideas was likely to result in a chill of first amendment rights. The
court's sensitivity to the proximity of first amendment rights is revealed by its
statement that such situations "are indistinguishable in principle from speech that
'invites dispute. . . induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger,' "" all of which the court
recognizes as within the protection of the first amendment. Thus the court chose
to sacrifice any possible protection of the Skokie citizens from mental abuse in
favor of full protection of speech.
The explanation for this disregard of the residents' emotions can probably
be placed at least in part upon practical considerations. The distinction between
activities which are designed to intentionally harass and those which are not
would require the court to make a subjective determination of motive. In addition, deciding whether such activity is indeed abusive to its hearers rather than
merely annoying requires abstract consideration of the background of the target
and the actor's knowledge of this background in exploiting weaknesses.
Although the line dividing mental harassment from simple disturbance is
difficult to draw, such a distinction has been made in other contexts. The clearest
example of this is again the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress.
Because of the close proximity of free speech, courts have strictly construed
"mental distress" to require more than insults or indignities." Recovery has generally required a showing of both intent and extremely outrageous conduct such
that an ordinary man in the plaintiffs position would be mentally distressed.58
Thus while such a distinction may not be simple to make, it is possible, at least
in a post facto context.
A second reason for the court's reluctance to allow regulation in Collin is a
fear of the consequences of enunciating a new exception to protected speech.
This concern is best expressed in the concurring opinion of Judge Wood:
56
57
58
So. 37

578 F.2d at 1206 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
E.g., Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, 100 S.2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
See W. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 59. See also Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84
(1920).
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It may also be well to remember that often "words die away, and flow off
like water-leaving no taste, no color, no smell, not a trace." Any exception,
however, to the First Amendment which we might be tempted to fashion
for these particular persuasive circumstances would not "die away." It
would remain a dangerous and unmanageable precedent in our free and
open society."
Future impact of a decision is always a relevant consideration, as Judge Wood
recognizes. However, the hesitation to create a new exception to protected
speech must be weighed against the need for protection of the recipients of that
speech.
. Despite refusal to expressly consider the potential mental disturbance of
targeted listeners as a factor in determining whether speech can be restricted, it
appears that some courts have implicitly granted protection of this right. This
protection has generally been accomplished by construing the facts so broadly
as to fit the contested activity within one of the existing exceptions to protected
speech. An example of this approach is the decision in Jewish War Veterans of
the U.S. v. American Nazi Party."
In Jewish War Veterans the District Court of the Northern District of
Illinois enjoined a demonstration upon the public streets based on its likelihood
to cause a public disturbance. An examination of the case reveals a situation
markedly similar to that presented in Collin. Members of the Nazi party announced that on the Jewish High Holy Days they would march through Jewish
neighborhoods wearing "storm-trooper" uniforms and carrying placards inscribed with anti-Jewish slogans. The plaintiff group asked for an injunction to
prevent the march, claiming that the actions of the Nazis infringed upon their
right to worship peacefully and without insult, that it abridged their privileges
and immunities, and that it would tend to incite riot and create public disturbances.
In issuing the requested injunction, the court recognized that the nature of
the proposed action was such that it invited some type of response. The court
was thus able to justify its restriction of speech under the traditional "tendency to
incite violence" exception to protected speech, though no concrete threat of actual
violence was shown.
The root of the court's decision seems to be a feeling that inherent injustice
would be done if the Nazis were allowed to harass the Jewish citizens as an exercise of first amendment rights. A comment in the majority opinion best
capsulizes this feeling:
Defendants do not march, or seek permission to march, for the purpose
of obtaining lawful rights for themselves. There is nothing constructive in their
activities. By their scurrilous attacks they seek only to destroy-to take from
others rights to which they are entitled as human beings as well as under the
Constitution."'
59

578 F.2d at 1210 (Wood, J., concurring)

Lecture, 1972).
60
61

260 F. Supp. 452 (1966).
260 F. Supp. at 456.

(quoting Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Nobel
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The court in Jewish War Veterans was thus presented with much the same
problem as the Seventh Circuit in Collin. In Jewish War Veterans, however, the
court had a nail upon which to hang its justification for restriction of speech,
namely the alleged threat of violence. While a court often may be able to prevent
abusive use of speech by relying on the tendency of such speech to result in
violence, this cannot cover every situation where speech is abusive.
The most obvious exception is the situation presented in Collin, in which the
Village conceded that despite the objectionable nature of the NSPA activities, no
responsive violence was anticipated. 2 If the court relies on the "tendency to
incite violence" exception as providing adequate protection against abusive
speech, the result is disproportionate. Those who threaten responsive disturbance
would have their peace protected, while those who passively accept abuse without
fighting back would not.
C. Protection Without Infringement Upon Speech
Summarizing the present status of first amendment rights vis--vis the right
of targeted listeners to be free of mental distress intentionally inflicted, it is apparent that courts presented with such conflicts have either found alternate
justification for restriction of the speech, as in Jewish War Veterans, or have
opted for protection of speech without regard to its effect upon its audience, as in
Collin.
The failure to openly recognize such a countervailing right does not appear
to be based upon judicial denial of the existence of such an interest, since the
same value has been granted independent legal protection in the tort context.
Rather, the reluctance to recognize such a right seems to be a function of
judicial hesitation to step outside established standards, especially since the full
implications of such a step would be difficult to project. As a result, the Seventh
Circuit missed an opportunity to openly recognize the existence of such a right
and to examine the scope of its protection.
Had the Seventh Circuit decided to recognize expressly a right of targeted
listeners to be protected from mentally abusive speech, it would not necessarily
have produced a different result in Collin. This right would become part of the
balancing process, and the court would then need to consider the extent of the
effects of the speech upon the audience in deciding whether the speech was
abusive enough to justify restriction upon free speech.6"
The factual setting of Collin suggests that the proposed activities of the
NSPA were intended to harass the Jewish residents of Skokie. A real possibility
exists, however, that the court might not find the proposed activities to be of sufficient abusiveness to meet this test. The activities were not overly intrusive
if carried out according to plan. The march was not to take place in a residential
area, involved a limited number of demonstrators, and was to last only half an
62 See note 38 supra (discussion of the dispute over the effect of such concession).
63 The effect of the actions of the NSPA should not be confused with the effect of the
national publicity aroused by the situation. Any added impact resulting from the media
attention should not be charged to the actors in weighing the effect, since if this were done
any attempt to publicly communicate views on a controversial issue would be open to limitation
because of the likelihood of a multiplier effect from the press.
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hour. Although the presence of the espoused Nazis was, itself, enough to upset
some of the Skokie residents, it is unlikely that a court would find mere presence
in a business area disturbing enough to outweigh the values of freedom of speech.
Whether or not the Seventh Circuit had decided to recognize an independent
right of protection in the targeted listeners, it is thus likely that in the circumstances of Collin the same conclusion would have been reached. In a future
situation, however, where the circumstances of the speech were more offensive or
intrusive, whether or not such a right is considered in the weighing process could
be outcome determinative.
Recognizing the practical considerations that have heretofore prevented the
court from protecting this right, the question naturally arises whether there
is a means by which protection could be afforded without undue infringement
upon free speech. Can a government body, such as the Village of Skokie, assert
violation of such a personal right of its citizens as a justification for first amendment regulation?
The power of a government to enact regulation to protect and promote the
welfare of its citizens has long been recognized as within the police power of a
state. 4 This power has included regulation of activities such as obscenity which,
although not threatening breach of the peace, infringe upon the rights of other
citizens. Use of the police powers to restrict speech which inflicts psychological
or emotional injury upon its audience received additional support from the
Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.6 In Chaplinsky the court
spoke not only of "fighting words," but also of words "which by their very utterance inflict injury," as invoking state interest.6"
Assuming the power of a state to protect the rights of its citizens under the
police power, the final question of how a government body could protect this right
without undue burden upon speech is ripe for consideration.
The Seventh Circuit's disapproval of the Skokie ordinances that attempted
such regulation was basically of two types. First, several of the ordinances, such
as that requiring insurance coverage, were inherently unacceptable burdens upon
speech, and thus unconstitutional. The second type were those which were
phrased so broadly as to prohibit legitimate exercise of speech as well as that
which could be regulated. This second category, overbreadth, can be interpreted
to imply that legislation can be used to restrict abusive speech, in narrowly defined
circumstances.
In view of the foregoing, it appears that such legislation could be enacted
subject to close scrutiny by the court. This scrutiny could be satisfied if two
criteria were met:
1) The language in the law must be very specific so as to restrict or prohibit
only speech which is abusive, and not speech which is constitutionally
protected. This would require very careful drafting of the statute or
ordinance with very specific definitions of abusive speech and strict
standards for its identification.
64 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
See also E. FRUEND, POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904).

65

315 U.S. 568 (1942).

66

Id. at 571.
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2) The activities proposed to be regulated must fit the prohibitions of the
statute very tightly.
Strict adherence to detail in drafting and in finding statutory coverage of a
given situation would severely limit the power of a state to regulate the exercise
of speech. Strict limitation, however, is essential if the regulation is to pass constitutional muster as a valid restriction upon free speech.
Some abusive speech would always evade regulation, particularly that which
is only questionably abusive. Collin would probably fall into this category of
nonregulation. Yet protection would be available for the more distinct cases in
which speech has mentally abusive effects, and nonabusive exercise of speech
would continue to receive full constitutional protection.
V. Conclusion
In deciding Collin, the Seventh Circuit was faced with a situation in which
exercise of rights of free speech under the first amendment would cause mental
and emotional disturbance of the target audience. Consistent with the traditional
view, the court did not recognize any right of the targeted listeners to remain
free from such speech, and ultimately found the attempts of the Village of Skokie
to regulate the exercise of speech to constitute undue burdens upon free speech.
In doing so, the court forfeited an opportunity to expressly establish this
right, which has been implicitly recognized in other legal contexts. The court's
unwillingness to take this step seemingly did not disturb the outcome in Collin.
The precedent established by this decision, however, could adversely affect the
position of targeted audiences in future cases in which the speech might be more
disturbing than that in Colin. Determination of the impact of the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Collin therefore must be postponed until such cases arise.
Ruth Ann Beyer

Standing-U.S. Attorney Lacks Standing to Challenge
Alleged Violation of Federal Immunity Order.
United States v. Kuehn*
"The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before
grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmly established in AngloAmerican jurisprudence." 1 The enactment of the immunity provisions of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 19702 reflects the recognition of this power as
crucial in attacking organized crime.' The act gives a witness immunity from
prosecution and thereby supplants his fifth-amendment privilege against selfincrimination in exchange for his future testimony. Yet it is sometimes difficult to
conceptualize whether the witness or the government is the beneficiary of the
immunity order and, consequently, to determine who has standing.
In United States v. Kuehn, the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of
whether a U.S. Attorney had standing to seek an injunction prohibiting the
continuation of an ongoing state prosecution of a federal witness on the grounds
that the state prosecutor had used evidence derived from the witness's federally
immunized testimony. The district court issued an injunction and was reversed
by the Seventh Circuit on the grounds that the United States lacked standing.
The Seventh Circuit's rationale for holding that the United States lacked
standing was superficial because it failed to give due consideration to the purposes
of the immunity provisions and to the practical considerations involved in organized crime investigations. These considerations warrant a more sophisticated
interpretation of the immunity provisions of the Act. With the benefit of hindsight, this comment will analyze the rationale of the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Kuehn and will suggest how U.S. Attorneys should assert standing to protect
immunity orders issued to their witnesses. Finally, measures will be proposed by
which Congress could definitively solve the standing problems which accompany
immunity orders.
I. Statement of the Case
On October 22, 1974, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois issued an immunity order compelling Marvin C. Schwartz to
testify before a federal grand jury investigating widespread corruption of public
officials. Schwartz had previously asserted his fifth-amendment privilege against
self-incrimination before that grand jury. The immunity order was issued by the
court, upon the request of the U.S. Attorney, pursuant to the immunity pro-

* 562 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'g, United States v. Rice, 421 F.Supp. 871 (E.D. Ill.
1976).
1 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972).
2 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6003 (1970).
3

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS

133 (1972).

GENERAL,

Organized Crime Control Legislation,
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visions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.' The immunity order
compelled Schwartz to testify before the grand jury and future federal criminal
prosecutions.
One of the seven subsequent federal criminal trials at which Schwartz
testified was the prosecution of Robert Rice, the State's Attorney for St. Clair
County, Illinois. Rice was indicted on March 3, 1976, for extorting Schwartz.'
Thereafter, pursuant to the criminal discovery process, Rice received a copy of
Schwartz's immunized grand jury testimony. Schwartz's immunized testimony
included an admission that he had given $1,000 to Albert S. Rolek for the purpose of bribing John Hoban, a state court judge. Having read the immunized
testimony, Rice caused evidence, including the testimony of Rolek, to be
presented to a state grand jury. On June 17, 1976, almost two years after
Schwartz's immunized testimony and immediately following Rice's acquittal in
federal court, the state grand jury indicted Schwartz for bribing the state judge.
Rice then proceeded to prosecute Schwartz in state court.
Schwartz filed a motion in the state court to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that Rice had used evidence derived from Schwartz's immunized testimony. This motion was denied by the state court after it found an independent
basis for the evidence presented to the state grand jury.'
On September 24, 1976, the U.S. Attorney sought an injunction in the
federal district court to enjoin Rice from continuing his state prosecution against
Schwartz on the grounds that evidence derived from Schwartz's federally immunized grand jury testimony was being used against Schwartz. Following the
federal court's issuance of a temporary injunction, Schwartz was permitted to
intervene as a plaintiff.
During the injunction hearing, Rice testified that he had begun his investigation of Schwartz before reading Schwartz's grand jury testimony and that he
4

18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) reads in relevant part:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee
or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order
issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing
to comply with the order.
5 The federal indictment alleged that Rice "did knowingly and willfully conspire . . . to
obtain property in the amount of $25,000 from Marvin Schwartz, . . . under color of official
right, namely the indictment of Marvin Schwartz for criminal acts and the offer to have those
indictments dismissed."
6 The state court judge found that Schwartz had related substantially the same facts to a
newspaper reporter prior to his being indicted by the state. 562 F.2d at 429.
The immunity afforded by § 6002 is only use immunity, not transactional immunity, so
the witness may be prosecuted for offenses relating to his immunized testimony provided the
prosecutor can show he has not used the immunized testimony or evidence derived from it in
bringing the prosecution. "This total prohibition on use provides a comprehensive safeguard,
barring the use of compelled testimony as an 'investigatory lead,' and also barring the use of any
evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosures." 421 F.Supp. at 874.
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had not used derivative evidence. The district court disagreed, however, and
found that an examination of the federal and state grand jury transcripts "lead [s]
one to the inescapable conclusion that inquiries before the State Grand Jury are
bottomed on information obtained from the Federal Grand Jury proceedings." 7
The court was unable to find that the inquiry before the state grand jury was
wholly without the benefit of any knowledge that Rice may have acquired by
reading Schwartz's testimony and found that some of the questions presented at
the state grand jury proceeding were almost identical to those asked at the federal
grand jury. The court specifically found that "[t]he name of the witness Albert S.
Rolek as purveyor of money [from Schwartz to the state judge] became known
to the world as a direct result of the compelled testimony of Marvin Schwartz."'
The court also noted that Schwartz was still a material witness in pending federal
prosecutions in which he would be required to testify pursuant to his immunity
order.' Accordingly, on October 14, 1976, the federal district court permanently
enjoined Rice from continuing his prosecution of Schwartz. That injunction was
appealed to the Seventh Circuit by Clyde Kuehn, Rice's successor as the State's
Attorney.
IL The Seventh Circuit's Decision
On September 19, 1977, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
injunction. The court held that the government lacked standing to protect the
immunity order because the government had received all that it had asked for
when Schwartz testified. The court's rationale was based upon the idea that
"... the grant of immunity flows to the witness and not to the Government.
Only the witness may claim its benefits."1 In essence, the court found that the
witness, not the government, was the beneficiary of an immunity order and, consequently, the government lacked standing to protect the order.
The court also addressed the anti-injunction statute" which the U.S. Attorney asserted as a basis for the court's jurisdiction. He asserted that the district
court could exercise jurisdiction to effectuate its own judgment when its immunity order was being interfered with by a state prosecution. The Seventh
Circuit held, however, that to overcome the anti-injunction statute, ". . . the
Government must have a judgment in its favor to effectuate, that is, the United
States must have a substantive claim to assert in the district court. Here it has
none." 2 The U.S. Attorney has no substantive claim because, according to the
Seventh Circuit, the grant of immunity flows to the witness and thereby forecloses
the government from claiming its benefits. Based upon this rationale, the court
reversed the injunction.
7 421 F.Supp. at 876.
8 Id. at 873.
9 Id.
10 562 F.2d at 431.
11 The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948), which states: "A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay court proceedings in a State Court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments." Id.
12 562 F.2d at 431.
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The Seventh Circuit also found Schwartz's claim as an intervenor to be
defective. It held that he was barred by collateral estoppel since he had lost
his motion in the state court. Furthermore, he had failed to make allegations
sufficient to overcome the Younger abstention doctrine.'
Although the court found it unnecessary to reach a decision on the merits
of the independent source issue, the court indicated that, were it necessary to do
so, it would have ruled that the district court's finding that the state prosecutor
did not have independent sources of evidence on which to base the indictment
was clearly erroneous. 4
The Seventh Circuit's rationale for concluding that the government lacked
standing was superficial because it failed to consider either the purposes of the
immunity provisions, as revealed by their legislative history, or the pragmatics of
organized crime investigations. These considerations indicate that although the
witness receives use immunity as the quid pro quo for his fifth-amendment
privilege, it is in fact the government which is the true beneficiary of an immunity order which is coupled with an order to compel testimony. To demonstrate this point, it is necessary to take "a glimpse at standing" to ascertain the
requirements which a party must fulfill for standing.
III. A Glimpse at Standing
Over two decades ago the Supreme Court stated that the law of standing
was a ". .

complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction. .

. .""

This statement

is even more accurate today. The Court has decided over twenty cases on standing since 1970 and confusion over the application of this concept still persists.' 6
The ultimate value sought to be preserved is the notion that, "[t]he very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."'
The formulation of a concise list of the prerequisites for standing has proved
to be an elusive task, as evidenced by the frequency with which the Supreme
Court has addressed this issue since 1970. The difficulty arises in part because
of the overlapping restrictions involved: the case or controversy requirement of
13 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). This doctrine prohibits, for reasons of comity
and federalism, a federal court from enjoining a state criminal prosecution, absent excepttional circumstances.
14 562 F.2d at 432.
15 Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
16 The subject of standing has produced an onslaught of scholarly analysis and criticism.
See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 702-87, (Supp. 1970); J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUND. & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 68-83 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
NOWAK & ROTUNDA]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79-114 (1978); C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 42-52 (3d ed. 1976); Broderick, The Warth
Optional Standing Doctrine: Return to Judicial Supremacy?, 25 OATH. U. L. RBv. 467 (1976);
Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. L. REV. 69 (1977); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:
The Who and When, 82 YALE L. J. 1363 (1973); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A
Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973); Yarbrough, Litigant Access Doctrine and
the Burger Court, 31 VAND. L. REV. 33 (1978) ; Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus
Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974); Comment, Federal Standing: 1976, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV.
383 (1976); Comment, Form and Function: FederalStanding Since Warth v. Seldin, 18 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 183 (1978).
17 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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Article III and the prudential limitations of judicial self-restraint.' s Further
difficulty results because the Court has focused on the individual claimant's
potential for presenting his particular case in a justiciable manner. This necessarily requires the Court to peek around the claimant "to look to the substantive
issues... to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted
and the claim sought to be adjudicated."' 9 Nevertheless, it is possible to distill
from the Court's opinions three prerequisites for standing.
The first prerequisite is that the claimant must allege he has received or
been threatened" with a distinct and palpable injury in fact,2 ' although the injury may be indirect22 and need not be economic. 2 This requirement represents
the Supreme Court's recognition of the limits of judicial competency. Its underlying rationale is to insure that the claimant will present his case in the proper
adversarial posture. Without true adversaries before it, a court, due to its traditional manner of processing controversies, cannot feel comfortable with a case.
Virtually every opinion on standing begins with this proposition by quoting
Baker v. Carr:4 "Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues [upon] which the court so largely depends for the illumination of difficult questions? This is the gist of standing."'" The Court has consistently required the claimant to allege a clear injury in fact to satisfy the case
or controversy requirement of Article III.2" "Absent such a showing, exercise of
court would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the
its power by a federal
27
Art. III limitation."'
The second prerequisite for standing is that the claimant must, "in any
concretely demonstrable way ... allege facts from which it could be reasonably

18 "This inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and
prudential limitations on its exercise. In both dimensions it is founded in concern about the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), however, the Court
explained that "[tjhe common thread underlying both requirements is that a person cannot
challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless he shows that he himself is injured by its
operation." Id. at 255. See Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-27
(1976); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-97 (1974); Fast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 97 (1968).
19 392 U.S. at 102. Likewise, the Court has stated that standing "often turns on the
nature and source of the claim asserted." 422 U.S. at 500. The necessity of peeking around
to the substantive issues has resulted in some commentators alleging that the Court is using
standing instead of its certiorari power to dispose of cases it views unfavorably on the merits.
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 16; Wolf, Standing to Sue: CapriciousApplication of Direct Injury,
20 ST. Louss U. L. J. 663, 678 (1976). Mr. Justice Brennan expressed the same concern in
his concurring opinion in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), in
which he stated: "[we may properly wonder where the Court, armed with its 'fatally speculative pleadings' tool, will strike next." Id. at 63.
20 Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973); Data Processing Serv. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
21 422 U.S. at 501.
22 Id. at 505. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973).
23 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972); 397 U.S. at 152.
24 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25 Id. at 204. See 405 U.S. at 732.
26 A generalized grievance alone is usually insufficient. E.g., 418 U.S. at 225; 418 U.S.
at 175; 392 U.S. at 106; Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
27 426 U.S. at 38.
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inferred that. .. there is a substantial probability"2 that his injury was caused
by the complained of action. A demonstration of "but for" causation became
29
and
mandatory after Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
3
Warth v. Seldin. In Warth, Justice Powell warned that conclusory allegations
of resulting injury will not be enough; the Court will not speculate on causal relationships."
The final requirement for standing is that the Court feel capable of granting
effective relief. This requirement may be viewed as flowing from the Court's
concern over speculative causation, since a court can hardly feel capable of
granting effective relief if the source of the injury is undiscernable.
This third prerequisite emphasizes the judicial restraint side 2 of justiciability, namely, that the court feel comfortable with its ability to handle the case
with the parties before it, to reach a competent and reasoned decision, and to
grant and enforce effective relief. Once again, the claimant must allege specific
facts, this time to show the substantial likelihood that the court is capable of
correcting the injury he has suffered." He must show "that he personally would
benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." 4
These prerequisites for standing, which have been referred to as the "direct
injury-effective relief test," 3 have been capsulized best by the Ninth Circuit, which
held that the "test for standing ... is that the plaintiffs must have alleged (a) a
particularized injury (b) concretely and demonstrably resulting from the defendant's action (c) which injury will be redressed by the remedy sought."3
These requirements have been endorsed by the Seventh Circuit in Mulquenny v.
National Commission on the Observance, Etc.
Whether or not both a witness and the government can fulfill these prerequisites when seeking to enforce an immunity order merits further analysis. In
such analysis the issue of the government's standing must take into account the
purpose of the immunity provisions as revealed by their legislative history as well
as the pragmatic considerations integral to organized crime investigations.

28 422 U.S. at 504. Likewise, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977), the Court stated: "the complaint must indicate that the injury is indeed fairly
traceable to the defendant's acts or omissions." Id. at 261. Accord, 426 U.S. at 41-42; 410
U.S. at 618.
29 426 U.S. at 25 n.25. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973); 397
U.S. at 152.
30 422 U.S. at 504-07.
31 Id. See 429 U.S. at 261; 426 U.S. at 45. But see, Note, The Price-Anderson Act Under
Attack, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 955, 961-64 (1978).
32 For a list of the Court's considerations on the subject of judicial restraint, see Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
33 See 429 U.S. at 262; 426 U.S. at 45-46. "Federal judicial power is limited to those disputes . . . which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial
process." 392 U.S. at 97.
34 422 U.S. at 508.
35 Comment, SANTA CLARA L. REV., supra note 16.
36 Bowker v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1976).
37 In Mulquenny v. National Comm'n on the Observance, Etc., 549 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir.
1977), the Seventh Circuit recognized the requirements: (1) injury in fact, (2) resulting
from the defendant's conduct, and (3) that the judicial relief requested will ameliorate the
complained-of harm. Id. at 1120.
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IV. Government Standing in Kuehn
In Kuehn the Seventh Circuit held that "the Government has no standing
to protect the grant of immunity. Once the witness has testified, the Government
received all that it asked for-the compelled testimony.""8 In short, the "grant
of immunity flows to the witness and not to the Government. Only the witness
may claim its benefits." 9
This conclusion suggests erroneously, however, that the government could
never satisfy the prerequisites for standing discussed previously.4 As revealed by
the legislative history of the immunity sections of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,4" the government was meant to benefit from grants of immunity. 2
As a result, compliance with the standing prerequisites by the government cannot
be foreclosed by simply concluding that "only the witness may claim its benefits."
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was aimed at "strengthening the
legal tools in the evidence-gathering process" of the government for the "development of legally admissible evidence."43 In 1969, President Nixon recommended
the adoption of a general witness immunity law by stating: "With this new law,
Government should be better able to gather evidence ... ."" The congressional
committee which studied the Act also believed "that the legislation would have
a beneficial effect on law enforcement." 4
The use of immunity granted by § 6002 was not designed to benefit the
witness, but rather was only the quid pro quo for the witness's fifth-amendment
privilege of silence. Immunity is the price which the government must pay to
secure the testimony of a recalcitrant witness. Given the choice, a witness in an
organized crime investigation would likely prefer his fifth-amendment privilege
to remain silent to the imposition of immunity which accompanies an order to
compel testimony.
Finally, the wording of the statute itself suggests that it may be properly
understood as granting the United States a right to judicial relief because of the
emphasis it places upon the U.S. Attorney in the immunity process. The statute
provides that only the U.S. Attorney may request an immunity order from the
district court and then only if he decides that it is in the public interest."

38 562 F.2d at 430.
39 Id. at 431.
40 See text accompanying notes 20-37 supra.
41 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6003 (1970). For the text of § 6002, see note 4 supra.
42 In a report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice, the Commission recommended an immunity statute because "organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process" and "[t]here is evidence
to indicate that the availability of immunity Ean overcome the wall of silence that so often
defeats the efforts of law enforcement to obtain live witnesses in organized crime cases."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 200 (1967).
43 Statement of Findings and Purposes, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, reprinted
in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1073.
44 H.R. REP. No. 1188, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970).
45 Id. at 11. Accord, NATIONAL ASSOCIATON OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 3. "The
ability of law enforcement officials to compel incriminating testimony is thought to be crucial
in any attack on organized crime." Id. at 133.
46 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1) (1970).
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Neither the court, upon its own request,47 nor the witness48 can initiate the immunity order process. Furthermore, the court has little discretion on whether to
issue the immunity order because the statute says the court "shall" issue, rather
than "may" issue the immunity order upon proper application."
A. Injury in Fact
The first prerequisite which the U.S. Attorney had to fulfill in order to gain
standing in Kuehn was to allege that the government had been injured in fact.
Since the statute was enacted to provide the U.S. Attorney with an "evidencegathering tool," the government has an interest in obtaining the fruits which the
tool was designed to provide. Additionally, the pragmatic difficulties inherent in
developing witnesses in organized crime investigations suggest that the government has a legitimate interest in maintaining its credibility in the future use of
immunity orders. The government merely seeks to insure that the tool remains
effective for future use.
If a U.S. Attorney is perceived as lacking credibility because his previous immunity orders have been ineffective, future witnesses who are compelled to testify
pursuant to an immunity order are likely to be uncooperative, forgetful of certain
facts, and less apt to volunteer additional information. Granted, the government
can seek perjury or contempt sanctions against an immunized witness who lies or
withholds information, and the witness can lose the protection of the immunity
order, but any litigator can attest to the difference between a friendly and hostile
witness, even if the hostile witness can be compelled to give the evidence the
attorney is seeking to elicit. To deny the legitimacy of the government's concern
over its credibility in the future use of immunity orders is to ignore the dynamics
of developing the testimony of immunized witnesses in organized crime investigations.5"
In Kuehn, the United States had not received "all that it asked for,"'" as
the Seventh Circuit held, because Schwartz was still a "material witness in cases
pending before the Federal Court."" He could still be compelled by the immunity order to testify for the government at those future trials. If Rice, the
State's Attorney, used evidence derived from Schwartz's immunized federal grand
jury testimony as the government alleged," then the government would be

47

Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d 986, 988-89 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.

933 (1975).
48

United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.

denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975).
49 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1970).
50 For an excellent discussion of how immunity orders are granted in practice, see Note,
Federal Witness Immunity Problems and Practices Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, 14 Am,.
CRIM. L. REV. 275 (1976).
51 562 F.2d at 430.
52 421 F.Supp. at 873.
53 "For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and
reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party." 422 U.S. at 501. Accord, Jenkins
v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969).
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threatened with injury by Schwartz becoming a hostile and uncooperative witness
54
and thus jeopardizing those future trials.
The Seventh Circuit's denial of standing is explainable, however, in view
of the government's failure to allege in a concretely demonstrable way that it was
threatened with injury in fact. Speculative pleadings that the government's
position would be enhanced by the absence of Rice's actions are insufficient. 5
Ideally, the government, in a case like Kuehn, should allege specific facts in its
complaint, supported by affidavits, attesting to the witness's change in attitude
following his state prosecution and that this change was jeopardizing the future
government prosecutions in which he was to testify.5
The government also has a legitimate concern for its future credibility when
evidence derived from a witness's immunized testimony is used to convict him in
state court. In organized crime investigations, prosecutors are especially concemed with their credibility" because they realize the practical necessity of this
trait for success in dealing with future witnesses.58 The district court which issued
the injunction seemed to recognize this concern:
If the defendants are permitted to use the testimony directly or indirectly
obtained from Marvin Charles Schwartz's own testimony given under order
of this Court, there would be immediate and irreparable harm to the United
States and to the United States jurisdiction over pending and future organized crime and racketeering cases.5 9
The pragmatics of using immunity orders indicate that in some cases there will
be a threatened injury in fact to the government's credibility.
A court faced with the question of whether the United States was injured in
fact, as the Seventh Circuit was in Kuehn, should find that the injury-in-fact requirement of standing is satisfied when the government's future pending trials
are being jeopardized by an uncooperative witness and its credibility with respect
to future immunity orders is being threatened. Such a holding would be supported by the underlying rationale of the injury-in-fact requirement: a "personal
stake""0 to insure the adversary context in which courts feel comfortable. Fur54 According to the U.S. Attorney who handled Kuehn, Schwartz was in fact becoming
uncooperative after his indictment by the state. Although the government's complaint only
alleged that Schwartz was a pending witness for future federal prosecutions, his uncooperative
nature was addressed in oral argument.
55 See text accompanying notes 26 and 31 supra.
56 Such allegations would appear to be less speculative than those in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976), in which the Court recognized a vendor's right, as a third party, to assert jus
tertii standing. The Court found that the vendor, as a result of a statute restricting the sale of
beer to men but not to women between the ages of 18-21, had suffered an injury in fact by
incurring a direct economic injury due to the constriction of her buyer's market. Id. at 194.
57 The sheer frequency with which immunity grants under § 6002 are used readily
demonstrates why the United States would be concerned with its credibility on this matter. In
the eighteen months following the Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) decision,
the Justice Department received over five thousand requests for approval of immunity grants
under § 6002. THE NEw YORKER, Apr. 19, 1976, at 42.
58 The U.S. Attorney involved in Kuehn told the author that attorneys representing
witnesses who are to be immunized under § 6002 still ask whether the immunity is worth
anything after the "Schwartz affair." Thus, the concern with credibility is not idle speculation.
59 562 F.2d at 873 (emphasis added).
60 See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
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thermore, when the judge "peeks around"'" the litigant to the substantive issues,
he should be satisfied that there is a logical nexus between the U.S. Attorney
and his interest in insuring that the terms of the immunity order are not violated.
The holding that the government was without standing in Kuehn demonstrates
the importance of alleging specifically the facts necessary to allow the court to
conclude there has been an injury in fact.
B. But For Causation
The second prerequisite of standing, "but for causation," would have been
relatively easy for the U.S. Attorney to fulfill in Kuehn. He would merely have
had to allege that the government's injuries in fact, namely, Schwartz becoming
a hostile witness and the threatened damage to credibility, were due to Rice's
use of evidence derived from Schwartz's immunized testimony. Although courts
will not speculate on causation, 2 the facts in Kuehn support a clear inference
that the government's injuries were the result of Rice using derivative evidence,
contrary to the terms of Schwartz's immunity order.
C. Effective Relief
The final requirement for standing, that the court feel capable of granting
effective relief, requires the government to allege that it would "benefit in a
tangible way" 3 if the federal court enjoined Rice's prosecution of Schwartz.
Had the Seventh Circuit found that the United States had been injured in fact
by Rice's prosecution, this requirement would have been fulfilled. The district
court's injunction would maintain the government's cooperative witness and
enhance the government's credibility in the future use of immunity orders.
This requirement in particular, however, is subject to the judicial restraint
side of justiciability. Whether a court feels comfortable with the parties before it
and capable of reaching a reasoned and enforceable decision depends on the
court's interpretation of the immunity provisions and its assessment of the pragmatics of immunizing witnesses in organized crime investigations.
The government should be able to satisfy the three prerequisites for standing
in a case like Kuehn by alleging specific facts which show that it was injured in
fact by the state prosecutor's conduct and that the court is capable of granting
effective relief. The legislative history and the wording of the statute itself, plus
the pragmatic credibility concern for its effective use, all demonstrate that the
government has a substantial interest in insuring that its use immunity is not
violated. Although the Seventh Circuit's failure to address these considerations
might be explained in that they were not alleged in the government's complaint,
the court's holding that the benefit of the "grant of immunity flows to the witness
and not to the Government' 6 is still troublesome. It implies that the government could never have standing to enforce an immunity order in a case like
61
62
63
64

See note 19 supra.
See text accompanying note 29-31 supra.
See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
562 F.2d at 431.
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Kuehn. In so holding, the Seventh Circuit failed to give due consideration to
the purpose of the immunity sections and their intended effect of facilitating
government prosecutions.
V. Additional Considerations
Even if the Seventh Circuit had recognized the government's standing in

Kuehn, the government would have had to overcome two remaining hurdles:
the anti-injunction statute and the Younger abstention doctrine.
A. The Anti-Injunction Act

In Kuehn, the court held that to initiate an action permitted under the
Anti-Injunction Act,65 the government needed a judgment in its favor to effectuate, and since the grant of immunity flowed to the witness, the government did
not have a substantive claim to assert."6 This holding, however, was actually
nothing more than a reaffirmation of the denial of standing. If the government
had had standing in Kuehn, the Anti-Injunction Act would not have been a
barrier.
"[I]t is settled law that the prohibition of the anti-injunction statute does
not apply to the Government of the United States."6 7 The issue of whether the
anti-injunction statute is applicable to the government has been decided by the
Supreme Court in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States.68 In a precise opinion
by Justice Frankfurter, a leading spokesman for judicial restraint, the Court
stated:
There is, however, a persuasive reason why the federal court's power to stay
state court proceedings might have been restricted when a private party was
seeking the stay but not when the United States was seeking similar relief.
The statute is designed to prevent conflicts between state and federal courts.
This policy is much more compelling when it is the litigation of private
parties which threatens to draw the two judicial systems into conflict than
when it is the United States which seeks a stay to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a national interest. 69
Not only did the Court believe the potential conflict between the state and federal
government was less compelling when the suit was bought by the United States,
65 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948). See note 11 supra for the text of this provision. The
Anti-Injunction Act has been the subject of several commentaries. See generally C. WRIGHT,
supra note 16, at 81-82; Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. R.v.
717 (1977); Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV. L. REv. 726
(1961); Comment, Limitation of the Federal Courts' Power to Enjoin Stat.e Criminal Proceedings: Hicks v. Miranda, 11 GONz. L. REV. 739 (1976); Comment, Federal Court Stays of
State Court Proceedings: A Re-examination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CHI. L.
REv. 612 (1971); Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts, 32 U.
Cm. L. REv. 471 (1965).
66 562 F.2d at 431.
67 NLRB v. Roywood Corp., 429 F.2d 964, 970 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Comment,
Exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 21 Ame. U. L. REV. 395 (1972).
68 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
69 Id. at 225-26. Accord, United States v. Inaba, 291 F. 416 (E.D. Wash. 1923). See
also Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Ass'n), 558 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1977); Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.).
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it also refused to interpret the Act as being designed to frustrate "superior federal
interests." 7 This interpretation"' of the anti-injunction statute remains viable
today,"2 even after Younger v. Harris.3
If the United States has standing, then its "superior federal interest"74
serves to bypass the prohibition of the anti-injunction statute. Although a court
may deny the government standing, as the Seventh Circuit did in Kuehn, such
a decision must rest upon the principles of standing and not the prohibition of
the anti-injunction statute. "For the Federal Government and its agencies, the
federal courts are the forum of choice. For them, as Leiter indicates, access to
75
the federal courts is preferable in the context of healthy federal-state relations."
B. Younger Abstention
Even if the Seventh Circuit had found that the government had standing
in Kuehn, the government would have been faced with the problem of overcoming the Younger ' abstention doctrine. Although the court did not apply
this doctrine to the government in Kuehn, it did raise the issue, in dismissing
Schwartz's intervenor claim and would have raised it with respect to the government, had its claim not been resolved on the basis of standing.
In Younger, the Supreme Court announced the concept of "Our Federalism" '7 8 which, for reasons of comity and federalism, prohibits a federal court
70 352 U.S. at 226.
71 "The purpose of § 2283 was to avoid unseemly conflict between the state and federal
courts where the litigants were private persons, not to hamstring the Federal Government and
its agencies in the use of federal courts to protect federal rights." NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co.,
404 U.S. 138, 146 (1971).
72 Id.; Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 235-36 (1972).
73 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Leiter interpretation of the Act is concerned with whether
the court has jurisdictional power to proceed. The Younger abstention doctrine is based on concerns for "Our Federalism."
74 The "superior federal interest" in Leiter was the loss of royalties for mineral rights.
This hardly seems overwhelming when compared to the government's interests in Kuehn which
was derived from the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The Act was enacted because
"organized crime activities in the United States weakened the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free
competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten domestic security, and
undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens." Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, supra note 43. Furthermore, an immunity order
may only be issued by the district court upon the request of the U.S. Attorney (with the approval of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General or designated Assistant Attorney
General), when he believes the testimony may be necessary for the "public interest." 18
U.S.C. § 6003(a). Accord, "He must be satisfied that the testimony is needed for the public
interest." H.R. REP. No. 1188, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970).
75 404 U.S. at 147.
76 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
77 The Younger abstention doctrine has been the subject of numerous commentaries.
See generally NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 16, at 97-100; TRIBE, supra note 16, at 152-56;
C. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 229-36; Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A Model for Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits That "Interfere" With State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 27 (1976); Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger and Beyond, 50 TEx L. REV. 1324 (1972); Wells Preliminary Injunctions and
Abstention: Some Problems in Federalism, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 65 (1977); Yarbrough, supra
note 16; Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal
Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REv.
266 (1976); Note, Federal Courts, Injunctions, Declaratory Judgments and State Law: The
Supreme Court Has Finally Fashioned a Workable "Abstention Doctrine," 25 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 75 (1976).
78 401 U.S. at 44.
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from enjoining a state criminal prosecution except upon a "showing of bad
faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable
relief.""0 As applied to the government's position in Kuehn, "Our Federalism"
appears to be an insurmountable hurdle"0 and would have been another way
by which the Seventh Circuit could have dismissed the government's claim.
There are some unanswered questions, however, concerning Younger's application to the government in a case like Kuehn. To date, all of the cases involving the Younger abstention doctrine have been brought by private parties.
Arguably, the same concerns for comity and federalism do not exist when the
United States is the moving party, asserting a "superior federal interest," and
the government is not a party before the state court proceeding. Some of
Younger's concerns for federalism and comity are similar to those behind the
Anti-Injunction Act, and as discussed previously, the Court in Leiter found that
Act inapplicable when the United States was the moving party."1
VI. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Kuehn, that the benefits of an immunity
order flow to the witness, restricts the effectiveness of immunity orders in organized crime investigations and ignores the goals sought to be achieved by the
statute. The immunity sections were enacted to provide the government with a
new tool for combating organized crime. Since the government is the beneficiary
of the Act, it should have standing to protect immunity orders when its future
trials are jeopardized because the witness is becoming uncooperative or when the
government's future credibility is threatened.
With the benefit of hindsight, the Seventh Circuit's failure to address these
issues may be explainable in that the U.S. Attorney's complaint only alleged
jurisdiction under § 134582 and § 2283.83 The court's holding that only the
witness may claim the benefits of the immunity order, however, reflects a failure
to give due consideration to the purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970. Furthermore, since the court not only "peeked around" to the merits but
actually indicated that it believed there was an independent basis for the evidence
used in the state prosecution, the court's superficial treatment of the question of
79 Id. at 54.
80 In Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), the Court held that a federal injunction
may not be used to challenge the admissibility of evidence in a state court proceeding. Id.
at 83-85.
81 See text accompanying notes 65-75 supra. It would be interesting to speculate on how
the Supreme Court would respond to the argument that Younger is inapplicable when the
government is the moving party asserting a superior federal interest as in Leiter. In Mitchum,
the concurring opinion stated that although § 1983 was an expressed statutory exception to
the anti-injunction statute, "it does nothing to question or qualify in any way the principles
of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a
state court proceeding." 407 U.S. at 244. Once again, however, that case is distinguishable
because the plaintiff was not the United States asserting a superior federal interest. Furthermore, the Court said the test is "whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right,
[such as the government's right to remain credible and take full advantage of its immunized
witness] . . . could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding."
Id. at 238.
82 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1948), which provides generally that district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions commenced by the United States.
83 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948). See note 11 supra for the text of this provision.
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standing may be explainable on the grounds that the court was unimpressed with
the case on its substantive merits.
The essential lesson to be derived from Kuehn is the need for claimants to
make specific factual allegations which guide the court through its inquiry of
standing. Not only is this the message of the Supreme Court's recent cases on
standing, but the consequence of failing to do so is apparent in Kuehn. Claimants must allege specific facts which permit the court to conclude that the three
requirements of standing have been satisfied.
The more effective solution to the problem posed by Kuehn, however, is for
Congress to amend § 6002 to remove any doubt as to whom the intended beneficiary of immunity orders is and to give the United States the express right to
enforce them.84 Such an amendment would recognize the pragmatics of immunity orders in organized crime cases. A U.S. Attorney who is dependent upon
an immunized witness for the successful prosecution of a series of organized crime
cases should not be without a means of relief when a state prosecutor's violation
of the immunity order threatens to alienate the witness. Nor should the government be dependent for its reputation for credibility upon a state prosecutor's
scruples. Whether or not Rice had an independent basis in Kuehn, cases will
arise in which the immunity order has been violated to the detriment of the
United States, and in such cases the government should have a right to relief.
"Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of
which can confer standing to sue . . .

,"

and it should do so by amending the

immunity provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act.
Jerome R. Doak
84 For an excellent discussion of implying standing from statutory authority, see Note,
Implying Standing to Sue from Statutory Authority: Applicability of a "Fair Reading"
Standard, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 102 (1978).
85 422 U.S. at 514. "Essentially, the standing question in such eases is whether the
constitutional or statutory provisions on which the claim rests properly can be understood as
granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief." Id. at 500. Such an
amendment might also eliminate the hurdle posed by Younger. See the test stated at the end of
note 81 supra.

Civil Procedure-The Clayton Act as an Expressly
Authorized Exception to the Anti-injunction ActFactual Showing Is Insufficient to Justify an Injunction
to Stay a State Court Proceeding.
Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist.*
I. Introduction
The relationship between the federal judicial system and state judicial
systems has been a rich source of complex substantive and procedural problems.
The conditions under which injunctive relief may be granted by a federal court
to stay a proceeding in a state court have proven recalcitrant to adequate
analysis.
A question that is of central importance in antitrust litigation concerns the
nature of such injunctive relief, namely, is the Clayton Act' an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act?2 The Seventh Circuit addressed this
question in Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist.'
The nature of injunctive relief and the conditions under which such relief
can be granted have been hotly contested in recent years and little coherent
direction has emerged from the Supreme Court. Although the Seventh Circuit
was correct in ultimately denying injunctive relief on the facts of Kurek, the court
ignored an opportunity to clarify important policy considerations and failed to
generate guidelines for district courts to apply when granting or denying injunctive relief.
II. The Kurek Decision
Kurek is a complex case involving an extended series of procedural maneuvers. Several golf professionals held pro shop concessions at golf courses operated
by the Peoria, Illinois, park district. During 1972 and 1973, an extended series
of negotiations were conducted between the golf professionals and the park
district concerning rental rates for the pro shops. These negotiations resulted in a
contract for the year 1973. Similar negotiations were conducted in 1973 to
procure a contract for 1974, but these negotiations failed.
On January 19, 1974, the park district awarded a three-year contract to
Golf Shops Management, Inc., for the pro shop franchises. On January 21,
1974, the golf professionals were served with a 30-day notice to terminate the
tenancy. The golf professionals refused to vacate, and the park district filed a
forcible entry- and detainer proceeding against them. The park district lost the
forcible entry and detainer action, but later won reversal by the Illinois Appellate
Court.'
574 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1978).
1 15 U.S.C. § 26 (Supp. 1977).
2 22 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
3 574 F.2d 892.
4 Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist. v. Kurek, 27 Ill. App. 3d 60, 325 N.E.2d 650 (1975).
*
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On July 25, 1975, the park district filed an action to recover damages for
the wrongful possession of the pro shops. The park district recovered a judgment
for $127,605, and the judgment was sustained by the Illinois Appellate Court.5
An antitrust claim was filed by the golf professionals in federal district court
charging that increases in concession fees demanded by the park district during
the negotiations for the 1974 contracts were part of an unlawful conspiracy to
fix prices. In addition, the golf professionals alleged that as retribution for refusing to participate in the price fixing scheme, the park district awarded a
monopolistic concession contract to Golf Shops Management. The district court
dismissed the case on the basis of state action immunity, namely that the activities
of governmental units are not covered by the Sherman Act.'
The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court on the
antitrust claim.7 Finding that recent decisions of the Supreme Court had
restricted the scope of the state action immunity defense, the Seventh Circuit
returned the case to the district court to consider the merits of the antitrust claim.'
The park district appealed to the Supreme Court. Certiorari was granted and
the case was subsequently returned to the Seventh Circuit for reconsideration in
light of a recent Supreme Court holding on the state action immunity doctrine.9
On remand, the Seventh Circuit re-affirmed its original judgment, and the case
was returned to federal district court. 10
While the antitrust litigation proceeded, the park district sought enforcement of the state court judgment. The golf professionals advocated enjoining
such enforcement." The issue before the Seventh Circuit in Kurek was whether
the facts of this case justified federal injunctive relief to stay the enforcement of a
state court proceeding. Although the denial of the injunction by the Seventh
Circuit was correct, the reasoning of the court merits further analysis.
III. Current Law
The threshold question that must be answered before any federal injunction
against a state court proceeding can be issued is whether the injunction falls
within one of the express exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act." The prevailing
5 Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist. v. Jones, 51 Ill. App. 3d 182, 367 N.E.2d 111 (1977).
6 Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist., No. 76-9 (S.D. Ill., filed June 1, 1976).
7 Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977).
8 The state action immunity doctrine, as developed in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943), has been altered by the holdings of Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)
and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
9 Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist. v. Kurek, 98 S. Ct. 1642 (1978). This case was
remanded to be reconsidered in light of City of Lafayette v. La. Power and Light Co., 98 S. Ct.
1123 (1978).
10 Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist., No. 76-1791 (7th Cir., filed September 11,
1978).
11 574 F.2d at 893.
12 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The language of the Act suggests an absolute prohibition
against enjoining state court proceedings. Notwithstanding the language of absolute prohibition, however, several judicially created exceptions exist. In Toucey v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), the Supreme Court prescribed in dictum harsh limitations upon the
circumstances under which federal injunctions could issue against a state court proceeding.
The legislative response was immediate. In the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948, Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2283, 62 Stat. 869 (1948), Congress adopted three explicit exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. See text accompanying note 14 infra. The Reviser's comment
suggests that the amendment "restores the basic law as understood prior to Toucey," 28 U.S.C.
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rule is that the Act is "an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions."'" The three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act are that "a court
of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state
court except [1] as expressly authorized by an act of Congress, or [2] where
necessary in the aid of its jurisdiction, or [3] to protect or effectuate its judgments."' 4
Kurek centered on the first of these exceptions, and hence the precise
objective was to determine whether Congress had "expressly authorized" an
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act which was applicable to the Kurek facts.
The relevant test in resolving this inquiry was articulated in Mitchum v.
Foster" in which the Supreme Court stated that the test is "whether an act
of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal
court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court
provision."'"
Neither the meaning nor the justification of this standard is clear. If
Congress expressly states that an injunction may be granted against a proceeding
in state court, then clearly the exception applies.' If an act of Congress permits
a federal court to stay a proceeding, even though the act does not mention state
proceedings specifically, a sufficient authorization probably exists.'" If a statute
does not fall within one of these categories, however, then the precise reach of
the Mitchum standard is unclear and must be determined.
The Clayton Act is a statute in this borderline category requiring interpretation and application of the Mitchum standard. Thus, it is unclear whether a
private party seeking federal relief under the Clayton Act for alleged antitrust
violations can get injunctive relief from a federal court to stay a state court proceeding, and this is precisely the problem sought to be resolved in Kurek.
In Vendey Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.,' the Supreme Court addressed the
issue that proved to be dispositive in Kurek. Is Section 16 of the Clayton Act,"0
§ 2283, Reviser's Note (1970). For a more detailed discussion of the anti-injunction statute
see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 37 (3d ed. 1976).
13 Atl. Coast Line R. R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970). See also
Reaves & Golden, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute in the Aftermath of Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad, 5 Ga. L.R. 294 (l970-71).
14 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).

15
16

407 U.S. 225 (1972).
407 U.S. at 238.

17 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 203.
18 Id.
19 433 U.S. 623 (1977). For an analysis of Vendo see Note, Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend
Corp.: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 44 Brooklyn L. Rev. 317 (1978); Note, Vendo Co.
v. Lektro-Vend Corp.: The Interface of the Clayton Act and the Anti-Injunction Act, 56 N.
Car. L. Rev. 601 (1978).
20 The Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (Supp. 1977), provides:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties,
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage
is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon
the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted
and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage isimmediate, a preliminary injunction may issue...
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which permits private injunctive relief in federal court against Sherman antitrust
violations, an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act? In particular, can a party
seeking antitrust relief in federal court under the Clayton Act seek to enjoin a
state court proceeding brought by the party against whom he is seeking relief
in federal court?
The plurality opinion in Vendo Co. indicates that the Clayton Act does not
constitute an express Congressional exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.2'
Were this the holding of the Supreme Court, Kurek would be a simple case; no
injunctive relief could be granted. Six justices were of the opinion, however, that
the Clayton Act is an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
The four dissenting justices maintain that the Clayton Act is a per se exception."
Two concurring justices suggested that although the Clayton Act is an exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act, the circumstances required to trigger the exception
were not present in Vendo Co. and thus joined the plurality in denying injunctive relief.2"
According to the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, a plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief under the Clayton Act is required to show a pattern of baseless
repetitive claims or some equivalent grave abuse of the state court system for a
federal court to issue an injunction to stay a state court proceeding. On a lesser
showing, such an injunction may not be issued.24
Although six justices of the Supreme Court are apparently prepared to hold
that the Clayton Act is an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act, this is not yet a holding of the Supreme Court. Thus, Vendo Co. is of
dubious precedential value. Further, only two justices adopted the Blackmun
standard for deciding when an injunction may properly issue, and neither the
meaning nor justification of the Blackmun standard is clear. Nonetheless, the
Seventh Circuit relied on the Blackmun standard as the basis for its holding in
Kurek."
IV. The Seventh Circuit's Analysis
The issue presented in Kurek is to determine whether a federal court has
the power to enjoin collection of the state judgment against the golf professionals.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that it could not issue the injunction. Although a
number of approaches might justify this result, the Seventh Circuit relied on an
application of the Blackmun standard proposed in Vendo Co.
The crux of Kurek is the judgment by the Seventh Circuit that the Blackmun
standard had not been met. The court explained:
21

433 U.S. at 641.

22 Id. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissent was joined by Justices
Brennan, White and Marshall.
23 Id. at 643 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Chief Justice joined the concurring opinion.
24 Id. at 644. For an analysis of each element of the Blackmun standard, see text accompanying notes 29-33 infra.
25 Full faith and credit, comity, federalism and the collateral attack on the state judgment
are all mentioned as possible bases for the holding in Kurek. None of these alternatives was
explored, however, and hence lend no analytical support to the result reached in Kurek. The
justification of Kurek stands squarely on the authority of Vendo Co.
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Reading the opinions as indicating that at least if the exceptional
circumstances described in the concurring opinion are made out, the court
could grant an injunction under the Clayton Act, we are not persuaded
that such circumstances have been shown here. Mr. Justice Blackmun,
writing for himself and the Chief Justice referred to a pattern of baseless
repetitive claims or an abuse of the state adjudicative process as a prerequisite to issuance of an injunction. He found that Vendo was not using
the state court proceedings as an anti-competitive device in and of itself. In
the case before us, the golf pros attempt to show us that this was done and
suggest strongly that park district misled the Illinois courts. We decline,
however, to give credence to these conclusionary assertions. Golf pros at all
times participated in the state proceedings and although some ex parte
rulings were made, golf pros were there given an opportunity to, and did,
seek to set aside the challenged rulings. There is no showing that there was a
failure of due process in the picture which has been presented to us. The
state litigation which was vigorously contested appears to us to come within
the ambit of Mr. Justice Blackmun's finding in Venda that the state court
26
proceedings were not an anti-competitive device in and of themselves.
The Kurek rationale is a cautious one. On the one hand, the Seventh
Circuit rejects the plurality opinion in Vendo Co. that injunctions cannot issue
under the Clayton Act. Thus, the Seventh Circuit apparently believes that the
Clayton Act is an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. At
the same time, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Blackmun standard as determinative of what factual showing was required for an injunction to issue.
Finding the factual showing insufficient, the injunctive relief was denied.
A second possible exception to the Anti-Injunction Act exists in that a
federal court may issue an injunction if it is "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction."27
The Seventh Circuit dismissed this principle as a basis for issuing the injunction.
The justification for dismissing such a claim is a reference to the plurality opinion
in Vendo Co. in which it was claimed that "no case of this Court has ever held
that an injunction to 'preserve' a case or controversy fits within the 'necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction' exception; neither have the parties directed us to any other
federal court decisions so holding."2 8 Hence, the motion for injunctive relief was
denied.
V. Analysis
The Kurek result was justified on the grounds that the Blackmun standard
in Vendo Co. had not been met. Consequently, in order to assess the holding in
Kurek properly, a close examination of the Blackmun standard is required. In
Vendo Co., Justice Blackmun argued,
26 574 F.2d at 895-96.
27 See note 2 supra.
28 574 F.2d at 896 (quoting Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977)).
It is unfortunate that the Seventh Circuit did not pursue this issue and chose instead to cite
only the plurality opinion in Vendo as controlling. In Vendo Co., Justice Rehnquist interpreted
this exception to apply exclusively to cases of in rem jurisdiction and cited Professor Wright
in support of this claim. C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 204. This analysis of the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is unsound. In Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501
(1954), the Supreme Court allowed an injunction under the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction"
exception for an in personam action. Since qualifying under this exception would have permitted the injunction in Kurek, further examination of this exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act was warranted.
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I would hold that no injunction may issue against currently pending
state-court proceedings unless those proceedings are themselves part of a
"pattern of baseless, repetitive claims" that are being used as an anticompetitive device, all the traditional prerequisites for equitable relief are
satisfied, and the only way to give the anti-trust laws their intended scope
is by staying the proceedings.29
The meaning of this test is unclear. No content is given to the concept of an
anti-competitive device as evidenced by a "pattern of baseless, repetitive claims."
Further, no indication is given of the circumstances that might invoke the concept of giving the antitrust laws their intended scope by staying a state proceeding.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, one might argue that these conditions are
individually necessary conditions for granting injunctive relief, and consequently,
the failure of even one condition is sufficient to deny the injunction. Apparently,
this was the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Kurek. Since no "pattern of baseless
repetitive claims" had been shown, the injunction could not issue. Hence no
other element in the Blackmun standard need be analyzed to reach the Kurek
result.
Such an analysis, however, is unduly restrictive. Even the initiation of a
single judicial proceeding could constitute part of a wider scheme to violate the
antitrust laws. Accordingly, neither the logic nor the policy involved in granting
injunctive relief under the Clayton Act depends on a violation committed by a
multiplicity of lawsuits as opposed to a violation involving only one lawsuit.2 "
justice Blackmun is not insensitive to this point, and accordingly, he suggests an alternative test: an injunction may issue from a federal court by showing
either a pattern of baseless repetitive state claims or "some equivalent grave
abuse of the state courts."31 Yet, the meaning of equivalent grave abuse is left
undetermined by the remainder of the opinion.
The foregoing analysis of the Blackmun standard undermines the justification given by the Seventh Circuit for the result in Kurek. There is no question
that pressing the enforcement of a state court judgment while the antitrust
litigation continues could fall well within the ambit of the "equivalent grave
abuse" standard. Since this is so, the failure to show a "pattern of baseless
repetitive claims" should not have been fatal to the argument of the golf professionals.
If so, the Seventh Circuit should have explored the meaning of "equivalent
grave abuse" to justify the Kurek result. Although the Seventh Circuit refused
to find any equivalent showing of grave abuse on the facts of Kurek,"2 no
29

433 U.S. at 644.

30 The standard of "baseless repetitive claims" is taken from Justice Douglas' opinion in
Cal. Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972). To be sure, the
Vendo Court was split on both the meaning and significance of the "baseless repetitive claims"
standard. See 443 U.S. at 644 (Blackmun, J., concurring) and 443 U.S. at 661 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Since Justice Blackmun does suggest an alternative test (see text accompanying
note 31 infra), adjudication of the dispute over the "baseless repetitive claims" standard is not
required for present purposes. In theory, Justice Blackmun would issue an injunction on a
showing of something other than a pattern of "baseless repetitive claims."

31
32

433 U.S. at 644 n.1.
574 F.2d at 895.
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analysis of the concept is given by the Kurek court."3 Since a showing of "grave
abuse" would have made federal injunctive relief permissible, a search of the
Kurek facts for such abuse was warranted. Further, without this explication of
"equivalent grave abuse," the standard employed to justify the result in Kurek
is indeterminate. Consequently, no adequate justification is given by the Seventh
Circuit for the result in Kurek.
No clear standard emerges from Vendo Co. as controlling. Rather, a
number of principles are suggested, each with little justification and each giving
little direction to determine how the standard might apply to different fact
situations. Kurek, rather than advancing toward clarifying the uncertainty left
after Vendo Co., merely reflects this uncertainty. As a result, no progress has
been made toward formulating coherent guidelines for future application by
district courts.
A more serious problem with the rationale of Kurek is the use of the Blackmun standard as dispositive. The Supreme Court has not yet given a definitive
opinion concerning the Clayton Act as an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,
and only two justices have expressed a preference for the Blackmun standard.
Given the lack of available precedent on the relevant issues, a more perspicuous
approach to the problem in Kurek could have been anchored in an analysis of
the policies served in granting or denying federal injunctive relief in factual
situations like the one involved in Kurek. When these issues are definitively
decided in the Supreme Court, the quality of this policy analysis-and not the
application of indeterminate and unjustified standards-will be dispositive.
VI. Conclusion
Kurek yields two hints about the future of the Clayton Act as an exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act in the Seventh Circuit. First, it seems clear that the
plurality opinion in Vendo Co. regarding the Clayton Act as an exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act has been rejected. On a proper showing, the Seventh Circuit
apparently would issue an injunction. Second, the Blackmun standard seems to
be the standard that will be followed in the Seventh Circuit in determining when
an injunction can issue. What is clear about this standard is that it will take an
extraordinary showing to justify the stay of a state court proceeding by a federal
court.
Nothing in this comment suggests that the result in Kurek is wrong and this
is easily demonstrated. In Vendo Co., specific findings of likelihood of ultimate
success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm, and protection of the public
33 The only clue as to what constitutes "equivalent grave abuse" is the reference in Kurek
to the fact that there was no failure of due process in the state court pyoceedings. 574 F.2d
at 895-96. The use of due process language adds further uncertainty to the meaning of "equivalent grave abuse," for there are a number of possible interpretations of "due process" with
respect to the granting of the injunction under analysis. First, the Seventh Circuit may mean
to imply that some violation of due process is a necessary condition for an injunction to issue.
Second, the court may be suggesting that a violation of due process is one of a number of other
(unspecified) conditions that meet the Vendo Co. standard. Third, the Seventh Circuit may
merely have used infelicitous language. The due process issue is not reached by the Vendo Co.
Court and hence it is difficult to specify what genuine justificatory role, if any, the due process
element plays in Kurek.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1979]

interest were made by the district court, and an injunction issued and was upheld by the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court reversed. No such findings of
fact were made in Kurek, and if the injunction did not properly issue in Vendo
Co., then a fortiori, it should not issue in Kurek.34
Whatever the rationale for Kurek, however, the justification given for the
analysis is flawed by the dubious value of Vendo Co. as a precedent. Thus, little
has been established in the way of setting rational guidelines with respect to the
issuance of injunctions under the Clayton Act as an exception to the AntiInjunction Act.
Harold F. Moore

34 Even if the application of a standard for analyzing a given fact situation justifies injunctive relief, such a result yields only the permissibility of injunctive relief. A federal court may
still decide, perhaps on grounds of comity, that a federal injunction should not issue to stay the
state court proceeding. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 255, 243 (1972); At. Coast Line
R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 298 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970).

Civil Procedure-Erie Doctrine-Depth of State
Law Analysis in Diversity Cases.
Leannais v. Cincinnati,Inc.*
I. Introduction
On April 20, 1973, appellant Raymond Leannais was injured while operating a coil slitting machine incident to his employment at Fullerton Metals
Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The machine on which the appellant was
injured had been manufactured by Forte Equipment Company and sold to
Fullerton in 1964.
In late 1967, Forte sold its assets to Cincinnati, Inc.,' the defendant-appellant, for cash and certain employment agreements. Cincinnati, Inc. created a
subsidiary, Cincinnati-Forte, to accept the Forte assets. The subsidiary was dissolved in 1973 after the assets were purchased by Cincinnati.
In the purchase agreement between Cincinnati and Forte, Cincinnati expressly limited its liability for personal injuries caused by Forte-produced machines to five years from the December 6, 1967, closing date of the contract, and
agreed to use its best efforts to secure insurance against such claims during that
time. No other liability for personal injury was assumed.
In this diversity action, Leannais and his wife sought damages from Cincinnati, Inc. and Cincinnati-Forte Co., the corporate successors to the original
manufacturer of the machine. The complaint alleged strict liability in tort, negligence in the design and manufacture of the machine, and failure to warn
potential users after serious injuries had occurred. After reviewing the affidavits
submitted by both parties, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying the
law of Wisconsin, reversed and remanded. The court held: (1) the district court
properly held that Cincinnati, the corporate successor to the manufacturer of the
machine, did not assume the liabilities of the transferor corporation by virtue of
the purchase of assets; 2 (2) the district court properly found that the record
* 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977).
1 Cincinnati, Inc. (hereinafter cited as Cincinnati) is an Ohio corporation; appellant is
a resident of Wisconsin. Jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1970). CincinnatiForte was later dismissed from the suit.
2 The general rule in the majority of American jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, is
that a corporation which purchases the assets of another corporation does not succeed to the
liabilities of the selling corporation. Bazan v. Kux Machine Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D.
Wis. 1973). Here, Cincinnati had no part in the design, manufacture, sale or distribution
of the allegedly defective machine and the general rule accords with the fundamental principle of justice and fairness, under which the law imposes responsibility for one's own act and
not for the totally independent acts of others. There are, however, four well-recognized exceptions to the general rule under which liability may be imposed on a purchasing corporation:
(1) when the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agreed to assume the selling corporation's liability; (2) when the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the purchaser and seller corporation; (3) when the purchaser corporation is merely a continuation
of the seller corporation; or (4) when the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape
liability for such obligations. 565 F.2d at 439 (citing Bazan v. Kux Machine Co., 358 F. Supp.
1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973) and Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir.
1971)).
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here did not indicate the existence, under Wisconsin law, of a cause of action
under the "product line" theory3 of strict liability in tort; and (3) the district
court resolution of whether Cincinnati had, and breached, a legal duty to warn
Leannais' employer was improper because the issue turned on material questions
of fac to be decided by a jury. Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor
of Cincinnati was reversed.
The product line theory in Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc. presented the
Seventh Circuit with a products liability question under Wisconsin law. In ruling
on the cause of action under the product line theory, the court concluded that
neither the record nor the briefs before it contained the slightest indication that
the courts of Wisconsin had created or would create such a far-reaching exception to the non-liability of asset-purchasers, a well-established principle which
strongly affected the economic decisions of the citizens and corporations of
Wisconsin.
The Seventh Circuit cast the product line theory in terms of a broad public
policy issue and held that such an issue would best be handled by the state legislature since it possesses comprehensive machinery for public input and debate.
The majority reasoned that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would, in an area
such as the one presented here, defer to the legislature.' This determination concluded the court's analysis of the product line theory; no attempt was made to
discern the merits of the theory under the current Wisconsin law.
II. The Scope of This Inquiry
Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc. is an important case because of what it does
not, or appears not to do. This diversity action, brought in the federal court to
adjudicate a products liability question, presented a theory never before addressed
by the courts of the forum state. The Seventh Circuit, faced with a classic
dilemma of a federal court applying the appropriate state law as required by
the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,' concluded that the highest court of
Wisconsin, if it were confronted with this precise issue, would defer to the legislature to formulate extensions of the law in the products liability area. The
3 The product line theory of strict liability in tort is set forth in the California case of
Ray v. Alad Corp., 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1977). In Ray, a ladder
manufacturer in 1968 was sued for injuries allegedly caused by a ladder manufactured by the
transferor corporation in 1952. The court propounded a theory that, henceforth, product
liability should run with the manufacturing business as such. No inquiry should be made as
to the corporate principals of merger, consolidation or asset purchase surrounding the transfer
of the business to the successor corporation. The rule of liability is to be one of tort, and not
of corporate law, with liability follcwing the business as long as it retained its distinctive
identity or character.
4 Cincinnati, Inc. assumed all service obligations of Forte. Whether Cincinnati's succession to the service contracts provides sufficient nexus to establish a legal duty to warn Leannais'
employer of the dangerous condition of the particular machine here involved, or of prior
serious injuries incurred on other machines, is unclear from the bare pleadings and affidavits
of record, and must await determination on remand. The existence of such a duty may be
dependent upon such unanswered factual questions as whether the particular machine involved
was under a service contract, whether Cincinnati had ever serviced that machine, or whether
Cincinnati had information on present or prior ownership of Forte-built machines. 565 F.2d
at 442.
5 The court cited as support for this conclusion, Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc., 42
Wis.2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969).
6 304 U.S. 64 '(1938).
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court's holding on the product line theory was predicated on a single Wisconsin
case of questionable relevance. The specific case cited as support by the court,
Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc.,' raised an issue clearly distinct from the one
presented to the Seventh Circuit here; the citation of Holifield was inappropriate
to resolve the precise question before the court.
In rendering a judicial opinion, the process is as important as the outcome.
In this instance, the Seventh Circuit neglected the process in favor of the outcome in its abbreviated Erie analysis. The court forfeited the opportunity to rule
on an issue of significant import which was properly before it. Furthermore, the
court may have damaged the image of the federal judiciary as the authoritative
forum for the determination of state law in cases involving parties of diverse
citizenship.
The relative merits of the product line theory will not be debated here, nor
will the actual outcome of the case be challenged. Rather, this analysis is directed
to the incomplete reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, to the departure by the
Seventh Circuit from traditional avenues of inquiry available to a federal court
under Erie, and to the broad declaration by the Seventh Circuit of the proper
scope of judicial power.
III. The Erie Doctrine
In 1938, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its decision in
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.' Mr. Tompkins had been injured in Pennsylvania by
a freight train while walking on a path beside the tracks of the Erie Railroad
Company. He brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York and recovered a judgment of $30,000 against the railroad.
The railroad appealed on the ground that, under the Pennsylvania law, Tompkins could not claim the status of licensee, but only that of a trespasser since he
was on a path which ran along, not across, the tracks. The circuit court affirmed
on the basis of general law without examination of the Pennsylvania cases.9 The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the appellate court for a
determination of the local law which it held to be controlling."
The Erie Court held that the term "laws of the several states" in the Rules
of Decision Act" included all state law, decisional as well as statutory, general
as well as local. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis suggested that this
construction of the Act was constitutionally compelled:

7 42 Wis.2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969).
8 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9 Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 90 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1937).
10 On remand, Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 98 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
637, rehearing denied, 305 U.S. 673 (1938). The Second Circuit, following the Supreme
Court directive, reversed, determining that Pennsylvania law denied Tompkins recovery.
Accordingly, the action was dismissed and the Supreme Court denied further review.
11 The Rules of Decision Act, Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provided that "[t]he
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in'trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply." The Act underlies
the whole of the Erie Doctrine. 28 U.S.C. §1652 (1970).
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Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether
the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its
highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no
federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State ....
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts. 2
As a matter of constitutional law, Mr. Justice Brandeis argued, Congress had no
lawmaking authority over a class of state substantive issues; thus, lawmaking
by the federal courts on such matters must also be beyond the constitutional authority of the federal government. 3
Underlying Erie is the policy that, in any given controversy, the selection
of a federal court as a forum rather than a state court "a block away'" 4 should
not lead to a substantially different result. Consequently, the doctrine demands
that in a diversity action in a federal court, the law of the forum state must
govern the federal court in ruling on the merits."5
The Erie Doctrine, as modified by Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 6 also
described the proper distribution of power between federal and state courts.
When a federal court has jurisdiction over a case involving a state right solely
because of the diversity of the parties, the court acts only as another court of the
state. The federal court cannot award recovery if recovery would be unavailable
under state law, nor can the court substantially alter the enforcement of the right
as defined by the state. Once a federal court undertakes to apply state law to any
or all issues in a particular case, the court is presented with the task of ascertaining exactly what the state law is. The mandate of Erie is unmistakable; the
federal court is bound to ascertain and apply state law, whether it be decisional
or statutory.
When the state's highest court has not acted, the federal court's duty is to
predict what the highest state court would rule if confronted with the issue and
not to formulate state law." Accordingly, the federal court will employ all available legal resources in an effort to ascertain accurately the law of the forum
state. Legislative expressions or intent may be considered, as well as well-reasoned
lower state court decisions. Virtually any reliable data tending to show what
the state law is may be considered within the scope of federal court inquiry.
Pursuant to anticipating an analysis which would be outlined by a state court,
relevant decisions in other jurisdictions, the principles of common law, other
federal court decisions, the American Law Institute's Restatements of the Law,
opinions of attorneys-general as well as scholarly treatments of the law including
law reviews and hornbooks may also be granted some weight in the court's
12 304 U.S. at 78.
13 Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of Decision Act and the Erie
Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678, 685 (1976).
14 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
15 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The law of the forum
state as controlling the case includes state choice of law rules. Hence, the federal court should
apply the law which the state court would apply.
16 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
17 See text accompanying notes 27-39 infra.
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analysis."8 In ruling in a diversity action, the federal court is bound to look at
the full range of legal sources which a state court would examine in reaching a
decision. The thrust of the Erie Doctrine is that the federal court is not at liberty
to choose the rule it would adopt for itself were it free to do so, but rather must
choose the rule it believes the state's highest court would adopt under these
circumstances.
IV. Leannais v. Cincinnati,Inc.: The Erie Doctrine in the Seventh Circuit
Leannais is a diversity case squarely within the parameters of an Erie inquiry. The Seventh Circuit had to apply Wisconsin state law to an issue not yet
addressed by any court in the forum state. Ignoring jurisprudence on both the
process of the Erie Doctrine and the substantive issue, the court declined to
address the products liability issue, characterizing it as an area of broad public
policy consideration. As a public policy consideration, the products liability issue
was deemed to be controlled by Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc. and thus required deference to the state legislature. The Holifield case, however, which was
so fundamental to the integrity of the court's opinion here, is readily distinguishable and does not support the holding of the Seventh Circuit.
The precise issue before the Holifield court was the time at which the Wisconsin statute of limitations began to run in a products liability case. The duration
of liability, a question of legislative choice, is totally distinguishable from the
issue in Leannais of the very existence and scope of corporate liability, a question
usually resolved by a court. Statutes of limitation are, by definition, statutory.
The statutes reflect particular legislative judgments, often arbitrary, concerning
the temporal limitations to distinct classes of causes of action. Ordinarily, these
laws are regarded as statutes of repose which do not involve matters of substantive rights but are available only as defenses. Courts have held that these
statutes are for the benefit and repose of individuals and not to secure general
objects of policy and morals. 9 Unlike statutes of limitation, the product line
theory does raise a substantive issue: does liability exist at all? The competing
factors, including policy considerations, which would affect the determination
of liability, at least in the first instance, might be better handled by the courts,
which have traditionally been immune from the pressures of various interest
groups and lobbies. A disinterested judiciary would be better able to weigh the
questions of justice and fairness which necessarily attend this analysis. Furthermore, the courts have traditionally controlled the expansion of the products
liability field.'" The citation of Holifield by the court was both inaccurate and
unfortunate. By misconstruing the decision in Holifield, the Seventh Circuit
relied on an irrelevant case thus forfeiting an opportunity to contribute significantly to the growing body of products liability law. The Seventh Circuit's pre18

1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.307, at 3077 (1978).
19 United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co., 147 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1945); Atlas Fin.
Corp. v. Kenny, 68 Cal. App.2d 504, 157 P.2d 401 '(1945).
20 As a matter of historical fact, the courts have traditionally determined the character
and bounds of products liability law. See generally Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050 (1916); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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mature termination of its analysis precluded an examination of an important
amount of Wisconsin state law which may have affected the courts holding on
the issue of product line liability.
In 1967, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first applied the rule of strict liability
in tort to the manufacturers and sellers of defective goods in Dippel v. Sciano.21
Although the facts of Dippel make the case distinguishable from Leannais, the
focus and direction of the former opinion are directly relevant to the question
presented in the latter. Consequently, the Erie Doctrine would compel an analysis
of the factors which gave rise to the holding in that case; the discussion of
expanded consumer protection in Dippel, when read in light of contemporary
experience, could have contributed to a fruitful analysis in Leannais. The significance of the court's departure from an accepted manner of proceeding in a diversity action becomes more pronounced when compared to its treatment of such
cases in the past as well as the treatment accorded such cases by other circuit
courts.
Two weeks prior to its decision in Leannais, the court rendered a decision
in an analogous case, Huff v. White Motor Corp.2 The two cases were similar
in that they were both diversity actions involving questions of products liability
law. In neither situation had the respective state supreme court rendered a
controlling decision. Additionally, in both cases, the lower federal court failed
to engage in an Erie analysis.
The Huff case presented the Seventh Circuit with the issue whether, under
Indiana law, a manufacturer had a duty to design a vehicle so as to eliminate
or diminish the risk of injury which would be sustained in a collision. Although
the Seventh Circuit itself had formulated a rule in an earlier Indiana case that
would deny liability here, the rule had become a distinct minority position among
the other American jurisdictions.22 The question presented in Huff was not
novel; numerous rulings of Indiana state courts had expressed increasing support
of the basic policy considerations justifying the imposition of the broader majority
rule. 4 In outlining its approach to a decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that,
"[tihe federal court must decide what rule the Indiana Supreme Court would
adopt in such a case and apply it. In doing so, that court should consider all the
data which the highest court of the state would consider." 2 Having determined
that the Supreme Court of Indiana would apply the majority rule, the court
was compelled to abandon its own minority position and overturn the earlier
rule which it had formulated. The Seventh Circuit thus undertook a complete
21 3 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
22 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
23 Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836
(1966).
24 The presence in the Huff situation of a number of lower Indiana state court cases
somewhat distinguishes it from Leannais but does not justify the disparity in the depth of
treatment between the cases. The effect of these cases might have been to circumscribe the
research and analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Huff. The actual reasoning, nevertheless, was
still precise and exhaustive. Leannais, on the other hand, was decided without the benefit of
state court guidance. The Seventh Circuit's analysis, however, fell far short of the effort made
in Huff. It would seem reasonable that the Seventh Circuit sitting as a state supreme court
would expend more effort in analysis where the lower courts had not done any work.
25 565 F.2d at 106.
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examination of the relevant law and arrived at its conclusion only after exhaustive
research.
Fourteen days later, however, the Seventh Circuit, in Leannais, asserted
that no authority existed to guide its reasoning and terminated its analysis after
a cursory reading of a single case of questionable relevance. The issue in Leannais was novel; the product line theory was a recent innovation of the California
courts."6 Furthermore, jurisprudence on product line theory was scarce. The
Leannais situation thus allowed the court infinitely more latitude in terms of its
analytical scope than did the Huff case. Yet the court's analysis in Leannais
was more confined and rigid than in Huff. Since the two cases were similar
procedurally in that they both required extensive Erie analysis, the variant treatment accorded the cases by the Seventh Circuit is disconcerting. The Huff decision is emblematic of honest judicial inquiry and is illustrative of traditional
Erie procedure. The opinion explored all relevant and proper avenues of jurisprudence and resolved the issue in a manner calculated to mirror that of the
forum state's supreme court. The opinion in Leannais, however, is an exercise
in conclusionary decision writing. The opinion is a superficial analysis of only a
fractional portion of the law which the state court would actually have scrutinized.
Factual differences in the two cases adequately explain different substantive
outcomes but cannot account for the unjustified analytical differences in the
cases. Two federal diversity proceedings involving analogous issues before the
same federal court should have received similar analytical treatment. The nature
of the products liability issue did not relieve the Seventh Circuit of the obligation
to engage in a thorough Erie analysis. The overriding principle of the Erie Doctrine is that it applies irrespective of the issue involved. The universality of the
principle is illustrated by the following cases in which Erie was applied in a
variety of legal contexts in other circuit courts of the United States.
V. The Erie Doctrine Among the Circuits
The pattern of application of the Erie Doctrine in the circuit courts of the
United States is remarkably uniform. The doctrine is well established and admits
of only minor deviation. Moreover, the uniform pattern appears unaffected by
the nature of the issue presented by each individual case. Whether the issue is
novel or familiar, controversial or commonplace, or traditionally within the
ambit of either the legislature or judiciary, the courts' application of fundamental Erie Doctrine principles remains unaffected. The consistency which
characterizes the treatment of diversity cases under Erie is highlighted in this
section with particular attention given to the nature of the issue presented to the
court and the specific factors which tended to be the most decisive in the court's
estimation. Here, at the juncture of federalism, jurisprudence and public policy,

26

Ray v. Alad Corp., 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3 (Ct. App. 1977).
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courts in cases involving parties of diverse citiwill the workings of the federal
27
clear.
most
become
zenship
The First Circuit's per curiam opinion in Mustapha v. Liberty Mutual In8
involved a question of interpretation of the Rhode Island
surance Company"
Workman's Compensation Act.29 Mustapha was a case of first impression and
the problem of statutory interpretation under this statutory cause of action was
traditionally a judicial task. Originally, the suit had been brought as common
law negligence; however, the court's research had revealed no Rhode Island
rulings which provided reasonable guidance. Invoking the Erie Doctrine, the
First Circuit distinguished a lower state court case, cited by counsel as relevant,
which the court believed would be inappropriate as part of the analysis of the
state's highest court. Hence, even in this area of the law which exists solely by
legislative fiat, the court pursued an Erie analysis beyond state statutory law and
gave meaning to the state enactment by critical examination of state cases.
Corporation law, also exclusively the creation of state legislation, was the
basis of the action in Schein v. Chasen.3" Schein involved a question of joint and
several liability under state corporation law for profits realized from trading in
stock with confidential information. As in Mustapha, Schein was introduced
under a common law theory (fraud), there was no clearly enunciated state rule
upon which the circuit court could rely, and the issue again was one of statutory
interpretation. The Second Circuit pursued its Erie analysis, finding guidance
in the law of other jurisdictions and the Restatements of the American Law Institute. Mustapha and Schein thus employed common law principles to deal
with modern statutory causes of action in the absence of authoritative state court
decisions. The mere fact that the legislature had given birth to those legal rights
did not affect the treatment of those rights under the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins.
The Uniform Commercial Code, unquestionably a product of legislative
impetus, has both created new causes of action and codified old ones. When the
Third Circuit was required to interpret a specific provision of the Pennsylvania
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)2 for the first time, 2 no decisions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court or lower Pennsylvania courts were found to be
applicable to the issue. In addition, the court found a dearth of relevant cases
on the issue in other circuits. The Third Circuit discerned the projected holding
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by considering the legislative intent behind
the Code, the comments of the drafters, and, not surprisingly, the public policy
of business and banking stability. The court's function here was essentially an
interpretive one; it construed the statute as courts traditionally have done in
27 The first three cases were selected to demonstrate that, even in areas of law specifically
developed by the legislature, federal courts in diversity actions will, nevertheless, try to ascertain what reading the state supreme court would give to the law in question. Theoretically,
the court in Leannais did this but with only one citation of case law and no reasoning. These
cases will highlight the avenues of inquiry missing in the Leannais decision.
28 387 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1967).
29 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-35-58 (1956).
30 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).
31 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §3-405 (1) (c) (Purdon).
32 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. First Pennsylvania B. & T. Co., 451 F.2d 892 (3rd Cir.
1971).
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typical Erie Doctrine applications. It is clear that if a federal court is to be true
to the mandate of Erie, i.e., to sit as an appellate court of the forum state, it is
compelled to examine the panoply of factors which a state court would actually
consider.
A more traditional cause of action was presented to the Fourth Circuit in
Sherby v. Weather Brothers Transfer Company,3 a diversity action based on
negligence. This legal theory differs from those present in the prior cases in
that negligence is more susceptible of judicial development and expansion than
are the statutory causes of action. Again, however, the federal court was without
relevant state court guidance. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's treatment of
the negligence issue was consistent with the treatment of the statutory issues
above:
In the absence of a state statute or a controlling decision on point, a federal
court will attempt to determine what the highest state court would hold if
confronted with the same issue. Considered dicta in opinions of the highest
state courts should not be ignored and dictum which is a clear exposition of
the law
must be followed unless in conflict with other decisions of that
34
court.
The breadth of federal court discretion under Erie in dealing with a common law cause of action (libel) is evident in a recent Fifth Circuit case, Hood v.
Dun and Bradstreet, Inc." Libel, an area which, at times, embraces controversial
arguments, would appear to be especially well suited to judicial deference to
legislative judgement. The Fifth Circuit noted that:
Federal courts are not immutably bound under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins to
follow state court decisions where it appears that a state court considering
the identical issue would not rely on such precedent. The federal court, like
the state court, can consider all information and data that the highest court
of the state would consider in determining whether strictly to adhere to a
prior ruling 3 6
The court here held that it could anticipate a change in state libel law. The
court did not limit its analysis to existing libel cases but went further and reviewed
and analyzed questions .of public policy. Hood is more significant than the previously cited cases because relevant state precedent did exist which the federal
court refused to accept passively. Fulfilling its obligation defined by the Erie
Doctrine, the Fifth Circuit aggressively reevaluated the legal reasoning as the
state court would and adopted the rule the highest court would enunciate.
The Seventh Circuit had recently addressed the issue of contributory negligence in the products liability setting in Collins v. Ridge Tool Company."7 Like
Leannais, Collins was a diversity action requiring the application of Wisconsin
law. Prior to Collins, the Seventh Circuit had favored the "open and obvious"
33
34
35
36
37

421 F.2d 1243 (4th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1244.
486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 31.
520 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1975).
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rule,"8 a theory based on New York and Indiana law. The court here, however,
reiterated that the main objective of its ruling in a diversity action would be to
resolve the issues as would the Wisconsin Supreme Court under the same circumstances. The decision is virtually indistinguishable procedurally from any
of the cases in the foregoing analysis. The Seventh Circuit did not suggest that
the issue of products liability was in any way distinguishable from other substantive legal questions for purposes of analysis. The opinion did not contain an
indication that the question was beyond judicial competence or called for legislative answers. The Seventh Circuit, in this case at least, discerned no compelling
interest in deferring the task to an alternate branch of government. The issue
was squarely and properly before the court and was resolved by the court.
A consideration of recent Erie Doctrine applications mandates the conclusion that the issue before the federal court, be it liberal or conservative, judicial
or legislative, traditional or innovative, should not affect the nature or the depth
of the treatment rendered by the federal court sitting in a diversity action. Unless
radical factual situations or policy considerations demand a different approach,
the federal court should pursue the Erie analysis to its complete and accurate
legal conclusion. 9
VI. Leannais v. Cincinnati,Inc.: A Postscript
The major issue unaddressed by the Seventh Circuit in Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., the product line theory, may itself provide the explanation for the
departure from such a well-established postulate of federal civil procedure. Does
extension of products liability theory to a product line approach require a deferential judicial treatment or occasion judicial restraint? Products liability law
has developed so rapidly that its ultimate effects and implications are not yet
fully clear. The Leannais case presented the Seventh Circuit with a volatile but
vital issue and an opportunity to clarify and define fundamental unanswered
questions of state law. Clearly, the product line theory is a new and controversial
response to expanded notions of corporate responsibility. Nevertheless, the case
provided an excellent vehicle for the court by their reading of Wisconsin law
either to reaffirm old principles or erect bold new standards in products liability.
The opinion in Leannais confesses a certain amount of result-orientation.
Fearful of controversy, the Seventh Circuit was reluctant to discuss an area of
law which had direct and significant impact on legal relationships within its
jurisdiction. The thrust of the preceding analysis, however, is that the Erie
Doctrine compels a full and fair analysis of state law irrespective of the issue
involved. The complexity of products liability law does not, of itself, counsel
judicial restraint. Indeed, the courts are best suited to treat the intricate legal
38 The open and obvious rule means that a manufacturer of a product is under no duty
to guard against or give notice of dangers which are obvious or patent to the user. The rule
was originally articulated in Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
39 Meredith v. City of Winterhaven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). "In the absence of some
recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of jurisdiction conferred,
which would in exceptional cases warrant its nonexercise, it has from the first been deemed
to be the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment." Id. at 234.
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in this area in a principled and dispassionate way. Furtherproducts liability law is largely a product of judicial developthe abnegation by the Seventh Circuit of its judicial duties
of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins was unjustified.
VII. Conclusion

The decision of the Seventh Circuit in Leannais was unfortunate for a number of reasons. Notwithstanding the importance of the doctrinal questions presented for the court, care should have been taken not to lose sight of the duty to
provide redress to the parties to the controversy. The court's refusal to engage
in a full consideration and analysis of relevant sources of the law worked an
injustice to the parties involved. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit denied its historic common law duty to foster the growth of the law. The case manifested
a need for a well-reasoned appraisal of relevant facts, current needs, and expanded concepts of consumer protection; the Seventh Circuit refused to provide
an answer. The Seventh Circuit failed to make an honest analysis of the product
line liability theory; the refusal by the court to rule on an issue properly before
it affected not only the parties to the litigation, but also other purchasers, consumers and users of goods.
Certainly, the federal courts today operate under the burden of an awesome case load. This burden, however, does not excuse the courts from pursuing
a full and fair analysis in each case they accept.
Russell Thomas Alba

Criminal Procedure-Rule 6 Disclosure of Grand Jury
Transcripts-A Witness' Request for a Copy of His
Testimony--Particularized Need Not Shown; Rule 43Private Judge-Jury Communications-Fifth- and SixthAmendment Rights Implicated-Harmless Error Found.
United States v. Clavey*
I. Introduction
The need for vigorously protecting the proper exercise of both grand jury
and trial jury functions has long been recognized by the judiciary.' In United
States v. Clavey 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was
confronted with issues relating to the proper conduct of both juries. Clavey
involved an attempt to invade the secrecy of the grand jury as well as an attempt
to excuse an inappropriate interference with trial jury deliberations.
Traditionally, grand jury proceedings have been cloaked with a veil of
secrecy.' The veil has generally been lifted only in narrowly circumscribed situations. A growing recognition exists, however, that disclosure of the contents of
grand jury proceedings, rather than suppression, ordinarily serves the administration of criminal justice.4 The general relaxation of barriers protecting the secrecy
of the grand jury has been gradual, however, and many courts still rigidly adhere
to an inflexible policy of nondisclosure.
The conflict between more liberalized disclosure and traditional adherence
to the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings materialized in Clavey. The precise
issue addressed by the Clavey court involved fixing guidelines to be met by a
witness seeking disclosure of his own grand jury testimony. The court denied
release of such testimony because Clavey failed to establish a particularized need
which would compel disclosure. To the extent this approach departs from general trends in favor of limited disclosure, the Clavey result merits further analysis.
In Clavey, the Seventh Circuit was also required to address the consequences
of private communications between the judge and the deliberating jury. To
ensure that the jury trial process is not inappropriately disrupted, courts have
carefully scrutinized interferences with jury deliberations.' Accordingly, a longstanding rule exists that any communication between the judge and the deliberating jury must be made in the presence of the defendant. To preserve the
adversarial context of the trial, defense counsel must have an opportunity to
* 565 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated, 578 F.2d 1219 (1978) (on the grand jury issue),
afl'g by an equally divided court, In re Clavey, No. 71 GJ 3567 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 1974).
1 For a historical discussion of the grand jury see, Comment, Grand jury Secrecy: Should
Witnesses Have Access to Their Grand Jury Testimony as a Matter of Right?, 20 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 804 (1973). See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975); Shields v. United States,
273 U.S. 583 (1927); and Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919),
as recognizing the importance of protecting the inviolability of the trial jury deliberations.
2 565 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1977).
3 Comment, Grand fury Secrecy, supra note 1, at 804.
4 United States v. Dennis, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966).
5 See, e.g., cases cited in note 1 supra.
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advance suggestions regarding the appropriate content of the communication.
If this rule is violated, courts will readily find error.6
In Clav'ey, the appellant assigned as error the trial judge's failure to respond
tQ the jury's request for supplementary instructions as well as the judge's failure to
advise counsel of the jury's inquiries. The error in the trial judge's conduct was
freely admitted.
Such an error does not, however, ordinarily require reversal. The error is
excusable if the court finds it harmless. In Clavey, the Seventh Circuit found that
the wrongful conduct was harmless but failed to enunciate clearly the precise
formulation of the "harmless error" test employed in reaching its decision. This
failure merits further analysis since a careful application of the generally accepted
formulation of this test would seem to have required reversal.
II. Statement of the Facts
Sheriff Orville Clavey twice appeared before the Special March, 1974,
Grand Jury in the Northern District of Illinois. On both occasions he testified
without the assistance of counsel. Approximately five weeks after his second appearance, Clavey retained counsel. The day after retention, his counsel requested that the government produce a transcript of Clavey's grand jury testimony. The request was made in order to enable counsel to advise Clavey whether
or not to recant aspects of his testimony pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (d) ,' which
allows a witness to avoid a perjury prosecution by admitting the falsity of certain
declarations.
Clavey's request was denied and, on two subsequent occasions, he petitioned
the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois to compel production of a copy of his testimony. Clavey alleged that he
was unable to tell counsel the substance of his testimony before the grand jury
due to the debilitating effect on his memory of several physical impairments.'
The court denied both petitions because Clavey had failed to demonstrate with
particularity a "compelling necessity" for disclosure.'
Clavey was indicted four months later under an eight-count indictment including four counts of false swearing before the grand jury.'" Clavey moved to,
suppress the indictment on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel in asserting his right to recant under § 1623 (d). This motion was denied.
Clavey went to trial on May 20, 1976. While the jury was deliberating, the
foreman sent a note to the court at 5 p.m. on the evening before the verdict was
3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 724 (1969).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1623(d) (1978) provides:
Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false,
such admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission
is made, the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not
become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.
8 Clavey claimed that an illness and a skull fracture adversely affected his memory.
9 The district court judge who denied Clavey's petition for a transcript did not preside
at his trial.
10 The eight-count indictment specified four counts of false swearing before the grand
jury, three counts of failure to report income on his tax returns, and one count of conspiracy
to extort funds from a liquor license holder.
6
7
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reached. The note requested a copy of the court's instructions. Without notifying
Clavey or his counsel, the court refused the request.11 Later, apparently during
that same evening, the jury sent another note to the court requesting that the
judge clarify some aspects of the indictment. The judge, again without notifying
counsel and in the absence of the defendant, refused to answer the question and
simply instructed the jury to "continue to deliberate." 12
The next morning the jury sent another note to the court which said in part:
"'The counts in the indictment are related to one another, some more than
others. For example, count two is related to count five. In this respect, if we find
the defendant guilty on count two and on count three, must we also find him
guilty on count one?' ""
The court, again without notice to Clavey or his
counsel, replied that the jury should "continue to deliberate." Ten minutes later
the jury reached a verdict. The jury acquitted Clavey on three of the false swearing counts (1, 2 and 4) and the extortion charge (count 8). Clavey was convicted of one count of false swearing (count 3) and three counts of tax evasion
(5, 6 and 7).
On November 10, 1977, Clavey filed a petition for rehearing en banc. The
petition was granted, but only with respect to the grand jury issue and, accordingly, the decision of the original panel on this issue was vacated. The Seventh
Circuit, after a rehearing en banc, affirmed the order of the district court denying
disclosure. 4
III. Disclosure of Grand Jury Transcripts
A. Policies Supporting Secrecy and the Development of the
Standard far Disclosure
As the Seventh Circuit's decision in Clavey evidences, many courts rigidly
protect the historical secrecy of grand jury proceedings. The "secrecy of granid
jury proceedings" is considered "indispensable."' 5 The reasons which lie behind
this secrecy have been traditionally summarized as follows:

11
12

565 F.2d at 118.
The judge advised counsel:
The answer to that [inquiry] was No, because I will not become the thirteenth juror
in this case, and I shall not invade the province of the jury, which I did not do. The
answer to the question to the jury, carried to them by the deputy United States
Marshall, was to "continue to deliberate."
565 F.2d at 118.
13 Id.
14 Although the opinion of the original panel on the issue is no longer authority in the
Seventh Circuit, the original opinion still merits careful scrutiny. It is difficult to discern
exactly what the Seventh Circuit's position is on the standard to be applied to a witness'
request for a copy of his own grand -jury testimony. The majority indicated a departure from
Sarbaugh, at least in attitude, and yet the dissent would utilize a completely different approach. Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 889 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra. An analysis of Sarbaugh and Clayey in light of the
pertinent case authority and the relevant policy considerations may serve to clarify matters.
See text accompanying notes 130-40 infra. Hereinafter the opinion of the majority of the
original panel will be referred to as the majority.
15 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943).
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(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated;
(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and
to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who
may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those
indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosure by persons who may have
information with respect to the commission of crimes;
(5) to prevent the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of
the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the exposure of
standing trial where there was no probability of guilt. 16
The protection of the secrecy of the grand jury and of the policy reasons
justifying secrecy is presently governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e)." Rule 6(e) becomes operative when a person, who does not have access
to the grand jury transcript as a matter of right, requests a transcript. Rule 6 (e)
was applied in Clauey, and so a close analysis of the Rule and those decisions
which have outlined the standards for disclosure under that Rule is necessary.
Rule 6(e) provides in part that "[d]isclosure otherwise prohibited by this
rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may be made-(i) when so
directed by a court preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding."1 "
Thus, the decision regarding the propriety of disclosure rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court.1 9 The Rule itself does not define a precise standard.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has enunciated guidelines for the
exercise of this discretion. The Supreme Court has determined that disclosure
should not be made unless the party seeking disclosure has shown a "particularized need" for the transcripts."0
1. Supreme Court Decisions
The "particularized need" standard was first articulated in United States v.
Procter& Gamble2 in the context of a discovery request for the production of a
16
17

18
19
20
21

United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254 (D.C. Md. 1931).
FEn. R. CRTm. P. 6(e) provides, in relevant part:
(e) Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure.
(1) General rule. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator
of a recording device, a typist, who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney
for the Government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph
(2) (A) (ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the
grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A
knowing violation of rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(2) Exceptions.
(G) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring
before the grand jury may also be made(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant,
upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury.
FEn. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (emphasis added). See note 17 supra.
United States v. Parker, 469 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1972).
United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
Id.
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grand jury transcript under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34.22 Following a
grand jury investigation of possible criminal antitrust violations in which no
indictment was returned, the government brought a civil suit to enjoin the alleged
violations. 2 The government made use of the grand jury transcripts from the
previous investigation to prepare for trial. The defendants moved for wholesale
discovery and production of the transcript under Rule 34. This motion was
granted by the district court but was subsequently reversed by the Supreme
Court." The Court held that "it is only where the criminal procedure is subverted that 'good cause' for wholesale discovery and production of a grand jury
transcript would be warranted." 2
The Supreme Court recognized that strong public policies weighed against
disclosure of grand jury testimony and recited the five traditional justifications
for secrecy. The Court emphasized that the secrecy of the grand jury was
particularly important in furthering the policy of encouraging all witnesses to
step forward and testify freely without fear of retaliation. 6 Thus, the Court concluded that the " 'indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings' must not be
broken except where there is a compelling necessity. There are instances when
that need will outweigh the countervailing policy. But they must be shown with
particularity." 7 Notwithstanding a showing of "particularized need," 2 the
secrecy of the proceedings is to be lifted only "discretely and limitedly."2 9 Accordingly, the court found the defendants' request for wholesale disclosure particularly inappropriate.
In PittsburghPlate Glass Co. v. United States," the Supreme Court affirmed
that the "particularized need" standard was to guide the exercise of judicial
discretion under Rule 6(e). A key government witness admitted on cross-examination that he had testified regarding the same general subject before the
grand jury which had indicted the defendant." Counsel for the defendant
moved for production of the grand jury minutes of the witness' testimony regard22

FED. R. Civ. P. 34, at the time of Procter & Gamble, provided in part:
Upon motion of any part showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all the
parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the court in which an action is
pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying
or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party of any designated documents,
• . . not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the
matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are
in his possession, custody or control....
In 1970 the rule was amended to eliminate the "good cause" requirement.
23 356 U.S. at 678.
24 In order to expedite review of this ruling, the order requiring production, on the
motion of the government, included a provision whereby the complaint would be dismissed if
the government failed to comply. The government persisted in its refusal to produce the
transcripts and the complaint was dismissed. The government appealed to the Supreme Court.
25 356 U.S. at 684.
26 Id. at 682.
27 Id. at 682 (footnote omitted).
28 Id. at 683. The Court said that when the transcript was to be used at trial to impeach
a witness, to refresh his recollection, or to test his credibility, particularized need would be
shown. The defendants, in this instance, contemplated the use of the transcript only as an aid
in their general preparation for trial.
29 Id.
30 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
31 Although the witness' testimony was important, the Supreme Court noted that the
proof was overwhelming aside from his testimony. Id. at 398.

[Vol. 54:438]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

ing the subjects testified to during direct examination. The trial judge denied
the motion.

The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that there existed an
absolute right to production. The court said that the decision to disclose was committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Since the defendant had not

attempted to show "particularized need," and had not even attempted to invoke
the discretion of the trial judge, the denial of the motion did not constitute an
abuse of discretion. 2

The "particularized need" standard attained some measure of practical
significance in Dennis v. United States.3 The Court, for the first time, was forced
to deal with the implications of the "particularized need" standard developed in
Procter & Gamble and Pittsburgh Plate Glass in the context of a limited request
for disclosure.
Dennis clearly suggests that the "particularized need" standard is to be
infused with the "realization that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant
'
materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of criminal justice."34
This statement suggests that the "particularized need" standard is to be given
a pragmatic construction in that the requisite level of "particularized need" is to
be balanced against the strength of the reasons for maintaining secrecy.
The criminal defendants in Dennis made a substantial showing of "particularized need." 3 Various factors contributed to this finding of "particularized
need": some of the grand jury testimony was as much as fifteen years old at the
time of the trial, the testimony sought was that of key prosecution witnesses, the
testimony concerned conversations and was largely uncorroborated, the witnesses
had reason for hostility toward the defendants, and one witness had earlier admitted to being mistaken as to important dates.3 ' These factors were all relevant
to the impeachment of the witnesses. Such a showing of "particularized need"
must be balanced against the need for maintaining secrecy. Since the government conceded that the importance of preserving the secrecy of the grand jury
minutes was minimal, the balance was clearly tipped in favor of disclosure.
The implication of Dennis is that the exercise of discretion should involve a
realistic assessment of the competing policy considerations. The application of
the balancing test is to be undertaken with the realization that disclosure of
relevant materials promotes the proper administration of justice.
2. Seventh Circuit
In Illinois v. Sarbaughy the Seventh Circuit recently dealt with the
standard for disclosure of grand jury transcripts. In Sarbaugh, the state of
Illinois brought a civil antitrust action against a number of corporations. Some
32 The result may have been different had the defendant appealed to the discretion of the
trial judge since the Court in Procter & Ganible had mentioned that the use of a grand jury
transcript to impeach a trial witness would constitute "particularized need." 356 U.S. at 683.
33 384 U.S. 855 "(1966).
34 Id. at 870.
35 Id. at 872.
36 Id. at 872-73.
37 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 884 (1977).
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of the defendant corporations had obtained transcripts of their employees' grand
jury testimony during a criminal antitrust proceeding which had since been
terminated. The state attempted to obtain those transcripts from John Sarbaugh,
Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department's Midwest Office. This
office had been involved in the earlier criminal proceeding.
The district court found that the required showing of "particularized need"
was not made. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and emphasized that the
application of the "particularized need" standard involved a pragmatic balancing approach between competing interests. A party seeking disclosure must
establish a need for such disclosure commensurate with the need for secrecy remaining. "The level of need has been said to diminish as the reason for preserving secrecy becomes less compelling.""8
The Seventh Circuit found that a "particularized need" had been shown due
to (1) the litigant's interest in securing accurate and truthful testimony from
witnesses, for impeachment purposes or to refresh the recollection of witnesses,
(2) the unfairness in permitting one side to have exclusive access to a storehouse
of relevant facts, and (3) the lapse of time.39 The Seventh Circuit adhered to
the Supreme Court's language in Procter & Gamble which required that even
with a showing of "particularized need," the secrecy of the proceedings is to be
lifted "discretely and limitedly." 4 Thus, the Seventh Circuit granted disclosure,
but imposed some rather severe restrictions on the use of the transcript."
The Seventh Circuit's approach in Sarbaugh was clearly pragmatic. The
court made a thorough assessment of the reasons for protecting secrecy. The
court made clear that secrecy would be maintained only when the reasons for
preserving secrecy prevailed over those mandating disclosure. The court also
evinced a willingness to disclose the requested grand jury transcripts when restrictions could obviate any possible threats to policy reasons underlying the
secrecy of the grand jury.
Sarbaugh and the previously discussed Supreme Court cases dealt with the
situation in which a party sought the transcript of a witness' grand jury testimony.
In this context, the protection of the grand jury witness himself is the prime
reason for maintaining secrecy." In Clavey, however, the Seventh Circuit dealt
with a grand jury witness' request for a copy of his own testimony. Since the
historical justifications for secrecy bear differently on this factual circumstance, it
is necessary to scrutinize closely the need to maintain secrecy. Then, to determine
whether secrecy prevails over disclosure, the justification for keeping information
secret must be balanced against the "particularized need" of the witness in securing a copy of his own testimony.

38 Id. at 774.
39 Id. at 775-76.
40 356 U.S. at 683.
41 The Court required that the attorney file a log with the court showing to whom
when each transcript was shown, that no copies were to be made, and that the transcript
to be returned when it was no longer needed. The attorney was limited in his use of
transcript to the litigation in process and only for the purposes of impeachment, refreshing
witness' recollection and testing credibility. 552 F.2d at 777.
42 356 U.S. at 682.
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B. A Grand Jury Witness' Request for a Copy of His Own Testimony

Little attention has been paid to the problems surrounding a witness' attempt
to secure a copy of his own grand jury testimony.43 The case authority is limited
and the Supreme Court has not had occasion to analyze a witness' request for
such disclosure.
Since no specific statutory provision deals with this situation, presumably the
general disclosure principle of Rule 6(e) 4" applies. Rule 6(e) imposes no bond
of secrecy on a grand jury witness. The witness is free to disclose all that transpired while he was present.4 5
The existence of this freedom raises serious doubts whether there should be
restrictions on a witness' access to a transcript of his testimony. Arguably, the
values protected by the policy reasons in favor of secrecy4" are no more threatened
by the release to a witness of a copy of his testimony than by permitting a witness to publish the contents of his testimony as sanctioned by Rule 6 (e).
Indeed, in In re Russo47 the United States District Court for the Central
District of California commented that it could "conceive of no reason why furnishing a witness a written transcript of his testimony should interfere with the
valid functions of the grand jury any more than does the existing practice. The
provision of a transcript does not weigh differently on the justifications for secrecy
than the present rule." 48 This statement suggests that, at a minimum, the requirement of "particularized need" and a strong presumption in favor of secrecy
should not be extended blindly to a grand jury witness' request for a copy of his
own testimony.
Courts that have considered the issue of disclosure pursuant to a grand jury
witness' request for a transcript of his testimony have split regarding the approach to be taken. Some courts have adopted the "particularized need"
standard. Other courts have found that the disclosure should be made in the
absence of a compelling government interest for maintaining secrecy. Under
either approach, however, the courts will, in the typical situation, be faced with
a balancing test to determine which interest prevails.
1. The Use of the "Particularized Need" Standard
Several decisions have extended the "particularized need" standard, which
43 See, e.g., Comment, Grand Jury Secrecy, supra note 1, at 810.
44 See note 17 supra.
45 The Original Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 6(e) stated that a seal of secrecy was
an unnecessary hardship to impose on the witness. Secrecy might lead to injustice if a witness
was not permitted to make a disclosure to counsel or to an associate. The view that the witness
has the freedom to disclose is consonant with the view expressed by one eminent commentator
that:
The privilege, therefore, is not the grand juror's, for he is merely an indifferent
mouthpiece of the disclosure. Nor is it entirely the state's, for the state's interest is
merely the motive for constituting the privilege. The theory of the privilege is that the
witness is guaranteed against compulsory disclosure; the privilege must therefore Be
that of the witness and rests upon his consent.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2362, at 736 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
46 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
47 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Calif. 1971).
48 Id. at 576.
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was formulated in the context of a party's request for the disclosure of the grand
jury testimony of a witness, to a witness' request for a copy of his own grand
jury testimony. In Bast v. United States,49 the Fourth Circuit endorsed a
stringent application of the "particularized need" approach.
Bast, a grand jury witness who had brought a civil suit against the United
States, applied for a transcript of his testimony before the grand jury. The grand
jury had been dismissed without returning an indictment. The district court
entered an order denying the request on the ground that Bast had not shown the
requisite "particularized need." The Fourth Circuit stated that the standard for
review of a district judge's order respecting the release of proceedings before a
grand jury is that of abuse of discretion, and that in this instance abuse had not
been shown.5"
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that although Rule 6 (e) imposes no condition
of secrecy on the witness, it does not lift the general veil of secrecy which covers
the grand jury.' The court felt that the established practice of shielding grand
jury proceedings justified the requirement that "particularized need" be shown. 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in
In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas,s" also applied the "particularized need"
standard to the requests of four witnesses for a transcript of their grand jury
testimony." The Florida District Court stated that the decision to disclose such
testimony rests on a determination whether the policies for maintaining secrecy
will be undermined by disclosure. The court expressed its concern that a witness
with an absolute right to disclosure might exercise poor judgment in seeking a
transcript. Witnesses need to be protected, the court reasoned, since a witness
who had obtained a transcript might succumb to the intimidation of a person who
was the target of the investigation and be compelled to furnish a copy of his
testimony.
The court found it significant that the person under investigation in In re
Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas "was not brought to trial on an indictment in a
previous case because of the disappearance of the government's main witness."" 5
49 542 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1976).
50 Id. at 895.
51 Id. at 896.
52 The dissent argued that a witness should have a prima facie right to a copy of his
testimony. This right would be rebuttable by the government's satisfying a heavy burden of
establishing special grounds for nondelivery. 542 F.2d at 899 (dissenting opinion). The dissent
argued that the traditional reasons in favor of maintaining secrecy are not applicable to a witness
who is already free to disclose his own recollection of the proceeding. "The horse is out of the
stable, and all that we are considering is whether to lock the barn door so that the horse may
not carry its master's correct colors." Id. at 899 (dissenting opinion).
53 370 F.Supp. 1282 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
54 This case plays a significant role in Clavey since the district court judge who denied
Clavey's request for a transcript relied on the reasoning of In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas
to support his order. In re Clavey, No. 71 GJ 3567 (Dec. 23, 1974). This order of the district
court judge was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit after rehearing en banc. 578 F.2d at 1219.
55 578 F.2d at 1285. The same concern was expressed in In re Alvarez, 351 F.Supp. 1089
(S.D. Calif. 1972). The witness refused to testify unless he was promised that he would be furnished a transcript. The Court held that there was no requirement that the witness be furnished
a transcript in the absence of a compelling necessity. The primary reason for denying disclosure
was to protect the witness from retaliation. The witnesses in this case were minor members of
a narcotics operation and if they had a transcript they would be "subject to pressure and threats
of retaliation from the dealers for whom they work and against whom indictments [were]
sought." Id. at 1091. If the witnesses did not have a transcript they could, when threatened,
deny, without fear of contradiction, that they gave any useful testimony.
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The inference was that the witnesses seeking disclosure, therefore, had testified
against a person not at all averse to seeking retaliation against such witnesses.
Thus, the threat to these witnesses was substantial. The court also found it
significant that any potential subornation of perjury would be facilitated by the
assistance of a transcript since it would be easier for a potential defendant to piece
together a contrived defense in a complicated case if he had access to a transcript.5" Otherwise, much'of the effectiveness of the perjured statements would
depend on the witnesses' ability to accurately recall their testimony. The concern
that disclosure would pose a threat to an innocent target of the ongoing investigation was also expressed."
The court did not find a "particularized need" on account of the witnesses'
fear that an inadvertent misstatement might subject them to a possible perjury
prosecution."8 This threat was no different with regard to these witnesses than
it would be for any other witness testifying before the grand jury.59
2. The Liberal Approach to Access
Some courts have disdained the use of the "particularized need" test in
determining whether a witness is entitled to a transcript of his own grand jury
testimony. In re Russq,6 ° a decision of the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, is the leading case endorsing disclosure without
requiring a showing of "particularized need." The court found that "[a]n
examination of the justifications for the policy of grand jury secrecy demonstrates
that requiring secrecy of witnesses would serve no useful purpose."'" The court
saw no threatened loss of grand jury effectiveness by giving the witness a written
copy of what he was already free to disclose. The court noted that Procter &
Gamble, in which the Supreme Court formulated the "particularized need"
standard, placed particular reliance on the need to encourage witnesses to step
forward and testify freely without fear of retaliation. The court stated that to
provide a witness with a transcript of his own testimony would not be inconsistent with this policy.62
In addition, the Russo court determined that to provide a transcript would
further the interests of justice and benefit the grand jury and the witness. A
written transcript would insure that the witness' attorney was provided an accurate record of the proceedings. The existence of a written transcript would also
minimize the possibility of the witness publicizing false information regarding the
proceeding. A review of the written transcript would give the witness an opportunity to correct errors in the transcript or inadvertent mistakes in the testimony itself."3
56 370 F.Supp. at 1286.
57 Id.
58 The witnesses had been granted "use" immunity but had expressed concern that they
were still exposed to possible perjury charges. Id. at 1285.
59 Id. at 1286.
60 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Calif. 1971).
61 Id. at 571.
62 See In re Minkoff, 349 F.Supp. 154, 157 (D.R.I. 1972), which suggests that the
assurance that a witness would have a copy of his statement might function as a catalyst to his
testimony.
63 53 F.R.D. at 571.
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The court was not concerned about the witness' inability to protect himself.
It noted that providing a witness a transcript does not force him to divulge the
contents of his testimony. The witness would be free to keep the transcript confidential or to reveal it.64 The Russo court concluded that "furnishing a grand
jury witness a transcript of his testimony shortly after his appearance is not inconsistent with valid reasons for grand jury secrecy and will not diminish the
effectiveness of the grand jury system or interfere with governmental efforts to
investigate crime."6 Thus, according to Russo, the witness should only have to
show that his testimony was recorded and that a transcript could be made.66
In In re Craven, 7 the Northern District of California followed the Russo
approach." In addition, the court argued that a protective order would be available to ensure that no prejudice to the government or to third parties would be
done. If the court ordered that the transcript could be seen only by the witness
and his attorney during the life of the grand jury, the possibility that third
parties -would be able to "piece together" references to them in the transcript and
either change their testimony or flee the jurisdiction would be obviated."
C. The Rationale of Clavey
1. Majority
In Clavey, the Seventh Circuit was faced with the claim that a grand jury
witness was deprived the effective assistance of counsel during the grand jury
proceedings which led to his indictment.7" This deprivation allegedly resulted
from the district court judge's denial of Clavey's request for a copy of his grand
jury testimony. Clavey argued that the denial of access to his transcript deprived
him of his statutory defense of recantation.
In reviewing the propriety of this ruling, the court determined that it was
proper to apply the "particularized need" standard to a grand jury witness'
request for a transcript of his own testimony. The court agreed with the district
court judge's ruling that Clavey had not satisfied this requirement. The court, in
making this determination, found it significant that Clavey's petition for disclosure was not verified. The Seventh Circuit believed the district court judge
was "appropriately skeptical" of Clavey's claim that as a result of his physical
ailments he was unable to recall the substance or detail of his testimony.71 The
64 Id. at 572.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 572-73.
67 13 CRxt. L. REP. (BNA) 2100 (N.D. Calif. 1973).
68 The Craven court argued that the privilege of secrecy is the witness' and concluded
that when the witness voluntarily waived his right, disclosure should be made. This is consistent
with the view espoused by Wigmore. See note 45 supra.
69 Id. There is dictum in Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972),
which supports the Russo-Craven position. The grand jury witness had been subjected to
repetitious questioning. In order to protect the witness from substantial risks of perjury for
inconsistencies, the court stated that the witness should be able to get a copy of his testimony
unless there are demonstrated some particularized and substantial reasons why it should not be
allowed. The precedential value of Bursey is limited, however, since it was abusive tactics,
rather than an inherent right, which led to disclosure.
70 565 F.2d at 113.
71 565 F.2d at 114.
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court recited the traditional justifications for secrecy72 and found that they should
73
not be discounted because a witness asserted an unverified need for a transcript.
Because Clavey failed "to verify with particularity a compelling necessity for a
transcript of his prior testimony, [the Seventh Circuit did] not believe the
district court denied him the effective assistance of counsel by refusing to release
a transcript to him." 4
2. Dissent
The lone dissenting judge vehemently contested both the majority's use of
the "particularized need" standard and the majority's conclusion that Clavey
had not shown "particularized need." He argued that a witness should have a
prima fade right to his own testimony unless the government could show overriding reasons for nondisclosure. He correctly noted that the "particularized need"
standard was formulated to deal with a request for a copy of the grand jury testimony of another witness. "To avoid blindly extending the 'particularized need'
standard and preserving secrecy for secrecy's sake, [it is necessary to] carefully
consider whether that standard should be applied in this context." 75 He concurred with the approach in Russo in arguing that any danger to the function of
the grand jury arises from the witness' freedom to disclose and not in allowing
7
him to disclose an accurate account of the proceedings.
The dissent also addressed the argument that the witness needs to be protected from his own poor judgment. 77 The witness might succumb to the intimidation of the person who was the target of the investigation and be persuaded
to furnish a copy of his testimony. The dissent opined that a witness' need for
protection could best be evaluated by the one who knew his interests best, namely,
the witness himself.
The dissent concurred with Mr. Justice Brennan's rationale that "[g]rand
jury secrecy is, of course, not an end in itself. Grand jury secrecy is maintained to
serve particular ends. But when secrecy will not serve those ends... secrecy may
and should be lifted."78 The dissent believed that since none of the policies in
favor of grand jury secrecy are served when a witness seeks a copy of his own
testimony, the witness should have access to a transcript as a matter of right.
The dissenting judge also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Clavey
had not made a showing of "particularized need." He pointed to a number of
factors which he felt established a "particularized need." Clavey had alleged
that he could not recall the substance of his testimony because of an illness and
a skull fracture that allegedly had an adverse effect on his memory. Clavey
claimed that due to memory lapses he needed a transcript so that he could seek
legal advice as to whether to exercise his right to recant. 7' The majority had
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 114-15 n.2.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 120 (dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id. at 121 n.4.
360 U.S. at 403 (dissenting opinion).
See note 7 supra.
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argued that the lack of a verified petition and of a verification of Clavey's ailments (such as doctors' reports) militated against a finding in favor of disclosure. Yet, the dissent did not recognize these failures as having a debilitating
effect on Clavey's claim. There is no reason to believe that Clavey's attorney's
request for a transcript was based on an outright fabrication. The allegation,
albeit unverified, did constitute at least some showing of "particularized need.""0
The dissent also argued that the recent enactment of the recantation statute
strengthened Clavey's case of "particularized need." The purpose of the statuteto induce witnesses to give truthful testimony by permitting them to correct
false statements without incurring the risk of prosecution-would be served by
allowing disclosure. This policy strengthens the showing of need but it does not
particularize it since every witness testifying before the grand jury would be
similarly situated.
D. Critique
The majority and the dissent in Clavey disagreed on the proper method of
handling a grand jury witness' request for a copy of his own transcript. The
majority opted to allow disclosure to be dealt with in the discretion of the court.
The dissent argued that, in this context, there should be a prima facie right to
disclosure.
Due to the absence of any statutory provision affording a grand jury witness
disclosure as a matter of right, the general disclosure provision of Rule 6(e)
must be utilized.81 The Rule indicates that disclosure, otherwise prohibited,
may be made when so directed by the court. Thus, under existing law, the
majority's position adopting a discretionary standard finds support. On the other
hand, those cases adopting the more liberal approach, which advocates disclosure
when the reasons for maintaining secrecy do not apply, are clearly consonant with
the Supreme Court's approach in Dennis.
If the balancing test in Sarbaugh is to have any efficacy, there must be close
scrutiny of the competing considerations. Clearly, a frustration of the values to
be served by the test exists if the general assertion that secrecy is necessary to
protect the grand jury "is used as a talisman to ward off further inquiry whether
[the secrecy] serves a legitimate function."8 2
The majority in Clavey appears to have adopted just such an approach.
The majority indicated that it exercised a strong presumption in favor of maintaining secrecy. Yet, the Clavey court never specifically addressed the question
whether the historical justifications for secrecy are applicable in the context of a
grand jury witness' request for a copy of his own testimony. Both the Clavey
holding and the majority's failure to make a thorough analysis of the competing
considerations serve to frustrate any effectuation of the principle recognized in
Dennis that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant material ordinarily
promotes the administration of justice.
80
81
82

565 F.2d at 133 (dissenting opinion).
See note 17 supra.
565 F.2d at 122 (dissenting opinion).
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The inadequacies of the approach in the majority are apparent. A thorough
analysis of the policy justifications for maintaining the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings leads to the conclusion that such justifications are without force in
this particular fact situation.
The courts have recognized that since a grand jury witness is already free
to disclose his testimony, providing him with a transcript does not present any
greater danger to the values protected by the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. Yet, two policy considerations are often relied upon by the courts in denying
a witness' request for disclosure of a copy of his grand jury testimony. These two
considerations, the danger of intimidation and harassment of the witness and
the danger of subornation of perjury, were both emphasized in In re GrandJury
Witness Subpoenas."' The existence of such valid concerns, however, does not
justify the result in Clayey. The values underlying these policy considerations are
not endangered in every factual setting, as the fact pattern in Clavey makes clear,
Any threat to these values may be avoided if disclosure is made on a limited
basis.
Clearly, the importance of maintaining secrecy pursuant to these considerations will vary significantly with the factual circumstances. It would be of
particular importance to know who was the target of the grand jury investigation. If the witness himself was the sole target, then the traditional reasons for
maintaining secrecy are clearly inapplicable. For in this situation there would
be no threat of intimidation, no increased possibility of escape of the potential
defendant, no threat to the innocent accused, and no additional assistance to the
subornation of perjury since the witness would have access to the testimony on
becoming a defendant.8 4
The grand jury which indicted Clavey was primarily investigating his
activities alone"5 even though others were involved who might have been im-

plicated by his testimony. Only to the extent that the existence of these other
potential defendants presented threats of intimidation or subornation of perjury
should disclosure be denied when such a potential defendant is seeking a copy

of his grand jury testimony for recantation purposes.
Clavey was clearly not as vulnerable to intimidation as were the witnesses
6 If the witness is not in need of protecin In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas."
tion, that reason for denying disclosure clearly loses its force. The possibility of
perjury arising from disclosure was also relatively trivial. Clavey was the key
target of the grand jury investigation and he would undoubtedly be indicted along
with any others. Even assuming that he would use the transcript of his testimony
to aid the others in contriving a perjured defense, the only situation in which
this option would not be available at some point in the proceedings would be if
370 F.Supp. at 1285, 1286. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
FED. R. GRIM. P. 16(a) (1) (A) provides in part:
Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and
copy or photograph . . . recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury
which related to the offense charged.
85 This is clear from an examination of the indictment which reveals the substance of
Clavey's grand jury testimony. See Brief for Appellant at 6-7, United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d
111 (7th Cir. 1977).
86 Those witnesses had testified against a man who, apparently, was not averse to retaliating against witnesses. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
83
84
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Clavey did not become a defendant. This eventuality was not probable, and the
district court judge, even at the stage of the grand jury proceeding at which the
request for disclosure was made, could undoubtedly have discerned this.
These considerations, admittedly, would demand a thorough factual inquiry.
Such a searching factual inquiry is necessary, however, to determine if and when
there remain any justifications for maintaining the secrecy of the grand jury. In
the Clavey factual situation, a thorough inquiry compels the conclusion that the
justifications for secrecy are relatively trivial.
Although some circumstances exist in which it would be desirable to maintain the secrecy of grand jury proceedings when a witness is seeking a copy of
his own testimony, in Clavey, the potential dangers do not appear so insuperable
that they could not have been avoided by restrictions on the use of the transcript.
This failure to discuss the possible use of a protective order in Clavey is particularly surprising in light of Sarbaugh. The Seventh Circuit in Sarbaugh exercised
a cautious approach to disclosure of grand jury transcripts,87 as is evidenced by
the severity of the court's protective order. 8
Curiously, in a situation in which there exists, at best, minimal justification
for maintaining secrecy and when a protective order would have been particularly
successful in avoiding the dangers of subornation of perjury and of intimidation
of the witness, the court did not even mention the possibility of its use. Clavey
even offered to receive the transcript under any restrictions that might be required
to preserve the secrecy of the grand jury.89
The reasons for maintaining secrecy in Clavey are virtually nonexistent.
Admittedly, however, the showing of "particularized need" was weak. Even with
this limited showing, the denial of disclosure in Clavey seems to have been improper because by the imposition of restrictions on such disclosure, any improper
use of the grand jury transcript could have been avoided.
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, the Seventh Circuit could only
reverse the district court's denial to release if the initial refusal were an abuse of
discretion."0 Had the Seventh Circuit given careful scrutiny to the applicability
of the reasons in favor of secrecy, a basis might have existed for finding an abuse
of discretion. To maintain secrecy for secrecy's sake is improper and if a restricted
disclosure could uphold any reasons for maintaining secrecy, a denial of the
request should be considered an abuse, even if the showing of "particularized
need" was not substantial. In fact, the conclusion that the denial of the request
for disclosure would constitute an abuse in factual circumstances like Clavey is
strongly suggested by Sarbaugh. If the Seventh Circuit, in Clavey, had con87

Comment, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 512 (1978).

88 See note 41 supra.
89 This offer was made in defense counsel's letter of November 25, 1974, to the Assistant
United States Attorney. Government's Response to Petition for Rehearing and Suggestions in
Support of Rehearing En Banc, at C-4, 5.
90 This is the standard that is generally applied. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
Clavey argued on appeal that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and not that the
district court judge had abused his discretion. This was apparently an attempt to induce the
court to focus on Clavey's "right" to his transcript. The majority, however, applied the
familiar approach of Pittsburgh Plate Glass which used a "discretionary" standard. Use of the
"particularized need" standard was proper, for as United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,581
(1976), indicates, the sixth amendment right to counsel does not apply in the grand jury
context since no. criminal proceedings have been instituted.
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scientiously applied the balancing test of Sarbaugh and had shown the same
amenability to use restrictions on disclosure, the conclusion that disclosure should
have been granted would have been unavoidable. Any contrary result, such as
the one reached by the district court judge, can only be characterized as an abuse
of discretion. There is no justification for falling back on the presumption in
favor of secrecy. A proper application of the balancing test requires a rigorous
inquiry into the justifications remaining for that secrecy.
Clavey leaves uncertain what approach the Seventh Circuit will take in
applying the "particularized need" standard. Sarbaugh indicated that the court
would make a thorough inquiry into the competing considerations. Sarbaugh
also recognized the usefulness of placing restrictions on disclosure in preserving
the values protected by maintaining disclosure. Clauey appears to be a step back
towards the inflexible, unreasonable position that grand jury secrecy is an end in
itself. This result is clearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's pragmatic approach in Dennis, which emphasized that the balancing process was to be infused
with the realization that disclosure, rather than suppression, promotes justice.
IV. Private Judge-Jury Communications
Since the deliberation of the trial jury is more closely tied to the determination of guilt than is the grand jury proceeding, it is even more important to the
proper administration of the criminal system and to the rights of the criminal
defendant that the proper conduct of trial jury deliberations be vigorously protected. In Clavey, the Seventh Circuit had to deal with two errors by the trial
judge that involved the trial jury's deliberations. The trial judge had failed to
respond adequately to the jury's requests for additional instructions and had failed
to notify either defendant or his defense counsel of these communications with the
court. The court ruled, however, that these errors were harmless and that
reversal was not required.
A. Early Recognition of the Impropriety Inherent in
PrivateJudge-Jury Communications
In order to analyze the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the trial judge's
wrongful conduct regarding the trial jury's deliberations was harmless, two early
Supreme Court cases which were cited as authority in Clavey must be reviewed.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the error manifest
in private judge-jury communications. In Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate
Company,9 the jury, during deliberation, asked the judge for assistance on the
issue of contributory negligence. The court reinstructed in the absence of the
parties or their counsel, without their consent, and without calling the jury into
open court. 2 The Supreme Court found this to be an obvious error.93 The
91
92
93

250 U.S. 76 (1919).
Id. at 80.
The Court stated:
We entertain no doubt that the orderly conduct of a trial by jury, essential to the
proper protection of the right to be heard, entitles the parties who attend for the
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Court rejected a simple reliance on the ameliorative effect of a later defense
exception to the error to cure any possible prejudice.
It is not correct, however, to regard the opportunity of afterwards excepting
to the instruction and to the manner of giving it as equivalent to an opportunity to be present during the proceedings. To so hold would be to
overlook the primary and essential function of an exception, which is to
direct the mind of the trial judge to the point in which it is supposed that
he has erred in the law, so that he may reconsider it and change his ruling
if convinced of error, and that injustice and mistrials may thus be obviated.94
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly indicated that it would not readily excuse
such an error. The Court found that such an error was "presumptively injurious"
and that the error would require reversal unless "it affirmatively appears that [it
was] harmless."95
The rationale of Fillippon was reaffirmed in Shields v. United States."
Shields established the right of a criminal defendant to be present when supplemcntarv instructions are given to a deliberating jury. The jury, unable to agree
as to the guilt or innocence of Shields and two of his codefendants, sent the
judge notice to that effect. The judge, from his chambers, sent a written reply
without the presence of or notice to Shields or his counsel. The note instructed
the jury to find whether these three defendants were guilty or not guilty. Shortly
after the communication, the jury returned a guilty verdict on one of the four
counts along with a recommendation of mercy. The Supreme Court, in finding
error, quoted Fillippon with approval and found that if it was true that the
defendant had the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard in a civil suit,
"a fortiori... [it was] true in a criminal case." 97

purpose to be present in person or by counsel at all proceedings from the time the
jury is impaneled until it is discharged after rendering the verdict. Where a jury has
retired to consider its verdict, the supplementary instructions are required, either
because asked for by the jury or for other reasons, they ought to be given either in
the presence of counsel or after notice and an opportunity to be present; and written
instructions ought not to be sent to the jury without notice to counsel and an opportunity to object. Under ordinary circumstances, and wherever practicable, the jury ought to
be recalled to the court room, where counsel are entitled to anticipate, and bound
to presume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that all proceedings in the trial
will be had. In this case the trial court erred in giving a supplementary instruction
to the jury in the absence of the parties and without affording them an opportunity
either to be present or to make timely objection to the instruction.
Id. at 81.
94 Id. at 82.
95 Id. In finding that the presumption of reversible error was not overcome, the Court
found that the supplementary instruction given was far from harmless. The instruction
incorrectly stated Pennsylvania law on contributory negligence and was so worded as to mislead the jury.

96

273 U.S. 583 (1927).

97 Id. at 588. The Court reversed without even considering the possibility of excusing
this error. (The prejudice in this instance, however, was obvious.) It should be noted that
because the Court reversed on the basis of Fillippon, it did not discuss the merits of defendant's
claim that the communication violated his right to due process of law.
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B. Bases of the Defendant's Right to be Present During Judge-Jury
Communications
Cases such as Fillippon and Shields established the right of the defendant to
be present during judge-jury communications, the policy reasons for such a
requirement, and a rather stringent standard to be met in excusing such violations. A number of sources exist in which the courts find support for this right.
In Lewis v. United States,9" the Supreme Court stated that "[a] leading
principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment . . . , nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner."99 Although
Lewis may not support the conclusion that the right of the defendant to be present
during judge-jury communications is of constitutional dimension,"' significant
authority exists in support of that proposition.
1. Constitutional Bases
The cases which deal with the right of the defendant to be present during
judge-jury communications as constitutionally based cite a variety of constitutional provisions. The due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendment
is most often cited.'
As one commentator says, "[i]t is hard to believe that a
right recognized even during the harsh common law administration of the criminal law, and never doubted since, is not part of the due process of law protected
°2
by the Fifth Amendment."'
Some courts consider the propriety of judge-jury communications in the
defendant's absence in the context of the general right to trial by jury guaranteed
by the sixth amendment."' Other courts consider such private communications

98 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
99 Id. at 372.
100 A later Supreme Court case indicated that Lewis dealt with the rule at common law
and not with constitutional restraints. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 117 n.1 (1934).
This does not preclude the possibility of considering the defendant's right to be present during
judge-jury communications as constitutionally based. Snyder merely wanted to avoid labelling
as constitutional error the defendant's absence from a portion of the proceedings which could
not have possibly prejudiced the defendant. The Supreme Court, in Snyder, indicated that it
would apply the fourteenth amendment in situations in which the defendant's presence has a
reasonably substantial relationship to his opportunity to defend. This would be the case when
the defendant is absent during judge-jury communications.
101 Jackson v. Hutto, 508 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1975).
Because a defendant's right to be present is, in the federal context, guaranteed by
FED. R. CRIAI. P. 43, the federal courts have, typically, not been called upon to
determine the precise constitutional dimensions of this right. . . . Nevertheless, there
appears little doubt that a defendant's right to be present is constitutionally grounded
in either the right to confrontation of the sixth amendment or the right to due process
of the fifth or fourteenth amendment.
508 F.2d at 891. United States v. Treatman, 524 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969);
Ware v. United States, 376 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Arrington v. Robertson, 114 F.2d 821
(3rd Cir. 1940); Burson v. Engle, 432 F.Supp. 929, 931 (N.D. Ohio 1977); State v. Pokini,
526 P.2d 94, 105 (Hawaii 1974).
102 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 193.
103 524 F.2d at 323; United States v. Gradsky, 434 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972); 376 F.2d at 718 (Ware also cites U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 for
this theory); 526 P.2d at 105.
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to be a violation of the right to a public trial."°4 When the defense counsel is
also absent during the communications, some courts discuss the right in terms
of the sixth amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel." 5 This is particularly
important since defense counsel could play a prominent role in helping the trial
judge frame a response to the jury's inquiry which would best facilitate the
jury's consideration of the issue involved. 6
2. Statutory Base
The most commonly cited source guaranteeing the defendant's right to be
present is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)."' In Rogers v. United
States,' the Supreme Court addressed a situation in which the jury sent a note
to the trial judge inquiring whether the court would accept a guilty verdict with
a recommendation of extreme mercy. The court, without notifying the defendant
or his counsel, instructed the marshal to deliver a note advising the jury that the
court would accept such a verdict. The Supreme Court concluded that "[c]ases
interpreting the Rule make it clear, . . . that the jury's message should
have been answered in open court and that petitioner's counsel should have been
given an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded." 0 9 The error
involved went beyond the absence of the defendant and counsel from the courtroom during the communications with the jury in that counsel is also to be given
an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responds. It is generally
recognized that there is great value in allowing the parties an input into the
judge's thinking so that the resulting communication will be the best possible."'
lu-t
a r.2d at 242 (also citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); Walker v. United States, 322
F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 976 (1964);
Badgwell v. State, 418 P.2d 114, 117 (Okla. Crim. 1966) (discussing section of the Oklahoma
Constitution entitling a criminal defendant to a public trial).
105 State v. Abrams, 39 Ohio St.2d 53, 58, 313 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1974) (dissenting
opinion).
106 See note 110 and accompanying text infra. The right to be present is essential to ensure
the proper protection of the defendant's rights. See note 93 supra. Therefore, it is imperative
that the defendant have the assistance of counsel. "It is essential to that principle that . . .
the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the
prosecution, formal or informal, where counsel's absence might derogate the accused's right to
a fair trial." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
107 FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a) provides:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every
stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict,
and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.
108 422 U.S. 35 (1975).
109 Id. at 39.
110 Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919) (See text accompanying
note 95 supra) ; United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
970 (1963) ; 526 P.2d at 106; Klesser v. Stone, 201 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1973). In Kesser,
the Court commented that:
Our system recognizes that neither litigants, lawyers, judges nor jurors are perfect
and that each principal participant in the mechanics of trial must be openly and
uninhibitedly receptive to receiving the assistance of others in insuring a fair trial.
This is true throughout the conduct of the trial and perhaps with greater force in the
cumulative jury deliberation. If there is a communication to be had between the jury
and the judge or vice versa, and it appears there is even a possibility that one of the
parties might be prejudiced, it is essential that the party litigants be aware of that
communication in order that they have the opportunity not only to protect their direct
rights, but to assist the court in achieving a fair determination of the issues and in
maintaining the appropriate aura of dignity and fairness.
201 S.E.2d at 274.
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C. Effect of a Violation
1. Automatic Reversal
When private communications between the court and jury are made, appellate courts have uniformly assigned error."1 A difference of opinion exists,
however, as to what effect such a violation should have on the proceedings.
Limited authority exists for the view that such communications per se require
reversal. In Arrington v. Robertson,"' the Third Circuit stated in a civil case that
the action of the trial judge in ... sending instructions to the jury from his
chambers in the absence of the defendant or his counsel and without giving
them notice and an opportunity to be present amounted to a denial of due
process of law. We hold that it was a denial of a right so fundamental as
necessarily to affect the substantial rights of the defendant regardless of the
nature or propriety of the instructions given." 1s
In Evans v. United States,"4 supplemental instructions were given in open
court with defense counsel present but with the defendant inadvertently absent.
The judge immediately recalled the jury and the court reporter reread the instructions in the presence of the defendant. Defense counsel made it clear that
he was satisfied with this handling of the matter. There was no claim that the
instructions given were in any way erroneous. Despite the fact that there was
little chance of prejudice, the Sixth Circuit found that the error required reversal." 5
2. Harmless Error
Generally, the rule requiring reversal is recognized as much too strict."'
The fear exists that a per se rule would require the sacrifice of considerable time
and effort. It has been held that the substantial rights of the criminal defendant
can be protected through rigid judicial scrutiny of the error. When it can be
determined that the error has only a relatively minor impact on the proceedings
111 See, e.g., 422 U.S. 35; 273 U.S. 583; 250 U.S. 76; 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 202.
112 114 F.2d 821 (3rd Cir. 1940).
113 Id. at 823.
114 284 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1960).
115 Evans was followed in Neal v. United States, 320 F.2d 533 (3rd Cir. 1963). In Neal,
the court, in reversing a narcotics conviction, identified the critical fact as being the defendant's
absence when the jury's inquiry was received and when it was answered by the trial judge.
The court felt that consideration of the government's harmless error theory was not necessary
to their disposition of the case.
Pennsylvania has adopted the rule, in both civil and criminal cases, that a communication of this nature requires reversal regardless of prejudice. Argiro v. Phillips Oil Co., 422
Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recognized that such
communications occur too frequently and has said that "the practice of trial judges in communicating with the jury or instructing the jury in any manner whatsoever, other than in the
presence of counsel for all parties, must be terminated." Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic,
422 Pa. 564, 569, 222 A.2d 713, 715 (1966). This strict approach was said to be the only safe
course since the practice of determining the influence of any such communications is plagued
by a lack of certainty. The practice of deciding such cases on an ad hoe basis through a
determination of actual prejudice would surely lead to confusion and inconsistent results.
Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364, 223 A.2d 696 (1966).
116 See 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 204, and the cases cited therein.
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it would be an insistence on form to reverse. Thus, most courts apply some variety
of the "harmless error" rule in their consideration of the effect the violation of this
right should have on the proceedings."'
If the defendant's right to be present and to have an opportunity to be
heard before response by the trial judge is deemed of constitutional dimension,
a stringent form of the "harmless error" doctrine is to be applied. In Chapman v.
California,"8 the Supreme Court enunciated the standard by which federal constitutional errors were to be judged:
We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed 'harmless, not
requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.*** [W]e hold .. . that
before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must
be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.""
The Chapman formulation of the "harmless error" standard has been applied by at least six circuits. 2 ' This is true even in those cases which base the
defendant's right on Rule 43. "It is true that as a general rule a violation of
indicates beyond a
Rule 43 does not require reversal if the record affirmatively
12
reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict."' 1
A significant minority of courts apply a slightly less strict formulation of the
"harmless error" standard. These courts sustain a conviction if the court can say
2
with a reasonable certainty that no harm was done.
Determining exactly which standard is being applied is often a difficult
task."' In fact, a thorough study of the cases leads to the conclusion that courts

117 See cases cited in note 118 infra.
118 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
119 565 F.2d at 126 (dissenting opinion) (quoting 386 U.S. at 22, 24).
120 The "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" and the "absence of a reasonable possibility
of prejudice" formulations amount to virtually the same test. 386 U.S. at 24. Among the cases
that indicate that either of these formulations is to be applied are: United States v. Nelson, 570
F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Benavides, 549 F.2d 392, 393 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Mesteth, 528 F.2d 333, 335 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Baca, 494
F.2d 424, 428 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Reynolds, 489 F.2d 4, 8 (6th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 988 (1974); United States v. Arriagarda, 451 F.2d 487, 488 (4th Cir.
1971); 434 F.2d at 884; United States v. DiPietto, 396 F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1968); 405
F.2d at 244; 376 F.2d at 719; Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609, 618 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); 322 F.2d at 436; Jones v. United States, 299 F.2d 661, 662
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 864 (1962).
121 405 F.2d at 244 (emphasis added).
122 United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
852 (1977); United States v. Higgans, 507 F.2d 808, 814 (7th Cir. 1974); 472 F.2d at 378;
United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 867
(1945).
123 This uncertainty is evidenced by the court's treatment of Walker v. United States, 322
F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 976 (1964); Walker is variously cited as
standing for either the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, 405 F.2d at 244, or the
"reasonable certainty that no harm was done" test, 522 F.2d at 1321. And there is language
in Walker that would support either conclusion, at 435 in favor of the latter approach, and at
court ultimately opted for the former, saying that the conviction must be reversed
where
436
"unless
thethe
record completely negatives any reasonable possibility of prejudice."
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are extremely careless when articulating which form of the "harmless error"
standard they are applying.'"
D. The Approach in Clavey
The majority opinion in Clavey is also marked by a careless approach to the
resolution of the issue. After relating the factual setting, the court admitted that
the trial judge committed an obvious error. The Seventh Circuit agreed that
the trial court judge should have advised counsel of the jury's inquiries and
made an effort to respond to them. 2 The court quoted Rogers with approval
and thus made it clear that the court recognized the seriousness of the error. As
the language in Rogers made plain, the concern over the absence of the defendant involved much more than the fear that he would not later be able to
remedy any injury arising from the improprieties in the communications. The
opportunity to be heard before such communications are made was also involved.
The input of defense counsel is important in order to ensure that the trial judge's
response to the jury is the one that is most calculated to facilitate the jury's con-

sideration of the issues involved. 2 '
124 This confusion is apparent when one examines the impact several important factual
variants have had on the formulation of the harmless error test. The presence of defense
counsel during the improper communications would certainly seem to militate against reversal.
Most of the cases in which counsel was present, however, have applied the more stringent
standard (i.e., Chapman). 570 F.2d 258; United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972); 434 F.2d 880; 376 F.2d 717; 335 F.2d 609; 299
F.2d 661. Although it would seem that if counsel were present the court could more easily
deem an error harmless without a derogation of the rights of the defendant, the courts have
not taken this approach.
Another factor that is sometimes stated as controlling is the nature of the communication.
In United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 378, the Seventh Circuit said that courts are more
willing to reverse when the communication to the jury involved a substantive matter. If the
communication is unequivocal (i.e., a mere refusal to reinstruct) the courts are more willing to
find harmless error. 472 F.2d at 378. The position espoused in Dellinger is not supported by
the cases. The distinction between substantive and nonsubstantive communications is of little
import regarding the formulation of the harmless error rule that the courts will apply. This
is illustrated by two cases from the Seventh Circuit. In United States v. DiPietto, 396 F.2d
283 (7th Cir. 1968), in which the judge simply told the jury to continue deliberations, the
court used the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. In United States v. Higgans,
507 F.2d 808, in which the judge denied the jury's request to see a transcript of the testimony,
the court was satisfied with applying a less severe standard (the "reasonable certainty" test)
before upholding a conviction.
The Supreme Court has done little to clarify matters. In Rogers, the Court noted that a
violation of Rule 43 would have to be considered in conjunction with Rule 52(a). 422 U.S. at
40. FED. R. CaIM. P. 52(a) provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." The Court cited United States v. Schor,
418 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1969), as supporting this approach. Unfortunately, Schor failed to
determine if Chapman or a less severe standard ("fair assurance that the verdict was not
affected") should be applied.
This confusion is exacerbated when one considers that some courts apply even another
standard of harmless error. There is language in a few cases which indicates that the error will
hot be considered harmless unless the defendant makes a showing of prejudice. 507 F.2d at
813; United States v. Woodner, 317 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 903 (1963).
This position is in the distinct minority. Most of the cases adhere to the position in Rice v.
United States, 356 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1966), which states that there is a presumption of
prejudice which needs to be rebutted.
125 565 F.2d at 119.
126 See notes 106 and 110 and accompanying text supra. Some authority exists which holds
that the denial of this opportunity is not to be tolerated under any circumstances.
"Harmless error" analysis of an ex parte judge-jury communication neglects a
significant reason underpinning the requirement that the judge afford the parties an
opportunity to be present prior to the communication-the importance of allowing
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The opportunity for input by defense counsel is particularly important when
the jury, in a complex case, is experiencing difficulty with the instructions. The
majority cited the Supreme Court's decision in Bollenbach v. United States"7
regarding the trial judge's duty in this situation:
Discharge of the jury's responsibility ...depends on discharge of the judge's
responsibility to give the jury the required guidance by a lucid statement of
the relevant legal criteria. When a jury makes explicit 2its
difficulties a trial
8
judge should clear them away with complete accuracy.1
In Clavey, the Seventh Circuit stated that the "judge's perfunctory answers were
clearly inadequate in this respect."'1 29 The input of counsel might have remedied
this deficiency.
The court admitted that the errors involved in the judge's behavior were
clear and then proceeded to determine whether these errors were "harmless."
The Clavey court found that due to the nature of the particular questions asked
by the jury, the trial court's errors were harmless. The Clavey court centered its
discussion on the jury's second and third questions to the judge. The third question was considered to be merely a particularization of the second. The court read
the jury's inquiry as asking whether Clavey had to be found guilty on counts one
and two if they found him guilty on the related counts three and five. Since
Clavey was acquitted on counts one and two, the court determined that the
jury resolved its uncertainty in the defendant's favor. The judge's error in
privately communicating with the jury was considered to be harmless since the
court felt that the'judge's answer to the jury's questions could not have produced
a result more favorable to Clavey.
E. Critique
The majority followed the usual approach in analyzing the problem of
judge-jury communications in the absence of the defendant or his counsel. First,
the error in failing to give Clavey or his counsel an opportunity to be heard and
in communicating with the jury in the absence of the defendant was readily admitted. Then the court, as is typical, proceeded to apply a "harmless error"
standard. The majority's analysis in applying this test, however, is somewhat
less than straightforward and merits further examination.
The Clavey court failed to articulate clearly which construction of the harmless error rule it applied. United States v. Dellinger"' and Ware v. United
States"' were both cited without a recognition that they ostensibly set forth
different approaches. Ware applied the strict Chapman formulation of the
the parties an input into the trial judge's thinking so that the resulting communication
with the jury will be the best one possible and not just one that an appellate court
can subsequently declare "harmless."
State v. Pokini, 526 P.2d 94, 106 (Hawaii 1974) (emphasis added).

127

326 U.S. 607 (1946).

128

Id. at 612-13.

129
130
131

565 F.2d at 119.
472 F.2d 349.
376 F.2d 717.

[Vol. 54:438]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Dellinger, however, articulated the position that it
"harmless error" standard.'
would excuse such an error "where it appear[ed] with certainty that no harm
was done."'3 3 A closer scrutiny of Dellinger,hoWever, indicates that as a practical
matter its approach is nearly as strict as the test in Ware. Yet, the Seventh
Circuit, in Clavey, failed to acknowledge this fact.
Dellinger emphasized that reversible error may arise because counsel was
not afforded the opportunity to make suggestions which might well have been
of assistance to the judge in framing his response to the jury. The possibility that
defense counsel might have been of some assistance to the judge militated against
the conclusion that, with reasonable certainty, the communications were harmless.
If this factor is taken into consideration, less certainty of the harmlessness of the
error will exist. This adds a great deal of stringency to the "reasonable certainty"
standard and, at least in Dellinger, makes that standard more akin to that
articulated in Ware. Thus, the court's citation of Ware and Dellinger, without
any attempt at reconciliation whatsoever, leaves significant doubts as to which
standard was actually applied.
The dissent provides some assistance in the resolution of this issue. The
dissent argued that the Chapman-Ware formulation should be applied in this
context.'
The implication is that it was not in this instance. A standard less
stringent than the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard may have
been applied, but the majority leaves little guidance as to the precise nature of its
formulation.
The lack of clarity with which the "harmless error" test is defined by the
court precipitates a great deal of confusion. The court's discussion of the harmlessness of the error is equally troublesome. There is little discussion of the effect
that defense counsel's intervention might have had given an opportunity to be
heard prior to the communications. Yet, a different response, prompted by
counsel's input, might have produced a different result. The possibility of a different outcome certainly weakens the persuasiveness of the conclusion that the error
was harmless.
The possible coerciveness of the trial judge's curt responses to the jury was
not addressed by the Seventh Circuit. His abrupt responses to the jury's undoubtedly serious concern about the proper discharge of their function may have
indicated a growing impatience with their inability to return a verdict. Indeed,
the comments of one juror interviewed by the sentencing judge prompts a concern whether the jury's resolution of their difficulties ought to be countenanced.
The juror indicated that there was a strong urge to go home 5"and was quoted
as saying:
I signed it for the simple reason that about three or four of those ladies, they
didn't want to spend the weekend down here.... If he was found guilty
on one he should have been found guilty on all of them and
if he was in36
nocent on one he should have been innocent on all of them.1
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 719.
472 F.2d at 378.
565 F.2d at 126 (dissenting opinion).
Brief for Appellant at 41.
Id. at 43.
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The possibility that the verdict may have been a compromise has been recognized
as bearing on the issue of "harmless error" in this context,1 7 yet the Clavey court
did not discuss this possibility.
Under either formulation of the "harmless error" rule the court's reasoning
in finding the error harmless appears, at first glance, to be convincing. The
court's conclusion that the judge's answer could not have produced a result more
favorable to Clavey is one possible interpretation. This reasoning is based on
the supposition that the jury had already made their determination as to the
guilt of the defendant on the third count of the indictment. Yet, such an assumption is not clearly true and the propriety of indulging in such a presumption is
therefore questionable. "The majority apparently rule[d] out the possibility of a
complete acquittal had the judge taken the steps the majority says he should have
taken.""
Much of this analysis involves speculation on the possible assistance of
defense counsel's input and the impact of the communications on the mental
processes of the jurors. This speculation is, however, inherent in any assessment
of the impact of a trial error on the jury's determination of guilt or innocence.
Because such speculation exists, however, it is essential that there be some degree
of clarity as to the standard the court is to apply in finding an error harmless.
There must also be the realization that this speculation must necessarily weaken
the certainty with which the court can adjudge an error harmless.
The dissent suggested that the Chapman standard should have been applied.
Arguably, the application of this standard could have produced a different
result.' 39 Convincing reasons exist for explicitly adopting the Chapman formulation of the "harmless error" doctrine in the context of improper judge-jury communications. The denial of the opportunity to be heard and to be present during
judge-jury communications implicates serious constitutional rights. Such private
judge-jury communications pose a serious threat to both the right to due process
and the right of assistance of counsel. When a violation of a right of such
dimension exists, the Chapman standard should be applied in order to afford
maximum protection to that right. In addition, the frequency with which such
improper judge-jury communications occur gives one cause for serious concern."'
A more stringent standard of harmless error would help remedy this situation.
These considerations compel the conclusion that the Chapman formulation
of the "harmless error" standard should have been clearly articulated and then
applied in Clavey. The violation of the defendant's rights from private judgejury communications should be deemed harmless only when it is clearly shown
that it is so unimportant and insignificant that it can be considered harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. In Clavey, the harmlessness of the error did not
appear with such a degree of conviction.

137 472 F.2d at 380.
138 565 F.2d at 126 (dissenting opinion).
139 "When the errors here are so judged, it is clear that they were far from harmless." Id.
140 Kersey Manufacturing Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 569, 222 A.2d 713, 715 (1966).
See generally 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 193.
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V. Conclusion
In Clavey, the Seventh Circuit was faced with two important issues. The
court was presented with an attempted incursion into the secrecy of the grand
jury and with an actual interference with the proper conduct of the trial jury's
deliberations.
The Clavey result protected the secrecy of the grand jury, but it may have
done so at the expense of the rights of Sheriff Clavey. The protection of the
secrecy of the grand jury is sometimes based more upon a simple adherence to
long-established tradition than upon a thoughtful assessment of the persuasiveness
of the justifications for secrecy in the particular fact situation before the court.
Clavey appears to be just such a situation.
Clavey asserted the claim that a grand jury witness has a right to receive a
copy of his testimony. 4 ' The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and applied
a discretionary standard which required a balancing of Clavey's "particularized
need" for a transcript against the need for maintaining the secrecy of the grand
jury proceedings. A proper application of this balancing test necessarily involves
a thorough evaluation of the justifications for secrecy in the context of this
witness' request for disclosure. The Seventh Circuit failed to adequately discharge this obligation.
The use of restrictions on disclosure of transcripts has been recognized by the
Seventh Circuit as a means by which any potential dangers to the values protected by secrecy might be obviated. This practice is a logical means through
which to effectuate the Supreme Court's recognition in Dennis that disclosure,
rather than suppression, of relevant materials most often promotes the proper
administration of criminal justice.'42 The court, however, failed to investigate
the possibility of restrictions on disclosure in this instance. The whole tenor of the
majority, in fact, seems to evince a predisposition against disclosure which is
clearly contrary to the rationale in Dennis.
The opinion of the majority on the grand jury issue is no longer mandatory
authority in the Seventh Circuit.' 43 The opinion and the subsequent proceedings
leave the state of the law in considerable confusion. The approach of the majority
is at odds with the court's recent opinion in Sarbaugh. And the majority's rationale indicates a return to a more inflexible, and less thorough, approach to possible intrusions into the secrecy of the grand jury. This is unfortunate, for if the
"protection" is not necessary to serve any of the values sought to be safeguarded
by secrecy, the denial of a request for disclosure in this context can only accomplish an abridgement of the witness' rights.
The Seventh Circuit, through an application of a "harmless error" standard,
excused a violation of the defendant's rights arising from the trial judge's wrongful conduct regarding the trial jury's deliberation. The court, however, carelessly
failed to articulate the precise formulation of the "harmless error" rule that it
applied.
141
142
143

See text accompanying note 90 supra.
See text accompanying note 34 supra.
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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The most disturbing aspect of the court's disposition of this issue was its
willingness to find the error in the private judge-jury communications to be
harmless. The error involved carries with it a presumption of prejudice. This
presumption should only be rebutted after careful consideration. The determination whether this presumption has been rebutted must involve a consideration
of both the error in the failure to answer the jury's message in open court and
in not affording defense counsel an opportunity to be heard. This second factor
must be dealt with openly if the defendant's rights are to be fully protected.
Rigid scrutiny of the error in improper judge-jury communications
should be made through the use of the stricter Chapman approach to "harmless
error." The right being protected, if not clearly of constitutional magnitude, at
least has constitutional implications. The improper communications involve an
interference with a very sensitive area-the deliberations of the trial jury. This
interference involves a great potential for prejudice. When the application of the
"harmless error" standard necessarily involves speculation into such imprecise
areas as the effect on the jury of the communications and of the prejudice resulting from a denial of the opportunity to be heard, a violation must be
closely scrutinized under a well-defined approach. An error should be excused
only when it is so insignificant that the court can declare the belief that it is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Richard S. Myers

Administrative Law-Medicare Act-District Courts
Do Not Have Federal question Jurisdiction to Review
Pre-1973 Medicare Provider Reimbursement DisputesReview of Constitutional Objections Is Available
in the Court of Claims
Trinity Memorial Hospital of Cudahy, Inc. v. Associated Hospital Service*
I. Introduction
Administrative agencies have traditionally functioned as autonomous decision-making bodies. Although courts have been reluctant to interfere with the
administrative process, in recent years there has been increasing concern over
the excessive degree of power which agencies have exercised. As a check on that
power, several commentators have called for a less restrictive policy for judicial
review of administrative decisions, particularly where agency actions or regulations can be questioned on constitutional grounds.' In Trinity Memorial Hospital of Cudahy, Inc. v. Associated Hospital Service,2 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether the federal district court
had jurisdiction to review a decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare when constitutional objections were raised.
II. Statement of Facts
The Secretary of HEW (the Secretary) is primarily responsible for the
administration of the Medicare program. In 1966, Trinity entered into an
agreement with the Secretary to provide services, without charge, to patients
eligible for treatment under the Medicare Act.'
In accordance with the provisions of the Medicare Act, Trinity nominated
Blue Cross Association (Blue Cross) as its fiscal intermediary. 4 As agent of the
*
1

570 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1977).
See, e.g., Klittzke, Administrative Decisions Eligible for Judicial Review in Wisconsin,
61 MARq. L. REv. 405 (1978); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge; Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHr. L. REV. 28, 30 (1975); Schwartz, Califano v. Sanders and Administrative
Procedure Act Interpretation: Has the Supreme Court's "Hospitable" Attitude Given Way to
a More Restrictive Approach?, 55 TEx L. REv. 1323 (1977).
2 570 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1977).
3 As part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Congress enacted two programs of
medical care for the aged. The first, "Part A Medicare," provides protection against the costs
of hospital and related health care. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97,
§§ 1811-17, 79 Stat. 297 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i, § 1395i-2 (1970)).
The second, "Part B Medicare," is a voluntary supplementary program covering the costs of
physicians services and miscellaneous services not covered under Part A. Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1831-44, 79 Stat. 301 (1965) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395w (1970)). Trinity provided services to persons eligible for old age
medical assistance under Part A.
4 Reimbursement for Medicare services provided by a health care facility is usually
effected through a fiscal intermediary, such as Blue Cross Association, Aetna Life and Casualty
Co., Mutual of Omaha, and Travelers Insurance Co. The fiscal intermediary is nominated
by a group of providers on behalf of their members. Although most providers nominate a private organization as fiscal intermediary, the law also permits nomination of a public agency,
such as a state public health agency.
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Secretary, the organization or agency selected as fiscal intermediary determines
the amount of payments due a provider.' Blue Cross delegated its duties as fiscal
intermediary to Associated Hospital Service (the Plan). As the agent of Blue
Cross, the Plan ultimately determined the Medicare reimbursable costs incurred
by Trinity as a provider of services.
Trinity received interim reimbursements based on billings submitted to the
Plan during the year.' At the close of each fiscal year, Trinity submitted an
annual cost report to the Plan to enable it to determine the actual amount of
reimbursement due.7 Pursuant to existing regulations,' Trinity employed the
"combination method" of reimbursement accounting to prepare the cost reports
for fiscal years ending September 30, 1968, September 30, 1969, and September
30, 1970. The combination method requires the provider to distinguish between
the cost of "routine services" and the cost of "ancillary services" when preparing
annual cost reports. After conducting year-end audits for fiscal years ending
1968 and 1969, the Plan reclassified certain costs as "routine" which Trinity had
determined to be "ancillary," and made the corresponding adjustments to the
cost report. The Plan reduced current interim payments to reflect the changes,
and informed Trinity that the revised classification scheme must be followed in
future cost reports.
Trinity paid the amount of disputed reimbursement as determined by the
Plan's audit and subsequently engaged in negotiations with the Plan's representatives to resolve the cost dispute. The Plan maintained that the disputed costs
must be classified as "routine" and refused to accept amended cost reports as
proposed by Trinity.
Trinity appealed to the Blue Cross Medicare Providers Appeals Committee
(the Committee). During the proceedings, Trinity objected to the composition

5 42 U.S.C. § 1395(h) (a) (1970).
6

The Plan, as agent of the Secretary, periodically reimbursed Trinity in accordance with

42 U.S.C. § 13 95 (g) (1970),

7
8

which provides that:

The Secretary shall periodically determine the amount which should be paid . . .
to each provider of services with respect to the services furnished by it, and the
provider of services shall be paid, at such times or at times as the Secretary believes
appropriate (but not less often than monthly) and prior to audit or settlement by
the General Accounting Office, from the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, the
amounts so determined, with necessary adjustments on account of previously made
overpayment or overpayments; except that no such payments shall be made to any
provider unless it has furnished such information as the Secretary may request in order
to determine the amounts due such provider under this part for the period with
respect to which amounts are being paid....
20 C.F.R. § 405.452 (1970).
20 C.F.R. § 405.452 (1970), in pertinent part, provides:
(a) Principle. Total allowable costs of a provider shall be apportioned between
program beneficiaries and other patients so that the share borne by the program is
based upon actual services received by program beneficiaries. To accomplish this
apportionment the provider shall have the option of either of the two following
methods:
(1) Departmental method. The ratio of beneficiary charges to total patient charges
for the services of each department is applied to the cost of the department.
(2) Combination method. The cost of "routine services" for program beneficiaries
is determined on the basis of average cost per diem of these services for all patients;
to this is added the cost of ancillary services used by beneficiaries, determined by
apportioning the total cost of ancillary services on the basis of the ratio of beneficiary charges for ancillary services to total patient charges for such services. . ..
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and procedure of the Committee as violating its right to due process.9 Notwithstanding Trinity's constitutional objection, the Committee affirmed the Plan's
original determination and denied Trinity's claim."
Prior to 1972, neither the Medicare Act nor its accompanying regulations
authorized a provider of services to appeal a fiscal intermediary's final cost determinations.11 Upon Trinity's request, however, the Secretary agreed to review
the decision of the Plan and the Committee, but ultimately refused to set the
decisions aside.' 2
Trinity thereupon instituted an action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. In its complaint, Trinity renewed its due
process objection to the Committee's composition and procedure and alleged
that the Committee's action in denying reimbursement failed to conform to the
described standards for adjudication by an administrative agency. Trinity requested that the Committee decision be vacated and that the Secretary be
ordered to refund the reimbursable costs. In the alternative, Trinity requested
that the case be remanded for a hearing before an impartial decision-maker.
Trinity predicated jurisdiction on § 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)" and the federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970)." The Secretary claimed that neither the APA nor § 1331 authorized
the district court to hear Trinity's case. Accordingly, the Secretary moved to
dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The district court found that it had jurisdiction over Trinity's claim by
virtue of the APA and proceeded to render a decision on the merits. The court
concluded that the composition of the Appeals Committee and the participation
by counsel for Blue Cross constituted a clear violation of due process. Accordingly, summary judgment was entered in Trinity's behalf."9
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Secretary claimed absolute discretion
9 570 F.2d at 663. One of the principal grounds of objection was that the extensive
participation of Blue Cross employees as members of the Committee resulted in there being
no impartial decision maker. Other procedures of Blue Cross in the decisional process were
also challenged.
10 Id.
11 In 1972 and 1974, Congress enacted provisions and amendments expanding statutory
review of provider reimbursement disputes. The 1972 amendment established a Provider
Reimbursement Review Board with jurisdiction to review disputes when the amounts in
controversy exceed $10,000. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §
243, 86 Stat. 1420 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (1970)). In 1974, Congress extended the
review provision of § 13 9 5oo to grant providers the right to obtain judicial review, in a district
court, of any decision of the Board and of any reversal, affirmance, or modification of the
Board's decision by the Secretary. Social Security Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-484,
§ 3(a), 88 Stat. 1459 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f) (1970)). These provisions apply
only to cost reporting periods ending on or after June 30, 1973, and therefore did not apply
to the present dispute.
12 570 F.2d at 663.
13 Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is embodied in 5 U.S.C. §§
701-06 (1970). Specifically, § 702 provides, in pertinent part, that "a person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial relief thereof. . . ." In addition, § 704,
in relevant part, provides that "agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review .. "
14 28 U.S.C. § 1331 '(1970) provides, in relevant part, that "the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.
15 570 F.2d at 663.
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regarding pre-1973 determinations of Medicare reimbursable costs. He asserted
that the district court had no jurisdiction, despite Trinity's due process challenge
to the procedure by which the cost decision was reached.
The Seventh Circuit held that the Secretary's decision regarding Trinity's
determination of Medicare reimbursable costs could not be reviewed. 6 In addition, the court found that neither the APA nor § 1331 provided a basis for review
of Trinity's due process objection.'" Despite these findings, the court disagreed
with the Secretary's contention that Trinity's due process claim could not be
reviewed. Conscious of the serious constitutional implications of totally precluding review of constitutional claims, the court merely dismissed the action,
without prejudice, allowing Trinity to sue in the Court of Claims."8
III. Jurisdiction
As previously noted, Trinity predicated jurisdiction for district court review
of the Secretary's decision on two statutory provisions. First, Trinity argued
that the Administrative Procedure Act provided for judicial review whenever a
person suffered a legal wrong because of agency action or was aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute. Second, Trinity maintained that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) gave the district court federal question
jurisdiction over its claim. The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected both of these
provisions as a basis for review.
A. Administrative Procedure Act as an Independent Basis of Jurisdiction
5
In Sanders v. Weinberger,"
the Seventh Circuit had held that the APA
provided an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction to challenge agency
action in the federal district courts. Relying on Sanders the district court in
Trinity determined that it had jurisdiction over Trinity's claim by virtue of the
APA.' °
In the interim between the district court decision and the appeal to the
Seventh Circuit, the United States Supreme Court reversed Sanders v. Weinberger, holding that the APA did not afford subject matter jurisdiction to review
a decision of the Secretary of HEW."' In accordance with this Supreme Court
ruling, the Seventh Circuit, in Trinity, summarily rejected the district court's
decision to base jurisdiction on the APA.

16 Id. at 666.
17 Id. at 667.
18 Id. at 667-68.
19 522 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1975).
20 570 F.2d at 663.
21 Sub. nom. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1970). The majority of cases decided
since Califano have similarly denied jurisdictional claims based on the APA. Harary v.
Blumenthal, 555 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1977); Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3rd Cir. 1977);
Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation v. Mathews, 554 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1977); Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co. v. U.S.E.P.A., 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977); Hazelwood Chronic & Cony.
Hosp. v. Weinberger, 543 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 430 U.S. 952 (1977);
Langson v. Simon, 74 F.R.D. 456 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
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B. Statutory Preclusion of Review Under § 1331-Title
42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970)
Having disposed of the APA as a basis of jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit
shifted its focus to the unanswered question of whether jurisdiction could be
predicated on § 1331. The Secretary claimed that Trinity was statutorily precluded from obtaining review under § 1331 by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)
(1970), which provided that
[t]he findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding
upon all individuals who were parties to such a hearing. No findings of fact
or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or
governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the
United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be
brought under section 41 [now section
22 1331] of Title 28 to recover on any
claim arising under this subchapter.
Section 405(h) originated as a preclusion of review provision of the Social
Security Act,22 and was later incorporated by reference into the Medicare Act.
The Seventh Circuit construed the second sentence of § 405(h) to preclude
all review, under § 1331 or otherwise, of the merits of the Secretary's decision
regarding Trinity's cost accounting. The court stated that "[t]he second sentence
of § 405 (h) directly prohibits in a broad and sweeping manner all judicial review
of such a decision involving promulgated regulations. . .. ""
Significantly, the court gave literal effect to the second sentence of § 405 (h)
only with respect to the Secretary's application of the administrative regulation.
Since the Secretary made no "finding of fact or decision" on Trinity's due process
objection, the Seventh Circuit found that the preclusion-of-review language in
the second sentence was inapplicable to the constitutional claim. The court thus
found it unnecessary to decide whether § 405(h) made the Secretary's decision
on constitutional claims absolutely final.
By failing to address the finality of the Secretary's decisions when constitutional objections are raised, the Seventh Circuit seemed to overlook authority
which considered constitutional questions unsuited to resolution in administrative
hearings. 21 If constitutional "questions cannot be resolved in administrative hearings, the Secretary might never have made a "finding of fact or a decision" on
the due process claim. The Seventh Circuit, therefore, should not have refused
to address the issue merely because the Secretary did not decide a constitutional
question in this case. Rather, the court should have found the second sentence
inapplicable to review of all constitutional matters because there may never be
a "decision of the Secretary" in that regard.
22 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970).
23 Social Security Amendments of 1939, § 201, 53 Stat. 1362 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
405(h) (1970)).
24 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1872, 79 Stat. 291 '(codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (1970)).
25 570 F.2d at 666.
26 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. at 109-10 (1977); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,
368 (1974). See also Appeal of Sly, C-27 593 725 (May 10, 1972), where the Board of
Veterans Appeals expressly disclaimed authority to decide constitutional questions (cited at
415 U.S. at 368).
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The Seventh Circuit's ultimate resolution of whether § 405(h) precluded
review, under § 1331, of Trinity's due process objection rested primarily on the
proper construction to be given the third sentence of § 405(h). The language
of this sentence makes no distinction between review of a decision on the merits
and review of a provider's constitutional claims. Likewise, the provision in the
context of the entire Medicare Act and the legislative history of the Act reveal
no explicit policy for judicial review of constitutional claims under § 1331.
In 1939, § 405 (h) was enacted as a preclusion of review provision of the
Social Security Act.27 At that time, Congress also amended the Social Security
Act to include 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) (1970),2" which provided for judicial review
of agency matters otherwise unreviewable under § 405 (h). The original version
of the Medicare Act incorporated § 405 (h) as it appeared in the Social Security
Act. Section 405(g), however, was incorporated merely to authorize review of
an agency determination that an institution was not eligible to act as a provider."9
One Senate Report indicated that review of matters not specifically mentioned
would be prohibited:
Hospitals, extended care facilities, and home health agencies would be
entitled to a hearing and judicial review if they are dissatisfied with the
Secretary's determination regardingtheir eligibility to participate in the program. It is intended
that the remedies provided by these review procedures
30
shall be exclusive.
According to the Senate report, therefore, provider reimbursements could not be
reviewed under § 4 05(g).
In 1972, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f) (1972) of the Medicare
Act.31 This provision established the Provider Reimbursement Review Board
for administrative review of a fiscal intermediary's final cost determination. The
House Report accompanying this provision indicated that there could be no
administrative appeal of the intermediary's decision prior to the enactment of
§ 1395oo:
Under present law there is no specific provision for an appeal by a
provider of services of a fiscal intermediary's final reasonable cost determination. Although the HEW has developed administrative procedures to
assist providers and intermediaries to reach mutually and satisfactory settlements of disputed reimbursement items, your committee believes that it is
desirable to prescribe in law a specific procedure for settling disputed final
determinations applying to the amount of program reimbursement. This
procedure would not apply to questions of coverage or disputes involving
individual beneficiary claims.
27
28

42 U.S.C. § 405(h)
(1970).
05

42 U.S.C. § 4 (g) (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to
which he was a party irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review
of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to
him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may
allow....
29 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 49 Stat. 330
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c) (1970)).
30 S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 54-55 (1965) (emphasis added).
31 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1878, 86 Stat. 1420 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f) 1970)).
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Your committee bill, therefore, provides for the establishment of a

Provider Reimbursement Review Board ....

32

In 1974, Congress further amended § 1395oo(f) to provide for district
court review of any decision of the Provider Reimbursement Review Board and
of any reversal, affirmance, or modification of the Board's decision made by the
Secretary. 3 The legislative note to this amendment stated, however, that the
amended provision applied only to cost reports ending after June 30, 1973. Since
no express provision for district court review of disputes regarding pre-1973
accounting periods was included, at least one court concluded that no review
of these claims could be made. 4 Although such a conclusion seems logical on
its face, it fails to encompass the strong policy in favor of judicial review of valid
constitutional claims. Accordingly, other courts rejected this conclusion, preferring to presume that a constitutional claim could be reviewed in the absence
of an express provision otherwise."
In Weinberger v. Salfi,36 the United States Supreme Court focused on the
"plain language" of § 405(h) to determine whether it precluded review of constitutional claims in a Social Security context. In Salfi, the Social Security
Administration had determined that a widow was not eligible to receive Social
Security insurance benefits. The decision was based on a Social Security Act
duration-of-relationship eligibility provision. Despite the striking language of
the third sentence of § 405 (h), the three-judge district court concluded that this
provision of the Social Security Act was nothing more than a codification of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.3" Since all administrative
remedies had been pursued by the plaintiff, the district court found that it had
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the district
court, holding that the district court was precluded from jurisdiction under §
1331. The Court vehemently disagreed with the district court's narrow construction of the third sentence of § 405(h) :
That the third sentence of § 405(h) is more than a codified requirement of
administrative exhaustion is plain from its own language which is sweeping
and direct and which states that no action shall be brought under § 1331,
not merely that only those actions shall be brought in which administrative
remedies have been exhausted.38
32 H.R. REP. No. 92-231, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5094.
33 Social Security Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-484, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1459 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395oo(f)(1) (West Supp. 1978)).
34 Trustees of Indiana Univ. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 445 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
35 Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation v. Mathews, 554 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1977); St.
Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
929 (1977); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. United States, 558 F.2d 8 (Ct. CI. 1977); Whitecliff, Inc.
v. United States, 536 F.2d 347 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
36 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
37 Id. at 759. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires a party
to seek all remedies at the administrative level before applying to the courts for judicial
review. The doctrine is designed to prevent the courts from prematurely interfering with the
administrative process. B.

at 22 (1978).
38 422 U.S. at 757.
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The Supreme Court construed the "broad and sweeping" language of § 405(h)
to preclude review under § 1331 of any action seeking to recover on any Social
Security claim, "irrespective of whether resort to judicial processes is necessitated
by discretionary decisions of the Secretary or by his nondiscretionary application
of allegedly unconstitutional statutory restrictions."'"
Although this construction of § 405(h) precluded all review under § 1331,
the Supreme Court found that § 405(h) did authorize review of the plaintiff's
constitutional claim under the alternative jurisdictional grant contained in §
4
05(g) of the Social Security Act. The Court thus concluded that the plaintiff
was not unconstitutionally foreclosed from district court review of her constitutional challenge.4"
As incorporated into the Medicare Act, § 4 05(g) afforded jurisdiction for
district court review of only provider eligibility and termination claims.4' Section
4
05(g) did not provide the district court with jurisdiction over provider cost
reimbursement disputes. Unlike the plaintiff in Salfi, therefore, Trinity could
not obtain review of its due process claim pursuant to § 4 05(g). Accordingly,
Trinity argued that the Salfi construction of § 405(h) should not be extended
to Medicare provider reimbursement disputes. Trinity contended that Salfi's
broad construction of § 405(h) was applicable only when the Social Security
Act provided for an alternative method of review, and that, in the absence of
specific alternative methods, the court was free to hear the case under § 1331."'
Presented with the dilemma of whether or not to extend the Salfi construction of § 405(h) to Medicare provider reimbursement disputes, the Seventh
Circuit turned to relevant case law. Prior to Salfi, the courts routinely interpreted § 405 (h) as a "codification of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies."'" Since the rejection of this construction by the Supreme Court in
Salfi, the circuits have differed in their interpretations of § 405. The focal point
of the controversy is the constitutional problem which would be created if the
Salfi construction was extended to preclude all judicial review of constitutional
claims. What has emerged from this controversy are two distinct formulae for
interpretation.
1. Presumption of Reviewability
The "presumption of review" doctrine was firmly established by the United
States Supreme Court in Rusk v. Cort.4 In Rusk, the Court held that the courts
should restrict access to judicial review only upon a showing of "clear and convincing" evidence of a contrary legislative intent.4 In Johnson v. Robisonj
the Supreme Court again invoked the presumption of review doctrine for the
particular purpose of authorizing federal courts to decide the constitutionality
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 762.
Id.
See note 28 supra.
570 F.2d at 664.
See note 37 supra.
369 U.S. 367 (1962).
Id. at 379-80.
415 U.S. 361 (1974).
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of veterans benefit legislation. The defendant in Johnson had moved to dismiss
the claim for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that review was statutorily precluded. The statute in question 7 prohibited judicial review of decisions rendered
by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs on any question of law or fact arising
under laws providing for veterans benefits. The Supreme Court concluded that
the statute should not be extended to actions challenging the constitutionality
of veterans' benefit laws because "neither the text nor the scant legislative history
of [the statute] provided the 'clear and convincing' evidence of congressional intent
required by [the Supreme] Court before a statute will be construed to restrict
access to judicial review."4
Trinity urged the Seventh Circuit to respect this presumption in cases raising
constitutional issues by limiting the application of Salfi's construction of § 405 (h)
to circumstances in which the Social Security Act provided an alternative method
for review. 9 When § 4 05 (g) is not available as an alternative basis for review
of a constitutional claim, as in Trinity, some courts have refused to adopt Salfi's
broad construction of § 405 (h). Instead, these courts have presumed that Congress did not intend § 405(h) to operate as a preclusion of § 1331 review of constitutional claims in Medicare provider reimbursement disputes.
In St. Louis University v. Blue Cross Hospital Service,"0 the Eighth Circuit
refused to find complete preclusion of federal question jurisdiction by § 405 (h).
This post-Salfi case arose from a Medicare provider reimbursement dispute over
cost accounting periods ending August 31, 1966. The provider asserted that the
Medicare statutes and regulations were violated in determining reimbursement
amounts and that he was deprived of an impartial hearing by the Provider
Reimbursement Review Committee. Having concluded that Congress committed
the determination of plaintiff's proper reimbursement wholly to administrative
discretion, the court considered whether § 405 (h) precluded jurisdiction of the
plaintiff's due process challenge.
In Salfi, the Supreme Court had authorized review of the constitutional
claim under § 405 (g). In St. Louis, the decision was more difficult because
§ 4 05 (g) did not afford an alternative basis for review of due process claims in
Medicare reimbursement disputes. The Eighth Circuit thus refused to apply
the Salfi interpretation of § 405 (h) in a Medicare context so as to avoid the
danger of unconstitutionally foreclosing the provider of services from judicial
consideration of its due process objections.
Similarly, in Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation v. Mathews," the Fifth
Circuit distinguished § 405 (h) in a Social Security context from § 405 (h) in
a Medicare context because of the unavailability of review under § 4 05(g). In
that case, a Medicare provider sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring
the Secretary to reopen and recompute adverse reimbursement determinations.
The court found that § 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act, was not
intended to preclude judicial review of issues, constitutional or otherwise, which
47
48
49
50
51

38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970).
415 U.S. at 373-74.
570 F.2d at 664.
537 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977).
554 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1977).
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could not be reviewed in any other way. Although the Fifth Circuit openly
recognized its construction of § 405(h) as "strained,"52 it found general federal
question jurisdiction under § 1331 as the basis for review of the provider's claim.
In Trinity, the Seventh Circuit rejected the position taken in both St. Louis
and MacDonald that § 1331 afforded jurisdiction for due process claims. The
court refused to presume that § 405(h) did not preclude review under § 1331.
Instead, the court adopted the Salfi construction of § 405 (h) to preclude all
review under § 1331.
2. The South Windsor Approach
In Salfi, the Supreme Court justified its broad construction of § 405(h) by
finding an alternative basis for review of the plaintiff's constitutional claim under
§ 405(g). Although § 405 (g) was unavailable as a basis for review in Trinity,
the Seventh Circuit still adopted Salfi. To avoid the danger of totally precluding
review of Trinity's due process claim, the Seventh Circuit followed the approach
taken by the Second Circuit in South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v.
Mathews. 3
In South Windsor, a provider challenged the validity of a Medicare regulation permitting the government to recoup accelerated depreciation taken by
a provider that had terminated its participation in the Medicare program.
Despite the constitutional underpinnings of the provider's claim, the Second
Circuit relied on Salfi to preclude jurisdiction under § 1331. The court found,
however, that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(1970) ."' Reasoning that the third sentence of § 405(h) merely forbade review
"under section 41 [now § 1331] of Title 28,""5 and that § 1491 was not part
of the original § 41, the court found that review by the Court of Claims would
not violate § 405(h).
The Seventh Circuit, in Trinity, expressly followed the reasoning of the
Second Circuit in South Windsor. The court thus held that § 405(h) was not
a bar to review of Trinity's case in the Court of Claims. 6
In Salfi, South Windsor, and Trinity, each court construed the third sentence of § 405(h) as totally precluding § 1331 jurisdiction to review constitutional objections to agency decisions. Each court expressly noted that, in the
absence of an alternative grant of jurisdiction for review of a constitutional claim,
this construction could render § 405(h) constitutionally invalid. Each court,
however, avoided this clash with the Constitution by finding an alternative avenue
for review.
52
53
54

55
56

Id. at 718.
541 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970), in pertinent part, provides:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases
not sounding in tort. In any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall have the
power to remand appropriate matters to any administrative or executive body or
official with such direction as it may deem proper and just.
See text accompanying note 22 supra.
570 F.2d at 667-68.
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Unlike the Supreme Court in Salfi, the Second Circuit in South Windsor
was unable to find an alternative basis for district court review of the constitutional claim. By merely retracing the steps taken by the Second Circuit in South
Windsor, the Seventh Circuit in Trinity overlooked the inadequacies inherent
in that approach. First, whether the legislative scheme permitted Trinity, as a
provider of services, to seek review of its constitutional claim in federal district
court was unclear. Consequently, Trinity erroneously relied on § 1331 as the
basis for review of its due process claim. Although granted the opportunity to
sue in the Court of Claims, Trinity must incur additional expenses in order to
obtain review, after having expended the time and money to proceed in the
district court. Second, such limited relief may not be available to all who expressconstitutional objections in the Medicare cbntext, since the jurisdictional grant
of § 1491 only extends to monetary, not equitable, relief."
Several other courts which have adopted Salfi's broad construction of §
405(h) have found an alternative basis of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1970), which gives the district court "original jurisdiction of any action in the
nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the U.S. or any agency
thereof" to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff."8 Mandamus jurisdiction for
review of administrative decisions has been extended to both statutory and constitutional allegations.50 Mandamus relief will be granted, however, only when
there is, (1) a clear right in the plaintiff to the relief sought, (2) a plainly defined and peremptory duty on the part of the defendant(s) to do the act in question, and (3) no other adequate remedy available."0 Consequently, mandamus
relief has typically been granted only in rather extraordinary circumstances.
Affording a plaintiff an opportunity to initiate an action for mandamus, then,
may be an even more inadequate form of relief than allowing the plaintiff to
proceed with its suit in the Court of Claims.
IV. Post-Trinity Developments
The underlying constitutional question surrounding § 405(h) and other
preclusion-of-review statutes resurfaced in two post-Trinity cases. Upon reconsideration of its earlier decision in Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation v.
Mathews,6 the Fifth Circuit held that § 405 (h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act, precluded all review of the Secretary's decision by federal district courts
under § 1331.62 The court abandoned the former distinction between § 405 (h)
in the Medicare context and § 405(h) in the Social Security context. Adopting
the Salfi approach, the Fifth Circuit extended § 405(h) to preclude review of
both statutory and constitutional claims, but found review available in the Court

57

58
59
1537
60
Park
61
62

See note 65 infra.

28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
Langson v. Simon, 74 F.R.D. 456 (N.D. I1. 1977); Wright v. Mathews, No. 75 C
(N.D. Ill., filed May 4, 1976).
City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 699-701 (7th Cir. 1976); City of Highland
v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 691 (7th Cir. 1975).
571 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 329.
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of Claims.63 It was expressly observed that, since all review was not precluded,
the constitutionality of § 405(h) was not drawn into question. As in Trinity,
the court was thus excused from "intimating any view as to the constitutionality
of a congressional scheme that would bar all judicial review of [Medicare provider reimbursement] disputes ...
""
In another later case, American Association of Councils of Medical Staffs v.
Calilano,6" the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of § 405(h) preclusion in
a somewhat different factual context. In that case, an association of medical
councils of private hospitals brought an action on behalf of its physician members,
challenging certain federal regulations promulgated under the Medicare Act.
The court never reached the merits of the judgment against the plaintiff because
it found the jurisdiction issue to be dispositive of the case. Unlike the providers
in South Windsor, Trinity and MacDonald,the plaintiffs in CMS sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and thus could not obtain review in the Court of
Claims.6" The court, nonetheless, regrettably denied both parties a decision on
the merits because of the lack of federal jurisdiction over the case:
The resolution we have reached is not pleasant. CMS has waited nearly
three years for the resolution of its suit ....
We must deny both parties a
decision on the merits where at least one argument is substantial. But the
alternative is to find that Congress cannot cut off jurisdiction over these issues
while providing another Court, the Court of Claims, to hear the issues. That
is a decision we cannot make ....
The Fifth Circuit expressed doubt over the constitutionality of § 405 (h), yet
once again failed to decide the issue. Instead, the court alluded to the alternative
of bringing a suit for mandamus to resolve "what [was] obviously an important
issue to the private hospitals in this country.""8 This result resembled the results
in both South Windsor and Trinity. The plaintiff's only relief was the opportunity to renew its claim in another forum after having expended the time and
money to seek review in the district court. In addition, the court was again
excused from intimating any view as to the constitutionality of § 405 (h) in the
Medicare context.
V. Conclusion
At a time when the excessive power of administrative agencies is a growing
concern,69 judicial review is an important control device, particularly as a means
63 The Court of Claims previously held that jurisdiction exists in the Court of Claims to
review the Secretary's decision, at least as to law and constitutional claims, despite § 405(h).
Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 347 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969
(1977). The Fifth Circuit in MacDonald held that it was powerless to overturn that holding.
571 F.2d at 332.
64 570 F.2d at 668 (Marshall, J., concurring).
65 575 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1978).
66 See note 54 supra. The court noted that the action could be heard by the court of
claims if the plaintiff could state a claim for nominal damages.
67 575 F.2d at 1373.
68 Id.
69 See note I supra.
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of challenging the constitutionality of agency actions and regulations. The jurisdiction of the federal courts to review such constitutional claims, therefore, should
not be unduly restricted. Conceding, however, that Congress has the power to
limit jurisdiction to review agency decisions, clarity in drafting preclusion-ofreview provisions such as § 405 (h) would reduce the risk involved in choosing
the wrong forum,7" as well as the need for indulging in "strained" determinations
of congressional intent.7 '
In Trinity, the Seventh Circuit held that the 1970 version of § 405(h)
precluded district court review under § 1331 of Trinity's constitutional claim.
This case is important, however, not for what it decides, but for what it does
not decide. By allowing Trinity to sue in the Court of Claims, the court excused itself from intimating any view as to the constitutionality of a congressional scheme
that would bar all judicial review of valid constitutional objections originating
in an administrative proceeding. The 1974 amendment to the Medicare Act,
which expressly authorized judicial review, significantly reduced the likelihood
of such a constitutional dilemma resurfacing in the Medicare provider reimbursement context. A similar problem may arise, however, as it has previously,72
from preclusion-of-review provisions in other administrative contexts. If the
Seventh Circuit had specifically addressed the constitutional issue arising from
§ 405(h), it could have made a significant contribution toward initiating a
resolution. As indicated by the more recent cases, however, the constitutional
dilemma surrounding § 405 (h) and similar preclusion-of-review provisions remains unresolved.
Bernadette Muller

70 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIvE ACTION (1965); Jurisdiction to
Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 HARV. L. RZv.
980, 999 (1975).
71 Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation v. Mathews, 554 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1977).
72 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).

Labor Law-Collective Bargaining-Employer's
Refusal to Furnish Customer Lists to a Union Seeking to
Administer a Collective Bargaining Agreement
Constitutes an Unfair Labor Practice.
National Labor Relations Board v. Custom Excavating, Inc.*
I. Introduction
The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to prescribe the rights
of both employees and employers and to provide orderly and peaceful procedures
for preventing interference by one party with the legitimate rights of the other.2
In furtherance of this goal, Congress has declared it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.'
As early as 1936, the National Labor Relations Board4 recognized that an
employer who claimed inability to afford a wage increase but who would neither
prove his claim by providing financial statements nor permit independent verification of the claim was not engaging in good faith bargaining.' To encourage
such good faith bargaining, Section 8(a) (5) of the Act' has been held to prescribe that an employer must furnish to the collective bargaining agent information relevant to the bargaining process.7
In NLRB v. Custom Excavating, Inc.,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue whether an employer is required to
furnish to a union the names and addresses of customers for whom work was
performed by union members.
II. Statement of the Facts
The controversy arose when Retzack, the union's business representative, was
visiting union jobsites for the purpose of checking compliance with a collective
bargaining agreement. At that time, he noted that Thimke, a union member,
was working on Saturday, September 13, 1975. Approximately one month later,
Retzack contacted Grimm, the company's president and informed him that the
* 575 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1978).
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NLRA or the Act].
2 See Fanning, The Obligation to Furnish Information During the Contract Term, 9
Ga. L. Rev. 375 (1975).
3 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject
to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title."
4 Hereinafter referred to as NLRB or the Board.
5 Pioneer Pearl Button Co., I N.L.R.B. 837, 842-43 (1936).
6 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
7 See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967) (equipment transfer information); NLRB v. Beverage-Air Co., 402 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1968) (job classification,
profit sharing, and insurance data).
8 575 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1978). The appeal in NLRB v. Custom Excavating, Inc., was
originally decided by unreported order. The Seventh Circuit subsequently issued a published
opinion.
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union had reason to believe that the company was not compensating its operating
engineers properly and asked to inspect the company's payroll records. Grimm
refused to comply with the request. Approximately three months later, after the
union threatened to file a grievance, Grimm allowed Retzack to inspect the payroll records of the two operating engineers in the bargaining unit.
The records provided reflected no hours worked by Thimke on Saturday,
September 13, 1975, and Retzack, proclaiming the records a "patent fraud,"9
requested a complete record of all payroll dates with respect to the company's
operating engineers for 1975. In addition, Retzack demanded a complete list of
the customers for whom the company had done work involving the operation of
construction equipment in order to resolve the perceived problem with the payroll
records. The information was not forthcoming and the union filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the NLRB.
At the ensuing hearing before an administrative law judge, Retzack testified
that the union considered the requested information essential to prove the
fraudulent nature of the payroll records. Moreover, the union introduced the
testimony of two former employees which indicated that the company regularly
maintained falsified records.
The company argued that such information was confidential and that its
customers would be unable to provide the requested information, namely, dates
and times when unit employees had worked. The administrative law judge
rejected these arguments and concluded that the company had refused to bargain
in good faith when it failed to furnish the union with the requested information."0
The NLRB affirmed the findings and conclusions of the administrative law
judge and separately stated Conclusions of Law which the administrative law
judge had inadvertently failed to set forth."
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board holding that the
NLRA required the disclosure of customer lists. The court modified the order
of the Board, however, to require respondent to furnish to the union only the
names of those customers for whom work was done by unit employees in 1975.12
III. NLRA Mandates Good Faith Bargaining
The NLRA is intended to encourage the peaceful settlement of labor disputes by collective bargaining. 3 Section 8(a) (5) of the Act labels a refusal
to bargain collectively an unfair labor practice and thereby illustrates the great
importance which Congress has ascribed to the collective bargaining process in an
4
effort to ensure industrial stability.'
Despite strong Congressional endorsement of the collective bargaining
process, the NLRA is flawed by its overly broad definition of the term "collective

9
10
11
12
13
14

575 F.2d at 104.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id. at 108.
See Fanning, supra note 2.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aero Div. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 68 (3rd Cir. 1965).
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bargaining."'" The Act fails to describe those actions or attitudes which constitute good faith bargaining and, therefore, merely provides broad guidelines
used to define and interpret the specific duties which are imposed upon the
parties engaged in collective bargaining. As a result, the NLRB must determine
what constitutes "good faith" bargaining in each individual context. 6
A. Good Faith-A Factual Determination
There exists a wide spectrum of management actions, each of which may,
under given circumstances, constitute an unfair labor practice. Whether a
particular management action will be classified as such generally is determined by
the factual context in which that action occurs. 17 Refusal to furnish information
requested by a union is one such action which might constitute an unfair labor
practice.
The Supreme Court has concluded, therefore, that the NLRB has the right,
after reviewing the surrounding circumstances, to consider the refusal to furnish
information in determining whether the obligation of good faith bargaining has
been met by the employer."
B. Information Requests
In appropriate circumstances, it is apparent why refusal to furnish needed
information constitutes an unfair labor practice. The union is designated by a
majority of employees in the unit as the exclusive bargaining representative and
as such is charged with the responsibility of negotiating and administering the
collective bargaining agreement. Without the disclosure of pertinent data, the
union would be handicapped in negotiations with the employer and would be
unable to properly perform its statutorily imposed duties. Since the mere meeting
and conferring of the parties, without a prior exchange of relevant requested data
does not facilitate effective collective bargaining, it does not meet the good faith
bargaining requirement of Section 8(a) (5)."9 Thus, the general obligation of the
employer to furnish necessary and relevant information is a natural corollary to
the duty to meet and confer in good faith.

15 The term "collective bargaining" is defined for purposes of the Act by 29 U.S.C. §
158(d) (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
16 See Fanning, supra note 2.
17 See, e.g., note 49 infra for a discussion of two instances in which management's refusal
to provide information may constitute an unfair labor practice.
18 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) (employer claiming financial
difficulties refused to provide information on financial standing and profits).
19 347 F.2d at 68.
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C. Qualifying the Duty to Furnish Information
Several qualifications restrict significantly the type and scope of the information to which the union is entitled. The NLRA's mandate of good faith bargaining dictates that the union must genuinely believe that the information requested
is needed for collective bargaining purposes.2" Furthermore, requests for data
need only be honored when the information sought is relevant and necessary to
the union's duty to negotiate and administer collective bargaining agreements. 2 '
As the Court in NLRB v. Truitt2 2 remarked, "[e]ach case must turn upon its
particular facts. The inquiry must always be whether under the particular
circumstances of the particular case the statutory obligation has been met.""3
Information of any description may be requested and received under appropriate circumstances. In its seminal decision, the Custom Excavating court
has determined that customer lists may be an appropriate subject for a union's
request for data. The inquiry must now focus on those factors which, when
analyzed within a factual context, establish the propriety of the request.
IV. Relevance: The Critical Issue
A. Relevance and Necessity--A Single Criterion
In NLRB v. 'Acme Industrial Co.,24 the Supreme Court prescribed a rule
which required an employer to furnish requested information which is both
relevant and necessary to the bargaining process. Although many court and
NLRB decisions are framed in terms of this dual language, 2 once relevance is
found, typically, the information is found to be necessary as well. In fact, the
terms "relevant" and "necessary" are synonymous because once information is
construed as relevant, it is a fortiori necessary. Thus, the rule has been stated:
"[I]f the requested data is relevant and therefore reasonably necessary to a
union's role as bargaining agent in the administration of a collective bargaining
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5)
agreement, it is an unfair labor practice within
26
of the Act to refuse to furnish the data.
Necessity, therefore, is not a separate and unique guideline which must be
independently satisfied but rather is subsumed in the standard of relevance.
Accordingly, regardless of what type of information is requested by a union, the
critical inquiry is whether disclosure of that information is relevant to the union's
collective bargaining responsibilities.
20 351 U.S. at 152. This comment examines a situation in which the request for information was made from a union to an employer. The requirement of good faith bargaining, however, is equally applicable to unions. It may be assumed that unions have a similar obligation
to furnish relevant information upon request by an employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3)
(1970). There appear" to be no decisions, however, concerning the scope or nature of a
union s duty to furnish information to an employer. See Di Fede, Employer Duty to Disclose
Information in Collective Bargaining, 6 N.Y.L.F. 400 (1960).
21 385 U.S. at 437.
22 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
23 Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
24 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
25 See, e.g., Fawcett Printing Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. 964 (1973).
26 347 F.2d at 68 (emphasis added).
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B. Relevance in Custom Excavating
In Custom Excavating, the information requested was clearly relevant to the
union's pending grievance. For a period of approximately six months the union
had sought payroll information from the employer. The data, eventually
provided, was deliberately falsified and of no use to the union. Thus, the court
properly concluded that it was "appropriate for the union to check with the
company's customers to determine whether the company was falsifying payroll
records as contended in the January 8 grievance." 2 The Seventh Circuit, however, apparently recognizing the existence of a single standard of "relevance and
necessity," treated the union's request only in terms of need.
With its decision in Custom Excavating, the Seventh Circuit became the
first court of appeals to sustain the right of a union to an employer's customer
lists. Since the weight of the evidence clearly established the relevancy of the
information to the union's pending grievance, the court, without distinguishing the nature of the information, endorsed prior holdings which found refusals
to bargain in good faith when employers withheld relevant information.2"
C. Developing a Standard of Relevance
Although the relevancy of the request in Custom Excavating was evident,
situations will arise in which "the thin red line between hard bargaining and
refusal to bargain . . ."29 will be difficult to delineate. This will be particularly
true when the information requested, such as customer lists, has no apparent application to the union's right to gather information pursuant to its collective
bargaining responsibilities. Thus, although there is a need for a more definite
standard of relevance, acknowledging that need is far easier than deriving the
appropriate standard.
In Acme Industrial Co., the Supreme Court concluded that the standard to
be applied to a union's request for information should be a liberal "discoveryAnalogizing to a discovery standard sugtype" determination of relevance.
gested by Professor Moore, 3 the majority ordered the enforcement of an NLRB
order when the Board had acted upon the probability that the desired information was relevant and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its
statutory duties and responsibilities. The Court seemed to indicate that broad
27 575 F.2d at 106.
28 Id.
29 NLRB v. Dothan Eagle, Inc., 434 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1970). The court continued:
"Some cases are so clear that we are led to one side or the other, but in the difficult case we
must in many instances rely extensively on the subjective factual conclusions of the [administrative law judge] and the Board." Id.
30 385 U.S. at 437.
31 Cf. 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.16 [1] (2d ed. 1948). Professor Moore suggests the following:
[I]t must be borne in mind that the standard for determining relevancy at a discovery examination is not as well defined as at the trial. . . . Since the matters in
Id.

dispute between the parties are not as well determined at discovery examinations as
at the trial, courts of necessity must follow a more liberal standard as to relevance.
at 1175-76.
"Examination as to relevant matters should be allowed whether or not the theory of the

complaint is sound or the facts, if proved, would support the relief sought." Id. at 1181.
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discretion lies with the trial court in determining relevancy-provided the determination is based on factual circumstances. Thus, the Court enunciated a
standard which infers an adjustable upper limit to the restrictions which may be
imposed upon a union information request.3 2
When the information sought, however, is so "picayune" that failure to
obtain it would not impede the union's effective representation of the employees,
no requirement to furnish it exists."3 Thus, even under the liberal "discoverytype" standard, some information which might be useful to the union will not
fall within the scope of Section 8 (a) (5).
The task remains, however, to distinguish between hard bargaining and a
refusal to bargain. The incident of a request for customer lists is illustrative of
this dilemma.

D. Customer Lists
Customer lists, in most situations, are unlikely to be a useful tool for purposes of collective bargaining. The sole function of such nonfacially relevant
information in the collective bargaining process would be to verify other data
provided to the union by the employer or to provide information which the
employer claims is not in his possession.
In Custom Excavating, the company argued that customer lists would not
be useful to the union because the customers either did not have the desired data
or would not talk to the union.' 4 As the court correctly explained, however, the
ultimate utility of the information was not the issue." Rather, the issue was
whether the requested data might prove useful to the union in the pending grievance procedure.
Recognizing that a union is always capable of requesting, in good faith,
information for purposes of verifying previously received data, the union should
be required to offer some additional justification for the demand. Considering
the employer's demonstrated bad faith in Custom Excavating, consultation with
the company's customers was the sole independent means of verifying the information furnished. Thus, the union's need for the customer list is legitimate
when evaluated within the whole context of the dispute. Additionally, the union's
representative in the hearing before the adminstrative law judge explained that
32 The Acme Industrial standard provides little guidance to the employer who is seeking
to determine the relevancy of a union request for information. Thus, except in instances of
clearly relevant collective bargaining information, an employer must resort to litigation in
order to have his responsibilities defined.
33 American Standard, 203 N.L.R.B. 1132, 1133 (1973) (request for 9-year-old job
descriptions). The Board further stated that "the alleged misconduct [refusal to furnish 9year-old job descriptions] is of such obviously limited impact and significance that we ought
not to find that it rises to the level of constituting a violation of our Act." Id.
34 575 F.2d at 106.
35 Id. The court explained:
[B]ecause of the need for verification, it is immaterial that the union might secure
some overtime information from its members. While the Company attempted to
show that some of its customers would be unwilling or unable to supply information
to the union relevant to its grievance, under Acme Industrial Co., the union is at
least entitled to attempt to bolster its case through the customers. Whether it will
succeed or not is not an issue here.
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the request was made in the light of the union's specific purpose of proving "the
patently fraudulent nature of [the company's] payroll records."3
In Fawcett Printing Corp. 7 the union articulated a similar suspicion of
fraud, namely, that the reasons advanced by the company for planned layoffs
were spurious. The NLRB concluded that the information requested was
relevant and ordered the company to furnish the requested customer information.
Thus, customer lists are likely to be relevant when either the employer claims a
lack of information or when the union can advance an "articulable suspicion" 38
that the information provided by the employer is fraudulent or inaccurate.
Although declining to define a particular standard, at least two courts of
appeal have addressed the issue of union requests for nonfacially relevant data.
In PrudentialInsurance Co. of America v. NLRB, 9 the union requested a
list of the names of all employees in the bargaining unit regardless of membership in the union. Prudential refused to supply the names of those employees who
were not union members. The union contended that the information was necessary for the union to locate and to communicate with these employees and that
no other adequate means of communication were available. In sustaining the
union's right to the names, the Second Circuit stated:
When a union requests information which is not ordinarily relevant to its
performance as bargaining representative but which is alleged to have
become so because of peculiar circumstances, the courts have quite properly
required 4 a° special showing of pertinence before obliging the employer to
perform.
The need for a special showing of relevance was reiterated in San Diego
Newspaper Guild v. NLRB.4 ' In Newspaper Guild, the union requested the
names of nonunion employees who were being trained by the appellant to
replace union employees in the event of a strike. The Ninth Circuit, following
Prudential,noted that when the union requests unusual information, a special
showing of relevance is required. 2
Accordingly, a union must present specific reasons to justify its request for
unusual information. A generalized assertion of need will not be sufficient. The
requirement of stating an "articulable suspicion" merely prescribes a specialized
form of the showing of relevance. The "articulable suspicion" standard strikes
a balance between a standard of assumed relevance for all information requests
and one which requires such an overwhelming proof of relevance that it effectively defeats the liberal "discovery-type" standard. 3

36 575 F.2d at 105.
37 201 N.L.R.B. 964 (1973).
38 This "articulable suspicion" standard might be analogized to the standard required for
a warrantless search. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
39 414 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969).
40 Id. at 84.
41 548 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1977).
42 Id. at 867.
43 Id. at 869.
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V. Harmonizing the Precedents
Three reported cases have arisen which specifically address the issue whether
a union should be granted its request for an employer's customer lists. Only one
of these, Custom Excavating, has progressed to the appellate level. The others,
Fawcett PrintingCorp. and American Needle & Novelty Co.,44 were decisions of
the National Labor Relations Board.4" The holdings of the Board in these two
cases are apparently contradictory.
A. American Needle & Novelty Co.
In American Needle, the Board affirmed the administrative law judge's
ruling that an employer is not obliged under the National Labor Relations Act
to furnish customer lists upon request.4" The Board had previously concluded
in Fawcett Printing Corp., that an employer was required to furnish such information.4" With these two NLRB decisions as precedent, Custom Excavating
assumes a pivotal position.
Although the Custom Excavating court disagreed without explanation with
the Board's conclusion in American Needle, the two holdings, as well as that in
Fawcett Printing Corp., can be reconciled. The critical question in analyzing
the American Needle decision is, as previously discussed, relevance.
In American Needle, the union's request was made incident to a claim by
the employer that for economic reasons it was unable to continue the operation
of one of its plants and intended to close it. 8 Although the claim of financial
inability forced the employer to substantiate his claim by providing financial
records to the union, it manifestly did not support a demand for customer lists by
the union.4 9 Thus, the union, if it desired the data, was bound to make some
44 206 N.L.R.B. 534 (1973).
45 It is well established that the National Labor Relations Board's determination whether
requested information is relevant in a particular case is given great weight by the reviewing
court. This weight attaches to the Board's findings either because the determination is a finding of fact that is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence under Section 10(e) of the
Act or because it is a mixed question of law and fact which is within the particular expertise
of the Board. See, e.g., 548 F.2d at 867.
Although great weight is given to Board determinations, judicial review is not foreclosed.
As the Supreme Court stated in Universal -Camera Corp. v. NLRB, "[A] reviewing court is not
barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence
supporting the decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety
furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view." 340 U.S. 474, 488
(1951).
46 206 N.L.R.B. at 545.
47 201 N.L.R.B. at 976.
48 206 N.L.R.B. at 540.
49 In addition to the rule raised in Custom Excavating, two other rules apply to requests
for information by a union. First, when an employer in the course of negotiations cites
financial inability as a reason for refusal to bargain, the burden is generally upon the employer to substantiate his claim by production of financial statements and records. See, e.g.,
351 U.S. at 152. It does not necessarily follow, however, that employees are entitled to substantiating evidence. As noted previously, "[e]ach case must turn upon its particular facts.
The inquiry must always be whether under the circumstances of the particular case the
statutory obligation to bargain in good faith has been met." Id. at 153.
The second rule provides that when the union's request is for wage data information, such
as payroll records, the data is presumptively relevant and the employer in the absence of rebuttal is required to furnish it. See, e.g., Boston Herald Tray. Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58
(Ist Cir. 1955).
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showing of relevance. The union made no attempt, however, to demonstrate the
relevance of the request. Absent such a showing, the Board's conclusion that
the employer should not be required to furnish the information was proper.
B. Fawcett Printing Corp.
In both Fawcett Printing Corp. and Custom Excavating, however, the requests for customer lists were made as a result of legitimate questions which
arose about the information furnished by the employer. In Fawcett Printing
Corp., the employer was in the process of laying off union workers, ostensibly in
Iresponse to the company's customers taking their business elsewhere because
of a
fear of an imminent strike. The employer refused to explain the relationship
etween the company and the Fawcett Publishing Company or to provide the
union with information about contracts with other publishing companies. Consequently, the union did not believe the asserted reasons for the layoff and
requested the customer lists. The employer refused to release the information
and the union charged the employer with a violation of Section 8 (a) (5).
At the ensuing hearing the union explained that the requested information
was necessary in order for the union to establish the veracity of the employer's
claim that no work was being subcontracted. The administrative law judge,
with subsequent affirmation by the Board, concluded that the requested information was relevant to the "not untenable theory that . . . the correspondence

between Respondent and its customers regarding the removal of such work [from
Respondent's plant] might reveal who really decided on such removal.""
C. The Custom Excavating Rationale
In Custom Excavating, the request for the customer lists was made in a
context in which the relevance of the information to the union was apparent.
Indeed, before demanding the customer lists, the union representative had proclaimed the records provided to be a "patent fraud."'" Moreover, the union's
evidence was presented to the administrative law judge virtually without rebuttal.
Thus, although the Seventh Circuit properly dismissed respondent's reliance
upon American Needle, the inference should not be drawn that the court feels
that customer lists will always be the proper subjects of a union's request for
information. Such an inference would be unwarranted and clearly the court
did not intend such a result. A careful reading of Custom Excavating demonstrates that the decision is largely founded on the facts of that particular case.
Thus, a more enlightened interpretation of the court's holding is that customer
lists are proper subjects of a union's request for information when an employer
provides fraudulent or inaccurate data or claims that information requested is
not in his possession.

50
51

201 N.L.R.B. at 975.
575 F.2d at 104.
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VI. Defenses to an Action for Failure to Furnish Information
In its disposition of Custom Excavating, the Seventh Circuit dismissed,
virtually without comment, the company's assertions of harassment and confidentiality."2 The court decided correctly that the company may not avoid the
union's request for relevant information by the interposition of these defenses
unless they have some bases in fact. Moreover, the company's expressed fear
of customer harassment and the need to shield its customers from such abuse is
merely another way of asserting a need for secrecy. Thus, the company's two
defenses effectively assert only a need for record confidentiality.
A. Confidentiality Claims Are Closely Reviewed
The confidentiality of an employer's records is a principle which has rarely
found support in the courts.53 As the Sixth Circuit has declared, "Rt]he requirement that the bargaining representative be furnished with relevant information
necessary to carrying on its duties overcomes any claim of confidentiality in the
absence of great likelihood of harm flowing from disclosure." 54 This is not to say,
however, that a claim of confidentiality will never be honored, but rather that the
standard applied to such a claim will be very demanding. In short, the union's
right to relevant information is superior to any right of the employer to withhold
such information to preserve its secrecy except in the most extreme circumstances.
B. Employers' Alternatives
Employers undoubtedly will descry the decision in Custom Excavating with
assertions of potential secondary boycotts and other harassment against customers.
The mandate to bargain in good faith, however, applies just as strongly to the
union as it does to the employer.5" Thus, if an employer can substantiate past
acts of harassment or probable future harassment if the union is provided
customer lists, he may withhold the information pending assurances from the
union that the data will not be misused.5" Moreover, harassment is strongly condemned by national labor policy and the courts have regularly upheld broad
orders designated to prevent or counteract such activities.57 Further, violation of
such orders or restrictions would be subject to the same sanctions as violations of
any provision of a judicially enforced order.58
VII. Conclusion
The holding of the Seventh Circuit in Custom Excavating was proper
52 Id. at 106.
53 See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1972); United
Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 993 (1971);
NLRB v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Assoc., 400 F.2d 565, 567 (8th Cir. 1968).
54 NLRB v. Detroit Edison Co., 560 F.2d 722, 726 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct.
1520 (1978).
55 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 159(a)
of this title."
56 Sign & Pictorial U. Local 1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
57 457 F.2d at 620.
58 560 F.2d at 726.
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considering the relevance to the union of the customer lists in completing its
investigation of falsified employer records. Given the bad faith of the employer,
as evidenced by the delivery of doctored records, a ruling denying the lists to the
union would have been incorrect.
The Seventh Circuit initially decided Custom Excavating by unreported
order, but later published its opinion. One might infer from this action that the
court was aware of the importance of the case and sought to avoid potential
misinterpretation.
Initially, the per curiam opinion appears to grant the union a right to
customer lists which is akin to the union's right to other forms of bargaining
related information.59 Such an interpretation, however, misconstrues the court's
opinion which, although flawless in its logic and application of the law, is marred
by its failure to elaborate on the bases of the decision. Consequently, the
opportunity to misapply this precedent still exists.
Generally, customer lists will be of little legitimate interest to unions in the
execution of their collective bargaining duties. Moreover, information of this
type is potentially damaging to an employer if it is utilized for such illegitimate
purposes as harassment and secondary boycotts against customers. Although
remedies are available to the employer for such violations of the union's duty
to bargain in good faith, they are of little value once the damage is incurred.
Thus, it is imperative that the courts clearly explicate that customer lists generally
are not relevant and that a union is not entitled to such information unless it is
able to advance an "articulable suspicion" that the employer has acted in bad
faith.
Two situations in which such a genuine need is likely to arise are (1) when
the employer claims the information is not available to him, and (2) when the
employer supplies fraudulent or inaccurate data. A generalized assertion, however, that the data presented is fraudulent or inaccurate, without the establishment of an "articulable suspicion" upon which to found the assertion, should
not be sufficient to sustain the union's request for customer list information.
Moreover, since the situations, enumerated above, are not all inclusive, the courts
should not summarily dismiss requests made in other factual settings. Rather,
the courts should closely scrutinize the circumstances to determine if an "articulable suspicion" exists upon which the request for customer lists is based.
The Seventh Circuit's failure to elaborate on its reasoning for enforcing the
order of the NLRB in Custom Excavating should not be construed in a manner
which would make customer lists generally available. Clearly this was not the
intention of-the court. The applicable rule is that customer lists must be furnished
in the unusual circumstance in which the union advances an "articulable suspicion" that the employer, in exhibiting bad faith, has furnished falsified information or has refused to furnish requested information which is relevant to the
union's collective bargaining responsibilities. Thus, union entitlement to customer
lists is the exception, not the rule.
Timothy J. Carey
59 See, e.g., note 49 supra, for a discussion of two instances in which a union's right to
bargaining related information has generally been upheld.

Labor Law-Labor Management Relations ActFailure to 'Exhaust Intraunion Remedies May Be
Raised by an Employer as a Defense to
an Employee's § 301 (a) Action.
Harrison v. Chrysler Corporation*
In Harrison v. Chrysler Corporation,' the Seventh Circuit confronted the
issue of whether failure to exhaust intraunion remedies could be raised by an
employer as a defense to an action brought by an employee under § 301 (a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act.2 The court's holding, to the extent it
allows such a defense, constitutes a clear departure from the generally recognized
principle that failure to exhaust intraunion remedies is a defense available only
to the union.
Terrence J. Harrison inspected power steering units on an assembly line at a
Chrysler electrical plant in Indianapolis, Indiana. On December 5, 1966, Harrison was discharged for allegedly falsifying a production count.' Harrison denied
the falsification and sought reinstatement and back pay by resorting to a
grievance procedure established under the collective bargaining agreement between Chrysler and his union.4
The union filed a grievance protesting the discharge, and shortly thereafter
Harrison was offered reinstatement by the labor relations supervisor for Chrysler
if he would admit that he falsified the production count and consent to a 30-day
disciplinary layoff. Harrison rejected the offer. At about that time, the
president of the local union privately told Chrysler's labor relations supervisor
that he did not think Harrison was telling the truth.5
The grievance was processed through the initial grievance procedure which
consisted of four steps in which union and management representatives, at
ascending levels of responsibility, attempted to resolve the employee's grievance.'
Under the collective bargaining agreement, if the participants in th-e last step of
the grievance procedure could not resolve the dispute, the union could refer
the grievance to an appeal board consisting of union officials, management
executives and an impartial chairman.7 The appeal board would then consider
the grievance in two stages. First, union and management representatives would
attempt to settle. If they could not, the matter was to be resolved by a decision
of the impartial chairman acting as arbiter.' A decision of the appeal board
would be final and binding on all parties.9 Harrison's grievance was processed
* 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977).
1 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977).
2 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
3 558 F.2d at 1275.
4 Harrison was a member of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local Union No. 1226. Id. at 1275 n.l.
5 Id. at 1276.

6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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through the initial procedure and finally referred to the appeal board.
On July 10, 1969, the union and management representatives on the board
issued a written disposition of the grievance under which Harrison was granted
reinstatement with full seniority but was denied back pay. Harrison was informed
of the board's decision in 1971 after he telephoned a representative of the union
concerning the progress of his grievance." The representative advised Harrison
of the decision and told him it was final. Harrison rejected the board's decision
and subsequently brought this action against Chrysler under Section 301(a)
asserting that the union had unfairly represented him in the grievance proceedings." The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
granted summary judgment for Chrysler on the ground that Harrison had failed
to exhaust his intraunion remedies.' 2
The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that an employer may raise the
intraunion exhaustion defense under limited circumstances, but that it was unavailable in this case because Chrysler had failed to establish that any private
remedy was available to Harrison to satisfy his claim for back pay.'"
Harrison's treatment of the intraunion exhaustion defense is novel in two
respects. First, the facts of this case did not present circumstances under which
the defense might be available to the employer. Consequently, the Seventh
Circuit's determination of the issue was not necessary to decide the case.'"
Second, those federal courts that have considered this question have held almost

10 Id.
11 Harrison's assertion of unfair representation was based on the following: 1) the statement by the president of the local union, to Chrysler's labor relations supervisor, that he disbelieved Harrison; 2) the slow processing of his grievance which resulted in a 2',2-year delay
between filing and disposition; 3) the ultimate agreement of the union's representatives on the
appeal board not to take the grievance to arbitration, but rather, to grant Harrison the same
relief he had earlier rejected; and 4) the failure of the uniori to notify him of the appeal
board's decision. Id. at 1277.
12 A union's constitution usually establishes certain intraunion appellate procedures
designed to allow a member dissatisfied with the action taken by the union to challenge such
action. The procedures in this case, as set forth in Article 32 of the 1968 Constitution and
Article 33 of the 1970 Constitution are as follows:
Section 1. All subordinate bodies of the International Union, and members
thereof, shall be entitled to the right of appeal....
Section 2. Any member of any Local Union or unit of an Amalgamated Local
Union who wishes to challenge any action, decision or penalty of that body or of any
official or representative of that body must, in all cases and procedures where no
other time limit is specifically set forth by this Constitution, initiate the challenge
before the appropriate body of such Local Union or unit within sixty (60) days of
the time the challenger first becomes aware or reasonably should have become aware
of the alleged action, decision, or penalty of that body.
Section 5. Any member feeling himself aggrieved by any action, decision or
penalty of his subordinate body shall be entitled to appeal that action, decision or
penalty to the International Executive Board only when it has been passed upon by
the Local Union membership or delegate body, as the case may be; except where
direct appeal to the International Executive Board from some action, decision or
penalty of a body other than the Local Union membership or delegate body shall
be specifically permitted by another Article of this Constitution.
Section 13. It shall be the duty of any member or subordinate body who feels
aggrieved by any action, decision, or penalty imposed upon him or it, to exhaust his
or its remedy and all appeals therefrom under the laws of this International Union
prior to appealing to a civil court or governmental agency for redress ....
13 558 F.2d at 1279-80.
14 See text accompanying note 76 infra.
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unanimously that the defense of failure to exhaust intraunion remedies is not
available to the employer."5
I. Federal Suits Under Collective Bargaining Agreements
Approximately 22.5 million workers are represented by unions and work
under terms of collective bargaining agreements. 1" These agreements were
termed in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co." an attempt to erect an entire
system of industrial self-government.' They cover the entire employment relationship and define the terms of workers' individual employment contracts, including certain employee rights regarding employee-employer disputes.' Within
this system of "industrial self-government" the union is designated as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employee in enforcing and protecting
these rights. This authority to represent all members of the union is created
under the Labor-Management Relations Act"° and includes a statutory duty to
fairly represent all employees in collective bargaining. 2 '
A. Employee Suits Under § 301(a)
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) 2 was
designed to reduce industrial disputes and place employees in an equal position
with unions in regard to bargaining and labor relations procedures." Section
301 (a) of the act confers jurisdiction on the federal courts in cases involving
contract violations: "Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees may be brought in any district court
of the United States without respect to the amount in controversy or regard to
citizenship."' 4 The individual employee has the right to sue under § 301 (a) on
collective bargaining agreements negotiated by his union and employer on the
rationale that he is a third-party beneficiary." Moreover, when an employee
claims that the employer has violated the collective bargaining agreement and

15 See note 53 infra.
16 U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, May 1, 1978, at 57.
17 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
18 Id. at 580.
19 Marchione, A Case for Individual Rights Under Collective Agreements, 28 LAB. L. J.
738 (1976).
20 The Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a)
(1970), states in pertinent part that "representatives designated or selected for the purpose of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purpose,
shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining."
21 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (.1967).
22 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-158, 159167, 171-183, 185-187, 191-197, 557 (1970).
23 48 Abi. JUR. 2d Labor § 391 (1970).
24 29 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1970).
25 MacKay v. Loew's, Inc., 182 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1950). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d
348 (1951); 48 Am. JUR. 2d Labor § 1298 (1970).
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that his union has failed to represent him properly in the grievance procedure,"
the employee under § 301 (a) may: 1) sue the employer for wrongful discharge;
2) sue his union for breach of the duty of fair representation; or 3) sue both of
them jointly. 7
Within the context of Harrison, it is crucial to realize that although an
employer may act in good faith in connection with the discipline of the employee
and may follow the statutory bargaining procedure, he is not protected from
an employee suit when the union has breached its duty of fair representation. As
stated in Vaca v. Sipes, 8
It may be true that the employer in such a situation may have done nothing
to prevent exhaustion of the exclusive contractual remedies to which he
agreed in the collective bargaining agreement. But the employer has committed a wrongful discharge in breach of that agreement, a breach which
could be remedied through the grievance process to the employee-plaintiff's
benefit were it not for the union's breach of its statutory duty of fair representation to the employee."
Furthermore, in such cases in which the union's conduct has been found to constitute an unfair labor practice,3" the National Labor Relations Board has proclaimed the employer's conduct an unfair labor practice and has held the union
and the employer jointly and severally liable for any back pay?'
B. Exhaustion of ContractualRemedies Defense
1. Employee Suits Against the Employer
Generally, an employee who sues his employer for wrongful discharge under
§ 301 (a) is bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and, if
the agreement establishes grievance and arbitration procedures as the exclusive
means of enforcing contract rights, the employee must attempt to exhaust those
procedures before he brings suit."
Collective bargaining contract remedies are separate and distinguishable
from intraunion remedies. The former creates a duty upon the employer,
union and employee to abide by the terms and remedies provided in the collective
26 The union breaches the duty of fair representation when its conduct toward a member
of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. For a survey of
the principles involved, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) ; Jacobs, Fair Representation and Binding Arbitration, 28 LAB. L. J. 369 (1977); Note, The Union's Duty of FairRepresentation-Fact or Fiction, 60 MARQ. L. Ray. 1116 (1977); Note, Individual Employee's
Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 251 (1977).
27 NLRB v. Local 485, Int. U. of Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs., 454 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.

1972).
28 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
29 Id. at 185.
30 A union's breach of the duty of fair representation has been held to constitute an unfair
labor practice. See, e.g., Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d
137 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also 48 Am. JuR. 2d Labor § 771 (1970).
31 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 197 n.18.
32 Id. at 184.
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bargaining agreement." The latter creates an obligation between the employee
and the union only and is created by membership in the union. Intraunion
remedies are a method for the resolution of employee-union conflicts and the
employer is not a party to this contract.
The duty of the employee to exhaust contract remedies is grounded in congressional policy that resolution by a method agreed upon by the parties is the
most desirable method for the settlement of grievance disputes. 4 Allowing the
employee to bypass available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit would
deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive
method of orderly settlement of employee grievances.35 In accordance with this
policy, the Supreme Court has held that suits by employees who have bypassed
contract grievance procedures must be dismissed by the district court."
2. Employee Suits Against the Union
A similar policy is found regarding suits by the employee against his union.
It is well established that when there is no question as to the adequacy and
mandatory nature of intraunion remedies,3" an exhaustion of those remedies is an
indispensable prerequisite to the institution of an action against the union."
Union membership establishes a contractual relationship between the union and
employee vis-a-vis the union constitution. This relationship imposes an obligation
upon the employee to exhaust intraunion remedies.39
A general national policy exists against judicial interference in the internal
affairs of a union until it has had at least some opportunity to resolve disputes
concerning its own internal affairs.4" This federal policy of "staying the hand of
judicial interference," and requiring exhaustion of internal remedies is based
on the desire that such procedures, with the aid of persons experienced at resolving member-union conflicts, will result in speedy resolution of disputes without
the delay inherent in judicial proceedings. 4'
II. Relaxation of the Exhaustion of Contractual Remedies Doctrine
The Supreme Court has recently redefined the balance between national
labor policy and individual employee rights within the scope of § 301 (a) actions.
In Vaca v. Sipes,42 the Supreme Court reiterated the basic premise that an employee must attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures
33 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
34 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartl y) Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)
(1970), states in pertinent part that "[f]inal adjustments by a method agreed upon by the
parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over
the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement .
35 Republic Steel Corporation v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 654 (1965).
36 Id.
37 See note 12 supra.
38 Newgent v. Modine Manufacturing Company, 495 F.2d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 1974).
39 Neal v. System Board of Adjustments (Missouri Pacific R.), 348 F.2d 722, 726 (8th
Cir. 1965).
40 Ruzicka v. General Motors Corporation, 523 F.2d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 1975).
41 Id. at 312.
42 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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established by the collective bargaining agreement when the action against the
employer is based upon a breach of that agreement. The Court acknowledged,
however, that since these contractual remedies are fashioned and often controlled
by the employer and union, they may prove, under certain circumstances, unsatisfactory or unworkable for the individual employee. The Court recognized
that an employee should not be limited to the exclusive remedial procedures
established by the contract when the conduct of the employer amounts to a
repudiation of those contractual procedures.43
Such a situation arises when the employee is prevented from exhausting his
contractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to process his grievance."
Under these circumstances the employer is estopped from relying on the unexhausted contract procedures as a defense to the employee's § 301 (a) action.45
In effect, the wrongfully discharged employee can bring a § 301 (a) action
against the employer in the face of a defense based on the failure to exhaust
contractual remedies provided the employee can prove a breach in the union's
duty of fair representation." The Court declared,
[W]e cannot believe that Congress, in conferring upon employers and unions
the power to establish exclusive grievance procedures intended to confer
upon unions such unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all
remedies for breach of contract. Nor do we think that Congress intended
to shield employers from the natural consequences of their47 breaches of
bargaining agreements in the enforcement of such agreements.
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.," the Supreme Court expanded the
Vaca rationale by holding that a "union's breach of duty relieves the employee
of an expressed or implied requirement that disputes be settled through contractual procedures and, if it seriously undermines the integrity of the arbitral
process, also removes the bar of finality provision of the contract."49 The Court
read § 301 (a) as reflecting the interest of Congress in promoting "a higher
degree of responsibility" among the parties to collective bargaining agreements to
the aggrieved employee.
Vaca and Hines reflect judicial recognition of the necessity of balancing
the dual interest presented under § 301 (a) actions: 1 ) the strong national policy
in settling labor disputes through the collective bargaining agreement, and 2) the
need to afford the aggrieved employee a final resolution of his claim while
protecting his rights."
As a practical matter, Vaca and Hines provide the employee with easier
access to a federal forum by relieving him of the duty to exhaust collective
bargaining remedies before bringing suit. In addition, they remove the finality
43 Id. at 185.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 186.
47 Id.
48 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
49 Id. at 567.
50 See 348 F.2d at 726. See also Note, Finality and Fair Representation: Grievance
Arbitration Is Not Final if the Union Has Breached Its Duty of FairRepresentation, 34 WASn.
& LEE L. REv. 309 (1977).
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of collective bargaining grievance resolutions, thereby resulting in the possibility
that the employer will be required to relitigate, in a federal court, the issue of the
wrongful discharge. The fact that the employer has acted in good faith in the
grievance procedure will not shield him from an action based on the union's
unfair representation.
As a result of Vaca and Hines, an employer who has received a favorable
decision under the collective bargaining grievance procedures and who is faced
with an employee § 301 (a) suit based on union misconduct cannot safely rely
on the finality of the decision arrived at under the grievance procedure, nor can
he rely on the exhaustion of contract remedies defense. Under these circumstances, employers sought to develop an alternate defense and, as a result, turned
to the intraunion exhaustion doctrine. This defense suggests that an employee
should not be allowed to sue an employer on a claim based on the breach of the
collective bargaining agreement when he has not completed the search for a
remedy within his own union.
Traditionally, however, the defense based on the employee's failure to
exhaust intraunion remedies has, under the authority of Federal Courts of Appeal, been available only to the union.51 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, found
itself attempting to shape the scope of § 301 (a) actions by favoring the defense,
even absent authority sustaining an employer's right to the defense. 2
III. Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies as an Employer's Defense
Both Federal District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeal have had occasion to address this defense. The conclusions reached by these courts, however,
have been conflicting.
A. Courts of Appeal
Circuit Courts of Appeal which have addressed the intraunion exhaustion
issue have held or stated that the defense is not available to the employer. 3
Brady v. Transworld Airlines, Inc.,54 is one of the earliest cases to define the
distinction between contract remedies and intraunion remedies. Its dicta has
stood for the basic proposition that the intraunion exhaustion defense is not
available to the employer. "The present dispute focuses on the employment
relationship rather than the union relationship. Failure to exhaust internal
remedies applies to situations which concern wholly internal union matters."55
51 Orphan v. Furnco Construction Corporation, 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972).
52 See note 53 infra.
53 See Winter v. Local Union No. 639, ETC., 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Peterson
v. Rath Packing Company, 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972); Retana v. Apartment, Motel,
Hotel and E.L.O.P.U., Loc. No. 14. 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972). For cases indirectly supporting this proposition, see Ruzicka v. General Motors Corporation, 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir.
1975); Imel v. Zohn Manufacturing Company, 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1973); Brady v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 102-04 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048
(1969); Foy v. Norfolk and Western Railroad Company, 377 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1967);
Finger v. Seaboard Airline Company, 277 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1960).
54 401 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
55 Id. at 102. The dispute referred to is the employee's action against the employer for
wiongful discharge. The employee was discharged for his alleged failure to pay back union
dues.
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In Peterson v. Rath Packing Company,5" a group of women brought a §
301 (a) action against their employer for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement and against their union for failure to represent them fairly. The
employer asserted the employees' failure to exhaust intraunion remedies as a
defense. The Eighth Circuit, in rejecting this defense, reasoned that "[t]he
company cannot urge that the plaintiffs should have further appealed the grievance to the rank and file membership since there is no such requirement within
the collective bargainingagreement. The question of exhaustion of internal union
procedures is the union's concern, not the company's.""7
The decisions denying the employer this defense are based on a recognition
of the basic difference between contract and union remedies. The intraunion
exhaustion requirement is predicated upon a contract between the employee and
the union, and "[t]he employer cannot avail himself of the union's contractual
defense.""8 Moreover, the policy of avoiding judicial interference with the
internal affairs of a union cannot be asserted by the employer since the policy
protects only the interest of the union. It is upon these premises that courts of
appeal have held or stated unanimously that the defense is not available to the
employer. 9 As stated by the D.C. Circuit in Winter v. Local Union No- 639,
ETC.,60
[n]o court of appeals has held that the defense is available to the employer;
the only court of appeals to suggest otherwise was the 7th Circuit in Orphan
v. Furnco. Even under the Orphan dictum, there is no circuit court authority for making the defense of failure to exhaust union remedies available to
the employer .... c"
B. District Courts
Even though an employer's use of the intraunion exhaustion defense has
not found favor in the courts of appeal, several federal district courts have made
the defense available to the employer. 2
The most cogent rationale for allowing the defense is found in Brookins v.
Chrysler Corp."5 This decision intimates that the availability of the exhaustion
defense to the employer derives collaterally from Vaca and Hines." The Brookins
court reasoned that requiring exhaustion might reveal the union's good faith
56 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972).
57 Id. at 315 (emphasis added). Under Hines, the employer could not avail himself of the
defense even if intraunion exhaustion was required under the collective bargaining contract.
The union's breach of duty relieved the employee of any requirement that disputes be settled
through contractual procedures.
58 569 F.2d at 150.
59 See note 53 supra.
60 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
61 Id. at 150.
62 Baldini v. Local Union No. 1095, ETC., 435 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Bradley
v. Ford Motor Co., 417 F. Supp. 23, 26 (N.D. Il1., 1975); Fleming v. Chrysler Corp., 416 F.
Supp. 1258, 1266 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563, 568-69
(E.D. Mich. 1974); Harrington v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
63 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
64 Recall that these Supreme Court decisions hold that the employer cannot safely rely
on the outcome of collective bargaining grievance procedures when the union has breached its
duty of fair representation during the grievance process. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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and thus render the contract action against the employer nugatory. 5 The court
stated:
By exhausting his internal remedies the employee may be able to eliminate
the very wrong of which he complains, not merely obtain a remedy in another forum. If the union's wrongful act were reversed .. . the employee
would no longer have a cause of action for breach of duty of fair representahave no right under Vaca to sue his employer
tion and consequently 6would
G
for breach of contract.
The court further indicated that this conclusion was consistent with national labor
policy favoring arbitration.
In Fleming v. Chrysler Corp.," the district court adopted the Brookins rationale and concluded that requiring exhaustion of intraunion remedies would
give the union a chance to rectify any alleged wrong and thereby prevent any
breach of its duty of fair representation.
An inference to be drawn from these decisions is that the district courts
were looking to promote the congressional policy of encouraging disputes to be
settled through the grievance machinery to which the parties had agreed in the
collective bargaining contract. It is primarily upon the Brookins rationale, augmented with an interest to further national labor policy, that the federal district
courts have justified the employer's use of the defense.6"
IV. Harrison on the Intraunion Exhaustion Defense
The Seventh Circuit in Harrison drew from its earlier decision in Orphan v.
Furnca Construction Corp., 9 a case in which an employee had brought a §
301 (a) action against his employer for violation of a collective bargaining agreement. The Orphan court suggested, without deciding, that permitting the
employer to raise the defense would facilitate the national labor policy favoring
nonjudicial resolution of grievance disputes. The court, however, declined to
extend the defense to the employer because it found that an intraunion appeal
could not have resulted in any practicable remedy for the employee.
Using the foundation established in Orphan, the Seventh Circuit concluded
in Harrisonthat a rule requiring intraunion exhaustion would directly and substantially benefit the employer by enabling him to rely on the integrity of the
grievance procedure in all cases in which it has not been irretrievably spoiled by
the union's unfair representation."0 The Seventh Circuit further established that
the employee owes an obligation to the employer to exhaust available methods of
reviving a stalled grievance procedure before abandoning that procedure and
resorting to the courts for relief. 7 ' The Harrison court found this obligation to
be implied under a collective bargaining agreement which reposes in the union
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

381 F. Supp. at 568-69.
Id.
416 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
See note 62 supra.
466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972).
558 F.2d at 1278.
Id.
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exclusive authority to represent the employee in contractual claims against the
employer and which provides grievance machinery as the exclusive method of
resolving those claims.7 2
The court stated that no valid reason appeared for relieving the employee
from the contractual requirement that he rely on the union for representation
and the grievance procedure for relief, so long as the procedure remained viable
and fair representation could be obtained."'
Harrisonindicates that to successfully raise the defense, the employer would
have to establish that: 1) an intraunion appeal could result in reversal of the
union's refusal to press the grievance; 2) the grievance could be reinstated in
accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement; and possibly, 3) resort to the intraunion appellate procedures would not be futile.74 If
an employer can establish these elements, the district court would be required
to dismiss the action.
A. The Propriety of the Seventh Circuit's Discussion of the Defense
In Harrison,after stating that an employer could use the intraunion defense
under certain circumstances, the Seventh Circuit held the defense unavailable to
Chrysler because an intraunion appeal could not have satisfied Harrison's claim
for back pay.
In this regard, Harrison is similar to Orphan. The latter case, however,
refused to extend the defense to employers since the facts were not proper for
its application. Yet in Harrison the court expressly concluded that employers
could use the defense notwithstanding the same lack of appropriate facts present
in Orphan. Thus, the grant of the exhaustion defense appears to have been unnecessary to a resolution of the case. As stated by Chief Judge Fairchild in his
concurring opinion,
[b]ecause it is clear that the facts of this case do not fit the situation suggested by the employer's argument discussed in Orphan, . . . and really
dictum there as here, I prefer not to speculate as to whether there are any
"limited circumstances" under which an employer might predicate
a defense
75
on the employee's failure to exhaust intraunion remedies.
The import of the Harrison decision is found in its "dictum" recognizing the
defense. It is essential, therefore, to isolate the reasons behind the court's discussion of the intraunion exhaustion issue.
The Seventh Circuit was possibly using Harrison to further their interpretation of national labor policy that favors the submission of grievances to arbitration
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1278-79.
74 Id. at 1279. Although the Seventh Circuit does not make the third factor explicitly an
element of the defense, the proposition that an employee is under no drty to exhaust intraunion
remedies when it would be futile to do so is generally accepted by courts that have addressed
the issue. See, e.g., Dorn v. Meyers Parking System, 395 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See
also 48 AM. JUR. 2d Labor § 334 (1970).
75 558 F.2d at 1280 (emphasis added).

[VCol. 54:489]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

instead of the courts. 76 The court stated that, "under certain circumstances an
employee's appeal within the union, after a union official's bad faith refusal to
push his grievance, might place the grievance procedure back on its proper
course." 7 7 Apparently the court was recognizing that it may be inequitable in
some situations to allow an employee to sue his employer based on the union's
breach of its duty of fair representation when the employer has complied in good
faith with all bargaining procedures.
Another possible explanation for the Seventh Circuit's action may have been
its concern with the recent proliferation of labor dispute cases in the federal
courts. Many of the disputes that were once settled by arbitration are beginning
to appear at an increasing rate on federal court dockets."8 This proliferation has
given rise to understandable concern since it directly conflicts with the policy
favoring nonjudicial disposition of grievance disputes.
B. The Implied Obligation Rationale
The Seventh Circuit rejected the rationale of district courts which have
allowed the defense 79 and adopted instead an "implied obligation" approach."
The legal grounds upon which this implied obligation is based are, however,
rather unclear. The duty to exhaust intraunion remedies is grounded upon a
contractual relationship between the employee and his union. The great weight
of authority recognizes that the employer, not being a party to the contract, has
no standing to raise the defense."' Yet the Harrisoncourt found an implied obligation owed by the employee to the employer to exhaust available methods of
reviving a stalled grievance procedure before abandoning that procedure and
resorting to the courts'for relief.8"
The "implied obligation," created under the Seventh Circuit rationale by
the collective bargaining contract, must be based upon the union contract with
its employees. The court does not reveal clearly how this obligation, which is
owed by the employee to his union for the benefit of the union and the employee,
can be collaterally incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement and
thereby entitle the employer to enforce it. Even assuming that the obligation
could arise under the collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court in
Hines held that no requirement exists to settle grievances under the contractual
machinery when there is unfair union representation.
The Supreme Court decisions of Vaca and Hines preclude the employers'
use of the exhaustion of contract remedies defense when there is unfair union
representation. The contractual defense is disallowed even though the employee
owes a direct duty to the employer under the collective bargaining agreement to
exhaust contract remedies before resorting to the courts. The Seventh Circuit
76 See Adomeit, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight: Another Step in the Seemingly Inexorable
March Toward Converting Federal Judges (and Juries) Into Labor Arbitrators of Last Resort,
9 CONN. L. REv.627 (1977).
77 558 F.2d at 1278.
78 See Adomeit, supra note 77, at 627.
79 558 F.2d at 1277.
80 See text accompanying note 71 supra.
81 See note 53 supra.
82 558 F.2d at 1278.
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appears to disregard the Vaca and Hines authority, however, by allowing the
employer to rely on an indirect duty which arises under the union constitution
and is incorporated by implication into the collective bargaining agreement. Yet,
if the employer is unable to rely on the direct duty, he should not be able to rely
on an indirect duty created under an "implied obligation" rationale. By allowing
the intraunion exhaustion defense when the collective bargaining defense is not
available, Harrison violates the spirit, if not the letter, of Vaca and Hines.83
Another possible interpretation of this "implied obligation" to exhaust is
that the employer is placed in the position of a third-party beneficiary. To assume, however, that the employer is the intended beneficiary of a contract
between the employee and the union is questionable. At most, the employer
would seem to be an incidental beneficiary who attains no right to the contract
benefits.84
The intent of the Harrison decision is to deter aggrieved employees from
resorting to the courts when intraunion appellate procedures could result in
reviving the grievance procedure. Its practical effect, however, will depend on
subsequent decisions applying the "limited circumstances" under which the
defense may be raised. These "limited circumstances" appear to be quite narrow.
The Seventh Circuit indicates that the defense may be used only for the
limited purposes of regaining fair representation and reviving the grievance procedure.8" The implication of this limited grant is best understood when viewed
within the context that collective bargaining agreements generally provide that a
settlement at any stage is final. As stated by Chrysler,
[w]hile the initial panel recognizes the employer's right to raise the defense
of exhaustion, nevertheless, it renders such defense almost useless by limiting
it to situations where a stalled grievance procedure can be revived. The
problem with the limited rule enunciated by the initial panel is that almost
uniformly collective bargaining agreements provide that a settlement at any
stage is final or that a grievance not processed from one step to the next
within certain time limits is barred. Therefore, as a practical matter in almost
every case in which an employee brings suit for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, it is already too late to revive or institute the grievance
procedure unless the employer voluntarily waives his right to rely on the time
further processing or on the final and binding nature of the
limits barring
86
settlement.
The Harrisoncourt, in commenting on this very problem, stated "[t]he suggestion
...that the union could have requested Chrysler to reopen the grievance proceeding . . . is patently frivolous. There is no basis for assuming that Chrysler
willingly would have exposed itself to the very liability that it resists in this
action." 8 7 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, apparently recognized the limitation
83 Cf., Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Company, 310 F. Supp. 891, 902 (D. Me. 1970) (by
implication).
84 See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 133, 147 (1932); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

85
86
87

§ 133 (1973).

558 F.2d at 1279.
Appellee's Brief for Rehearing at 8.
558 F.2d at 1279.
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of its rationale and yet failed to define its scope or to provide guidelines for its
implementation in future cases.
As a consequence of so limited and vague a rule, the employer is confronted
with the choice of abandoning the defense or voluntarily resubmitting itself to the
grievance machinery. In the final analysis, therefore, it seems unlikely that the
Seventh Circuit's "implied obligation" theory will be followed by other circuits
faced with the intraunion exhaustion issue. This conclusion results not only
because the theory finds little support under established case law, but also because
it is simply too limited to provide an effective means of promoting the national
labor policy in favor of arbitration.
C. Alternatives
The district court's rationale finds stronger support under case law with
respect to its use of Vaca in formulating a general grant of the defense. The
proposition that there is no breach of the duty of fair representation until there
is intraunion exhaustion, however, is flawed for several reasons. First, Vaca held
that an employee must plead and prove unfair representation in order to sue the
employer. The Court further held that this was established when the union's
conduct was found to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. The Court did
not hold, nor can it be inferred, that intraunion exhaustion was an element of
proving bad faith. In fact, exhaustion of internal union remedies is not an
element of the cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation.
Rather, it is a requirement based on strong federal policies favoring the quick
resolution of such disputes without judicial interference.88 Second, the fictitious
assertion that a wrong has not been committed until intraunion procedures are
exhausted would
result as a practical matter in allowing an injustice to go with89
out a remedy
Dorn v. Meyers ParkingSystem"0 rejects the district courts' rationale that the
existence of an intraunion appellate procedure prevents a cognizable breach of
the union's fair representation duty from occurring prior to the exhaustion of the
appellate procedures. The Dorn court states that "that holding is analogous to
the principle that where state officials violate state law by conduct also prohibited
by the Federal Constitution if a state remedy exists, no unconstitutional state
action has yet occurred. This holding has been firmly repudiated."'"
In applying national labor policy to § 301 (a) actions, there must be a
recognition that such policy also includes a strong interest in protecting individual
employee rights as well as a desire to submit grievances to arbitration rather than

88 Pesola v. Inland Tool & Mfg., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 30, 34- (E.D. Mich. 1976).
89 The suit against the employer would be dismissed because the employee failed to exhaust
his internal remedies; yet since union constitutions almost uniformly provide that challenges to
union actions not processed within certain time limits are barred, the employee would be
effectively foreclosed from a hearing on his grievance. Cf., 569 F.2d at 153 n.1 (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting) (exhaustion cannot be absolute prerequisite to suit).
90 395 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
91 Id. at 785 n.6.
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courts.92 For this reason, one possible solution to the basic controversy might be
found in the nature of the claims asserted by the employee and employer.
The employee is basically aggrieved because his union has wrongfully refused
to take his grievance to arbitration. The employer desires to resolve disputes
through the arbitration procedures established under the collective bargaining
agreement. Under these circumstances, an order by the court compelling arbitration, while retaining jurisdiction, would seem to provide the best remedy to the
various interests asserted.9" The Vaca court indicated that this was a possible
solution to the problem.
It is true that the employee's action is based on the employer's alleged breach
of contract plus the union's alleged wrongful failure to afford him his
contractual remedy of arbitration. For this reason, an order compelling
arbitration should be viewed as one of the available remedies when a breach
of the union's duty is proved. 94
By the use of this procedure, the grievance could be settled within the
established collective bargaining machinery, considerable time and expense could
be saved for both the employee and employer, and the greater expertise arbitrators possess in labor dispute cases could more easily resolve the controversy.
Moreover, such a solution would take the interests of both the employee and
employer into account. The employee is afforded a potentially speedier remedy
and the employer is able to rely on the collective bargaining machinery upon
which he and the union had bargained. Finally, it provides a resolution which is
clearly in line with national labor policy.95
V. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit's "implied obligation" to exhaust intraunion remedies
appears to be an attempt to establish, without precedent, a new principle of law
in § 301 (a) employee-employer disputes. Although it is evident that the Seventh
Circuit's primary concern in Harrison was facilitating the national labor policy
favoring the resolution of labor disputes within the collective bargaining machinery, the limited scope and uncertainty of the decision will limit its practical impact
on this goal. As a result, it seems unlikely that the "implied obligation" approach, as formulated by the Seventh Circuit, will find favor in the additional
Federal Courts of Appeal.

92 See Marchione, supra note 19, at 740.
93 See, e.g., Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 1975);
Marchione, supra note 19 at 745-46.
94 386 U.S. at 196.
95 It should be recognized that a rule compelling arbitration has its limitations. First, if
the collective bargaining agreement does not provide for arbitration the rule may not be applicable. Second, compelled arbitration would serve no useful purpose if the circumstances of
the employee-employer dispute have reached a level where arbitration could not provide a
viable remedy to either party. For these reasons, a rule allowing for compelled arbitration
would be best left to the trial court's discretion.
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A preferable approach to the problem is found in a procedure which allows
the district court to compel arbitration, while retaining jurisdiction, until the
controversy is settled. Beyond providing a method for resolving labor disputes
within the collective bargaining machinery, an order compelling arbitration
benefits both the employee and employer by allowing them to rely on the expertise possessed by arbitrators in these types of cases. Since such a procedure can
result in a speedier resolution of the grievance while taking into account the
interest of both parties, it seems likely to promote labor policy to a greater extent
than would a grant of the exhaustion defense to the employer.
Alcides I. Avila

Labor Law-Interpretation of Section 8(d) (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act of 1947-Untimely Notice
by the Initiating Party to Mediation Services Does Not
Prevent Economic Sanctions by the Noninitiating Party.
Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board*
I. Introduction
When considering lockouts or strikes as a means of introducing economic
pressure during collective bargaining, special attention must be given to the conditions on collective bargaining imposed by Section 8(d) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) of 1947.' In addition to the general duty to bargain in
good faith,2 the statute requires that the initiating party, the party desiring to
modify the contract, must notify the opposing party of the desired contract
change sixty days before the expiration of the current contract.' Section 8(d)
further requires that the initiating party give notice to federal and state mediation
services thirty days after the first notice to the opposing party.4 Nonobservance of
*
1
2

573 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1978).
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act).
Section 8(d) provides:
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession:

Id.
Sections 8(d)(1) and (4) provide:
Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering
employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract,
unless the party desiring such termination or modification(1) serves written notice upon the other party to the contract of the
proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date
therefor, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days
prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification ...
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty
days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract,
whichever occurs later.
29 U.S.C. § 158 (d)(1), (4) (1970).
The sixty-day period established in both § 8(d) (I) and § 8(d) (4) is commonly referred
to as the sixty-day "cooling off" period. In NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957), the
Supreme Court clarified the definition of "expiration date" mentioned in § 8(d) (4) to include
a date for modification of the contract as well as a termination date.
If the initiating party serves notice less than sixty days before the expiration date, the full
sixty days must still elapse. Until then, neither a strike nor a lockout can occur. [1978] 3
LABOR L. REP. (CCH)1 5240. Untimely sixty-day notice, however, is not the subject of this
comment.
3

4

Section 8(d) (3) provides:
that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the
party desiring such termination or modification(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty
days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith
notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate
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these requirements may render either a strike or a lockout unlawful.
Although charged with abiding by the statute, parties have, on occasion,
failed to comply with its provisions and then afterwards attempted to justify
their actions. As a result, ambiguities have arisen concerning the effect of giving
untimely notice.5
In Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
the Seventh Circuit was confronted by a novel variation of noncompliance with
the statute. The initiating party in Hooker Chemicals, the union, allegedly exploited its failure to give timely notice to the mediation services. The union
sought to prevent the noninitiating party from imposing economic sanction at
the expiration of the contract by forcing it to withhold the impositions of such
sanctions until the end of the thirty-day period for mediation.
The Seventh Circuit concluded in Hooker Chemicals that, pursuant to Section 8 (d) (3), the noninitiating party can bring economic pressure on the initiating party at the end of the contract or of the sixty-day "cooling off" period' despite
untimely notice by the initiating party to the mediation services. This comment
will interpret the manner in which Section 8(d) (3) treats this unique but
potentially recurring situation in collective bargaining. Such an analysis of Section
8(d) (3) demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute is
in harmony with congressional intent in rendering a just resolution for the
parties involved.
disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no
agreement has been reached by that time .
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) is an independent agency,
which is required to offer its mediation and conciliation facilities to industry whenever in the
Service's "judgment the dispute threatens to cause a substantial interruption of commerce."
The Service does not extend its facilities to interstate railroads or airlines, which are under
another agency. [1978] 3 LABOR L. REP. (CCH) 116920.
Mediation is essentially a passive attempt to resolve differences; the parties agree to submit
to a third party, called a mediator, who proposes ways of resolving the underlying dispute.
Conciliation is a more active attempt to resolve the differences; the conciliator acts to effect
necessary adjustments, but in neither case are the parties compelled to accept the suggestions
of the Service. The parties may, however, give the Service binding power over them in arbitration. Id. ff 6901. For the Service's complete regulations see [1978] 1 LABOR L. REP. (CCH)
1 1181-1186.16.
5 In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956), the Supreme Court held
that a strike during the sixty-day "cooling off" period was lawful because it was held to protest
the employer's unfair labor practice. Procter & Gamble Independent Union of Port Ivory v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962), held that untimely notice to the
mediation services did not extend the period of the contract past its expiration date. In United
Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955), a strike
called within one hour of giving notice to the employer and with no notice given to the mediation services was held unlawful and thereby allowed the employer to lock out. Local 3, United
Packinghouse Workers of America v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1954), held that a strike
which occurred several months before the end of the contract was unlawful. International
Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Dahlem Constr., 143 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1951), held that when
untimely § 8(d) (3) notice was given, the fact that thirty days had elapsed after notice and
before the strike could not provide a defense in a breach of contract action. Illinois State
Employers v. NLRB, 395 F. Supp. 1011 (1975), dealt with a situation similar to Hooker
Chemicals. The union delayed filing notice to the mediation services and went on strike
before the end of the thirty-day period. In re Eisen, 77 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1948), held that failure to
give timely § 8(d)(3) notice does not prolong the length of a contract. Kaynard v. Bagel
12,499, presented a situation in which the employer and
Bakers Council [1968] 57 Lab. Cas.
not the union was the initiating party and failed to give § 8(d) (3) notice.
6 According to § 8(d) (4), economic weapons can be used only after the latter of the two
time periods have elapsed. See note 3 supra.
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II. Statement of the Case
Hooker Chemicals and the International Chemicals Workers Union operated under collective bargaining agreements, one of which was to expire on
April 15, 1975. On January 27, 1975, the union gave notice of its desire to renegotiate those contracts and thereby initiated the sixty-day "cooling off" period.
Despite intense bargaining, the parties were unable to reach an agreement by the
middle of April. The union gave notice to the mediation services pursuant to
Section 8(d) (3) on April 9. On April 15, the union informed Hooker Chemicals that it had rejected the management's last offer. Although the union advised
Hooker Chemicals that its members were willing to continue work, the management locked out its employees upon expiration of the current contract.7
The noninitiating party, therefore, imposed a lockout after the end of both
the contract and the sixty-day "cooling off" period but before the end of the
thirty-day period for mediation. The union sought relief from the lockout by
charging Hooker Chemicals with unfair labor practices before the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB held that by locking out its employees
before the end of the thirty-day period for mediation, Hooker Chemicals had
violated its duty to bargain collectively under Section 8(d) of the Act and thus
had committed an unfair labor practice.' The Board balanced the legitimate
interests of the noninitiating party against the potential benefits of mandatory
mediation and ruled in favor of mediation. The Board believed that such a
result would best effect the congressional intent of eliminating substantial obstruction to the free flow of commerce by encouraging collective bargaining.
In light of Section 8(d) (3) and National Labor Relations Board v. Peoria
Chapter of Painting & Decorating Contractors,' Hooker Chemicals petitioned
for review in the Seventh Circuit. The court granted the petition and denied the
NLRB's cross-application for the enforcement of their prior order that the use
of economic weapons by the noninitiating party before the end of the thirty-day
period for mediation was an unfair labor practice.
III. Section 8(d) (3) and Its Initial Evolution
In passing the NLRA, Congress discussed extensively its underlying
policies." The prevailing objective of the Act is to preserve the "normal flow of
commerce" by avoiding industrial strife." By prescribing "the legitimate rights
of employers and employees"'" and by prescribing procedures for the peaceful
7 The lockout continued from April 15, 1973, to June 9, 1973, when the parties reached
a new two-year agreement. Id. at 967.
8 Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 1535 (1976). Section 8(a)(1)
provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of the title." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1) (1970). Section 8(a) (5) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (5) (1970).
9 500 F.2d 54 (7th -Cir. 1974).
10 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § l(b), 61
Stat. 136 (1947).

11

Id.

12

Id.
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resolution of labor disputes, the threat of industrial strife is minimized. Essential
to this concept is the preservation of the employee's right to organize collectively.13
In interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court recognized a dual purpose regarding collective organization, namely "to substitute collective bargaining for
economic warfare and to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted
activity for their own benefit."' 4 To accomplish the first goal, Congress imposed
a sixty-day period, during the first thirty days of which the parties must attempt to
resolve the dispute themselves. Absent success, the party who first raised the issue
of modification has the responsibility' of notifying the mediation services that
assistance is needed to resolve the dispute."6 The NLRB and the courts, therefore, have held that notification is mandatory 7 and that it is an "integral part of
the congressional scheme to achieve a higher degree of stability in collective
bargaining.""8
The Act should not be interpreted, however, so as to prohibit the use of
economic weapons. Section 8(d) (4) specifically permits strikes or lockouts 9
after the expiration of the contract or the sixty-day "cooling off" period, whichever occurs later. Thus, the policy considerations in Hooker Chemicals are contrasting. The value of requiring a thirty-day period within which to mediate conflicts with the right of the noninitiating party to use economic pressure at the end
of the "cooling off" period. If the initiating party had fulfilled its obligations to
13 Id.
14 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. at 284. The Court also warned against
adopting an interpretation which "would produce incongruous results." Id. at 286.
15 When the noninitiating party might be prevented from using its economic weapons
because the initiating party has either failed to give notice or given untimely notice, it has
been suggested that the noninitiating party could preserve its right to use economic pressure
at the end of the sixty-day period by inquiring whether the initiating party had given notice,
and if it had not, to give notice itself. The NLRB in both Peoria Contractors, 204 N.L.R.B. at
346, and Hooker Chemicals, 224 N.L.R.B. at 1536, proposed this solution. A comment on
Peoria Contractors proposes that both parties carry the burden of notifying the mediation
services. Comment, Labor Law-The Lockout Loophole in 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (3), 24 EMORY
L. J. 495, 507-10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lockout Loophole].
The congressional regulation requiring the noninitiating party to? notify the mediation
The District of Columbia Circuit in United Furniture
services is well reasoned.
Workers v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 838 (1964), noted that if
the burden of notification is not squarely placed on one party, there is a high probability
that the public interest in the emollient intervention of the mediation services will
fall between the two stools of contending parties. . . . It is a peril which can be
avoided by assigning a fixed and definite responsibility for notifying the public
agencies. Congress has made that assignment and, not surprisingly, it is to the party
who started the process.
Id. at 741.
The Seventh Circuit in Hooker Chemicals noted, however, that such a proposal could
place the noninitiating party in a dilemma. If it does not inquire to determine whether
notification has been given, it risks being delayed in using its economic sanctions. If it does
inquire, it risks cooling the negotiation. 573 "F.2d at 970.
16 The beneficial effects of mandatory notification were quickly recognized after the passage
of the Act. "In the days before the 30-day notice was required, strikes frequently occurred
before the... service had any knowledge that there was a dispute. Mr. Chaing (First Director
of the FMCS) believes that in many instances the early intervention of conciliators has prevented a strike."2 JOINT CosM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT, S. REP.
No. 986, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1948).
17 International Union of Operating Engrs. v. Dahlem Construction, 193 F.2d at 473.
18 Retail Clerks Local 1179, 109 N.L.R.B. at 759; Peoria Contractors, 204 N.L.R.B. at 346.
19 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (4) (1970). In American Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300
(1965), the Supreme Court held that the employer may lock out "in support of a legitimate
bargaining position," and a lockout, therefore, was not "inconsistent with the right to bargain
collectively." Id. at 310.
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file proper notice pursuant to Section 8 (d) (3), the use of such economic pressure
would not be questioned.
In addition to Hooker Chemicals, Peoria Contractorsis the only case which
has addressed the effect of untimely Section 8(d) (3) notice on the noninitiating
party. Thus, the NLRB's treatment of this form of untimely notice in both Peoria
Contractors and Hooker Chemicals merits further analysis.
IV. The Board's Position Requiring Mediation
A. Prior Board Decisions
The Board first addressed the issue of untimely Section 8(d) (3) notice in
Retail Clerks InternationalAssociation Local 1179.20 The union, which desired
to modify the contract, served proper sixty-day notice, but never served notice to
the mediation services. The union went on strike almost four months after giving
the first notice. Although the Trial Examiner held that the union committed an
unfair labor practice by not notifying the mediation services, he also ruled that
the mediation provisions were ancillary. Thus, violation of the mediation provisions alone did not render the strike unlawful. 2
The Board ruled, however, that striking without first giving notice to the
mediation services constituted an unfair labor practice. The Board noted that the
Trial Examiner's ruling would "[permit] the very act which constituted the
Respondent Union's misconduct to go unremedied," 22 and that "[t]here is
nothing to indicate that Congress regarded the mandatory requirement [of
Section 8(d) (3)] as less significant than any other of the mandatory provisions."" The NLRB further stated that the mediation services "enhance the
probability of a peaceful settlement,"24 and that such services are "an integral
part of the scheme evolved by Congress for achieving a higher degree of stability
in collective bargaining." 2 Accordingly, the Board held that "Section 8(d), by
its plain language and intent, made it unlawful for the Respondent Union to
strike . . . without first serving notice [upon the mediation services] of its dispute . .
The sanctity of the thirty-day period was reaffirmed in Local 219, Retail
Clerks InternationalAssociation.2 7 In Local 219, Retail Clerks, the union gave
notice to the mediation services over two months after Section 8(d) (1) notice
had been given and struck ten days afterwards. In adopting the Trial Examiner's
holding that a thirty-day period must exist within which to mediate, the Board apparently adopted an argument made by the General Counsel to the NLRB
that "the spirit of the law has been violated by not permitting thirty days since the
[services of the] Mediation Service [were] available or could be obtained." 2
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Retail

109 N.L.R.B. 754 (1959).
Id. at 768.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 759.
Id.
120 N.L.R.B. 272 (1958).
Id. at 278. The Board apparently presented this argument to the court in Local 219,
Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 265 F.2d at 819.
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In finding that the Union had committed an unfair labor practice by striking without giving notice to the mediation services, the Board observed in Fort
Smith Chair Co. 9 that
it has also been concluded that, where late notices under Section 8(d) (3)
to the Mediation and Conciliation Service are filed, the waiting period must
be extended to include a full 30 days after the filing of such notices in order
to give mediation its intended statutory period in which to work.30

The NLRB supported this analysis by relying on two Supreme Court decisions,
National Labor Relations Board v. Lion Oil Co."' and Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Board.32 The NLRB referred to the dual purposes of
the Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mastro Plastics: "to protect concerted activities and to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare."3
Thus, the Board's interpretation in Fort Smith Chair Co. in favor of mediation
seems to follow Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the NLRB contended
that the second thirty days of the "cooling off" period are tolled pending notice by
the initiating party.
The Board in its Hooker Chemicals decision recognized that a posture of
"continuing the current agreement and maintaining the parties' bargaining
position" is thereby attained until mediation can be attempted."4
B. The Board's Examination of Congressional Intent
In the initial NLRB opinions in Peoria Contractors and Hooker Chemicals,
the Board also attempted to justify its position by examining the congressional
intent behind Section 8(d) (3). The Board reiterated that "the 30 days is an
integral part of the congressional scheme for achieving a higher degree of stability
in collective bargaining."3 From this postulate the Board deduced that Congress
did not intend to waive the thirty-day period. The Board further noted that the
mediation services are "important contributor[s] to the 'probability of a peaceful
settlement of the dispute.' ""
Given these premises and the prevailing purpose of the statute, as clarified
by the Supreme Court, to "substitute collective bargaining for economic war29
30

143 N.L.R.B. 514 (1963).
Id. at 519.

31 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
32 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
33 .1d. at 284-.
34 Hooker Chemicals, 224 N.L.R.B. at 1538. Both Local 219, Retail Clerks and Fort
Smith Chair Co. were affirmed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In Peoria
Contractors and Hooker Chemicals, the Board emphasized these affirmations to justify their
conclusions.
35 204 N.L.R.B. at 346. To further support this proposition, the Board before the Seventh
Circuit cites Senator Taft's explanation of 8(d) to Congress:
We have provided in the revision of the collective bargaining procedure, in conneceither party
tion with the mediation process, that before the end of any contract ...
who wishes to open the contract may give 60 days' notice in order to afford time
for free collective bargaining, and then for the intervention of the Mediation Service.
93 CONG. R c. 3839 (1947). The Seventh Circuit, in relying upon the Legislative History
of the Labor Management Relations Act, twice incorrectly cites that address by Senator Taft
as 93 CONG. REc. 3955.
36 224 N.L.R.B. at 1536-38.
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fare,"37 the Board declared that the period for mediation "must be preserved
in spite of the potential abuse of the statutory scheme."'" The Board admitted
that such a ruling could place a burden on the parties by delaying the imposition of economic sanctions but dismissed this argument as placing only "minimal
additional burdens on the parties."'"
The Board summarized its conclusion in the form of a balancing test. The
value of increased stability as promoted by a definite period of mediation outweighs the conflicting interests of mandatory notice and the right of the noninitiating party to resort to economic pressure at the end of the contract."0
Finally the Board suggested that if the noninitiating party really desired to use
its economic sanctions at the end of the contract, it could send notice to the
mediation services itself. "
In some instances, however, penalizing the noninitiating party for the unlawful action of the opposing party is inequitable and, as a result, a potential for
abusing the statutory scheme exists by endorsing the Board's position. Furthermore, the Hooker Chemicals circumstances and the cases relied upon by the
Board are factually distinguishable. As will be shown further on in this comment, a closer scrutiny of the legislative history and prior judicial interpretation
of Section 8(d) (3) reveals that the Board's reliance on its prior decisions and
perceived congressional intent is not accurate. These reasons support the Seventh
Circuit's conclusion that the initiating party's untimely Section 8(d) (3) notice
should not hinder the noninitiating party in imposing economic sanctions upon
the expiration of the contract.
V. Endorsing the Hooker Chemicals Result
A. Factual Differences in Precedent
Hooker Chemicals and Peoria Contractors can be distinguished on their
facts from each of the cases relied upon by the NLRB as authority for concluding
that the thirty-day notice requirement is immutable. In Retail Clerks, Local 1179,
Local 219, Retail Clerks, and Fort Smith Chair Co., the party which had the
legislative obligation to give notice failed to do so and then flaunted this evasion
by striking the employer. 2 In Peoria Contractors and Hooker Chemicals, however, the noninitiating party, which had no obligation to provide notice, locked
out its employees at the end of the congressionally mandated sixty-day "cooling
off" period. A district court perceived this fundamental difference when it held:
The actual decisions are not necessarily in conflict, however, because they
all hold that a party giving a 30-day notice cannot terminate the contract
legally until the 30 days have expired. The Seventh Circuit takes the additional step of holding that a party which does not initiate the procedure
by a 60-day notice is not bound by the 30-day notice .... 43
37

38

Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. at 284.

224 N.L.R.B. at 1538.

39 Id.
40 Id. at 1537.
41 See note 15 supra.
42 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
43 Illinois State Employers v. NLRB, 345 F. Supp. at 1014.
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B. PriorJudicial Interpretation
In addition to distinguishable factual circumstances in the named precedent,
enforcement of the Board's position would lead to results inconsistent with prior
interpretation of the Act. Examination of the District of Columbia Circuit's
opinion in Local 219, Retail Clerks reveals that although that court may have
agreed with the Board's result, the court disagreed with the Board's reasoning
and actually rejected the Board's position that there must be a thirty-day period
for mediation. The court framed the Board's proposition as follows: "the spirit
of Section 8(d) (3) is violated only when the Mediation Service or state agency
does not have thirty days to intervene in the bargaining process."" After acknowledging the Board's theory, however, the court reflected: "Although this interpretation may be consonant with the purpose of the section, it does not seem to
give sufficient weight to the requirement of Section 8(d)(3) that notice to the
Mediation Services must be given within thirty days of the sixty-day notice under
Section 8(d) (1)."" The D.C. Circuit finally rejected the Board's theory by
adopting the "more logical" interpretation of 8(d) (3) as making two demands.
First, Section 8(d) (3) requires the initiating party to give proper notice within
thirty days of the sixty-day notice period. Second, the Section requires a thirtyday waiting period before commencing a strike or a lockout by the initiating
4 6
party
Hooker Chemicals extended the D.C. Circuit's interpretation by ruling that
the noninitiating party is not penalized for the other party's violation and may
at its own discretion use its arsenal of legitimate economic sanctions.
In addition to the development above, several cases imply that the application
of the Board's position could result in extending the effectiveness of an expired
contract.47 In Procterand Gamble Independent Union of Port Ivory v. Procter
and Gamble Manufacturing Co., the Second Circuit ruled that the "appellee's
failure to give timely notice to federal and state agencies did not have the effect
of extending the period of the expired contract.""' By analogy if untimely notice
does not extend the contract, then also untimely notice should not create a thirtyday-notice period which adds to the sixty-day period and thereby extends the
effectiveness of the contract.
C. CongressionalIntent and History
The Board's proposition of tolling the second half of the sixty-day "cooling
off" period to guarantee mediation is not in full accord with the statutory
44 265 F.2d at 819.
45 Id. (emphasis added).
46 Id. (emphasis added). This second requirement does not apply to the noninitiating
party. In United Furniture Workers the District of Columbia Circuit did not modify this
position formed in Local 219, Retail Clerks. Instead, it viewed the case as applying those
principles to the specific facts of the case, namely when the union does not give Section
8(d) (3) notice at all. 336 F.2d at 741.
47
See text accompanying note 34 supra.
48 312 F.2d at 189. For earlier holdings of this same principle see In re Eisen, 77 N.Y.S.2d
at 679; United States Gypsum Co. 90 N.L.R.B. 964, 968 (1950); Int'l Harvester Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 242, 243 (1948).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1979]

language, purpose and history. Section 8(d) (3) specifies the time at which
notice to the mediation service should be given. "[T]he party desiring ... termination or modification [of the contract shall] notif[y] the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a
dispute. .

. .""

The language of the Act itself declares that the time to give

notice under Section 8 (d) (3) is not variable in that the thirty-day notice must fall
within the 60-day-notice framework of Section 8(d) (1).
Section 8(d) (4) requires that "the [initiating] party .

.

. [continue] in full

force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is
given. . . ."" After the conclusion of the sixty-day period, there is no statutory

mandate that economic sanctions be withheld any longer.
In analyzing Section 8(d) (3), the Peoria Contractors court commented:
The Section is clearly phrased in terms of a unitary sixty-day waiting period
keyed to the notice provision in § 8(d) (1) ....
There is no provision in §
8(d) (4) for a bifurcated waiting period of thirty days following each of the
two statutory notices when the notice to the mediators is untimely given.5'
The use of the phrase within thirty days in Section 8(d) (3) and the phrase a
period of sixty days after such notice is given in Section 8(d) (4) is unambiguous.
The language clearly indicates a congressional intent to have one "cooling off"
period of sixty days rather than a divided period consisting of two thirty-day
segments.
To support its premise of the prevailing importance of mediation, the
Board cited an address by Senator Taft, which said that Congress provided a time
for free collective bargaining and then for the intervention of the mediation
services.52 It also cited the report of the Watch Dog Committee, 3 which said that
before passage of the act the services often never knew of disputes and that early
intervention has often prevented strikes.5 4 These comments strongly support
the value of mediation. The Seventh Circuit concluded, however, that these
quotes are not decisive. In analyzing the Taft speech, the Hooker Chemicals
court found that "[t]he statement is equally susceptible to an interpretation that
Congress required the 8(d) (1) 60-day notice within which time the mediation
services could intervene assuming they were timely notified."5 In dealing with
the report of the Watch Dog Committee the court concluded that the "report is
even less persuasive support for the Board's position than Senator Taft's statement. The only clear indication of legislative intent is to place the burden of
obligation on the initiating party."5 6
The legislative history of the Act offers persuasive evidence that Congress
did not intend that notice to the mediation services must precede a strike or a
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (3) (1970) (emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1970) (emphasis added).
500 F.2d at 57-58.
See note 35 supra.
See note 16 supra.
Hooker Chemicals Corp. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d at 968.
Id.
Id.
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lockout. Two versions of the bill were introduced in Congress. 7 The Senate
version had substantially the same provisions as does the present Act.5" The
House bill was more specific in that it required notification to the mediation
services as a condition before any lockout or strike could occur. The House bill
provided:
(11) The terms "bargain collectively" and "Collective bargaining" as applied to any dispute between an employer and his employees or their representative, means compliance with the following minimum requirements: ...
(vi) the following requirements shall be applicable as a condition of
authorizing, conducting or participating in, any lockout or strike in
connection with the dispute:
(a) The collective bargaining representative shall notify the Administration of its desire to have a strike vote conducted in connection with the dispute. 59
Congress could have endorsed these requirements had it desired to impose upon
the parties the duty to notify mediators before any strike or lockout could occur.
The differences in the two bills were resolved by congressional conference, however, which rejected the House version. As Senator Taft explained: "[I]n adopting
the language of the Senate bill, the conferes rejected a definition of collective
bargaining which was contained in the House bill. . .,6.
Arguably, in rejecting
the House proposal, Congress also rejected the mandatory mediation service
notice feature prior to the utilization of economic weapons.
D. Chief Judge Fairchild'sDissent
Chief Judge Fairchild dissented from the Hooker Chemicals decision. He
would reverse the Peoria Contractors ruling and enforce the NLRB's order.
Fairchild postulates that Congress must have assumed that the sixty-day period will
always include a thirty-day period for mediation"' and that this assumption was so
prevalent that Congress never considered the issue. Thus, endorsing the Board's
theory will further congressional intent. Chief Judge Fairchild adds that because
the national interest, not just the parties' interest, is served by mediation, the
mediation services should be given every possible opportunity to conciliate.6 2
The response of the majority in Hooker Chemicalswas that if mediation is so
essential, Congress wouild have corrected the Peoria Contractors decision by
amendment. In the four years since the Seventh Circuit decided Peoria Contractors,however, no such congressional action has been taken.6
57 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) ; S. 1126, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947).
58 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE. LAOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 8,
114-16 (1948).
59 Id. at 36-38 (emphasis added).
60 93 Cong. Rec. 6444 (1947).
61 The record of the congressional debates is not decisive on Judge Fairchild's proposition.
The Congress did consider the effect of failing to give proper sixty-day notice. See note 35 supra.
Moreover, Congress was not totally assuming and inadvertent about the drafting of § 8 d)'(3).
When the committee accidentally failed to allow for the state mediation services, Senator Ives of
New York proposed an amendment to correct this deficiency. 93 Cong. Rec. 5081 (1947).
Such consideration and care make such an assumption seem unlikely, but the fact that it was
not mentioned is some support for the judge's opinion.
62 573 F.2d at 970-71.
63 Id. at 969 n. 8.
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E. The Noninitiating Party Unfairly Penalized
The NLRB's position of requiring thirty days for mediation unfairly penalizes
the noninitiating party. In Retail Clerks, Local 219, even the petitioner admitted
that "its untimely notice to the Service ... was a violation of Section 8(d) (3)
and hence an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b) (3)."" Yet the Board's
holding condones noncompliance, a noncompliance which unfairly penalizes the
noninitiating party by forcing it to forego the rightful imposition of economic
sanctions until the thirty-day period has passed. Therefore, to enforce the Board's
ruling would create the inequitable situation in which "one party' could flatly
refuse to comply with [the statute] but at the same time demand for himself all
the benefits of the Section." 65 Under such circumstances the noninitiating party
would not be able to use the legitimate ecoliomic leverage which otherwise would
be available.6
F. Potential Abuse
The Board's decision, in permitting one party to check the other's right,
opens the statutory scheme to potential abuse, which, despite the Board's
pleading otherwise, would actually frustrate the legislative purpose. In Peoria
Contractors, the Seventh Circuit observed that the Board's bifurcating the sixtyday "cooling off" period into two periods of thirty days each "is in fact antithetical
to the statutory scheme and would upset the delicate timing mechanism embodied in the Act."6 The Court further explained that the statute in allowing
for only one sixty-day period for negotiation inserts the mediation services "at the
optimum time for settlement.""8 Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that if the
Board's position were enforced, "[t]he probability of successful mediation occurring.. . is less apparent." 9
The Board's decision allows the union to restrict the managements' options
by effectively precluding the use of lockouts as a bargaining tool until the statutory thirty-day period expires. The Seventh Circuit concluded, however, that this
result is unfair since the noninitiating party, which had bargained in good faith
and could normally resort to a lockout after the expiration of the sixty-day period,
would be at the mercy of the initiating party as to when it could lock out. The
court perceived that by carefully manipulating the giving of notice, the initiating
64 265 F.2d at 816. See Procter & Gamble Union of Port Ivory v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181, 188-89 (1962); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Dahlem
Constr., 143 F.2d at 473; In re Eisen, 88 N.Y.S.2d at 678. Kaynard v. Bagel Bakers Council
[1968] 57 Lab. Cas.
12,499. Gorman in his treatise on labor law summarizes the law:
"Failure to give timely notice to the mediation services is technically a violation of Section
8 (d) (3) .... GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 57 at 425 (1976). Yet, the Board "rarely addresses it as an unfair labor practice in
isolation." Id. See also Lockout Loophole, supra note 15, at 498.
65 United Electrical, Radio, & Mach. Workers Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223 F.2d at 342.
66 Textile Workers v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 404, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The court in this case
further held that Congress did not limit "the use of economic pressure in support of lawful
demands." Id.
67 500 F.2d at 58.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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party could trap the noninitiating party into a more serious violation of the Act
and then harvest the benefits of its strategy. 0 The initiating party could also
reserve its threat of untimely notification "to neutralize any pressure through
strike or lockout which the other party might muster after sixty days to resolve
the dispute quickly."'"
In Hooker Chemicals the Seventh Circuit suggested that the threat of abuse
materialized into reality. The union delayed filing notice so that it could coordinate bargaining at the three different plants 2 thus placing unanticipated
pressure on Hooker Chemicals and preventing timely intervention by the mediation services.
Regardless of the form, the threat of abuse is substantial. To allow such a
risk, as the Board's interpretation would, invites further strife when the Congress
sought to prevent it. Thus, sanctioning an interpretation of Section 8(d) (3)
which creates the possibility of abuse is not consistent with the goals of the Act.
The position of the Hooker Chemicals court provides strong incentive to the
initiating party to file timely notice. Due to its dereliction in filing notice, the
initiating party is temporarily stripped of its economic weapons, but the noninitiating party may, at its discretion, resort to economic sanctions. Thus, to
prevent the noninitiating party from gaining this potential advantage, the initiating party will have greater incentive to file timely notice."
VI. Conclusion
The desire to avoid industrial strife through negotiation and, if necessary,
mediation strongly supports the NLRB's position of mandatory mediation. Yet
the Hooker Chemical result is more appropriate and desirable. The Seventh
Circuit's decision is more appropriate because it recognizes the factual differences
between the Retail Clerks, Local 1179 series of cases and the Hooker Chemicals
case. The Seventh Circuit's decision also more closely follows congressional intent
and prior judicial interpretation of the Acts. The Hooker Chemicals result is
more desirable because it more fairly weighs the interests of the parties, and
provides for a more just resolution in that the timely use of mediation is encouraged and the chance for abuse of the statutory scheme is diminished. This
is accomplished by avoiding the disadvantage of unfairly foreclosing the noninitiating party's right to economic sanctions because of the initiating party's violation of the Act.
David F. Parchem

70 If management were to lock out before the expiration of the period for mediation,
the union could bring suit for back wages. If the union were to strike before expiration,
management could lawfully discharge the employees.
71 Peoria Contractors v. NLRB, 500 F.2d at 58.
72 573 F.2d at 969.
73 Id.

Securities Regulation-Discretionary Commodity
Futures Accounts Are Not Securities Within the
Purview of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.*
I. Introduction
The classification of discretionary futures trading accounts is a problem1 that
presently has the federal circuit courts of appeal in conflict. In particular, disagreement exists on the question whether discretionary accounts in commodities
futures are securities2 within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Acts).' This disagreement has
resulted in considerable confusion regarding the requisite elements of investment
contracts4 and has fostered various interpretations of a common enterprise.
In Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.,5 the Seventh Circuit faced the issue
whether a discretionary futures trading account could be protected by the fraud
provisions of the Securities Acts. 6 Relying on Milnarik U. M-S Commodities
Inc.,' an earlier Seventh Circuit opinion, the court held that a discretionary
account is neither an investment contract' nor a certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement' and therefore not a security within the meaning of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. In so ruling, the Seventh Circuit
expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit's contrary holding in SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp.'"
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Hirk merits further analysis for several
reasons. First, despite the court's claim to the contrary, 1 the Hirk holding ignores
the remedial purposes of the Securities Acts and promotes form over substance
by focusing on the language of the agreement between the investor and broker
rather than the economic realities of such an agreement. Second, the court over* 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
1 See text accompanying note 86 infra for a description of discretionary accounts. See
generally Bonnett, How Common Is a Common Enterprise?, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 339; Hodes
& Dreyfus, Discretionary Trading Accounts in Commodity Futures-Are They Securities?, 30
Bus. LAW. 99 (1974); Comment, Discretionary Accounts, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 401 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as DiscretionaryAccounts].
2 See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974);
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972); Maheu v. Reynolds &
Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
3 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1976).
4 Both 15 U.S.C. §77b(1) (1976) and 15 U.S.C. §78c(10) (1976) provide in part that
"the term security means any . . . certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement . . . investment contract .

5 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
6 The fraud provisions are codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j(b), 78o(c) (1976); SEC
rules lOb-5, 15cl-2 and 15cl-7; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.15cl-2, & 240.15ci-7 (1977).
7 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972).
8 561 F.2d at 99.
9 Id. at 102.
10 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
11 Id. at 102. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
516
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looks the diverse nature of discretionary accounts and attempts to enunciate an
inviolable rule of law. Finally, Hirk fails to give adequate emphasis to the legal
context within which the decision was rendered.
II. Statement of the Case
William F. Hirk was induced to enter a trading agreement with the defendant, Agri-Research Council, Inc. (ARCO), by the two individually named
defendants, John Burlington and Glenn Andersen. Pursuant to the agreement,
Hirk deposited $10,000 in an account with Miller-Lane & Co., an ARCO
futures commission merchant. A power of attorney was executed appointing
Burlington as his agent and attorney-in-fact. Burlington utilized Hirk's money for
margin deposits while conducting transactions in Hirk's account.'
Hirk's complaint alleged that defendants Burlington and Andersen, the
president of ARCO, made numerous misrepresentations to him regarding the
profitability of the enterprise, the acumen of their analysts, and certain investment
information to be supplied to him. Hirk was also promised that his losses would
not exceed $7,500 and at no time would his account have a balance of less than
$2,500. Profit and loss statements of other accounts managed by the enterprise
were shown to Hirk, implying that all were profitable."
Despite the defendants' knowledge that Hirk was a novice in commodities
trading, Hirk was not informed that he was engaging in a high risk venture. Due
to the defendants' mismanagement of his account, Hirk lost his initial investment
of $10,000 and incurred additional liabilities of $17,880.'
Hirk's complaint sought recovery of $27,880 in actual damages and
$100,000 in exemplary or punitive damages. Count I of the original complaint
asserted that the discretionary trading account executed with the defendants was
either "an investment contract" or "a certificate of interest or participation in a
profit-sharing agreement" and thus was a security within the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The security status of the discretionary account required registration under Section 5 of the 1933 Act 5 and
compliance with the anti-fraud provisions of both Securities Acts.'8 Hirk
claimed that the defendants' violation of these provisions made them liable for his
losses under Section 12 of the 1933 Act.
On June 24, 1974, Count I of Hirk's complaint was dismissed on the ground
that the agreement with the defendants was not an investment contract and therefore not a security under Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act and Section 3 (a) (10) of
the 1934 Act.' The court required a finding of a "common enterprise" before an
investment contract could exist. This element was found to be lacking despite
Hirk's claim of overlapping investment services and the similarity of concomitant
12 Id. at 98.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 98-99.
15 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
16 See note 6 supra.
17 561 F.2d at 99. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976) authorizes a cause of action for damages
resulting from the purchase of an unregistered security.
18 See note 4 supra.
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transactions conducted in the various discretionary trading accounts managed
by the defendants.' 9
To overcome the common enterprise requirement, Hirk amended his
complaint to allege that the defendants treated all the discretionary trading accounts in substantially the same manner and therefore he shared pro rata with
the other accounts "as if" all the funds had been commingled. Further, he
averred that the defendants employed his monies to cover ARCO's operating
expenses and to pay for additional advertising necessary to attract new investors.
Amended Count I was dismissed on the grounds that Hirk's new allegations
failed to establish the requisite commonality and were directly contrary to the
terms of the agreement.2" On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of amended Count I.
III. The Conflicting State of the Law
SEC v. Howey" is the landmark case defining the term "investment
contract." In Howey, the Supreme Court defined an investment contract as a
"contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter
or a third party."22 The Court held that an offering of units of a citrus grove
development coupled with a contract for cultivating, marketing and remitting
the net proceeds to the investor was an offering of an investment contract
within the purview of the Securities Act of 1933.23
The conflict in Hirk regarding the requisite elements of an investment contract arose from this definition. Generally, a four-part test is utilized in applying the Howey investment contract definition: 24 a person must (1) invest money
(2) in a common enterprise (3) with the expectation of profits (4) solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party. The second element, a common
enterprise, has presented difficult questions of interpretation. Each interpretation
depends upon which promoter-investor relationship is considered to have fulfilled the requisite degree of commonality.2"
A. The De-emphasis of a Common Enterprise-The Liberal Interpretation
The Howey test has received two basic judicial interpretations. The first,
or liberal interpretation, originated in Maheu v. Reynolds & Co.,2 in which
19 561 F.2d at 99.
20 Id. Hirk's amended complaint included three pendent claims based on violations of the
Illinois Blue Sky Law, common law misrepresentation, and breach of a fiduciary duty. The
pendent claims were dismissed without prejudice. 561 F.2d at 98 n.l.
21 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
22 Id. at 298-99. At a later point the Court states that "the test is whether the scheme
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others." Id. at 301.
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW § 2.04 at
2-14 (1974); Bonnett, supra note 1, at 341; Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security":
Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367, 373 (1967).
25 Whether a common enterprise need be found at all has been challenged given the facts
of Howey. See Bonnett, supra note 1.
26 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Howey was found to require either a common enterprise or an expectation of
profits derived solely from the efforts of others." The Maheu court stated that an
agreement could be classified as a security despite the absence of a pooling arrangement or a common enterprise. 8 Professor Loss' treatise on securities regulation was cited in support of this contention.29 Loss states that "a pooling
arrangement among investors helps, but it is not essential.""0 He proposes that
in deciding whether an investment contract exists, "the line is drawn, . . . where
neither the element of a common enterprise nor the element of reliance on the
efforts of another is present."'"
In rejecting the argument that security status was lacking, the court read
Loss to propose that reliance on the skills of the broker would suffice for the
absence of a common enterprise. The stipulated facts of Howey were asserted
as support for this conclusion. 2 The court's analysis, therefore, focuses on the
broker's control of the account and the investor's dependence on the broker's skill
in the generation of profits. The greater the broker's skill and client's dependence,
the more likely a security will be found 3 notwithstanding the absence of a formal
finding of a common enterprise.
The liberal interpretation of a common enterprise was expanded in SEC v.
Glenn Turner Enterprises.4 In Turner, the Ninth Circuit defined a common
enterprise as "one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and
dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment of third
parties."3 2 This approach emphasizes the dependence element found in Maheu
and in addition, recognizes the common interest of the broker and investor as
satisfying the commonality element. 6 This type of commonality has been referred to as "vertical commonality."37 The Turner court stated that in deciding
whether an investment contract exists, a more "realistic" test should be employed, namely, "whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are
the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect
the failure or success of the enterprise."3 " Significantly, in both Maheu and
Turner the profits of both the investor and manager were dependent on the
success of the investment scheme. 9
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 429.
Id.
1 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 489 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
Id.
282 F. Supp. at 429 (citing Loss at 491).
The facts stipulated to in Howey were that
[a]ll sales (made by defendants) have been an out-right sale of a definitely identified
tract of land. In no instance has -there been a sale of a right to share with others in
the profits of land held in common with the defendant Companies or others .... In
the care of each grove, as in the yield of fruit, the cost of the care and the proceeds
of the fruit may be, and are, definitely and distinctly accounted for with respect to
the specific property owned by the individual.
282 F. Supp. at 429 (quoting 151 F.2d at 715-16 n.5). See note 25 supra for writers supporting this view.
33 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAUD SEC RULE lob-5 § 432 (Supp. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERO].
34 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
35 Id. at 482 n.7.
36 Id.
37 Discretionary Accounts, supra note 1, at 401 n.1; BROMBERG § 434.
38 474 F.2d at 482.
39 Turner involved a scheme to sell self-improvement courses. 474 F.2d at 476.
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The Fifth Circuit extended the vertical commonality concept in the context
of discretionary accounts in SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp." The
court in that case adopted the Ninth Circuit's definition of a common enterprise 1
and held that an investment contract existed when the broker's payment was
based solely on commissions and did not depend on the profitability of the
account. Continental Commodities has been interpreted to hold that no pooling
element need be found when trading in the account lies within the broker's
discretion.42
Continental Commodities is unique because the relevant discretionary account was created to purchase options on commodities futures contracts as opposed to,the contracts themselves. "3 In these circumstances, if a customer elects
to exercise his option, the broker must then secure the futures contract. The
substantial cost of such contracts may necessitate the pooling of funds from the
various discretionary ,accounts held by the broker. A transaction of this type
should thereby satisfy the common enterprise element. Thus, accounts dealing
with futures options are more susceptible to a finding of a common enterprise."'
One commentator has suggested that the Continental Commodities result
and its reliance on Turner can be justified solely by the conduct of the broker.4"
In Continental Commodities the broker's conduct was similar to that of a
promoter since discretionary accounts were solicited. The usual discretionary
account involves the situation in which the investor seeks the services of the
broker.46 Thus, solicitation of investor monies might stimulate the finding of a
security.
The Fifth Circuit, however, did not sustain its decision on that basis.
Instead, the court opted to avoid a "litmus application of the Howey test" ' and
elected to reject the necessity of a pooling of investor funds. The court stated:
"the critical factor is not the similitude or coincidence of investor input, but
rather the uniformity of impact of the promoter's efforts."4 " The court also
rejected the notion that investor remuneration on a pro rata basis is necessary:
"The fact that an investor's return is independent of that of other investors in
the scheme is not decisive. Rather, the requisite commonality is evidenced by the
fact that the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied to the efficacy of the
[broker].,1
The cases endorsing the liberal interpretation reveal a commitment to
enforce the remedial purpose of, the Securities Acts. A premium is placed on
protecting the investor while the increased burdens of registration are placed on
the broker. This goal is accomplished by applying an expansive definition of
40 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
41 Id. at 522.
42 See DiscretionaryAccounts, supra note 1,at 409 n.45 and accompanying text.
43 497 F.2d at 518.
44 See Long, The Naked Commodity Contract as a Security, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv.
211 (1973).
45 DiscretionaryAccounts, supra note 1, at 409 n.46.
46 Id.
47 497 F.2d 521-22.
48 Id. at 522 (quoting SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir.
1974)).
49 Id. (quoting 497 F.2d at 479).
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a common enterprise so as to extend the scope of the investment contract theory
of security status. The contrary approach demands a literal reading of Howey
and narrow view of a common enterprise.
B. Fidelity to Howey-The Necessity of a Common Enterprise
The second approach to the Howey test requires a rigid application of the
four criteria, particularly the common enterprise element. The benchmark
case for this interpretation, as wellas for the proposition that discretionary futures
accounts are not securities due to the absence of a common enterprise, is
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.50 In Milnarik, the discretionary account
agreement called for the broker's compensation to come solely from commissions
generated by his trading in the account.5 ' Thus, the broker's interest in the
agreement was not dependent upon the profitability of his transactions and no
commingling of funds with other discretionary futures accounts occurred.
Under these circumstances, the Seventh Circuit held that the agreement
was not an investment contract and therefore not a security within the purview
of the Securities Act of 1933. The court stated that "judicial analysis of the
question whether particular investment contracts are 'securities' within the
statutory definition have repeatedly stressed the significance of finding a common enterprise." 52 Although the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant broker had
entered into similar agreements with other investors the court found that "the
success or failure of those other contracts had no direct impact on the profitability
of plaintiffs' contract."'" Thus, the Milnarik court concluded that the various
customers were merely represented by a "common agent" and were "not joint
'
participants in the same investment enterprise."54
Milnarik apparently requires the presence of a pooling of monies of various
investors so as to evince a common interest in the investment. Pooling of investor
monies has been described as "horizontal commonality."5 5 Professor Bromberg
describes this form of commonality as "requiring that [investors] share profits and
losses, or at least that one investor's success or failure have an impact on other
investors." 56
The Third Circuit endorsed the Milnarik approach in Wasnowic U.Chicago
Board of Trade.5 7 In Wasnowic, a securities fraud complaint filed by a corporate
investor in a discretionary commodity futures account was dismissed for want of
a common enterprise. The district court found a common enterprise to be lacking (1) in the corporation's relationship with its shareholders and (2) despite
the actual commingling of funds of the various investors in violation of their
agreements with the broker. The district court asserted that "[w]hether an
'investment' contract exists depends, like any other contract, upon the original
50
51
52
53
54

457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
Id.
Id.
55 BROMBERG § 433.
56 Id.
57 352 F. Supp 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 994 (1974).
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intention of the parties."58 The court rejected the theory that a common enterprise could be established by the unilateral act of one party to the agreement.
The Seventh Circuit considered Hirk cognizant of the conflicting interpretations of the Howey test. The liberal interpretation as enunciated by the Fifth
Circuit in Continental Commodities accepts "vertical commonality" as the
equivalent of a common enterprise. The alternative approach is the Seventh
Circuit's own ruling in Milnarik which demands the existence of "horizontal
commonality" before the common enterprise criteria is satisfied. Thus, the
question in Hirk was whether the Seventh Circuit would elect to endorse its
earlier decision in Milnarik or adopt the less rigid test of Continental Commodities.
IV. The Seventh Circuit's Resolution of Hirk
On appeal, Hirk presented three alternate arguments to counter the Milnarik
precedent. First, he suggested that the Seventh Circuit reexamine its holding
in Milnarik that a common enterprise requires both "multiple investors and a
pooling of their funds"59 and instead elect to adopt the Fifth Circuit's contrary
view in Continental Commodities. Second, Hirk called for a reexamination of
the pooling requirement enunciated in Milnarik "in terms of the remedial purpose
of the [Securities] Acts, the legislative directives of flexibility, and the emphasis on
substance over form.""0 Finally, as an alternative to finding security status
premised on an investment contract, Hirk claimed the existence of a security on
the basis of a "certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement."'"
A. Reexamination of Milnarik in Light of Continental Commodities
The Hirk court resolved the pooling issue by focusing on the Fifth Circuit's
express rejection of the need for a pooling arrangement or pro rata sharing of
profits as well as its consistency with Milnarik. Noting that Milnarik did not
directly address the pooling requirement, the court sought to ascertain whether
that requirement was subsumed in Judge Steven's opinion." The answer was
found in footnote seven of Milnarik.6
The court cites footnote seven as holding that Howey requires an investment
pool. In writing the Milnarik decision, Judge Stevens utilized footnote seven to
draw attention to the fact that in Howey the investors in the citrus tracts were
not entitled to specific fruit. The land developer was only accountable to individual investors for an allocation of net profits based upon a survey conducted
at the time of picking. As a result, all the fruit was pooled by the developer and
sold under its own name.6" The Milnarik court felt that the relative importance
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

352 F. Supp. at 1070.
561 F.2d at 100.
Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 100.
457 F.2d at 279 n.7.
Id.
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of commonality was reflected by the Supreme Court's statement that "[t]he in-

vestors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the promoters
manage, control, and operate the enterprise."" In essence, the Seventh Circuit
held that footnote seven conclusively required a pooling of investor funds. Thus,
Hirk's first argument fell with the court's rejection of Continental Commodities.
B. Reexamination of Milnarik in Light of the Remedial Purpose
of the Securities Acts
Hirk's contention that the Seventh Circuit reexamine Milnarik in light of
the remedial purpose of the Securities Acts and reach a conclusion consistent
with the flexible standards asserted by the Supreme Court in Tcherepnin v.
Knight6" was also rejected. The court stated that Milnarik was decided by a
court cognizant of these guidelines and therefore the decision was consistent with
both the letter and spirit of the law. 7
C. The Absence of a Certificate of Interest or Profit-Sharing Agreement
The argument that the discretionary futures agreement entered into with
ARCO was a certificate of interest or profit-sharing agreement, and thus a
security, was dismissed on the same basis as the investment contract theory,
namely, a lack of commonality."8 The court held that the commonality requirement was identical to that necessary for an investment contract as defined by
Milnarik. This assertion was made despite the presence of a 75%-25% profitsharing clause in Hirk's agreement with ARCO and its literal inclusion in the
securities definition as found in the Securities Acts.6 " Hirk cited Professor Loss'
statement that "the classic example of [such an agreement] is a contract whereby
the buyer furnished the funds and the seller the skill for speculating in the stock
or commodity markets under an arrangement to split any profits." 7 The court
averred that the cases cited by Loss made no real distinction between investment
contracts and profit-sharing agreements and noted that each investment scheme
was characterized by widespread public participation. Thus, the court found
the commonality element to be firmly entrenched in the definition of a profitsharing agreement.7 '
V. An Analysis of the Seventh Circuit's Finding
Hirk is a classic example of judicial myopia-the application of the rule of
stare decisis when dissimilar facts mandate a more responsive analysis. The Hirk
facts are readily distinguishable from those in Milnarik in that no profit-sharing
65 Id. (quoting 328 U.S. at 300) (emphasis added by the Seventh Circuit).
66 389 U.S. at 336. Here the Supreme Court stated that the remedial nature of the
Securities Acts requires an expansive definition of a security.
67 561 F.2d at 102.
68 Id.
69 See note 4 supra.
70 561 F.2d at 102 (quoting Loss at 489). See Bonnett, supra note 1.
71 Id.
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agreement existed in Milnarik. Also, a critical analysis of the facts of Howey
lends credence to the de-emphasis of the commonality requirement as found in
the circuits following the liberal interpretation of the Howey test. Despite the
factual distinctions of Milnarik and Howey the Seventh Circuit was apparently
determined to establish an inviolable rule of law; discretionary accounts are not
securities.
The facts in Howey support the view that the common enterprise element
must be applied loosely. The investors in the Howey Company citrus tree scheme
paid varying prices for their plots depending on the age of the trees. Prices
ranged from $675 to $1000 per acre.72 Every purchaser entered into a separate
contract for a distinct tract of land. 3 Supplementing the sale contracts were
service and management contracts. These provided for the development of the
land and the harvesting and sale of the fruit at the discretion of the Service
Company. 74 The company in turn received a management fee plus expenses
for labor and materials employed in developing the particulartract of land. The
total cost of care for an individual tract of land was "definitely and distinctly
accounted for with respect to the specific property owned by the individual. '75
Although the yields of the individual tracts of land were pooled for marketing,
the individual investor's profits were determined by the amount of produce
actually generated by his tract and at no time was there a sale of a right to share
in the profits of land commonly held."
Given these facts, it is obvious that the investment scheme in Howey was
substantially unitary in nature. Each tract had "a success or failure rate without
'
regard to the others."77
The return on any given tract was dependent upon the
unique costs and yield it produced. The pooling of total yields for marketing
purposes is merely reflective of the fungible nature of the commodity and a
uniform market price. Thus, the so-called pooling element, to which the Seventh
Circuit attached such importance in Hirk, is of little importance to the return on
a single tract of land. The success or failure of one tract would have little direct
impact on the profitability of the other tracts.
Individual tracts among the
2,500 acres of citrus groves would have varying costs and yields depending upon
the extent of disease or insect infestation, terrain conditions, soil fertility, tree replacements, and general maintenance.7 9 Therefore, the definition of a common
0
enterprise articulated in Turner,"
and later followed in Continental Commod8
ities, is more descriptive of the factual setting in Howey: "whether the efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."
The Howey facts indicate that those circuits endorsing the liberal interpretation
72 SEC v. Howey, 60 F. Supp. 440, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1945).
73 151 F.2d at 716 n.5.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 561 F.2d at 101. This is the language used by Seventh Circuit to describe the discretionary account in Hirk.
78 This was the test for a common enterprise applied in Milnarik. See note 53 supra.
79 60 F. Supp. at 411.
80 474 F.2d at 482 n.7.
81 497 F.2d at 522.
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of the common enterprise element are more responsive to the Supreme Court's
analysis. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's narrow definition of an investment contract is difficult to comprehend based on the Howey factual setting. The requirement of multiple investor input with interdependence of profit and losses is simply
not presented by the Howey scheme. Concluding that Howey demands an
investment pool as the Seventh Circuit first did in Milnarik, and did subsequently
in Hirk, results in an interpretation unsubstantiated by the Howey facts.
By opting for a narrow interpretation of the common enterprise element, the
Seventh Circuit was also endorsing form over substance. The Supreme Court,
however, has clearly encouraged a contrary approach. In Howey the Supreme
Court noted that "form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed
upon economic reality" 2 in state court decisions dealing with the scope of the
term investment contract. The Court later averred that the Securities Acts
require a broad definition of the term "security": "[the definition] embodies a
flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaption to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money
of others on the promise of profits." 3 This elastic approach was reasserted by
the Court in Tcherepnin v. Knight.4 Noting the remedial nature of the Securities
Acts, the Court in Tcherepnin expressed an obligation to follow the expansive
guidelines established in Howey."5
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's encouragement to employ a flexible
definition of a security, the Seventh Circuit excluded a discretionary futures account from its purview. Such exclusion was accomplished by concentrating on
the unitary nature of the agreement, namely, an investor and a broker came to
terms.
The approach of the Hirk court is formalistic because it focuses on the contractual relationship between the parties rather than the economic realities involved. The investor is "pooling" his resources with the broker in every sense of
the term. Resources are commingled to generate profits for both. The investor
supplies the funds while the broker provides the business acumen. The two
interests are interwoven into a single "common enterprise." Any definition of
a common enterprise which would exclude such a relationship can only be characterized as demanding form while sacrificing substance. Thus, a literal reading
of the investment agreement should not preclude consideration of the economic
realities of the situation.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Hirk also ignores the diverse nature of the
discretionary account and the differences between the agreements posed by
Hirk and Milnarik. Generally, discretionary accounts take one of three forms:
(1) The investor places his money with a broker, permitting the broker to
invest it at his discretion. The broker is paid on a commission basis. The
broker has similar accounts with other investors, but each is handled on an
individual basis with the broker trading only for that account.
82
83
84
85

328 U.S. at 298.
Id. at 299.
389 U.S. at 336.
Id.
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(2) The account is opened giving the broker authority to enter into transactions at his discretion. The broker is compensated from the profits generated by his trading skill or the broker may invest his own funds.
(3) Several investors pool their money and have it invested at the broker's
discretion or the broker combines the funds of several accounts and invests
for the benefit of all. 86
The structure of these three arrangements reveals that the degree of commonality present in a given discretionary account can vary greatly. The first type
of agreement presents the strongest case for not finding a common enterprise.
The interests of the broker and the investor are completely segregated."
The second and third types are representative of the vertical and horizontal
commonality distinction. The vertical commonality of the second type of discretionary account is representative of the agreement in Hirk. The interests of
the investor and broker were interwoven by a 75%-25 % profit-sharing agreement. This provision makes the Hirk agreement readily distinguishable from
Milnarik in which the broker was paid on a commission basis regardless of the
profitability of the account."
Hence, vertical commonality was absent in
Milnarik although present in Hirk.
The Milnarik decision also rejected the notion of a common enterprise
despite the fact that the discretionary account in question was a seven-person
joint account, 89 which is representative of the third type of arrangement. Multiple investors in such a single scheme is referred to as horizontal commonality.
This difference in the method of the broker's compensation makes it clear that
the Hirk agreement is not analogous to the Milnarik contract, which itself
presents an element of common enterprise distinct from that found in Hirk,
namely horizontal commonality.
Despite the lack of similarity between the discretionary accounts in Hirk and
Milnarik, the Seventh Circuit held the Milnarik decision to be controlling. By
so ruling, the court ignored the distinction between vertical and horizontal commonality. Implicit in both the Milnarik and Hirk decisions is the necessity of
horizontal commonality before the common enterprise element can be satisfied.
Not only is this position inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Howey,
but it also fails to acknowledge the varied forms of discretionary accounts. By
relying on Milnarik to render void the claim of security status in Hirk, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the possibility of vertical commonality satisfying the
common enterprise requirement. Such a generalized approach to the commonality element results in a single conclusion: discretionary futures accounts are
not securities. Such a result denies the investor who relies on the broker's invest86 See Tew & Friedman, In Support of SEC v. W.I. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of
the Parameters of the Economic Relationship between an Issuer of Securities and the Purchaser, 27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 407, 415-16 (1973); Discretionary Accounts, supra note 1, at
403-04.
87 The SEC made such a recommendation when the broker offered the account without
solicitation, all accounts were segregated, independent investment decisions were made, and
the broker and investor did not share profits. See E.F. Hutton and Co., SEC Div. Corp. Fin.
94-95 Letter (Aug. 8, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,007.
88 457 F.2d at 275.
89 320 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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ment skills, and who shares his profits with the broker, the protection of the
Securities Acts. Yet Howey clearly demonstrates that either vertical or horizontal
commonality is sufficient to insure classification as a security.90
The context in which Hirk was decided also merits further analysis. In
Hirk, the Seventh Circuit was reviewing the dismissal of a complaint and therefore was compelled to accept all allegations asserted in the complaint as true.9
The court, therefore, accepted as valid the claim that ARCO "treated all of the
discretionary accounts in substantially the same manner and consequently that
he shared pro rata with the other accounts 'as if' all the funds had been commingled." 92
Despite these allegations, the court ignored the presence of a common
enterprise "especially in light of plaintiff's claim that such treatment was in direct
contravention of defendant's representations and plaintiff's expectations."9 2
Thus, the court was willing to permit ARGO to escape the purview of the
Securities Acts by intentionally violating the agreement with Hirk and perpetuating the fraud it had allegedly committed.
Such a conclusion continues to emphasize form over substance and ignores
the economic realities inherent in the Hirk circumstances. If ARGO treated all
the discretionary accounts in the same manner and Hirk was actually sharing
pro rata in the profits, then ARGO was essentially managing a mutual fund.
Hirk was alleging in essence that ARGO was dealing in investment contracts collectively for the various accounts and then allocating profits and
losses on the basis of investment amounts. By ruling that the absence of authorization of this conduct in the investment agreement will preclude it as the basis of
a common enterprise, the Seventh Circuit enables the broker to control whether
a common enterprise will be found. An uninformed investor is not likely to
require a broker to state explicitly the manner in which he will conduct his
business. That the account is discretionary serves as an indication that the investor acknowledges naivete in commodities dealings.
In resolving Hirk the Seventh Circuit was obviously cognizant of Howey
and later Supreme Court decisions suggesting an expansive definition of a
security. Thus, one must speculate as to the courts motive in applying a
restrictive definition. To some extent the court may have been inspired by
judicial expediency. Although a broad interpretation would extend the protection of the Securities Acts, other factors require consideration. By extending
security status to discretionary accounts dealing with commodities futures, the
court would be infringing on the commodities market, an area subject to an
independent regulatory scheme and enforcement agency. The resulting overlap
in regulations and statutory remedies would add further complication to the
already complex regulatory scheme of the commodities market. Increased costs
of registration and compliance with the Securities Acts also militate against the
90 Vertical commonality is evidenced in Howey by the management-service contracts, which
place discretion in the Service Company in the management of the citrus tracts. 328 U.S. at

299-300.
91 561 F.2d at 98 n.5, (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)).
92
93

561 F.2d at 99.
Id.
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extension of the Securities Acts. Thus, the segregation of the securities and commodities markets reduces duplication of statutory remedies and assists in eliminating the unnecessary costs of overregulation.
Notwithstanding the merits of these policy considerations, the Seventh
Circuit predicated the Hirk decision on the Howey criteria and subsequent
decisions. Critical analysis of Howey renders suspect the conclusion that the
unitary nature of a discretionary account precludes security status. Also, the
claim of adequate remedies under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 fails to
focus on the basis of the security claim. Security status is alleged in the discretionary account, not the commodities futures contracts. The nature of the
agreement between the broker and investor is averred to be an investment contract. Therefore, the object of the investment, whether citrus groves or commodities futures contracts, is not of importance. The court's attention should be
directed to the investor giving the broker money with the broker making the
investment decisions. The Seventh Circuit's implicit view to the contrary evinces
a results orientation, which does have practical justification, but is inconsistent
with existing case law.
In summary, economic reality should be the court's concern in the search
for a common enterprise. The relevant inquiry should be to determine the
manner in which the broker manages the discretionary account, both individually
and in relation to other accounts. By asserting the allegations of uniform treatment of accounts and pro rata sharing of profits, Hirk was attempting to uncover
an investment scheme that was masquerading as an individualized opportunity,
but was in reality a common venture. These allegations should be sufficient to
establish a cause of action. The allegations still must be proven before recovery
under the Securities Acts will be allowed.
VI. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit's decisions in Milnarik and Hirk reveal a commitment
to deny security status to discretionary accounts. By following its earlier decision
in Milnarik, the Seventh 'Circuit failed to focus on the precise terms of the Hirk
agreement and instead sought to enunciate an inviolable rule of law, discretionary futures trading accounts are not securities. This blanket approach to the
issue fails to recognize that discretionary accounts are not indistinct, but present
varying degrees of commonality.
The Seventh Circuit's denial of security status to the Hirk agreement based
on the unitary nature of the account is also without merit. The Supreme Court
found the existence of an investment contract in Howey, which presented an
investment scheme more unitary than that found in Hirk. Investor profits and
losses in Howey were not interdependent, but segregated by the terms of the investment agreement.
The decision in Hirk may be explained in part by a desire to keep the commodities laws and securities laws distinct. 4 Although the elimination of the
94 In Hirk, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court dismissal of a cause of action
under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936. 561 F.2d at 103-04.
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overlap in statutory remedies might foster judicial expediency, this decision is
ultimately one for the legislature and not the courts. An aggrieved investor who
has satisfied the Howey criteria should not be denied the protection of the
Securities Acts by the application of an overly restrictive definition of a "common enterprise." Employment of such a test tends only to obfuscate the definition of an investment contract and adds more confusion to an area of law plagued
by uncertainty.
Although discretionary futures accounts may be drawn so as to escape
securities status, Hirk did not present such a case. The Hirk agreement conforms
to any reasonable application of the Howey criteria. The exclusion of the Hirk
account from the purview of the Securities Acts contradicts the remedial purpose
of the Acts. It also runs contrary to the express instructions of the Supreme
Court which suggest an expansive definition of a ''security."
Given the division of the circuits" on this issue, Supreme Court resolution
is necessary. Until this is accomplished, both brokers and investors in the various
circuits are subject to inequitable treatment under federal law. Absent final
resolution, the federal courts should follow those guidelines already established by
the Supreme Court and focus on the precise terms of the agreement in question
and not attempt to establish immutable rules of law. Unless this course is pursued, further inconsistencies and distortions of the Securities Acts are certain to
follow.
Glenn A. Clark

95 The following circuits have held discretionary futures accounts to be securities: Second
Circuit: Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Fourth Circuit:
Rochkind v. Reynolds Securities Inc., 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975); Fifth Circuit: SEC
v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Eighth Circuit: Marshall
v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Tenth Circuit: Commercial
Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39 (10th Cir. 1973) (by implication).
The following have denied security status to discretionary accounts: Third Circuit:
Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Sixth Circuit:
Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,862 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Seventh Circuit: Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Ninth Circuit: Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan,
Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Many of the decisions in the various circuits are those of the district courts. Therefore,
realignment is possible. Both the D.C. Circuit and Ninth Circuit have expressed the possibility
of granting discretionary accounts security status if presented with the proper fact situation.

Securities Regulation-Limited Partnership Capital
Contributions Constitute Separate "Purchases" for a
Rule 10b-5 Action.
Goodman v. Epstein*
I. Introduction
In Goodman v. Epstein, the Seventh Circuit was confronted with the question whether each capital contribution made by limited partners in response to a
call from general partners, pursuant to a partnership agreement, constituted a
separate "purchase" of a security for the purposes of an action for fraud brought
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 1Ob-5.' Although the partnership agreement
did not provide an express option to the limited partners to refuse to contribute
capital on the general partners' call, the Seventh Circuit said the agreement
contemplated a "continuing relationship" between them and concluded that
"the contribution by each Limited Partner in response to the call constituted
a separate 'purchase' of a security and, therefore, any material representations or
omissions at that time were 'in connection with the purchase or sale' of a security,
as required by § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5."' By this decision, the Seventh Circuit
departed from analogous case law and expanded the definition of "purchase"
within the context of the federal antifraud provisions.
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Agreement
Plaintiffs in Goodman brought an action seeking compensation for damages
suffered in connection with a limited partnership land development scheme that
went awry. In October of 1971, Lee A. Freeman, an experienced real estate investor and attorney, contacted L. W. Douglas, an experienced real estate develop582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978).
Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reads in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
2 Rule lob-5 states, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . (a) to employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
3 582 F.2d at 414.
*

1
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er and Sidney Epstein to inform them that he wanted to obtain a substantial
equity interest in a real estate development project Douglas was proposing. Subsequently, Freeman became the moving force in setting up the financing for the
project. In June of 1972, the real estate development project was formalized into
the D-E Limited Partnership Agreement. Freeman and seven others4 signed as
limited partners while Douglas, Epstein, and two others5 signed as general
partners.
The purpose of the partnership, as expressed in the agreement, was "residential development" of a 108-acre tract of vacant land (Westmont Project).'
To finance the venture the limited partners contractually obligated themselves in
the agreement and subsequent amendments' to furnish total capital of $3 million.' Moreover, it can be assumed that this contractual agreement did not contain any alternatives to contribution by the limited partners because the defendants in support of their case, and the court in making its decision, went to
great lengths to show that the limited partners did have a "legal option" to contribution. However, in the exhaustive list of these possible alternative courses of
action available to the limited partners,9 neither the limited partners nor the
court made mention of any alternative provided for in the agreement.
Early on, the Westmont Project encountered significant problems, including:
formal denial of a sewage permit by the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency, denial of local government approval because of undersized pipes of an
adjacent developer, and the removal of Douglas ° as a general partner. Failure
4 Jerry E. Poncher, a sometimes client of Freeman, originally assumed forty percent of
the equity interest. In July of 1972 David L. and Mollie E. Goodman purchased twenty-five
percent of Poncher's interest. The percentage division of the remaining interest was not set
out in the opinion although it was stated that Freeman had tentatively agreed in 1971 to take
or place at least sixty percent of the equity. Lee A. Freeman, Jr., Freeman's son and law
partner, was the only other limited partner mentioned in the opinion.
5 Raymond Epstein and Melvin M. Kupperman were the remaining original general
partners. Messrs. Epstein and Kupperman were architects, engineers and developers for the
project.
6 The project as originally planned consisted of three phases, the first of which was the
construction of some 480 rental units on approximately thirteen acres of the 108-acre tract.
The limited partners' $3 million obligation concerned only phase one.
7 The first amendment, the only one pertinent here, was signed at the same time as the
agreement. Shortly after the execution of the agreement (and its amendment), a certificate
of limited partnership was signed and filed pursuant to Illinois state law.
8 Although the court stated the $3 million was not collected "up front" but was to be
contributed upon requests from the general partners from "time to time," this does not imply
that the limited partners were not committed for the entire amount. Nothing in the agreement
would have prohibited the general partners from requesting the lump sum up front; in fact,
one of the plaintiffs believed that the total amount was due upon signing the agreement.
Under certain circumstances, the limited partner could be called upon to contribute in
excess of $3 million. 582 F.2d at 412-13. 391 n. 8.
9 See note 58 infra and accompanying text.
10 Douglas' removal resulted primarily from his performance on another project.
One of the terms of Douglas' withdrawal, which was negotiated by Freeman, was the
release of any claim arising from his acts as general partner. To effect this release a second
amendment to the partnership agreement was executed that read:
The Limited Partners and each of them do hereby release and forever discharge Raymond Epstein, Sidney Epstein and/or Melvin M. Kupperman from any
and all claims, debts, liabilities, payments, obligations, actions and causes of action
of every nature, character and description which the Limited Partners or each of them
hold as of the date of actual execution of this Second Amendment or have ever held
against Raymond Epstein, Sidney Epstein and/or Melvin M. Kupperman arising out of
or in any way connected with the partnership.
582 F.2d at 394 (quoting from the Second Amendment to the partnership agreement).
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of the Westmont Project, as originally planned," was conceded in March of 1973
when the developers, faced with these and other difficulties, requested return of
the money the partnership had paid to obtain the necessary building permits.
During the period described above, the limited partners responded on several
occasions to capital calls. Another call came on June 6, 1974, requesting money
for payment of interest and taxes. At the district court trial below, a dispute
arose concerning whether the limited partner plaintiffs had knowledge of the
serious difficulties encountered by the general partner defendants. The trial,
however, resulted in a general verdict; hence, there was no finding of fact resolving the dispute. The final months of the Westmont venture involved accounting
and disbursement of funds as both the limited and general partners "jockey[edi
for position in the lawsuit which was then looming ever more ominously over the
horizon.""
B. The Litigation
Suit was filed on February 23, 1976, by the limited partners who alleged
violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC rule
10b-5 (Count I), common law fraud (Count II), and breach of fiduciary obligation (Count III), and sought $1,061,500 in damages." The jury returned a
general verdict in favor of the defendant general partners on all three counts.
On appeal, the plaintiff limited partners raised seven errors on the part of
the trial judge (4 pertaining to instructions and 3 involving his conduct at trial).
Six of the seven errors were found insufficient to require a reversal 4 but, one, the
trial judge's instruction stating that "each subsequent capital contribution made
pursuant to such an agreement does not constitute a purchase of a security," was
found to be an incorrect statement of the law. The Seventh Circuit held that this
instruction amounted to a peremptory direction in favor of the defendants on
Count I and therefore it reversed and remanded to the district court for a new
trial on Count I"
C. The Issue
A prerequisite to a cause of action under § 10(b) is that there must have
11 See note 6 supra.
12 582 F.2d at 394.
13 The plaintiffs in the action were David L. Goodman, Mollie E. Goodman, Lee A. Freeman, and Lee A. Freeman, Jr. The $1,061,500 figure represented fifty percent of the total
investment of the limited partners, the owners of the other fifty percent interest electing not to
sue.
14 The four errors alleged pertaining to ihstructions concerned: (1) the trial court's
instructions dealing with the validity of the release of the general partners which accompanied
Douglas' removal as a general partner; (2) the trial court's instruction on the means of
knowledge and the due diligence defense; (3) the trial court's instruction on whether a limited
partnership interest constitutes a security; (4) the trial court's instruction stating when a
''purchase" occurs.
15 At oral argument, it was determined that all of plaintiffs' objections related only to
Count I, thus judgment was affirmed as to Count II and Count III.
The Seventh Circuit said that such an instruction amounted to a peremptory direction
because if the only purchase or sale of a security occurred at the execution of the limited
partnership agreement in 1972, then this claim, filed in February of 1976, would be barred
by the three-year statute of limitation absent additional proof of fraudulent concealment.
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been a purchase or sale of securities. Although there has been an enormous
number of decisions concerning § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, there is limited authority
on when a purchase or sale takes place. 6 The issue in Goodman was whether
each capital contribution made by the limited partners in response to a call from
general partners, pursuant to a partnership agreement that did not provide any
express options to contribution, constituted a separate "purchase" of a security
under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
The limited partners, who cited no specific authority, contended that the
original "commitment" to the limited partnership was not the final "investment
decision" to be made in the venture; rather, each capital contribution was a
separate "investment decision" and therefore each contribution was a separate
"purchase" of securities. The general partners, on the other hand, relying
primarily on the "commitment doctrine" enunciated by the Second Circuit in
Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntzy advanced the position that the limited
partners became "committed" on the date of execution of the limited partnership
agreement. Therefore, any duty on the part of the general partners arising under
the federal securities laws to furnish information to the limited partners ceased
at that time.
III. "Purchase or Sale" Under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
A. Statutes
The starting point in the construction of a statute is the language itself, 8
even though history has demonstrated that cases construing the terms of the
statute in context often turn out to be the most valuable source. This is essential
because the scope of the antifraud rule lOb-5 cannot exceed the power granted
the Securities and Exchange Commission by Congress under § 10(b).' 9 Although
"the interdependence of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly a
relevant factor in any interpretation of the language Congress has chosen,".2 "the
meaning of particular phrases must be determined in context."'" Moreover,
"Congress itself has cautioned that the same words may take on a different coloration in different sections of the securities laws; both the 1933 and the 1934
Acts preface their lists of general definitions with the phrase 'unless the context
otherwise requires.' ""
The statutory definitions in and of themselves lend little guidance in specific
16

See 5 A.

JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE

lOb-5, § 38.02(d) '(1978).

17 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972).
18 Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977), Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976), Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
19 430 U.S. at 472-73; 425 U. S. at 212-14.
20 425 U.S. at 206 (quoting SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 '(1969)).
21 393 U.S. at 466.
22 Id. Section 3 of the 1934 Act provides:
(a) When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires(13) The terms "buy" and "purchase" each include any contract to buy, purchase,
or otherwise acquire.
(14) The terms "sale" and "sell" each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1976).
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factual situations; therefore, courts have generally looked to the purposes behind
federal securities laws2" in their attempt to define the reach or limits of the
securities acts' terms and phrases. 4 Consequently, in the past, statutory terms
and phrases have generally been broadly construed and have not been limited to
their common law meanings. 5 In particular, the Seventh Circuit has previously
commented with respect to the 1934 Act's definitions of "purchase" and "sale":
[The] broad language [in the Exchange Act's definitions] indicates an intention by Congress that the words "purchase" and "sale" are not limited
to transactions ordinarily governed by the commercial law of sales. The
purpose is evidently to make control of securities transactions reasonably
26
complete and effective to accomplish the purposes of the legislation.
The Seventh Circuit again in Goodman relied on this general history of expansive
reading of the terms of the federal antifraud provisions when it made its determination to include each capital contribution within the meaning of "purchase." 7
However, "reading the Rule flexibly does not relieve . . . the obligation to
define the limits of liability imposed by the Rule and to adhere to common
sense."28 Indeed, recent Supreme Court decisions have sharply reversed the
former trend of expansive reading and have given narrow interpretations to the
terms of rule 1Ob-5 and other antifraud provisions.29
B. The "'Commitment" and "Investment Decision" Doctrines
Closely related to the question of what constitutes a "purchase" or a "sale"
under § 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 is the question of when the "purchase" or "sale"
takes place, an issue on which there is limited authority." The time of the
The Supreme Court in Hochfelder described the purposes behind the Acts as follows:
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et
seq., was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information
concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against
fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical
standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.,
1-5 (1933). The 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against
manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges. See S.
Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934).
425 U.S. at 195.
24 See 393 U.S. at 466-67.
25 For general discussion of what is a "purchase or sale" and a list of authorities see generally Annot., 4 A.L.R. Fed. 1048, 1054 (1970) and 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 16, at § 38.02[a].
26 Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967).
27 582 F.2d at 410.
28 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
29 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (where the Court opined that
"artifice to defraud" and "fraud or deceit" in rule lob-5 mean something more than breach of
fiduciary duty). Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (where the Court held
specifically that "scienter-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" must be alleggd for a
private lOb-5 action. 425 U.S. at 193). Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) (here the Court upheld a rule developed by the Second Circuit several years earlier
and limited standing under rule lOb-5 to actual purchasers or sellers of securities).
30 See note 16 supra.
23
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purchase or sale is crucial because in an action under rule lOb-5 the alleged misconduct must take place "in connection with a purchase or sale."'" To be "in
connection with a purchase or sale," the misrepresentation or omission must be
prior to or contemporaneous with the purchase or sale."2 Moreover, the need for
setting a specific time for the sale or purchase becomes obvious when a person
is faced with the question whether the claim is barred by the statute of limitations."3
A general rule states that the time of purchase or sale is when the parties
have become irrevocably committed to the consummation of the transaction.
Referred to as the "commitment doctrine," the rule was recently enunciated by
the Second Circuit in Radiation Dynamics" and appears to be firmly established
in the law. The rationale for using the moment of commitment as the critical
point at which a "purchase" takes place derives from the purpose behind the
federal antifraud provisions, that is, "[t]o substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor"" in purchases or sales of securities. Once
the parties decide to irrevocably commit themselves to a sale or purchase there is
no reason to require further disclosures since the disclosure could have no effect
on that decision. 7
In Radiation Dynamics, plaintiff Radiation Dynamics, Inc. (RD), in need
of working capital, sold stock in another company, Technical Research Group,
Inc. (TRG). RD, subsequently, discovered that TRG was involved in a merger
with Control Data Corporation. As a result of the merger, the stock which RD
sold for $299,000 to the defendants was resold, within two and a half months, by
the defendants at an enhanced value of $690,270.
The evidence indicated that Cohen, an officer from RD, contacted Goldmuntz, the chief executive of TRG, in late May of 1964, to determine whether
RD's share of TRG could be marketed. Goldmuntz indicated to Cohen a possible
buyer of the stock who later proved uninterested. 8 During this same period
TRG became involved in merger discussions with another corporation which
31 For text of the rule see note 2 supra.
32 Kogan v. National Bank of N. America, 402 F. Supp. 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1975);
Pepsico, Inc. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
33 There is no general federal statute of limitations and no provision in § 10 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Therefore, the appropriate act of limitation in the forum
state controls. In Illinois, the forum state of Goodman, the action must be brought within three
years of the purchase or sale of a security. Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996 '(7th Cir. 1974);
ILL. REv.STAT. ch. 121!, § 137.13D (1975).
34 464 F.2d 876. Radiation Dynamics is not the first case in which the Second Circuit has
articulated the "commitment" doctrine. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), the court found that liability for
insider trading violations under rule lOb-5 attaches at the time of commitment to buy or sell
rather than the time of the transaction's ultimate execution.
35 See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1049-51 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 690-91 (D.
Md. 1975); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 801-02 (W.D. Pa. 1973),
aff'd as to liability, 491 F.2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 '(1976). See
generally 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 16, at § 38.02[d].
36 SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
37 SEC v. National Student Mkting. Corp., [1978] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
96,540 at
94,191.
38 Goldmuntz also introduced Cohen to one Fisher who subsequently arranged for the
purchase of 3,000 shares of TRG stock. This sale was closed on August 8, 1964. These
purchasers were also named as defendants.
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were abandoned in the early stages. Determined to sell, Cohen recontacted
Goldmuntz on June 24, at which time they made a binding oral contract under
which Goldmuntz agreed to purchase 500 TRG shares, subsequently increased
to 700 shares. The sale was actually completed on August 17. In the period
between June 24 and August 17, TRG continued to seek a merger and on July
24, serious discussions were held with Control Data Corporation. Negotiations
continued throughout August and then on September 23, the parties made a
public statement that they had reached an agreement to merge. This merger
agreement was finally signed on November 12, 1964.
RD, in an attempt to recover some of the lost profits, argued that Goldmuntz and the other defendants39 had violated § 10(b) and rule 10b(5) by not
disclosing TRG's merger plans. A special verdict was returned in favor of the
defendants upon a finding that the defendants did not possess "material information as to a reasonably possible .

.

. merger with Control Data" when RD, on

June 24, made its respective "commitments" to sell its TRG stock.4" On appeal,
RD argued against the trial judge's instruction that made the date of sale for
disclosure purposes the date at which RD became "committed" to sell. RD
contended that the date of the consummation of the transaction, August 8, was
the actual date of the "sale." Affirming, the Second Circuit held that the trial
judge
correctly instructed the jury when he stated that the time of a "purchase or
sale" of securities within the meaning of Rule lOb-5 is to be determined as
the time when the parties to the transaction are committed to one another. A
party does not, within the intendment of Rule lOb-5, use material inside
information unfairly when he fulfills contractual commitments which were
incurred by him previous to his acquisition of that information, for, as Judge
Pollack instructed the jury, the Rule imposes "no obligation to pull back
from a commitment previously made by the buyer and accepted by the
seller because of after acquired knowledge." The goal of fundamental faIrness in the securities marketplace is achieved by such a determination....
•.. "Commitment" is a simple and direct way of designating the point at
which, in the classical contractual sense, there was a meeting of' the minds of
the parties; it marks the point at which the parties obligated themselves to
perform what they had agreed to perform even if the formal performance
of their agreement is to be after a lapse of time .... 41
Decisions prior to Radiation Dynamics place emphasis on the options and
investment decisions available to the complaining parties in lieu of performance
under a purchase or sale agreement when determining whether the acts or
omissions of the defendants were "in connection with the purchases or sale of
any security."
In SEC v. North American Finance Co.,4 the SEC brought an action to
enjoin the defendant from engaging in acts and practices constituting violations
of both securities acts. The defendant corporation had used subscriptions for
39
40
41
42

See note 38 supra.
464 F.2d at 884 n. 8.
582 F.2d at 412 (quoting from 464 F.2d at 891) (emphasis deleted).
214 F. Supp. 197 (D. Ariz. 1959).
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selling its stock. After subscribing to purchase stock, the subscribers had the
option at a later time to either purchase the stock or cancel the subscription
option, thus freeing themselves of further obligation. Recognizing that this
option was available to the plaintiffs and therefore required the subscribers to
make an investment decision, the court granted the injunction and held "that the
sale is not consummated until the full subscription price has been received by the
issuer and all shares
subject to the subscription have been issued and delivered to
43
the subscriber."
In another stock subscription case, United States v. Kormel, Inc. 4 the court
found that representations made to induce investors to continue payment under
the stock subscription were made "in the offer or sale" of the stock within the
meaning of the securities act. 5 The court showed its concern with the options
available to the plaintiff when it stated:
It is not persuasive to suggest that the subscribers,in making additional
payments under the subscription contracts, would be doing only what they
were already legally bound to do. In view of the injunction action brought
by the SEC which resulted in the entry of a permanent injunction, by consent, against the defendants, it is at least likely that the contracts were voidable. Further,the contracts contained a provision for forfeiture of payments
already made if the full subscription price were not paid, rather than an
express promise to pay the full sum and from this viewpoint, were in the
nature of conditional unilateral contracts rather than bilateral contracts.46
Thus, in both these subscription cases, where the courts found a sale at the time
of payment, there was a contractual alternative available to both of the contributing parties.
In a Second Circuit case, Fershtman v. Schectman, 7 the limited partners
brought an action under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities legislation and rule 10b-5 for concealment or misrepresentation in the termination of a
limited partnership. The court held: "if the defendants were legally entitled to
terminate the partnership on March 31, 1968, in their sole discretion, it would
make no difference what they represented or concealed, even if we assume in
'
plaintiff's favor that this transaction constituted a sale." 48
Thus, here again,
when determining if there is a requirement to disclose, a court placed emphasis
on whether the complaining party had an option remaining under the agreement.
Cases after Radiation Dynamics have followed the "commitment doctrine"
rationale and have cited the case approvingly. In Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chemical Corp.," the plaintiff had an option to purchase $6.7 million worth of
stock for which it paid $334,785 on January 9. The final payment and exchange of shares was to come between February 9 and April 19. After the
43 Id. at 202.
44 230 F. Supp. 275 (D. Nev. 1964).
45 Id. at 278.
46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 450 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 '(1972).
48 Id. at 1360 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). For a discussion on the duty to
correct and on how long correction is necessary, see 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD,
§ 6.11 (540-543) (1977).
49 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
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initial payment but prior to further payment, the purchaser discovered material
information that made further purchases undesirable. On erroneous advice
from counsel that it was committed to full payment, the remaining $6,360,915
was paid by Sundstrand on February 2. In a subsequent § 10(b) action, the
Seventh Circuit found liability but limited damages to only the first payment on
January 9 because it discovered from its own study of the record that Sundstrand
was not obligated under its contract with Sun Chemical to purchase the stock.
The court determined that the option actually gave Sundstrand the right but not
the duty to proceed with the purchase." The Seventh Circuit reasoned, then,
that Sundstrand had a legal and contractually valid alternative to the second
payment, even if Sundstrand's counsel was not aware of it. Because plaintiffs
knew of the adverse information prior to payment, they were not injured by its
nondisclosure. The important point is that the Seventh Circuit saw that the
legal alternative to payment which constitutes a separate "sale" was based upon
the contract itself.
Ingenito v. Bermec Corp.,51 explains that the key to determining whether
a transaction is a purchase or sale hinges on whether or not there is an investment
decision to be made. Ingenita arose out of a cattle investment operation. The
defendant was in the business of selling breeding cattle and maintaining them for
the purchasers. The investors made periodic payments to the seller under maintenance contracts to pay for the upkeep of the cattle. The district court, "while
not free from doubt,"52 held that each payment under the maintenance contracts
constituted a "sale" under § 10(b)." The court relied on what it expressed as
an impressive analogy to SEC rule 136," which deals with assessable stock. The
maintenance payments, the court analogized, could be viewed as charges which,
like assessments, the purchasers were not obligated to pay because the maintenance contracts were cancellable by the investor prior to the due date of any
payment. The court, to avoid resting solely on the analogy to rule 136, discussed
two similar cases55 involving periodic payments. The court stated:
The crux of those decisions, as we read them, is that plaintiffs' right to continue purchasing the installments on their contracts, or to cancel at their

Id. at 1049-51.
376 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Id. at 1182-83.
Id.'
Rule 136, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) An "offer, ....
offer to sell" or "offer for sale" of securities shall be deemed to be
made to the holders of assessable stock of a corporation when such corporation shall
give notice of an assessment to the holders of such assessable stock. A "sale" shall
be deemed to occur when a stockholder shall pay or agree to pay all or any part of
such an assessment.
(c) The term "assessable stock" means stock which is subject to resale by the
issuer pursuant to statute or otherwise in the event of a failure of the holder of such
stock to pay any assessment levied thereon.
17 C.F.R. § 230.136 (1977).
55 The cases discussed were SEC v. North Am. Fin. (see note 42 supra and accompanying
text) and Gross v. Independence Shares Corp., 36 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa- 1941) (which held
that each monthly payment under a "contract certificate" cancellable at any time by the inventor was a purchase of an interest in a security within the meaning of § 2 (3) of the Securities
Act of 1933).
50
51
52
53
54
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option, amounted to a series of investment decisions to purchase (with a
corresponding increase in their equity in the issuer) and, accordingly, a series
of sales by the issuer. The contracts were executory, or open, and in practical
effect they involved the same sort of investment choice as, for example, the
decision to purchase monthly 100 shares of General Motors stock (or, more
true to life, one share per month).-"
The Ingenito court, however, viewed promissory note payments in a different
light. The purchasers of cattle investment contracts received certificates of ownership of their cattle at the time of the original transaction in exchange for promissory notes which called for installment payments. The court found that
[i]nsofar as the animals taken alone represented a § 2(3) "interest in a
security," the interest was purchased at the time of the initial sale and the
rights and obligations of the parties were fixed at the time of the making of
the note. Each payment represented not the creation or assumption of new
obligations, but the fulfillment of those previously created. There is a substantial economic and legal difference between the note payments and the
maintenance payments. Each payment on a maintenance contract represented a fresh decision to further invest in Black Watch; the herdowner
"bought" something each month which he did not own before which, by
virtue of the cancellation clause,
he was not obligated to buy. The same
57
is not true of the note payments.
Thus, on close examination of the cases leading up to Goodman, the courts
support the proposition that the time of purchase or sale of a security is that time
at which the parties have become irrevocably obligated to the consummation of
the transaction. Cases such as North American Finance, Kormel and Ingenito,
which find periodic payments pursuant to a contractual agreement to be separate
purchases or sales, rely on the fact that the plaintiffs in each of these cases had a
contractual option to performance and, therefore, had a remaining "investment
decision" at each payment. In other words, the plaintiffs in these cases were not
committed to making the periodic payments.
IV. "Purchase or Sale" in Goodman v. Epstein
Distinguishing Goodman from the situation in Radiation Dynamics, the
Seventh Circuit in Goodman seized on the available "legal alternative" to performance under the agreement, not available to the plaintiff in Radiation
Dynamics. This alternative required the investors in Goodman to make an "investment decision" each time they made a capital contribution.
The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the contract between the parties in
Radiation Dyiamics contemplated no continuing relationship and that the
seller in that case was bound to perform whether or not he acquired the information regarding merger. In contrast, the court viewed the partners in Goodman
as having contemplated a continued relationship requiring an investment decision
to be made by the limited partners as to their "legal alternatives" each time a
56
57

376 F. Supp. at 1184.
Id.
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capital call was made. As stated by the court, the "legal alternatives" were:
A limited partner could (claim the investors) : (1) comply with the
call; (2) abandon the project; (3) sell his limited partnership interest;
(4) if he had any information tending to demonstrate fraud by the General
Partners, refuse to contribute the called-for capital and defend against
the General Partners' suit (if, indeed, one was brought) on the basis of
breach of the Limited Partnership Agreement by the General Partners;
(5) file for a declaratory judgment ending his obligations to the Limited
Partnership; or (6) file an action to dissolve the partnership and seek a
return of prior contributions.5
The Seventh Circuit, citing Sundstrand, emphasized that Goodman was not
the first time it found the critical fact to be whether an "investment decision"
remained to be made by a party from whom information was withheld. The
Goodman court, reading its earlier opinion, stated: ". . . Sundstrand could have
avoided the final payment-(the court) determined that Sundstrand had had a
legal alternative which it could have exercised." 9
The test selected, and properly so, by the Seventh Circuit in Goodman to
determine the time of "commitment" was whether an "investment decision"
could be made each time there was a capital call. The absence of a remaining
"investment decision" would signal "commitment."" The criterion used by the
Seventh Circuit to determine if an "investment decision" remained was whether
the limited partners had a "legal alternative which [they] could have exercised.""0
The absence of an available "legal alternative" would signal that no "investment
decision" remained.
The Goodman court placed great weight upon the fact that the limited
partners, like the plaintiffs in Sundstrand, had a legal alternative to performance.
However, even though the Seventh Circuit chose to draw an analogy between
options available 1 to the limited partners in Goodman and the contractual stock
option available to the plaintiff in Sundstrand, they are in fact very dissimilar.
It is apparent that the choice to exercise the right given the purchasing party
in Sundstrand through the stock option involved an "investment decision." To
say, however, that the limited partners in Goodman had "legal alternatives"
similar to the contractual option in Sundstrand stretches the facts of both cases.
The partners in Goodman became committed to the limited partnership
when they all signed the agreement in late June of 1972. From that time
forward, the limited partners had obligated themselves to furnish at least $3
million in capital which could have been called for at any time. 2 It was prior
to the signing of this agreement, which did not provide a contractual alternative
to contribution when capital was called for, that the limited partners should have
evaluated the risks and merits of their prospective investments and determined
their ability to bear the total investment risk. It was also at this time, prior to the
58
59
60
61
62

582 F.2d at 398.
Id. at 413, 414.
Id. (emphasis deleted).
See text accompanying note 58 supra.
See note 8 supra.
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execution of the agreement, that the potential investors should have been provided
with the same information that would be required on a securities registration
statement. 63
None of the "legal alternatives"" which th6 limited partners listed to support
their theory that an "investment decision" remained to be made at each capital
call, the theory adopted by the Seventh Circuit,65 were provided for in the agreement. The list of "legal alternatives," when analyzed, provides basically for
three possible paths of action on the part of the limited partners when faced with
a capital call. First, a limited partner could comply with each capital call;
second, he could sell his limited partnership interest; or third, the limited partner
could seek judicial relief from the agreement while at the same time subjecting
himself to a possible lawsuit for breach of the partnership agreement.
Thus, the first way a limited partner could have reacted to a capital call was
to respond to it. This was the only way to assure fulfillment of the contractual
commitment. The second alternative available, sale of the limited partnership
interest, was more academic than real. Although the partnership agreement
provided that "[t]he transferee shall be a limited partner to the extent of the
partnership interest transferred or encumbered," there might be some question
whether these transferees would hold limited partnership status.6"
The court, analyzing the third alleged alternative, judicial relief, placed
emphasis upon the limited partners' awareness "of their ability to bring about
dissolution of the partnership if it could not be operated profitably, Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 106Y § 32(1) (e)..... .The ability of a party to bring suit in lieu of
performance under a contract, however, is not unique to this situation, and it is
not accurate to say that seeking a judicial remedy is an option within the scope of
an "investment decision." The conclusion to be drawn from this type of analysis
is that every case involving a delay in performance following contractual commitment would present the "legal option" of litigation in lieu of performance.
By holding each capital contribution to be a separate "purchase" the Seventh
Circuit also introduced some practical problems. The court did not clarify
whether it intended each contribution to be a "purchase" for the purposes of the
Securities Act of 1933 or whether it intended to extend this rather broad interpretation for § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 purposes only. This uncertainty exists
because the court put substantial weight on its analogy to assessable stock. The
time of sale of such stock is provided for in SEC rule 136(a), a rule promulgated
under the 1933 Act. If each contribution is a separate "purchase" for purposes
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953).
See text accompanying note 58 supra.
582 F.2d at 414.
Id. at 392 n. 10.
Id. at 413. The Illinois statute provides, in pertinent part:
(1) On application by or for a partner the court shall decree a dissolution whenever:
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the
carrying on of the business,
(d) A partner wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership or agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business
that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him,
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss,
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 106!2 § 32 (1975).
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of the 1933 Act, then the issuers would have to establish a "private offerings"
exemption under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act to avoid registering the security.
Further, if the limited partnership interests did not qualify as a "private offering"
and had to be registered pursuant to § 5 of the 1933 Act, it follows that at each
contribution a new filing would have to be made with the SEC, a burden that
could prove to be quite expensive.
The Seventh Circuit, to buttress its argument, referred to two of its prior
decisions in which the availability of a "legal alternative" was a deciding factor.
In Wright v. Heizer Corp.,6" the court held that the power of shareholders under
state law to veto an amendment to a corporate charter was a sufficient choice to
establish the fact that the shareholders had relied on material omissions prior to
their approval of the amendments."9 There is a crucial difference between the
shareholders' option to veto certain amendments in Wright, and the limited
partners' "legal alternative" of seeking judicial relief in Goodman. The right to
veto gave the shareholders in Wright a free choice; however, the limited partners
in Goodman would subject themselves to substantial risk of being sued for breach
of contract if they attempted to seek judicial relief from compliance with a capital
call.
In the second case, Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,"
the court found that the ability to vote down a pension plan or withhold services
from the local fund- was a sufficient "legal alternative" to render compulsory contributions to the pension fund a "purchase or sale." 71 Thus, in both Wright and
Daniel, the rights of the investors lay within their contracts. In Goodman, however, the limited partners did not have the contractual right not to comply with
capital calls.
Finally, to support its conclusion, the court spoke of SEC rule 13672 as lending support to its holding. The analogy, although having some surface appeal,
stands on weak footings. The weakness of the analogy to the irrevocable obligation of the limited partners in Goodman becomes evident by reading one of the
court's own sentences, which states: "The stockholder is, of course, 'committed'
to meet the assessment call; but his option to return the stock [pursuant to Rule
136(c)] to the issuer in lieu of meeting the assessment requires an investment
decision on his part. ' 73 Thus, the purchaser of assessable stock is only "committed" to decide whether or not he will meet the assessment, unlike the limited
partners in Goodman who were not afforded an option similar to that available
under rule 136(c).
V. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit has made a rather liberal extension of the concept of
68 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
69 Id. at 250.
70 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
71 Id. at 1243. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court, which has been
recently limiting the reach of the federal antifraud provisions, has granted certiorari to this
case. See note 70 supra.
72 For text of 'rule see note 54 supra.
73 582 F.2d 414.
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"purchase or sale" on the theory that § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are to have broad
and liberal applicability. Although courts in the past have given broad protection
under these antifraud provisions, a binding limited partnership agreement to contribute capital should be treated as possessing a great degree of finality. The goal
of securities regulation, as stated previously by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand,
is "to achieve fundamental fairness in the marketplace." 74 But the scope of the
securities laws is not infinite. Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 cover fraud in
connection with "purchases" or "sales" of securities, they do not, and were not
designed to, reach all instances of fraud.
To have held that each capital contribution was not a separate "purchase,"
and therefore not each time trigger the protection of § 10 (b), would not deprive
the limited partners of all possibility for protection and recovery. The limit'd
partners could, and in fact did, seek relief by bringing an action for common law
fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation, causes of action on which the general
partners prevailed in Goodman. 5 Moreover, additional proof of fraudulent concealment would have equitably tolled the running of the statute of limitations
with respect to any § 10(b) cause of action arising at the time of execution of
the partnership agreement.
The Seventh Circuit in Goodman should have concluded that the trial
judge's instruction stating "[that] each subsequent capital contribution made
pursuant to such an agreement does not constitute a purchase of a security" was
a correct statement of the law given these facts. The only "purchase" of a
security should have been found to have taken place at the time that the agreement was signed. After the signing, the limited partners did not have the freedom
to make any more "investment decisions" within the plain meaning of the words;
holding otherwise deviates from earlier case law. The limited partners' claim
under Count I, therefore, should have been barred by the three-year statute of
limitations. To have so held would have been in line with the current Supreme
Court trend to give a narrow reading to the terms and phrases of the federal antifraud provisions" and would have given greater finality to contractual commitment.
Thomas P. Powers
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75
76

553 F.2d at 1050.
582 F.2d 390.
See note 29 supra.

Attorney Work Product-New Counsel for Party
May Be Granted Access to Predisqualification Work
Product of Prior Counsel.
First Wisconsin Mtg. Trust v. First.Wisconsin Corp.*
In exercising its broad discretionary power to supervise the conduct of attorneys appearing before it,' the Seventh Circuit in First Wisconsin Mtg. Trust v.
First Wisconsin Corp. considered the novel question whether counsel who have
been disqualified for prior simultaneous representation of both parties to a con2
troversy may properly turn over to substitute counsel their work product generated prior to the order for disqualification. The Seventh Circuit concluded
that absent a showing of a "reasonable possibility" 3 that confidential information
would be passed through the work product, access to the work of former counsel
by new counsel should not be denied. In reaching this conclusion the court rejected the position adopted by the dissent that once an attorney is disqualified
it should be presumed that the work product is tainted with confidential
information.4
The Seventh Circuit was confronted with a difficult issue of first impression.
The few relevant decisions to consider presdisqualification work product gave
little analysis or guidance. In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the
Seventh Circuit was strongly divided on the proper outcome of First Wisconsin.
The court attempted to devise a holding that would have the least detrimental
practical impact on the administration of justice and the parties involved. As a
result, the majority failed to adequately consider the issue, and a vociferous dissent legitimately criticized the holding 'as ignoring the ethical considerations
relevant to the decision. This comment will consider the two divergent approaches given in First Wisconsin in light of the ethical principles involved in
granting access to predisqualification work product.
Plaintiff in First Wisconsin is a real estate investment trust ("Trust") established in 1971 under the sponsorship of defendant First Wisconsin Corporation.
Plaintiff Trust was jointly involved in various investments with and advised by
two subsidiaries of First Wisconsin Corporation, both also named as defendants.
The law firm of Foley & Lardner served as general counsel to the Trust,
First Wisconsin Corporation and its subsidiaries from 1971 until September,
1974, when it withdrew as counsel for the Trust following a dispute concerning
problem loans. Trust hired special counsel in February, 1974, and filed suit in
* No. 77-1786 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1978) (en banc), rev'g, 571 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1978).
1 Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 1977); Schloetter v.
Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d
568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975).
2 The term "work product" was used throughout the litigation to refer to the written
work prepared by the attorneys for defendant. No. 77-1786, slip op. at 2 n.1. Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), developed extensive rules concerning work product in the context of discovery. Hickman is to be distinguished from First Wisconsin in which plaintiff is
attempting to prevent turnover of the work product from defendants' former attorneys to their
new counsel.
3 No. 77-1786, slip op. at 16, 31.
4 See text accompanying note 22 infra.
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March, 1975, claiming that defendants had violated certain sections of the federal
securities laws and regulations.5 After commencing the action, Trust refused to
consent to the continued representation of defendants by Foley & Lardner, and
moved on August 4, 1975, to disqualify defense counsel. The motion was granted
15 months later on November 16, 1976.6
Following disqualification of their attorneys, defendants, through substitute
counsel, moved for authorization to request access to the work product generated
by Foley & Lardner prior to disqualification.' The defendants requested the
"written work product, consisting essentially of summaries of loan files relating
to more than 300 complex transactions, and an explanation limited to an identification of the documents reviewed."' This work product, prepared in anticipation of litigation by 15 attorneys throughout 1974 and early 1975, was the
result of "routine lawyer work of a type which any competent lawyer ....could
accomplish. .. ."' The motion for access to the work product was denied,1" and
defendants appealed. After an initial determination by the Seventh Circuit that
it had jurisdiction to consider the appeal," a divided three-judge panel affirmed
the district court order. 2 A rehearing en banc was granted and the decision of
the panel was reversed.
I. First Wisconsin Majority
For a clear perspective of the impact of First Wisconsin, it is necessary to
note that the disqualification of Foley & Lardner was not questioned by the
Seventh Circuit because the issue was not properly before it." In its limited
examination of the propriety of allowing access to the work product of former
counsel, the First Wisconsin majority began by emphasizing the routine nature
of the work product in question. Relying on this routine nature of the work, the
six-judge' 4 majority unquestioningly accepted "the defendants' assertion that the
preparation of the loan file summaries was not aided by any confidential infor5 Plaintiff's complaint alleged failure to disclose material information relating to plaintiff's investments and breach of contractual and fiduciary duties by defendants. No. '77-1786,
slip op. at 32 (dissent).
6 First Wisconsin Mtg. Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 422 F. Supp 493 '(E.D. Wis.
1976).
7 Substitute counsel initially filed a notice of appeal of the disqualification order and
requested a pretrial conference to discuss defendants' access to the work product generated
by Foley & Lardner prior to disqualification. The appeal was dismissed voluntarily by defendants after the district court declined to hold the pretrial conference on grounds that it had
been deprived of jurisdiction due to filing of the notice of appeal. No. 77-1786, slip op. at 3-4.
8 Id.at 5.
9 Id.
10 First Wisconsin Mtg. Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 74 F.R.D. 625 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
11 First Wisconsin Mtg. Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978).
The court determined that it had jurisdiction as a reviewable collateral order, and this portion of the three panel decision was incorporated into the en. banc review by reference. No.
77-1786, slip op. at 4. See IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3rd Cir. 1978). See also
Note, Disqualification of Counsel for the Appearance of Professional Impropriety, 25 CATH.
U. L. REV. 343, 346-49 (1976); Note, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for
Disqualification of Counsel in Federal Courts, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 450 (1978).
12 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978).
13 See note 7 supra.
14 The majority opinion was supported by Fairchild, C.J., and Swygert, Pell, Tone, Bauer,
and Wood, J.J.
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mation1 acquired by the Foley lawyers through their prior relationship with
Trust."
Once it had concluded that no confidential information was involved, the
court began a piecemeal justification for reversal. The court dwelled primarily
on the undesirable results which would occur if it was presumed that the work
product was tainted with confidential information once an attorney is disqualified.
It would destroy the work done by disqualified counsel, irrespective of
any fault on the part of the party for whom the work was done;
It would do this regardless of whether the work destroyed involved the
use of any confidential information obtained from the complaining party;
It would foreclose trial courts from any exercise of discretion in determining what effect an order of disqualification should have upon the parties
to litigation, for it creates a per se rule whose effect is automatic and unqualified once an order of disqualification is entered, regardless of the circumstances giving rise to the disqualification and regardless of the extent to
which the complaining party may have caused the work in question to be
done;
It would seriously impede the administration of justice, because the
rationale of the decision applies to all work done by disqualified counsel,
and for all practical purposes it would impose a moratorium upon trial preparation for such period of time as it might take to rule upon a motion for
disqualification;
It would do a major injustice to the clients of disqualified counsel, causing them to pay a second time for the same work;
It would encourage the public in its dissatisfaction with the expense
and delay involved in the administration of the judicial system;
It would provide no benefit to the complaining party other than the
satisfaction of imposing an unnecessary financial burden on its opponent;
It would in no way discipline disqualified counsel whose actions have
been the cause of the disqualification order."6
Only in an addendum to their decision did the Seventh Circuit majority
finally offer some guidance to the district courts who are charged with determining whether the work product reflects confidential information. The court
adopted the general test offered by the dissent of "whether there exists a reasonable possibility of confidential information being used in the formation of, or
being passed to substitute counsel through, the work product in question."'" The
burden of proof would be on the movant to indicate whether such a possibility
exists. To protect any confidential information contained in the work product,
the court could proceed on an in camera basis if necessary. In defense of its conclusion that no confidential information was reflected in the Foley work, the
court cited plaintiff's concession that no confidential information in the evidential
sense had been used. 8
Throughout the majority opinion, the court made no specific reference to
15 No. 77-1786, slip op. at 5.
16 Id. at 14-15.
17 Id. at 16. While the dissent offered this general test, it applied it by use of a presumption that the work product reflected confidential information. Id. at 26, 31.
18 Id. at 17.
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the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The opinion, however,

was not completely devoid of sensitivity to the need for high professional standards of conduct. In applying the reasonable possibility test, the court urged
an ad hoc determination of whether there is "taint of confidentiality or other

improper advantage gained from the dual representation."' 9 Yet, without explanation, the First Wisconsin majority never allowed plaintiff the opportunity
to demonstrate "other improper advantage" which might occur from turnover

of the Foley work. Plaintiff Trust realized that it had not been allowed to apply
the First Wisconsin test, and brought a Petition for Rehearing En Banc and
Modification of the Mandate, requesting the court to remand to the district court
for findings of fact concerning the actual existence of other impropriety. The
petition was denied without comment by the Seventh Circuit."
II. First Wisconsin Dissent
The three-judge dissent" recognized the serious flaw in the majority holding: reversal was not in compliance with the ad hoc appraisal urged by the
majority. The holding was also challenged as unworkable because of the time
and judicial resources required for ad hoc appraisal, the absence of adequate
guidance to lower courts, and most importantly, the reversal of the burden of
proof. The majority view was attacked as being ethically improper. Support for
this contention was derived from the CPR.
Canon 4 states, "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets
of a Client." The dissent concluded that this command applies with equal force
to both the work product of an attorney and the person himself. This is true
because the work possesses the potential for being the vehicle used to reveal confidential information obtained prior to disqualification. It is, however, in the
applicationof Canon 4 to the work product that the tension between the majority
and dissent views becomes apparent. The dissent urged that Canon 4 be applied
to work product in the same manner that it is applied to disqualification: once
it is demonstrated that a former attorney-client relationship existed between
counsel and the complainant, and that there was a substantial relationship between the former and current representations, it should be presumed that confidential information is reflected in the work product." In defense of this presumption, the dissent stated that the rule would not'be a per se denial of the
work product. For example, if the work product was generated prior to the
hiring of a new attorney who at one time had represented the opponent in a
matter substantially related to the current suit, it would be obvious that there
would be no possibility that the work reflected confidential information." However, such exceptions would be rare, and the practical effect of the dissent approach would be a per se exclusion of the work product.
19 Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
20 Petition for Rehearing En Banc and Modification of the Mandate, No. 77-1786 (7th
Cir. Sept. 22, 1978) "(submitted after en bane reversal), denied Nov. 1, 1978.
21 The dissenting opinion was supported by Castle, Senior J., and Cummings and Sprecher,

J.J.

22
23

See note 27 infra.
No. 77-1786, slip op. at 30.
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The dissent further supported use of a presumption by its analysis of the
facts of First Wisconsin. Without any deliberate impropriety, it is possible,
claimed the dissent, for the work product to include special emphasis of certain
loan transactions. Such emphasis might not be apparent to an outsider, such as
a judge in an in camera inspection, who is under time pressure and unable to
examine carefully minute details of the work product.
The dissent did not rest its case with Canon 4. Rather, it turned to the
generic command of Canon 9 that, "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety." It is possible that not only the attorney himself, but also the attorney's work product, might give an appearance of impropriety. The dissent concluded that such an appearance was cast by use of
the work product in First Wisconsin because the average person would not distinguish between the work product and the attorney, and the consequent loss
of public trust would outweigh any harm which might come to the defendants.24
Responding point by point to the majority's list of practical effects that
would occur with use of a presumption that confidential information was reflected in the work, the dissent claimed that: there is some indication of fault
on the part of defendants in their urging Foley to continue work despite knowledge of possible conflict; the proper test is the possibility of confidences being
used or revealed; no per se rules are advocated; the extent to which plaintiff
caused creation of the work product is a matter for the district court to judge;
the moratorium argument is unpersuasive because defendants were aware of the
possibility of loss of the work product; expediency should not override ethical
standards; defendants' hardship does not outweigh plaintiff's detriment in having to litigate against secret materials; and the dissent position encourages the
public to fully confide in their attorneys.2
III. Application of Canons 4 and 9 to First Wisconsin
It is obvious that proper conduct should be encouraged, even at the sacrifice
of smooth administration of justice. When unsure about what constitutes proper
conduct, courts should resolve all doubts in favor of more careful enforcement
of ethical rules." This maxim is a helpful guide, but it does not indicate at what
point doubts become so relatively unimportant that the application of these ethical
rules will be more harmful to the litigants than it will be beneficial to the legal
community. Courts can only instinctively grope for the answer. The ethical
canons of the CPR, however, provide a proper starting point.
A. Canon 4
1. Application to Disqualification
Canon 4 is commonly applied to disqualification through use of the "substantial relationship test."'" Under this test, once an attorney-client relationship
24 Id. at 38.
25 Id. at 42-43.
26 R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 256 (2d ed. 1970). Id. at 35.
27 T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
This test was previously adopted by the Seventh Circuit. See 546 F.2d 706.
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between counsel and the adverse party is shown to have existed, the attorney
will be disqualified if the current suit involves matters substantially related to the
issues of the prior representation. Most courts hold that no breach of confidence
need be demonstrated to justify disqualification,2 8 and they will presume that
confidential information was revealed to the attorney. The reason advanced
for this presumption is that requiring a former client to prove that confidential
information was involved in the attorney-client relationship creates a danger of
disclosure of the very confidences sought to be protected.29 Because disqualification and the question of access to predisqualification work product are so
closely linked, the issue raised by Canon 4 is whether, in its application,
the presumption that confidential information was involved in the former attorney-client relationship should also be used to presume that confidential information taints the work product.
2. Application to Work Product and First Wisconsin
The scope of the protection of Canon 4 clearly is broader than the First
Wisconsin majority recognized. Although grounded in the attorney-client relationship,"0 the Canon includes more than the attorney-client evidentiary privilege:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or
the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would likely to be detri31
mental to the client.

The acknowledgement by plaintiff Trust that no confidential information
in the evidentiary sense had been used' 2 was a limited concession. Because Foley
& Lardner had represented plaintiff and defendant jointly before suit was'filed,
there were no "confidences" given to the attorneys which were not simultaneously
given to defendants."
The majority hinted that secrets might be a factor in denying work product
to new counsel by holding that courts should look for "taint of confidentiality
or other improper advantage." However, no specific mention of secrets was
made. This failure to adequately consider possible secrets is an indication that,
28 The dissent cites T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). Accord, 546 F.2d at 710. A minority of courts allow rebuttal of the presumption that confidential information was passed. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). At
least one court has indicated the possibility of a variable burden of proof to demonstrate
confidential information, depending upon the facts of the case. Consolidated Theatre, Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Cir. Man. Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954) (dicta).
29 566 F.2d at 608; Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 '(2d Cir.
1973).
30 American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1971); E. F. Hutton
& Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
31

ABA CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101

(A), (1976).

32 No. 77-1786, slip op. at 17.
33 Transcript of Oral Arguments on Rehearing En Banc, First Wisconsin Mtg. Trust v.
First Wisconsin Corp., No. 77-1786 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1978), at 23-24. See 305 F. Supp.
371, and note 49 infra.
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at least in First Wisconsin, the court thought secrets not to be worthy of stringent
protection. This view is not without some logical support. Examples given by
the dissent of possible secrets included knowledge by Foley & Lardner's attorneys
of the Trust's reaction to certain loans, and-possible unconscious emphasis on
certain transactions in the loan file summaries. However, even if Foley & Lardner
had withdrawn as attorney for both parties at the first sign of conflict, defendants
could have indicated these secrets to their new counsel because, just as with
confidences, this information was also available to the defendants.
However, the mere fact that both the confidences and secrets of plaintiff
Trust were also known to defendants does not solve any ethical problem raised
in First Wisconsin. The CPR, ethical canon 4-4, states that the ethical obligation
of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client, "unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of the information
or the fact that others share the knowledge." This canon would not have prevented Foley & Lardner from making all information known to both plaintiff
and defendant during the joint representation. However, the Canon appears
to apply where the attorney has withdrawn from joint representation. Therefore, despite availability of the information during the period of joint representation, the test of whether there exists a reasonable possibility of confidences and
secrets being reflected in the work product still applies. The availability of the
information is a factor to be considered when determining propriety of work
product turnover, for a balancing of potential harm to the parties is not foreclosed in the Canon 4 analysis.' The First Wisconsin court should have remanded the case to allow plaintiff the opportunity to demonstrate possible confidences and secrets.
B. Canon 9
1. Application to Disqualification
Canon 9 admonishes an attorney to avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. It is now clear that counsel may be disqualified solely on
these grounds.3 " This "appearance of evil" doctrine is designed to effectuate the
goal of maintaining public confidence in the legal system. Laypersons and lawyers
alike acknowledge that confidence in both the law and lawyers may be eroded
by conduct which appears improper"5 although it may be of borderline propriety.
For this reason, courts often state that an attorney's conduct "should not be
weighed with hairsplitting nicety."3 7 It is possible that even if Canon 4 is not
threatened by the work product turnover, the work could give such an appear34 No. 77-1786, slip op. at 37 n.15.
35 Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (3rd Cir. 1976) ; Richardson v. Hamilton International Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 986 (1973). See Note, Appearance of Impropriety As Sole Grounds for Disqualification, 31 U. MAMI L. REv. 1516 (1977).
36 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-2, (1976).
37 United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964). See also United
States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270, 273 n.3 (4th Cir. 1977); Allied Rlty. of St. Paul, Inc. v.
Exch. Nat. Bank of Chic., 408 F.2d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom.,
Abramson v. Exch. Nat. Bank of Chic., 396 U.S. 823 (1969).
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ance of impropriety that denial would be justified. This issue can be decided
only by looking to the facts of First Wisconsin.
2. Application to Work Product and First Wisconsin
As noted by the three-judge panel before en banc reversal, the essence of an
attorney's representation is his or her "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
or legal theories."38 The court continued, "[t]o say that a lawyer's physical presence gives the appearance of impropriety while the use of his work product
does not is to immerse oneself in the same 'hair-splitting niceties' which properly
have been condemned in the enforcement of ethical standards." 9
Yet, the work product remains one step removed from the actual presence
of the attorney. It may capsulize one particular point or issue without the full
reflection or explanation possible when the attorney is present and actively representing the client. Whether this distinction is sufficient to erase an appearance
of impropriety depends on how the public sees the work product. In First Wisconsin, neither pleadings nor answers to interrogatories were questioned by the
court as appearing improper to the general public.4" If these documents, an
acknowledged and highly visible work product, do not give an appearance of
impropriety, it is difficult to justify a presumption that all other types of work
will give such an appearance.
The First Wisconsin dissent proposed a balancing test, stating that "we must
ask whether reasonable members of the public would view access to predisqualification work product as being improper, and, if so, whether the benefit of permitting such access outweighs the harm to the public trust."'" In order to incorporate the public scrutiny spirit of Canon 9 into this test, it is also necessary
to consider how the public would view the economic and strategic impact of
denial of work product on the parties. A per se denial of access to the work
product could "encourage the public in its dissatisfaction with the expense and
delay involved in the administration of the judicial system.""4 The public could
easily interpret such a rule as being merely another tactic on the part of the legal
community to create more work for themselves. Protection of the values inherent
in Canon 9 requires a broad reading of the balancing test, with consideration of
both the work product and the previous representation. This flexible rule would
preserve the high value placed on the appearance of proper conduct without
damage from overzealous ethical fervor.4" Canon 9, like Canon 4, requires discretion on the part of the trial court judge, for no rule of certitude could accomplish the purpose of Canon 9-to maintain confidence in the legal system.
38 571 F.2d at 397 (quoting 329 U.S. at 508, 511).
39 Id.
40 Pleadings and other documents were discussed by the dissent in reference to Canon 4.
The dissent distinguished such documents from the general work product because of their
public access. Id. at 30-31 n.8. Ease of inspection would not appear to mitigate the appearance of impropriety under Canon 9, should it exist.
41 Id. at 38.
42 Id. at 15.
43 At least one court has acknowledged the practical detrimental effect of overcompensating
for the deteriorating public image. 370 F. Supp. at 591. See Note, Ethical Considerations
When an Attorney Opposes a Former Client: The Need for a Realistic Appraisal of Canon 9,
52 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 525 (1975).
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IV. Impact of First Wisconsin
A. Burden of Proof
Although the First Wisconsin majority gave an incomplete analysis of the
issue, its holding provides adequate protection to confidences and secrets under
the instant facts. A shift in the burden of proof to require the movant to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that confidences and secrets are involved in the
work product is a workable device only by careful application." The First
Wisconsin opinion can be interpreted to say that once the disqualification order
has been entered, the court will examine the record to determine if there is an
independent basis for an inference that confidential information had been used in
preparation of the work product. 5 If such an inference can be drawn from the
facts, new counsel may attempt rebuttal." Only if rebuttal is successful must
the former client establish a reasonable possibility that confidential information
was used. Disclosure of the actual confidences and secrets is not required where
the inference from the record is not rebutted. Where disclosure is required, in
camera proceedings will protect the material discussed." Through a strict application of the reasonable possibility test, the necessity of in camera review would
be infrequent, thereby alleviating the fear expressed by the dissent that such a
review would be unworkable because it requires excessive amounts of judicial
time.
B. Cooperation of the Courts
It is apparent from the dearth of cases on point that litigants have seldom
questioned whether the work product should be turned over to substitute counsel. 49 Now that litigants are aware that work product may be denied if the
44 Courts should not follow the example given by the Seventh Circuit in First Wisconsin.
See text accompanying note 20 supra.
45 No. 77-1786, slip op. at 7. The court stated:
No doubt it will frequently be that the lawyer who is unfortunate enough to become
involved in the Goodwin Sands of simultaneously representing clients whose interests
either are or thereafter come into conflict, and who ceases representation of one of
the clients, will find that the work performed during the period subject to disqualification will have aspects of confidentiality or other unfair detriment to the former
client arising from the very fact of the knowledge and acquaintanceship acquired
during the period of the prior representation. This does not mean, however, that
this is always the situation, or even that it is frequently so.
Id. (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 5. It appears the court concluded that defendants' contention that the loan file
summaries were prepared without use of confidential information was sufficient to rebut any
inference of a taint which might have arisen from the record.
47 Id. at 16.
48 Id.
49 Only three cases cited by the litigants directly considered the question of access to
predisqualification work product, and none of them had any difficulty in justifying work product
turnover. IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3rd Cir. 1978) ; E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown,
305 F. Supp. 371; Allied Rlty. of St. Paul, Inc. v. Bxch. Nat. Bank of Chic., 408 F.2d 1099
(8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom., Abramson v. Exch. Nat. Bank of Chic., 396 U.S. 823
(1969). IBM involved simultaneous representation of both plaintiff and defendant in unrelated
matters, a violation of Canon 5. There was no question of confidential information being involved, and the court held that disqualification was sufficient "vindication of the integrity of
the bar." In Hutton counsel for plaintiff was disqualified in a suit by a corporation against a
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attorney is disqualified for a Canon 4 violation, courts must be increasingly
aware that motions for disqualification and subsequent work product denial may
be used as a trial tactic. For example, the movant may submit excessive discovery
requests to his or her opponent which properly could be postponed until the
motion for disqualification is acted upon. Without some control by the court,
the moving party may encourage this artificial buildup of the work product
to the detriment of the nonmoving party should the work product be denied.
Inherent delays in the legal system compound the problem, as evidenced by
the 15-month delay between submission of the motion to disqualify in First
Wisconsin and the disqualification order by the court. Courts should attempt to
give a prompt response to a motion to disqualify, in order to minimize lost time
should access to the work product be denied. Harmful effects from the First
Wisconsin holding will be avoided only through full cooperation from the courts.
V. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit in First Wisconsin formulated a correct standard for
determining the propriety of predisqualification work product turnover by examining the facts of the case to determine whether there existed a reasonable possibility of confidential information being passed through the work product. The
court analyzed the work product independently from the initial disqualification,
and did not assume that confidential information was reflected in the Foley &
Lardner work. As a consequence, the First Wisconsin decision has shifted the
burden of proof to require the party opposing the transfer of work product to
demonstrate a possible taint of the work product.
However, in arriving at its conclusion, the court, despite the objection of
the dissent, failed to give sufficient weight and thought to Canons 4 and 9.
Future courts should note that the Seventh Circuit in First Wisconsin was confronted with an issue of first impression, that it gave an incomplete analysis of the
issue, that it did not apply its own standards to the facts of the case, and that
the decision was countered by a strong and rational dissent. These factors give
First Wisconsin dubious precedential value unless courts are willing to give First
Wisconsin a restrictive reading.
First Wisconsin, however, does give warning that courts should be sensitive
to the use of motions for disqualification and subsequent denial of work product
as simply a trial tactic. Only a sensitive administration of the holding will afford
litigants the protection they are due. Courts will be guided correctly if they
pause to question whether Canons 4 and 9, so carefully propounded by the
American Bar, will be supported by denial of the work product.
Judith A. McMorrow
former vice-president because the firm had represented the vice-president at SEC hearings
concerning the matters substantially related to the current suit. Hutton relied on the absence
of an attorney-client relationship and the fact that the vice-president knew that any information revealed to the attorneys would be given to the corporation. Disqualification was upheld
but the attorney work product was turned over to new counsel for plaintiff. Hutton was distinguished by the dissent as involving factual statements rather than legal analysis of the facts.
No. 77-1786, slip op. at 26 n.4. In Allied a former government attorney who had been
involved in a related criminal suit against defendants was disqualified from representing plaintiff. The work product, including pleadings, was not excluded. Allied was distinguished by
the First Wisconsin dissent as involving material which had already been made public. Id.

Disqualification of Counsel-Attorney-Client
Relationship Can Develop Absent the Requirements
Needed for the Establishment of an Agency Relationship
-Traditional Imputation of Knowledge Rule Applies
Regardless of Size or Geographic Scope of Law Firm.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.*
I. Introduction
The basis of all disqualification motions is an alleged ethical transgression.
Such motions normally raise three questions: (1) did a violation actually occur? (2) what type of transgression was it? and (3) was the type of violation
found of such magnitude that the need to preserve ethical standards outweighs
an individual's freedom to choose his own counsel?
Each of these questions arose in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp. Although a seemingly obvious ethical transgression had occurred, the
characterization of the violation was dependent on whether an attorney-client
relationship existed between the moving parties and the law firm they sought to
disqualify. The Seventh Circuit, therefore, had to determine what factors must
exist for the development of an attorney-client relationship and whether such a
relationship was established here. Once this determination was made, the court
could consider whether the violation mandated affirmation of the disqualification
motion. An analysis of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning on these questions, with
strict attention paid to the underlying facts of the case, forms the basis of this
comment.
II. Statement of Facts
Westinghouse is an appeal of the district court's denial of a disqualification
motion made by four named defendants.' To fully understand this complex case,
some historical background is required. On September 8, 1975, Westinghouse, a
major producer of nuclear reactors, notified a number of utility companies that it
would not fulfill existing uranium supply contracts. Because the price of uranium
had increased substantially, Westinghouse claimed that the contracts had become
commercially impracticable under § 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code,2
*
580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1978)
(No. 78-422).
1 The four named defendants referred to are Gulf Oil Corp. (Gulf), Kerr-McGee Corp.
(Kerr-McGee), Getty Oil Corp. (Getty) and Noranda Mines Limited (Noranda). Gulf
Minerals Canada Limited is also a defendant, but for convenience is included within Gulf. See
generally 580 F.2d at 1312.
Noranda's motion for disqualification stems from a claimed conflict of interest different
in fact from those alleged by the oil companies. See generally 580 F.2d at 1312. The issues
raised by Noranda are not addressed in this comment.
2 The Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615 states in relevant part:
Except as far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by the seller . . . is
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thus excusing Westinghouse from performance.3 In response, all of the utility
companies filed breach of contract actions against Westinghouse in various
courts.4 Ancillary to its defense of the above contract actions, Westinghouse
filed an antitrust action on October 15, 1976, against 12 foreign and 17 domestic
corporations5 involved in various aspects of the uranium industry. In this complaint, Westinghouse claimed that the defendants had conspired to increase
uranium prices. 6 Throughout all phases of this litigation, Westinghouse retained
the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis as lead counsel.7
Beginning slightly before the alleged breach by Westinghouse and continuing
throughout the time of the antitrust litigation, the American Petroleum Institute
(API), of which the three principal Westinghouse defendants' were dues-paying
members, was engaged in an extensive lobbying effort in opposition to legislative
proposals seeking to break up oil companies both vertically and horizontally.
One facet of this lobbying effort was the creation of a legal task force to conduct
studies and legal research "into the implications of divesture and the adequacy
of existing laws to keep the industry competitive." 9 One of the recommendations
of this task force was that a law firm be retained to conduct an overall review of
the subject. On February 25, 1976, Kirkland was retained for this purpose." °
In a letter sent from API to Kirkland on May 4, 1976, Kirkland was told that
its work
should include the preparation of possible testimony, analyzing the probable
legal consequences and antitrust considerations of the proposed legislation.
...As part of the study, we [API] will arrange for interviews by your firm
with a cross section of industry personnel.... Your firm will, of course, act
as an independent expert counsel and hold any company information learned
through these interviews in strict confidence, not to be disclosed to any other
company, or even to API, except in aggregated or such other form as will
preclude identifying the source company with its data.1
not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed
has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or
domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to
be invalid.
3 For further information on the Westinghouse "breach," see BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 1,
1976, at 92; Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1976, at 1; BARRON'S, Sept. 15, 1975, at 7.
4 580 F.2d at 1313. Thirteen suits initiated in various courts have been consolidated for
trial in the Federal District Court of Virginia at Richmond under MDL Docket No. 235. Id.
5 Included as defendants in this antitrust action were Gulf, Kerr-McGee, and Getty, the
three principal defendants in the case addressed here. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom
Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
6 448 F. Supp. at 1288.
7 Kirkland & Ellis is a two-city law firm with offices in Chicago and Washington, D.C.
During the time period in question the Washington office used the name Kirkland, Ellis &
Rowe. Kirkland "Chicago" employs approximately 130 attorneys and Kirkland "Washington"
employs an additional 40 attorneys. 448 F. Supp. at 1288-89.
8 These defendants are Gulf, Kerr-McGee, and Getty. 580 F.2d at 1314.
9 448 F. Supp. at 1291.
10 Id. Kirkland, Ellis & Rowe was actually retained by American Petroleum Institute (API).
Throughout the time in question, Chicago-based attorneys were responsible for the Westinghouse
litigation while Washington-based attorneys worked on the API report. Id. at 1305. See generally note 7 supra.
11 580 F.2d at 1313 (emphasis added).
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In the weeks that followed, API developed channels through which Kirkland
could obtain the confidential information it needed to complete the report.
Through these channels Kirkland successfully obtained a great deal of information which was publicly unavailable. Kirkland's final report to API contained
230 pages of text and 82 pages of exhibits. Uranium references appeared
throughout the report, and uranium was the primary subject of approximately
25 pages of text and 11 pages of exhibits. The report concluded that "the energy
industries, both individually and collectively, are competitive today and are
likely to remain so."13 This final report was released on October 15, 1976, the
same day as the Westinghouse antitrust litigation was filed.
A comparison of Kirkland's API report and the antitrust complaint it filed
for Westinghouse reveals a basic conflict. Although Kirkland's report for API
stated that the energy industry in general and the uranium industry in particular
were extremely competitive and were likely to remain so for the foreseeable future,
Kirkland's complaint for Westinghouse claimed a complete lack of competition
in the uranium industry and hinted at possible collusion among energy producers.
In essence, simultaneously inconsistent positions were taken by Kirkland-a contention even Kirkland did not attempt to rebut."
Kerr-McGee, Getty, and Gulf sought disqualification of Kirkland as counsel
in the Westinghouse antitrust action because of Kirkland's relationship with them
and with API in preparation of the antidiversification report. 5 The oil companies' principal assertion was that during the course of Kirkland's preparation
of the API report, they had given confidential industry and market data to Kirkland attorneys. Relying on The American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility Canon 4, which requires a lawyer to preserve the confidences and
secrets of his client,"e Canon 5, which dictates that an attorney must exercise
independent judgment on behalf of his client,1 7 and Canon 9, which seeks to deter
even the appearance of attorney impropriety," the oil companies claimed that the
simultaneous representation of both API and Westinghouse "create[d] a sub:12 See generally 580 F.2d at 1314-16. API sent questionnaires to 59 member-companies
directing the recipient to return the answers to Kirkland. In a cover letter accompanying the
questionnaire, API explained the need for the requested information and noted that "Kirkland,
Ellis & Rowe is acting as an independent special counsel for API, and will hold company information disclosed in strict confidence, not to be disclosed to any other company or even
API ....
580 F.2d at 1313-14 (emphasis in the original).
API also set up interviews between a Kirkland partner and a cross section of industry
personnel. See generally 580 F.2d at 1314-16. Representatives of eight oil companies were
interviewed, including representatives of Gulf and Kerr-McGee. Getty personnel were not
interviewed by Kirkland attorneys. Getty did receive, complete, and return a questionnaire to
Kirkland, with the understanding that the data contained within would be kept in strict confidence. 580 F. 2d at 1314-16.
13 448 F. Supp. at 1296.
14 Id.
15 Other disqualification motions were presented at the district court level. One involved
Noranda, discussed in note 1 supra. Another was made by twelve other corporate defendants
to the Westinghouse antitrust action. Their argument centered on the possibility that Gulf,
Kerr-McGee, and Getty might be dropped from the case. They claimed this would be
prejudicial to their positions. See generally 448 F. Supp. at 1289.
16 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4: "A lawyer should preserve
the confidences and secrets of a client."
17 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5: "A lawyer should exercise
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client."
18 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 9: "A lawyer should avoid even
the appearance of professional impropriety."
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stantial conflict of interest, a potential for disclosure of confidential information,
and the appearance of impropriety."19 Because of these violations, the oil companies moved to disqualify the entire Kirkland firm or, in the alternative, to
dismiss the oil companies from the antitrust suit. The district court denied the
motion to disqualify the firm" and the oil companies appealed to the Seventh
Circuit.
III. Disqualification as a Remedy for Canon 4 and Canon 5
Violations
A. The Agency Test
The first issue to be determined in Westinghouse was whether an attorneyclient relationship had developed between Kirkland and the oil companies.
Stressing that such a relationship was one of agency, the district court initially
looked for any explicit evidence of an agency relationship. Finding none, the
court then searched for any conduct between Kirkland and the oil companies
which would imply such a relationship. Again the search was futile. 2 Finally,
the court looked for evidence of what it considered to be the three fundamental
characteristics of an agency relationship. These characteristics are (1) the power
of the agent to affect the legal relations of the principal, (2) the fiduciary relationship existing between the agent and the principal in which the agent works
on behalf of and primarily for the benefit of the principal, and (3) the principal's
right of control over the acts of the agent. The court held that evidence of these
characteristics was insufficient to establish an attorney-client relationship. In addition, the court held that any beliefs the oil companies may have had regarding
the existence of such a relationship were irrelevant since agency is a concept
dependent upon the manifest conduct of the parties and not their intentions or
beliefs.22 As no agency relationship existed, Canons 4 and 5, which apply solely
under the umbrella of such a relationship,2 accorded no relief to the defendant
oil companies.
In reversing the district court,24 the Seventh Circuit held that the court
erred in its "narrow, formal agency approach to determining the attorney-client
relation... ."" The Seventh Circuit, however, promulgated no hard and fast
rules to determine when an attorney-client relationship comes into existence. The
court did hold that "to apply only the agency tests is too narrow an approach for
determining whether a lawyer's fiduciary obligation ha[d] arisen."2 " The court
19
20
21
22

23

448 F. Supp. at 1289.
Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1300-01.
Id. at 1303.

See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977).

24 The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's holding that Kirkland could continue
as counsel for Westinghouse in the antitrust action regardless of the defendants. The court,
however, gav6 Westinghouse the alternative of dismissing Gulf, Kerr-McGee, and Getty as
defendants in the antitrust action in lieu of discharging Kirkland. As Westinghouse had
obtained substitute counsel by the time this decision was rendered, it chose to discharge Kirkland. 580 F.2d at 1322.
25 Id. at 1318.
26 Id.
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specifically outlined various situations in which an implied attorney-client relationship or fiduciary obligation on the lawyer's part was found despite the absence of
all the characteristics required by the district court's agency tests. Alluding to the
defendants' reasonable belief that a confidential relationship between themselves
and Kirkland had developed, the court held that such a relationship existed, at
least for purposes of applying Canons 4 and 5.27
The district court's holding that "[a]n attorney-client relationship is one of
agency to which the general rules of agency apply"2' 8 and therefore "arises only
when the parties have given their consent, either express or implied, to its formation"2 9 is not well-supported. Although the district court's application of an
agency theory to the attorney-client relationship has been applied by other
courts, ° no federal court has used an agency principle to allow an attorney to
escape what would otherwise be an obligation to his client." A reading of the
relevant cases indicates that the agency principle normally has been applied in the
attorney-client context either to bind a client to, or relieve him from, actions of
his attorney in much the same way that agency principles have been applied
when the agent was a layman. 2 Although the attorney-client relationship may
possess many of the same traits as an agent-principal relationship, the absence of
these traits, either in whole or in part, is not a per se indication that no attorneyclient relationship exists.
The one case cited by the district court as support for the agency test approach to the determination of an attorney-client relationship, Committee on
ProfessionalEthics & Griev. v. Johnson," is not conclusive. Johnson, which was
a disbarment proceeding, involved an attorney who allegedly was guilty of unethical conduct relating to land dealings. The district court had suspended the

27 Id. at 1321. The Seventh Circuit never actually stated that an attorney-client relationship between Kirkland and the oil companies had developed. Its decision appears to be solely
on the applicability of the Canons. Since the court did not refute the district court's ruling
that Canons 4 and 5 are irrelevant in the absence of an attorney-client relationship, however,
it can be inferred that the Seventh Circuit found such a relationship existed.
28 448 F. Supp. at 1300.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Brinkley v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir.
1973); Blakely v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 424 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1970); Hensley
v. United States, 281 F.2d 605, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Rothman v. Wilson, 121 F.2d 1000,
1006 (9th Cir. 1941).
In Brinkley, the agency test was used to deny any liability of an insurance company for
injuries received by the plaintiff in an automobile accident with a car driven by an attorney
who was returning home after defending the insurance company at a trial some distance from
the attorney's residence. In Blakely, the agency theory was applied to attribute to the client
(in this instance, an insurance company) the mistakes made by the client's attorney while
working for the client. In Hensley, a criminal case, an agency theory was utilized to hold
the defendant's waiver of a jury trial valid, even though the waiver in fact had been made by
the defendant's attorney. Finally, in Rothman, the agency theory was applied to allow a
layman to recover profits, which were made by the attorney's acquisition of interests antagonistic
to those of the client, from the attorney.
31 One possible exception is Committee on Professional Ethics & Griev. v. Johnson, 447
F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1971). For reasons discussed in the text accompanying note 33 infra, the
application of the agency principle by federal courts in cases with similar facts may fairly be held
as nonexistent.
32 See note 30 supra. In none of these cases was the agency theory utilized to allow the
attorney to escape obligations owed to his client.
33 447 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1971).
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defendant attorney on two or three separate grounds.14 Only one of the grounds
directly involved a disputed attorney-client relationship. On appeal, the Third
Circuit reversed the suspension and remanded the case because of a due process
violation." The statement in Johnson, on which the district court in Westinghouse relied, that "[a]n attorney-client relationship is one of agency and arises
only when the parties have given their consent, either express or implied, to its
formation,"" thus becomes mere dicta. Further, any comparison between the
factual situation in Johnson and that in Westinghouse is palled by the varying
degrees of contact between the attorney and client.
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit's views that an "attorney is held to obligations to the client which go far beyond those of an agent and beyond the principles of agency," 7 and that "attorney-client" fiduciary relationships can develop
without the presence of any of the traditional characteristics of an agency relationship, are well supported. Many situations exist in which an implied professional relationship is present despite the lack of any express attorney-client relationship. For example, a professional relationship can arise when a prospective
client engages in preliminary consultations with an attorney38 or when co-defendants and their attorneys exchange information in a criminal case. 9 An attorneyclient relationship can also exist when an insurer retains an attorney, and the insured cooperates with the attorney; the attorney may not thereafter represent a
third party suing the insured.4" The fundamental characteristics of an agency
relationship required by the district court exist in none of these situations; still,
professional relationships governed by the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility can be found.
B. Justification for the Disqualification
Once the existence of a fiduciary relationship between Kirkland and the oil
companies was established, the entire ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
became applicable.4 The direct application of Canon 4 and Canon 5 was then
decisive on the issue of Kirkland's disqualification.
Canon 442 is designed to preserve a client's trust in his lawyer. In Interna34 Id. at 171. The Third Circuit was unable to determine the number of grounds on which
the district court's memorandum decision was based.
35 Id. at 174. The Third Circuit held that the failure to give adequate notice of the
iharges to the defendant-attorney constituted a blatant due process violation. Id. The issue
of agency as it applied to an attorney-client relationship was, therefore, irrelevant to the holding
of Johnson.
36 447 F.2d at 174.
37 580 F.2d at 1317.
38 "Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper
functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and
secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him." ABA CovE oF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4, EC 4-1 (emphasis added). See also Taylor v. Sheldon, 172 Ohio St.
118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1961).
39 See Wilson P. Abraham Const. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977).
40 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Walker 382 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
41 See note 27 supra.
42 Canon 4 clearly states that an attorney must protect more than the information received
from a client which is protected by the attorney-client privilege. Secrets of the client must also
be protected. Secrets refer to "other information gained in the professional relationship that
the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
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tional Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer,4" the Second Circuit held that one seeking to
employ Canon 4 for disqualification must show not only the presence of an
attorney-client relationship, but also a substantial relation between the subject
matter of the previous dealings and the current litigation.44 The party seeking
the disqualification need not prove an actual breach of confidence since access to
confidential information raises an irrebuttable presumption of disclosure. 4
Since Kirkland did not debate that a substantial relationship between the API
report and the Westinghouse antitrust litigation did exist, the Internationaltest
was met. The Canon 4 violation, premised on the presumption of disclosure, thus
permitted the disqualification of Kirkland.
Canon 5 deals with an attorney's exercise of independent professional judgment. The Canon specifically precludes simultaneous representation of conflicting interests.46 By representing both Westinghouse and the oil companies, however, Kirkland did simultaneously represent conflicting interests: Kirkland
formulated the antitrust complaint for Westinghouse contending collusion in the
uranium industry and at the same time prepared a report for the oil companies
stating that this same uranium industry was highly competitive and was likely
to remain so for the foreseeable future. Because of these conflicting interests,
Kirkland violated Canon 5 thus justifying the firm's disqualification by the
Seventh Circuit.
IV. Disqualification as a Remedy for Canon 9 Violation
The failure of the district court to find an attorney-client relationship
between Kirkland and the oil companies did not dispose completely of the
disqualification motion. Because the oil companies also based their motion on
a Canon 9 violation by Kirkland, and because Canon 9 applies "to the entire
spectrum of lawyer conduct,"47 the presence of an attorney-client relationship was
not a prerequisite to finding a Canon 9 violation on Kirkland's part or upholding
the disqualification motion.
The district court found evidence of a Canon 9 violation, 8 but was reluctant
to disqualify on the basis of Canon 9 itself. Noting that a Canon 9 disqualification usually rests on an infraction of the Canon's disciplinary rules,4 9 the district
court found that Kirkland's apparent impropriety did not violate any Canon 9
disciplinary rules. Rather, the conduct was on the perimeters of ethical transgressions. In these gray areas, the court believed that "a mechanical application
would likely to be detrimental to the client." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Canon 4, DR 4-101 (A). Except in rare cases, an attorney may not reveal these secrets, use
them for the advantage of himself, or that of a third party. The same, of course, holds true
for confidences. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4, DR 4-101 (B) (1),

(2),(3).
43 527 F.2d 1288 '(2d Cir. 1975).
44 Id. at 1291. See also American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th
Cir. 1971).
45 See In Re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976).
46 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5, EC 5-14.
47 566 F.2d at 609.
48 448 F. Supp. at 1304.
49 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 9, DR 9-101, DR 9-102.
Many courts have been hesitant to use Canon 9 as a tool for disqualification when no such
violations have been found. See, e.g., International Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288,
1295 (2d Cir. 1975).
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of Canon 9 is to be avoided.... 0 To give pragmatic content to the canon, the
court suggested that "an attorney should be disqualified under Canon 9 only
when 'there is a reasonable possibility of improper professional conduct ....

",'

The district court therefore examined the conduct of the Kirkland firm to
determine whether it had been improper.
The primary basis for the oil companies' charges of impropriety was the
presumed disclosure of confidential information gathered by Kirkland's Washington attorneys preparing the API report to Kirkland's Chicago attorneys handling the Westinghouse antitrust litigation. Although imputation of knowledge
between members of the same law firm has been the traditional rule, the district
court noted that "recent decisions [had] occasionally rejected this rigid approach,
in recognition of the changing realities of modem legal practice," 52 and refused
to apply the traditional rule. 3 Once this rule was discarded, most of the apparent impropriety involving Kirkland vanished.
Like the district court, the Seventh Circuit found Canon 9 applicable in
this situation. Unlike the district court, however, the court of appeals believed
that this Canon was a basis for disqualification. Steadfastly adhering to the
traditional rule that actual knowledge of one or more lawyers in a firm is to be
imputed to every member of that firm, the Seventh Circuit gave no judicial
weight to the possibility that Kirkland attorneys working for API had been
completely insulated from Kirkland attorneys handling the Westinghouse case.54
Acknowledging the district court's test that " 'a reasonable possibility of improper
professional conduct' "" must exist before an attorney could be disqualified under
Canon 9, the Seventh Circuit found that "there exists a very reasonable possibility
of improper professional conduct despite all efforts to segregate the two sizeable
groups of lawyers." 56 The Kirkland firm was thus disqualified under Canon 9 as
well as under Canons 4 and 5.
The Seventh Circuit was not obligated to address the issue of disqualification
which may result from a "technical" Canon 9 violation or a Canon 9 violation
premised on the imputation of knowledge rule. The district court was forced to
examine this issue because it found no attorney-client relationship. At the appellate level, however, a determination of the Canon 9 issue was unnecessary
because the Seventh Circuit had already held that an attorney-client relationship
existed between Kirkland and the oil companies, that Canons 4 and 5 had been
violated, and that these violations warranted Kirkland's disqualification.
The Seventh Circuit's discussion relating- to imputation of knowledge was
particularly unnecessary. As noted previously, 7 Kirkland is one of the nation's
50 448 F. Supp. at 1304.
51 Id. (citing 537 F.2d at 813 n.12).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1305.
54 580 F.2d at 1321. In the district court, Kirkland maintained that their Chicago attorneys working for Westinghouse and their Washington attorneys working for API had been
sufficiently insulated from each other. 448 F. Supp. at 1305. Whether Kirkland continued
to maintain this position before the Seventh Circuit is unclear. See 580 F.2d at 1321 n.2 8 .
In any event, complete isolation was not achieved. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
55 448 F. Supp. at 1304 (citing 537 F.2d at 813 n.12).
56 580 F.2d at 1321.
57 See notes 7 and 10 supra.
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largest law firms with offices in Chicago and Washington, D.C. In Westinghouse,
the Chicago-based staff handled the antitrust litigation and the Washington
office handled the API matter. In theory, the two teams were completely segregated. There was, however, one crack in the "Chinese wall.""8 This break,
evidenced by the showing that one Kirkland attorney assigned to the Westinghouse litigation also admittedly prepared a legal memorandum for API, was
crucial.5" Since an actual breach had been proven, the court did not have to
rule on the imputation of knowledge issue. Overall, by commenting on the issues
raised by the Canon 9 allegation, the Seventh Circuit evidently deemed it necessary to rectify errors in the district court's application of Canon 9.
A. The "Technical" Violation: Appearance of Impropriety
The modern case law on the issue of Canon 9 disqualification appears to support the district court's view. Courts which have used transgressions of this Canon
as a basis of disqualification have typically done so only when one of the disciplinary rules of Canon 9 has been violated."0 To allow disqualification simply
on the appearance of impropriety opens the door for potential abuse as a court
can easily find the appearance of impropriety in many everyday attorney actions.
The Seventh Circuit's application of Canon 9 did not follow these precedents.
Kirkland violated no Canon 9 disciplinary rules, 1 yet one of the reasons the firm
was disqualified was the appearance of impropriety in some of its actions.62
Such use of the canon gives the practicing attorney little guidance. With no
guidelines or boundaries set, he or she may tread into truly proper areas, and
only later be informed that the journey was unethical because some steps appeared improper. Although hindsight may clearly show that one's actions took
on the appearance of impropriety, whether foresight can give as accurate a view
is questionable. As disqualification is detrimental to both the so-designated unethical attorney and the innocent client, "non-particular" Canon 9 disqualification should rarely, if ever, occur. Further, if a court believes such a disqualification is warranted, the court should fully explain its reasoning. In this way, the
disqualified attorney and, more importantly, attorneys who face similar problems
in the future, will have guidelines for future reference.
Any broader application of Canon 9 may defeat the goal of the Canon
itself. As the Fifth Circuit in Woods v. Covington Cty. Bank, 3 explained this
concept:
58 580 F.2d at 1321. "Chinese wall" was the term used by the Seventh Circuit to describe
Kirkland's attempt to segregate its Washington attorneys from its Chicago attorneys.
59 At least one judge on the Seventh Circuit's three-man panel may have reached a
different result in Westinghouse if this breach had not been shown. Judge Fairchild states that
if it had been established that there was a real insulation in all relevant particulars between
the lawyers working in the Washington office on the API report and those working in the
Chicago office on the antitrust action, imputation of knowledge to all partners would have
been eliminated from consideration in this case. 580 F.2d at 1321 n.28.
60 See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
61 See note 49 supra.
62 A close reading of the Seventh Circuit's opinion shows Kirkland's disqualification was
based not only on the Canon 4 and Canon 5 violations, but also on a Canon 9 transgression.
See 580 F.2d at 1321.
63 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
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It does not follow, however, that an attorney's conduct must be governed by
standards which can be imputed only to the most cynical members of the
public. Inasmuch as attorneys now commonly use disqualification motions
for purely strategic purposes, such an extreme approach would often unfairly deny a litigant the counsel of his choosing. Indeed, the more frequently
a litigant is delayed or otherwise disadvantaged by the unnecessary disqualification of his lawyer under the appearance of impropriety doctrine, the
greater the likelihood of public suspicion of both the bar and the judiciary.
An overly6 4 broad application of Canon 9, then, would ultimately be selfdefeating.

B. Imputation of Knowledge
The Seventh Circuit's holding that Canon 9 was a basis for disqualification
of Kirkland in Westinghouse may have stemmed solely from the apparent impropriety which developed when the imputation of knowledge rule was applied.
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit criticized the district court for "applying a different imputation of knowledge principle ... than that 'traditionally' and recently
applied by this circuit. . ."" In so commenting, the Seventh Circuit used Wes-

tinghouse to reaffirm its recent holding in Schloetter v.Railoc of Indiana, Inc.6
In Schloetter, a patent infringement case, a former partner of the law firm representing the defendant was shown to have previously been retained by the
plaintiff's agent in prosecuting the original patent application. 7 Noting that no
question regarding the propriety of disqualification would arise if the former
partner himself attempted to represent the defendant, the court went on to
reiterate the traditional rule that confidential information possessed by one member of a law firm is imputed to all members of that firm. " The Seventh Circuit
thus affirmed the district court's disqualification of defendant's counsel. 9
There is little question that imputation of knowledge between members of a
law firm is the traditional rule."° This rule, however, was designed for a time
when law firms were relatively small, when interaction among the various partners was great, and when a firm's influence extended over a limited geographic
area.7 Under such conditions, continuation of the rule can be supported as it is
reasonable to assume that knowledge will be passed between firm members in such
situations. In the large, multicity law firms of today, such conditions no longer
exist. Law firms, as well as the clients they represent, have changed considerably
over the years. Firms have become departmentalized to the extent that the
individual departments can be thought of as law firms within themselves.
64 Id. at 813 (footnotes omitted).
65 580 F.2d at 1318.
66 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976).
67 Id. at 708.
68 Id. at 710. The Seventh Circuit further held that when the attorney left the firm, the
inference that other firm members had been exposed to the confidential information was still
present, but that in such a case the inference becomes rebuttable. In this case, however, the
defendant failed to successfully rebut the presumption. Id. at 710-11.
69 Id. at 713.
70 See generally Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954); Note, Disqualification of Attorneys Representing Interests Adverse
to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917 (1955).
71 A leading case in this area, Laskey Bros. of W. Va. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d
824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956), involved a two-man firm.
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Partners are often separated by thousands of miles and have minimal contact
with each other.
The modern law firm has outgrown the traditional rule. To continue to
hold, as the Seventh Circuit did in Westinghouse, that "actual knowledge of one
or more lawyers in a firm is imputed to each member of that firm," 2 regardless of
the underlying circumstances, is neither practical nor justifiable. Realizing this,
recent decisions have departed from the traditional rule.7 No longer should
knowledge relating to every aspect of a firm's practice be imputed to every member of the firm. In an increasing number of cases involving the possibility of impropriety, courts have been scrutinizing the facts before applying the traditional
rules of imputed knowledge. In essence, the modem judge prefers to exercise
discretion rather than apply a rigid rule in such cases. Such action is to be applauded. By refusing to follow this trend, the Seventh Circuit imposed unrealistic
standards on many law firms under its jurisdiction.
V. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit's reversal of the district court's decision in Westinghouse
was correct. The court's finding that an attorney-client relationship did exist
between Kirkland and the oil companies was well reasoned. The oil companies
believed that such a relationship existed, and solely as a consequence of this
belief was the disputed confidential information disclosed. Kirkland itself may
have perceived the existence of some type of professional relationship between the
firm and the oil companies."4 Once such a relationship was shown, disqualification of Kirkland became a necessity because of the Canon 4 and 5 transgressions.
The Seventh Circuit's comments on the applicability of Canon 9, however,
were not as well-reasoned. The court's decision opens the door for frivolous disqualification motions based solely on the appearance of impropriety. By this
action, the fears so cogently stated in Woods have been advanced one step closer
to reality. Further, by reaffirming its outmoded imputation of knowledge
standard, the Seventh Circuit closed its eyes to changes taking place in the American legal system. Such changes pose challenges, but if these challenges are to be
effectively met, new rules and theories must be formulated. Clinging to outdated
solutions under the guise of striving for high ethical standards is not the answer
when conditions are such that the standards sought cannot be met. When next
called upon to decide like issues, the Seventh Circuit should meet the challenges
of the changing world head on and formulate rules which will be just to attorney
and client alike.
Anthony F. Kahn
72 580 F.2d at 1321.
73 See, e.g., Gas-A-Tron of Arizona v. Union Oil 'Co. of Cal., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.
1976); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1977);
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (S.D. N.Y. 1973),
aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
74 Confidentiality was certainly present in this relationship. If this were not the case,
why would Kirkland have accepted API as a client when the demands of confidentiality were
made by API? See note 11 supra. The demands of confidentiality made by API were solely
for the benefit and protection of its members.

